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课程论文A Brief analysis of the Influence of Trumps Election 学 院 荆楚理工学院专 业 英 语 年级班别 2013 级 3班 学 号 2013410010301 学生姓名 徐 明 建 教 师 黄 音 频 中 国 荆门 2016 年11月20日A Brief analysis of the Influence of Trumps ElectionDonald Trump has won the presidency, despite losing the popular vote. The US has, as a result, chosen as its next president a man whose inexperience, character, temperament and knowledge appear to make him unsuited for this high office.I. The consequences of a Trump presidency will be many and various. The consequences of a Trump presidency will be many and various. But the economic ones will not be the least important.His administration might even reverse globalization , destabilize the financial system, weaken US public finances and threaten trust in the dollar.US-led globalization is already fragile. Mr Trump seems likely to push it into its coffin. After his victory, the Trans-Pacific Partnership looks dead. That might leave an opening for a Beijing-led alternative: the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. But TPP might be replaced by nothing. The proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership was moribund and is now dead.Mr Trump has also suggested repeal or renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement. Above all, he has suggested imposition of high tariffs, especially on imports from China and Mexico, to discourage companies from laying off their workers in order to relocate in other countries and ship their products back to the US tax-free. They would almost certainly be contrary to World Trade Organization rules. They would also create a risk of retaliation. The costs to the US, world trade and the credibility of the trading system might prove very high. A second area of concern is financial regulation. Mr Trump has supported repeal of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, the regulatory response to the financial crisis. Many financial businesses hate it. Yet the question is whether it would be replaced by a more effective alternative or by a return to the pre-crisis free-for-all. If the latter, the chances of another, possibly bigger, crisis would surely be enhanced.Yet on financial regulation, unlike on trade, Mr Trumps populism might protect the US from the worst deregulatory instincts of congressional Republicans rather than the reverse. Mr Trump also wants a big surge of spending on infrastructure and tax cuts.The former would be desirable, particularly if the projects were sensible. Indeed, it would be deeply ironic if Mr Trump carried out, with Republican support in Congress, precisely the sort of Keynesian fiscal stimulus congressional Republicans adamantly opposed when reasonably suggested by the administration of Barack Obama in 2009. Unfortunately, the timing would be far worse since the US economy of today is vastly closer to full employment than it was back then.The tax proposals would shower huge benefits on already rich Americans such as Mr Trump.According to the Tax Policy Center, his latest plan would raise the after-tax income of those in the middle fifth of the income distribution by $1,010 or 1.8 per cent. But the top 0.1 of the population would enjoy an average tax cut of nearly $1.1m, or more than 14 per cent of after-tax income.The cumulative increase in federal debt might be as much as 25 per cent of gross domestic product by 2026. Congressional Republicans might wish to offset the latter, at least partially, by slashing spending, including on social security and health. But Mr Trump opposes this. Together, then, Mr Trumps populism and the Republicans tax-cutting mania might open up large and permanent increases in fiscal deficits. This would then pose a big challenge for the US Federal Reserve.The obvious response would be to tighten monetary policy. Mr Trump has indicated he favors this.But he has also suggested the economy should grow at close to 4 per cent a year. That seems impossible given the slow growth of the labor force.Yet when choosing a replacement for Janet Yellen, Fed chair, by 2018, Mr Trump might look for someone who would run monetary policy on the assumption that such growth was feasible.The result would be the classic populist blend of ultra-loose fiscal and monetary policies.The effects are likely to be rising inflation, higher long-term nominal interest rates and a weak dollar.That might mark a transformation in the global monetary regime.It could even generate the sort of environment seen in the 1970s, when President Richard Nixon and Arthur Burns, Fed chairman, were in charge.What actually happens depends both on whether Mr Trump does as president what he stated as candidate, and on his interaction with Congress.Some suggest that wiser heads will contain his excesses.Little in his past behavior suggests this is all that plausible.Make no mistake: Mr Trumps triumph might destabilize the US and world economies.II. Trump was elected to the influence of ChinaFor many Chinese, theUSelections were being depicted as a test of the virtues of the American model of democracy.The process became an easy target for Beijings propagandists to illustrate what they see as a flawed political system, with its internal divisions and a costly, time-consuming election that yielded two candidates both judged untrustworthy by the majority of American voters.But as unexpected as the outcome was for the Chinese, there is an old saying: Be careful what you wish for.Donald Trumps victory may have pleased those Hillary Clinton regrettably referred to during the campaign as the basket of deplorable but what Beijing really wanted was more nuanced.The Chinese public was evenly split between Mrs Clinton and Mr Trump in pre-election surveys but their counterparts in other east Asian countries overwhelmingly favored Mrs Clinton.For China, Mrs Clinton was a known product but seen as personally antagonistic towards the country; Mr Trump was an unknown product but as a businessman was judged, rightly or wrongly, less likely to get involved in Chinas internal or external affairs. For officials dealing with theUS, the choice depended on whether one viewed the relationship through an economic or a geostrategic prism. For three decades, Beijings primary concern was sustaining rapid and stable economic growth and the avoidance of external conflict.This was facilitated byAmericas open trade and investment policies and the comfort blanket given by a military presence that moderated tensions and deterred regional conflicts.This clearly benefitedChina.The factors that shaped this environment, however, have changed over the past decade.Chinas rise as an economic power has led to more assertive policies to establish what Beijing calls a new kind of great power relations that has altered its geostrategic objectives.For the leadership, the choices are now more complex. Despite the characteristically ambiguous official statements, those at the helm of the party-state had strong views about both candidates. Mrs Clintons perceived predictability and pragmatism were viewed in the context of her seemingly aggressive views on ideological issues such as democracy and human rights as well as her support for a strongUSrole in providing the security architecture underpinning the pivot back to Asia.This assertiveness, coupled with her record of criticizing Chinaas first lady, senator and then secretary of state, led Beijing to view a Clinton presidency as a credible threat to Chinese interests. Mr Trumps candidacy was more complicated. His public statements on trade and investment relations with Beijing were even harsher than Mrs Clintons and featured more centrally in his election platform. He had consistently placed much of the blame forAmericas economic malaise squarely onChinas shoulders.And his threat to impose a 45 per cent tariff on imported Chinese goods inspiredChinas finance minister publicly to call Mr Trump an irrational type. Thus, many of Beijings economic authorities were in favor of Mrs Clinton rather than the Republican to continue the dialogue with the Obama administration on trade and investment issues. However, Beijing is used to the ritual ofUSpresidential candidates competing to show who can be tougher onChina, yet after the elections taking a more conciliatory approach so who won would probably not matter.What will happen with theUSChinadialogue on trade and foreign investment issues is uncertain.The Trans-Pacific Partnership, which was being sold tactically by the Obama administration as a means to stop China from setting the trade agenda, would ironically seem less likely to be ratified now given Mr Trumps views on trade.He may find the Bilateral Investment Treaty under negotiation a more attractive vehicle to engage Beijing given his claims thatChinasinvestment regime has not been fair to American companies.The reality is that liberalization would be in the interests of both sides.ForChinas top leadership, however, what matters more are the geostrategic implications.Some see a Trump victory as a chance to realign the regional balance of power in favor ofChina.The latters perceived aggressiveness inEast Asia has elevated the potential for maritime conflicts stemming from the island disputes; a US president-elect who reportedly considers most of his countrys allies as free riders who do nothing to contribute to US national security may mean an America less inclined to intervene in regional affairs.If so, key players such asJapanandSouth Koreamay decide to go their own way in developing a nuclear capability.And the Asian nations might seek to accommodateChinasregional interests even more than the recent visits to Beijing of the heads of state of thePhilippinesandMalaysiahave signaled.While all this could mean a geopolitical opening forChinato increase its presence in the region, it could also lead to a downward spiral of protectionist economic policies and a rearming of protagonists in which there are no winners.Only history will reveal whether Beijing got what it wished for.III. Trump was elected to bring more turmoil for China 中央党校国际战略研究院副教授梁亚滨表示，由于特朗普之前从未有任何施政经验，也没有任何担任公职的经历，所以无法根据其过往的政治表现来推测其未来政策走向，只能根据其个人言论，哪怕是自相矛盾和反复无常的个人言论，来推测其未来政策倾向，同时结合美国政治制度包括三权分立的制衡和官僚制度的限制来加以调整。尽管此次竞选过程中，特朗普直接涉及中国的言论并不多，但综合他的其他言论，我们依然能够大概勾画出其对华政策走向的轮廓。The Central Party School associate professor at the International Institute for Strategic Studies said Liang Yabin, because Trump had never before had any policy experience, do not have any experience in office, so I can not according to their past political performance to speculate the future policy direction, only according to his own words, even contradictory and play fast and loose personal statement, to speculate the future policy at the same time, combined with the tendency of American political system, including the balance of the separation of the three powers and bureaucratic restrictions to adjust. Despite the campaign, Trump directly involved in Chinas speech is not much, but the integration of his other remarks, we are still able to outline the contours of its policy toward china. 在地缘政治和军事安全上，特朗普政府很可能会出现一定程度上的政策混乱。一方面，特朗普认为美军国防开支占经济总量的比例处于二战以来的最低水平，希望加大军事方面的投入来重塑美国的军事力量和领导地位。特朗普给中国在南海的活动贴上军事化的标签，并猛烈批评美国政府的不作为。他认为中国在南海岛礁修建军用机场，达到了令人恐惧的地步，对美国的威胁超过伊斯兰国。特朗普还批评奥巴马政府在朝鲜、伊朗核问题上的无能为力。在中东，他对目前美国打击伊斯兰国中的表现非常不满，并表现出对无限制使用武力的偏执，包括轰炸输油管道、部署多达3万人的作战部队、变更禁止军方使用酷刑的国际法规，甚至还提出要杀死恐怖分子的家人以达到杀一儆百的效果。因此，相对于希拉里注重软实力与硬实力相结合的“巧实力”亚洲战略，特朗普更加偏好硬实力和不可预测。至少根据目前言论，他很有可能成为一个比希拉里更加坚定的“亚太再平衡者”，在亚洲部署大量美国军事力量，实施更加积极的干预主义政策。In the geopolitical and military security, the Trump administration is likely to appear to a certain extent, the policy of chaos. On the one hand, Trump believes that the U.S. defense spending in the proportion of the total economic output in the lowest level since World War II, hopes to increase military investment to reshape the U.S. military forces and leadership positions. Trump to China in the South China Sea activities labeled with the military, and a fierce criticism of the U.S. governments inaction. He believes that the construction of China Military airports in the South China Sea reefs, reached a point of fear, a threat to the United States over the Islamic state. Trump also criticized the Obama government in North Korea, Irans nuclear issue can not do. In the Middle East, the United States to combat the Islamic country he is very dissatisfied with the performance, and show no restrictions on the use of force of paranoia, include the bombing of oil pipelines, the deployment of as many as 30 thousand combat troops, prohibited the use of torture to change the military international regulations, and even to kill terrorists in order to achieve the effect of family shayijingbai is also proposed. Therefore, with respect to Hilarys emphasis on the combination of soft power and hard power of the smart power of Asia strategy, Trump more preference for hard power and unpredictable. At least according to the current speech, he is likely to become a more determined than Hilary, the Asia Pacific rebalancing, the deployment of a large number of U.S. military forces in Asia, the implementation of more aggressive intervention policy. 但另一方面，特朗普也表现出一定程度的孤立主义倾向，试图从全球范围内实施战略收缩，例如试图与俄罗斯实现某种和解和在打击伊斯兰国方面的合作，要求日韩等盟国分担美国实施安全保证的费用。从这个角度来看，他将中国视作军事威胁的言论很可能只是竞选言论。这种战略收缩无疑将扩大中国在亚太地区的影响力，但也很可能会导致原来受到压制的地区不稳定因素凸显，造成地区安全秩序失衡，带来更多的冲突和动荡。特朗普曾说会与金正恩进行直接对话，威胁韩国要撤回驻韩美军。解禁集体自卫权的日本也会加快向“正常国家”的转变。在这种情况下，地区权力格局将发生剧烈的变动，既是机遇也是挑战。这对中国的实力运用和外交智慧都提出了非常高的要求。如果应对有力，东亚地区将成为中国稳定的权力辐射区，彻底清除冷战的余毒。如果应对不力，该地区将被失衡的权力格局进一步撕裂，成为地缘政治上的破碎地带，变成不断给中国带来安全挑战的麻烦之源。But on the other hand, Trump also showed a certain degree of isolationism, attempts from the global implementation of the strategic contraction, such as trying to achieve a reconciliation with Russia in the fight against the Islamic state and the cooperation requirements of Japan and South Korea and other allies shared the United States to implement securi