合约解释 第六章 语境.doc

第六章 外部解释合约订约时的背景/语境1 序言1.1 传统解释看来是双方接受的完整文书合约条文/文字的做法传统法院的做法去解释文书合约/文件是尽量给一个文字上（literal）的意思，这说的是它的一般性（ordinary），自然（natural），平易（plain），通用（popular sense）的解释。换一个说法解释合约只是在一份看来是双方接受的完整文书合约（典型的好例子就是双方签署了的一份合约）内的四个角之内（four corners of the contract）的条文/文字，除了在一些例外情况，不管有关双方订约时的背景、理解些什么或为什么去使用起争议的语言等。这传统解释合约的做法与可接收外来证据的例外情况在Lovell and Christmas Ltd v. Wall (1911) 104 LT 85的上诉庭先例中Cozens-Hardy MR大法官有说明如下：“If there is one principle more clearly established than another in English law it is surely this: it is for the court to construe a written document. It is irrelevant and improper to ask what the parties, prior to the execution of the instrument, intended or understood. What is the meaning of the language that they have used therein? That is the problem, and the only problem. In saying that, I do not mean to assert that no evidence can be admitted. Indeed, the contrary is clear. If a deed relates to Black Acre, you may have evidence to show what are the parcels. If a document is in a foreign language, you may have an interpreter. If it contains technical terms, an expert may explain them. If, according to the custom of a trade or the usage of the market, a word has acquired a secondary meaning, evidence may be given to prove it. A well-known instance is where in a particular trade 1000 rabbits meant 1200. But unless the case can be brought within some or one of these exceptions, it is the duty of the court, which is presumed to understand the English language, to construe the document according to the ordinary grammatical meaning of the words used therein, and without reference to anything which has previously passed between the parties to it.”。上述的说法可以说是与一个不懂法律人士的思维方式很不一样，后者会马上想到如果去解释一个合约的真正订约意图，最简单的办法就是把订约双方请来，要求他们作出解释。但这其实也不简单，因为他们有了争议就肯定会是南辕北辙地作出自己的解释，变了去接受这种主观的订约意图是只会令整个争议更加复杂与无所适从。这在G Dworkin, OdgersConstruction of Deeds and Statutes (5th edn, 1967) (Odgers)中有提及：“To a layman, the easiest way to answer this question might seem to be to call the parties before the court and ask them what they meant. In that case, the parties would not only usurp the function of the court, but would probably hold entirely different opinions as to what was meant by the words used.”。这一来，在这两种截然不同的思维方式中，孰优孰劣，可去探讨一下。不懂法律人士接受在争议中的订约双方提供合约解释的证据，有几方面的大问题。（一）是英国法律一直以来坚持是去客观看待合约中双方约定的文字去解释，去由订约双方提供证据就变了是有危险接受主观的解释了。（二）是这种证据免不了是对证人自己有利，加上可能解决争议与订约的时间相隔较长，真实性有多少很有怀疑，尤其是口头证据。（三）是双方在争议中提供两个不同的版本通常是不会对法官/仲裁员对合约的解释有真正的帮助，反而会带来混乱。（四）是双方在谈判中经常会改变立场，甚至在每一封来往的信函中讨价还价，这种改变只会到了最后订约的一刻或签署合约时才会“认命”，所以去看谈判过程往往也找不出双方的真正订约意图。上述的一些大问题Wilberforce勋爵在Prenn v. Simmonds (1971) W.L.R. 1381中有提到，说：“On principle, the matter is worth pursuing a little, because the present case illustrates very well the disadvantages and danger of departing from established doctrine and the virtue of the latter. There were prolonged negotiations between solicitors, with exchanges of draft clauses, ultimately emerging in clause 2 of the agreement. The reason for not admitting evidence of these exchanges is not a technical one, or even mainly one of convenience (though the attempt to admit it did greatly prolong the case and add to its expense). It is simply that such evidence is unhelpful. By the nature of things, where negotiations are difficult, the parties positions, with each passing letter, are changing and until the final agreement, though converging still divergent. It is only the final documents which records a consensus. If the previous documents use different expressions, how does construction as an expression, itself a doubtful process, help on the construction of the contractual words? If the same expressions are used, nothing is gained by looking back; indeed, something may be lost since the relevant surrounding circumstances may be different. And at this stage there is no consensus to the parties to appeal to. It may be said that previous documents may be looked to explain the aims of the parties. In a limited sense this is true: the commercial, or business object, of the transaction, objectively ascertained, may be a surrounding fact and if it can be shown that one interpretation completely frustrates that object, to the extent of rendering the contract futile, that may be a strong argument for an alternative interpretation, if that can reasonably be found. But beyond that it may be difficult to go: it may be a matter of degree, or of judgment, how far one interpretation, or another, gives effect to a common intention: parties, indeed may be pursuing that intention with differing emphasis and hoping to achieve to an represent a formula which means different things to each side, yet may be accepted because that is the only way to get agreement and in the hope that disputes will not arise. The only course can then be try to ascertain the natural meaning. Far more common, and indeed, totally dangerous is to admit evidence of one partys objectiveeven if this known to the other party.”。1.2 文字表达的不足之处但这一个传统解释合约做法受到批评，原因之一就是文字上的表达可以有好几个不同的解释，甚至也不能简单说它们之间有什么合理与不合理之分。 再去举一个简单的例子（虽然在其他章节已经给了不少例子例如在第五章第5段），以“consideration”一字为例，Webster字典就给了4个十分不同的解释。（一）是考虑（deliberation），（二）是尊重他人或为他人着想（respect for others, thoughtful regard），（三）是一个行动的原因（a motive for action, reason），（四）是报酬/支付（remuneration, payment）。可以说，在一些商业或与法律有关的文件中，只有第四个解释才比较适用，可视为是合约中的约因或对价。所以，转去看Oxford Law Dictionary，对“consideration”一字的解释就只有针对第四个解释，如：“Consideration may be a promise to do or forbear from doing something, or some loss or detriment suffered at the request of the promisor. It is normally a payment, transfer of goods, doing of services or surrender of another legal claim. It cannot be anything which the promisee is already under an obligation to do. It must be of some value, but not necessarily value equivalent or adequate to the promise.”。这表示了去解释合约文字，除了看字典的一般性与传统解释（conventional meaning），还要去看看合约的本质（context）才能作出准确的解释。另要去看是双方在订约时的背景（background）才能更加准确地掌握双方所用文字是应该代表什么解释，也就是该文字的语境（factual matrix）。这些背景往往就是在双方的谈判过程中，其中会显示了双方对合约的某一条文/文字的共同理解，等。而这样做重要的地方倒不是合理与否的问题，而是这才代表了双方订约时用某一些文字的真正意图。1.3 目前解释看来是双方接受的完整文书合约条文/文字要考虑的三个方面所以现在有关解释合约条文/文字的法律地位应该是要考虑三个方面。（一）是合约本身，包括其他所有的条文以作出全面、完整与协调的解释；（二）是合约的本质，例如是涉及保险、货物买卖、航运或建筑的本质；（三）是订约时的背景/语境。只去在无数先例中（部分已经在本书其他章节有介绍）先举一个去显示根据合约本质或语境作出的解释，它是The “Zeus V” (1999) 1 Lloyds Rep. 703先例，其中保单的保证是一个对受保游艇的检验（survey）的先决条件。但明示条文并没有去详尽说明这检验是要包括些什么。本来，“检验”只是非常一般性与通用的一字，对游艇随便看看可以是一个检验，对游艇全面去在干坞检查花上好几天时间也可以是一个检验，所以在该先例是应该给这个文字什么解释呢？对要求赔付的游艇船东，他当然是希望检验的解释是尽量宽松，因为他的确是进行了一个简单的检验说是满意，而且这检验也不包括要把检验的结果在风险产生前去交出给保险商。但不想赔付的保险商自然是希望“检验”一字有一个严格的解释，包括像针对适航，乘客的安全，船舶要进干坞（表示对船底也要检验），要打开主机，进行海上试航（sea trial），船舶重心测验，等。同时这个检验不可以有不同的检验师去进行与任何不妥之处全部要修复，等等。在这些对“检验”一字有好几个不同的解释，Colman大法官就是根据订约时的语境（factual matrix）与保险合约的本质（context）判这检验是通常投保这种风险的保险商所需要的范围，这也要靠专家证人的意见证据了。而判决的结果是认为该简单检验不足去满足一个合理的保险商要求，所以不必作出赔付。Colman大法官是这样判：“ a condition survey should have been satisfactory in the sense that it gave rise to no defects or recommendations in respect of seaworthiness or passenger safety; and whereas it was not a precondition of the continuance of the cover that underwriters would be provided with a report and that they should approve it, nevertheless the assured would have to provide such report for the purpose of evidencing compliance with the subject condition;The subject condition was not to be construed as necessarily imposing on the assured a requirement that there should be an out of the water survey or the opening up of machinery or sea trials or stability tests after completion of the refit and before the commencement of the in commission period; the nature of the survey required, on the proper construction of the condition was one which was to be no more stringent than in all the circumstances would reasonably be necessary to satisfy the underwriters of the vessels seaworthiness and safety; only if it were inadequate for this purpose would the underwriter be entitled to treat themselves as off risk once the period of commission had started;The subject condition required any condition survey and valuation to be entirely conducted and the results recorded by the same independent qualified surveyor and not partly by an anonymous governmental surveyor in respect of some aspects of the vessel and partly by another surveyor engaged by the assured in respect of other aspects of the vessel; the fact that the SVL report referred to what was stated to be the results of the MMM inspections ashore and afloat did not amount to a survey report in respect of those results; the survey conducted by SVL was insufficiently comprehensive to satisfy the reasonable requirement of an underwriter for the purpose of the subject condition; it followed that the condition was not complied with and the underwriters were not at risk at the time of the loss;”。再举一个通俗一点的例子让读者更容易明白，中国人简单的一句话“要你好看”如果当时的环境是在吵架，显然就有威胁与敌意的味道。但如果当时的环境是一位化妆师与她的顾客讲了同一句话，这就完全是不同味道了。所以，在最近的30年，英国法律有了许多重要案例去强调在解释合约必须先去考虑订约时的背景（background）才能理解文字或条文的本质，这背景可被称为“语境”（factual matrix）。虽然早在River Wear Commissioners v. Adamson (1877) 2 App Cas 743, HL中Blackburn勋爵就已经提到这一方面说：“But, from the imperfection of language, it is impossible to know what that intention is without inquiring farther, and seeing what the circumstances were with reference to which the words were used, and what was the object, appearing from those circumstances, which the person using them had in view, for the meaning of words varies according to the circumstances with respect to which they were used.”。但以前的传统解释合约做法，即基本上避免去考虑语境，也不去接受一些需要去证明语境的文书合约以外的外来证据（extrinsic evidence），有很大不同。“语境”也发展到以往是遇上合约中有含糊（ambiguity）或不肯定（uncertainty）之处才去考虑至目前是即使合约中清楚明确的表达也会考虑语境。目前的地位可节录上诉庭在Static Control Components (Europe) Ltd v. Egan (2004) 2 Lloyds Rep. 429所说的：“ in principle, all contracts had to be construed in the light of their factual background, that background being ascertained on an objective basis; accordingly, the fact that a document appeared to have a clear meaning on its face did not prevent, or indeed excuse the Court from looking at the background; the judge had been correct to look at the background to the signing of the guarantee.”。这些变化可从Hoffmann勋爵在Investors Compensation Scheme c. West Bromwich Building Society (1998) 1 W.L.R. 896所说要求把以前解释合约的大部分“思维包袱”（intellectual baggage）去丢掉，可见到这个变化。看来，应该是有了定论就是有新的取向，这定论就是在贵族院的Investor Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society，其中只去节录Hoffmann勋爵所说的如下：“The meaning which a document (or any other utterance) would convey to a reasonable man is not the same thing as the meaning of its words. The meaning of words is a matter of dictionaries and grammars; the meaning of the document is what the parties using those words against the relevant background would reasonably have been understood to mean. ”。（一份文件或者任何讲的话会对一个合理人士带来的意思与内中的文字的意思不一样。文字的意思是由字典与语法得来，但一份文件的意思是订约方根据当时的背景所采用的文字，并会去合理了解它的意思。）。但这个变化也不代表“语境”这一个说法以前并不存在与现在被全盘接受。 时至今日，没有被全盘接受是因为去考虑语境的确是会带来各种问题，例如仍是存在的所谓谈判除外规则（negotiation exclusion rule或prior negotiation rule），这在本书第三章13.1段与本章2.5.1段有介绍。也有质疑是这个变化到底是否有重大的改变，或只是强调方面有不同侧重，或是以前是先看文书合约的文字而现在是先看背景再看文书合约的文字。这里可节录Evans大法官在The BOC Group v. Centeon (Unreported April 29, 1999)中所说的：“The old intellectual baggage has been discarded but the courts are not traveling light. The cabin trunks have been replaced by airline suitcases; the contents are much the same, though they are expressed in more modern language.”。以下段节去详细针对这一方面的问题。2 口头证据规则（parol evidence rule）要去进一步探讨语境，先要介绍解释合约条文/文字可以接受一些什么证据的问题，这包括了口头证据。口头证据是指一些在订约前双方谈判的记录与过程，不论是口头或是文件。这包括了合约的草稿：Miller v. Travers (1832) 8 Bing. 244; Ingris v. Buttery (1878) 3 App. Cas. 552; National Bank of Australasia v Falkingham & Sons (1902) A.C.585，初步协议：Leggott v. Barrett (1880) 15 Ch.D. 306; Youell v. Bland Welch & Co Ltd (1992) 2 Lloyds Rep. 127与谈判来往信函：Mercantile Bank of Sydney v. Taylor (1893) A.C. 317。2.1 什么是口头证据口头证据规则可去分作三个方面。（一）是不接受一些次要的证据，也就是今天已经不存在的最佳证据规则（Masquerade Music Ltd v. Springsteen 2001 E.W.C.A. Civ 513; 2001 C.P.L.R. 369; 2001 E.M.L.R. 25）。对一个已经是签署的合约，这是双方订约意图最佳的证据，去以一些以前谈判的次要口头证据去帮助解释合约条文/文字就是违反最佳证据规则。（二）是不容许提供文书合约以外的证据为了去改变、推翻或增加该文件的条文/文字。（三）是一直以来法官通常只是局限在文书合约的四个角内去作出解释，不能接受与考虑有关背景的外来证据。2.2 不接受口头证据/合约以外的外来证据的原因照说，英国法律把解释文书合约条文/文字视为是法律问题，就应该不存在证据的问题：Carmichael v. National Power plc (1999) 1 W.L.R. 2042, HL；The “Nema” (1982) A.C. 724，这也是传统去解释合约的做法，就是只客观去看合约本身书面的内容。 至于其他的证据（材料），特别是订约前的一些谈判或背景，或是订约后双方的履行，被视为是外来证据（extrinsic evidence），尽量要去拒绝接受，即使它们会对解释合约条文/文字有一定帮助（或混乱）。这方面权威的说法是早在1897年，Morris勋爵在Bank of Australasia v. Palmer (1897) A.C. 540中所说：“Parol testimony cannot be received to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the terms of a written contract, or the terms in which the parties have deliberately agreed to record any part of their contract.”。另在Jacobs v. Batavia & General Plantation Trust (1924) 1 Ch 287也有同样说法：“firmly established rule of law that parol evidence cannot be admitted to add to, vary or contradict a deed or other written instrument.”。显然，去排除口头证据只适用在一种情况，就是能够去假设双方已经把他们之间所有的约定记录在一份文书的合约内，它通常就是一份签署了的合约。它的合理性是为了尊重双方已经开了眼睛去记录在案的合约，进而去避免一些不方便与麻烦的争议（great inconvenience and troublesome litigation in many instances）：Mercantile Agency Co Ltd v. Flitwick Chalybeate Co (1897) 14 T.L.R. 90。它也有其他的一些好处，例如可去让订约方的律师或者法律顾问安心的根据记录在案的文书合约给出法律意见而不必要去把谈判过程从头到尾去取证才敢讲话。除了律师外，更重要的是一份文书合约会被很多其他第三者去依赖，比如是银行根据一份签署的合约去给与贷款或作出担保。2.3 例外情况下可接受口头证据/外来证据但显然上述的假设在许多情况是站不住脚，所以去排除口头证据已经很早就有了许多的例外。例如，只要是能够证明一份文书合约并非是双方所有的约定， 而只是部分内容。例如双方的约定是一部分记录在文书，另一部分是在口头：这方面请看第二章12段。Russell勋爵在Gillespie Bros. & Co v. Cheney, Eggar & Co (1896) 2 Q.B. 59说：“although when the parties arrive at a definite written contract the implication or presumption is very strong that such contract is intended to contain all the terms of their bargain, it is a presumption only, and it is open to either of the parties to allege that there was, in addition to what appears in the written agreement, an antecedent express stipulation not intended by the parties to be excluded, but intended to continue in force with the express written agreement.”。附带保证/协议（collateral warranty/contract）的说法也是属于这一类别，它通常是订约一方为了吸引另一方同意而去作出的一些承诺，但该承诺并不记录在文书合约内，法律就会把该合约外的承诺视为是一个附带协议，正如Denning勋爵在Dick Bentley Productions Ltd v. Harold Smith (Motors) Ltd (1965) 1 W.L.R. 623中对附带协议有解释如下：“ it seems to me that if a representation is made in the course of dealing for a contract for the very purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it, and actually inducing him to act upon it, by entering into the contract, that is prima facie ground for inferring that it was intended as a warranty. It is not necessary to speak of it being collateral. Suffice it to say it was intended to be acted upon and was in fact acted on.”。另一种例外情况是在合约的有效性受到争议，例如显示的文书合约被指称有错误或违反立法，这可去节录Chitty on Contracts第29版之12-106段：“No Contract. Extrinsic evidence is admissible to show that what appears to be a valid and binding contract is in fact no contract at all. Thus evidence may be admitted to show that one or both parties contracted under a mistake, or that a person who signed the document was under a misapprehension as to the real nature of the transaction into which he had entered so that it was not his deed in law. Also it may be shown that the writing was not intended by the parties to give rise to contractual obligations or that the contract is void for non-compliance with a statute.”。这种例外的情况可以伸延去其他方面，例如是合约的有效性受到其他方面的争议，例如是非法（illegality）、误述（misrepresentation），等。变了在这种争议，就非要去看口头证据了。去概括的说，在Chitty on Contracts一书第29版中12-096段至12-112段就罗列出了15种例外情况可去接受口头或外来证据。另在Gerard McMeel教授的The Construction of ContractsInterpretation, Implication and Rectification一书中列举了10种例外情况如下：2.3.1 例外一：文件非是被订约双方意图当作完整的合约（document not intended to be whole contract）已经是说过，一份文件例如是一份已签署的合约会被假设是双方意图当作完整合约的记录。但这只是假设，可以被推翻，例如是已经介绍过的法院接受部分书面部分口头合约，或是附带协议的情况。 明确是被当作完整的合约看来只有一种情况，就是文件中有一条非常广泛的“完整合约条文”（entire agreement clause）。有了这一个条文，就会在绝大部分的情况下排除口头证据， 只能以该合约的条文/文字为准。2.3.2 例外二：附带保证/协议（collateral warranties or contracts）已经简单介绍过，附带保证/协议通常是订约谈判时一方为了吸引对方而作出了一些承诺或陈述，例如在买卖合约中卖方去“卖花赞花香”，但这些承诺或陈述并没有记录在文书的合约内。如果由于疏忽导致这些陈述不正确，在1967年误述法生效前，由于普通法只把误述区分为两种，一种是欺诈性误述（fraudulent misrepresentation），另一种是无辜性误述（innocent misrepresentation），这导致了疏忽的误述（negligent misrepresentation）除非它的严重性能够提升到欺诈性误述，就往往令受害方没有索赔损失的救济。这一来，法院为了公正，就经常去把这种疏忽的误述当作是另一个合约或保证，可名为“附带保证/协议”。显然要去证明有这个合约或保证的存在，是在文书合约以外，就要去看双方谈判的口头证据了。举一个例子是City of Westminster Properties Ltd v. Mudd (1959) Ch 129, Ch D，案情是一个店铺的租约，订约谈判时房东知道租户是要租用该店铺同时用作一个古董店与居所，但租约是明示不准店铺用作住宅。在续约的签署前，房东代理口头告诉租户不会反对他继续居住。后来房东反悔，但法院认为房东是受到他在签约前这个承诺的约束。另一个例子就是Esso v. Mardon (1976) 2 Lloyds Rep. 305，案情是有关Esso石油公司建造了一个加油站，并去出租给一位Mardon先生，在谈判的时候，Esso的一位当地经理告诉Mardon先生说估计该加油站能够一年出售20万加仑汽油。但后来的销量与这个数字差得很远，因为当地的规划部不批准Esso让加油站直接面对大街，而需要去从边道才能进出。但Esso去把加油站出租给Mardon先生的时候并没有去把原先的20万加仑汽油销售量去往下作出调整。结果是一审法院判是没有这个附带保证/协议，但这被上诉庭推翻，Denning勋爵说：“ there was a breach of a collateral warranty that the forecast as to the throughput had been made with reasonable care and skill and was sound.”。要去证明一个附带保证/协议，并非是容易。 因为许多在谈判中作出的所谓保证并非是保证或承诺，而只是像卖花赞花香一样的吹嘘或给一些主观的意见（opinion）。早在Heihut Symons v. Buckleton (1913) A.C. 30, HL，Moulton勋爵就对附带保证/协议的成立有指引如下：“It is evident, both on principle and on authority, that there may be a contract the consideration for which is the making of some other contract. If you will make such and such a contract I will give you one hundred pounds, is in every sense of the word a complete legal contract, but each has an independent existence, and they do not differ in respect of their possessing to the full the character and status of a contract. But such collateral contract must from their very nature be rare Such collateral contract, the sole effect of which is to vary or to add to the terms of the principle contract, are therefore viewed with suspicion by the law. They must be proved strictly. Not only the terms of such contracts but the existence of an animus contrahendi on the part of all the parties to them must clearly be shewn. Any laxity on these points would enable parties to escape from the full perfo