国际贸易学综合考试试题(doc 25页).doc

2004年国际贸易学综合试题一.判断（每题1分，共5分）1、在均衡的国民收入水平上，非计划存货投资必须等于零，且计划投资与实际投资必须相等。（ ）2、当政府对某一行业的产品实施最低限价政策时，通常会导致该行业单位供给减少，市场需求增加。（ ）3、根据国际商会2000年通则的规定，如果买方想采取铁路运输，愿意办理进出口清关手续并承担其中的费用，买方可以采用FCA贸易术语。（ ）4、根据国际惯例，保兑行审核单据无误而付款后，若开证行倒闭或无理拒付，则保兑行有权向受益人索要货款。（ ）5、2002年8月国际货币基金组织有关数据表明，中国是2001年黄金储备增长最多的国家。（ ）二.单项选择 （每题1分，共5分）1、垄断厂商面对两个相互独立、需求弹性不同的市场时，为获取最大利润，厂商应该实?br / （ ）。A、同一价格 B、一级价格歧视 C、二级价格歧视D、三级价格歧视2、厂商对要素的需求取决于（）。A、要素的边际生产力 B、产品的价格 C、要素的平均产量D、要素的供给量3、一切险与水渍险各项保险责任的不同之处在于（ ）的赔偿。A、自然灾害所造成的单独海损B、意外事故所造成的全部或部分损失C、一般外来原因所造成的损失D、特殊外来原因所造成的损失4、下列哪一项属于国际收支的长期性不平衡：（ ）。A、结构性不平衡B、收入性不平衡 C、周期性不平衡D、货币性不平衡5、下列属于三级储备资产的有（ ）。A、活期存款 B、短期存款C、黄金储备; D、普通提款权三、多项选择（每题2分，共10分）1、对于生产函数Qf（L，K）和成本方程Cw*L+r*K来说，在最优的生产要素组合点上应该有（ ）。A、等产量曲线和等成本线相切B、MRTS(lk)=w/rC、MRTS(lk)=-K/L=MP(K)/MP(L)D、MP(L)/w=MP(K)/r2、按UCP500规定，除非另有约定，卖方不得提交（ ）。A、舱面提单 B、已装船提单 C、清洁提单D、不清洁提单 E、指示提单3、一项合同成立的有效条件包括（ ）。A、当事人必须具有签订合同的行为能力 B、合同必须有对价或约因C、合同的内容必须合法 D、合同必须符合法律规定的形式E、合同当事人的意思必须真实4、在下列IMF贷款类型中，属于普通贷款的是（ ）。A、缓冲库存贷款 B、中期贷款C、信托基金贷款 D、补充贷款5、下列能在合同有效期任何一天交割的有（ ）。A、欧式期权 B、美式期权C、择期 D、远期合同四、名词解释（每题4分，共16分）1、经济增长的黄金分割率2、纳什均衡3、一价定律4、寄售五、简述（每题10分，共30分）1、新凯恩思主义是如何结实价格和工资粘性的？由此提出的经济稳定政策是什么？2、简述产业内贸易说的核心内容3、特里芬两难为何构成布雷顿森林体系的致命缺陷？六、论述与分析题（第1、2题每题10分，第3题14分，共34分）1、美国对包括钢铁、汽车及纺织品在内的许多产品实行配额。经济学家们估算通过拍卖配额权，美国财政部门每年至少获得100亿美元的收入，假定美国的服装市场在无贸易的条件下，国内的服装均衡价格为8美元/1单位，交易数量为200单位。而服装的世界市场价格为4美元/1单位，美国在自由贸易条件下，美国的服装价格降至4美元，国内生产者只供给100单位，需进口200单位才能满足国内的需求。现假定美国政府的服装配额为100单位，并将配额按一年的进口量分配给各进口国，请图示美国的服装配额进行分析：（1）美国的服装交易量和价格是多少？（2）配额导致的效率损失是多少？（3）拍卖配额权会带来什么影响？2、我某进出口公司于5月15日向外商A发盘并限其18日复到我方。A于16日上午10时向当地邮局交发关于接受我方发盘的电报。但由于当地邮局工人罢工，该电报在传递途中延误到22日才送达我方。我公司认为对方答复逾期，未予置理，并将货物以较高价格售予外商B。5月25日，A来电称：信用证已经开出，要求我方尽早出运货物。我方立即复电A，声明接受到达过晚，双方并不存在合同关系。因此，双方发生争执。试根据联合国国际货物销售合同公约的有关规定，分析双方孰是孰非？并说明理由。3、试析战略性外购（strategic outsourcing）的合理性。 七、专业英语（每题25分，共50分）1、The Taylor Rule: Could a Robot Replace Alan Greenspan? Macroeconomist John Taylor of Stanford University Calls for a New Monetary Rule That Would Institutionalize Appropriate Fed Policy Responses to Changes in Real Output and Inflation.In our discussion of rules versus discretion, “rules” were associated with a passive monetary policy-one in which the monetary rule required that the Fedexpand the money supplyai a fixed annual rate regardless of the state of the economy.“Discretion”on the other hand, was associated with an active monetarypolicy in which the Fed changed the interest rate in response to actual or anticipated changes in the economy.Economist John Taylor has put a new twist on the rule-versus-discretion debate by suggesting a hybrid policy rule that dictates the precise active monetary actions the Fed should take when changes in the economy occur.This so-calledTaylor rule combines traditional monetarism, with its emphasis on a monetary rule, and the more mainstream view that active monetary policy is a useful toolfor taming inflation and limiting recession. Unlike the Friedman monetary rule,the Taylor rule holds, for example, that monetary policy should respond to changes in both real GDP and inflation, not simply inflation. The key adjustmentis the interest rate, not the money supply.The Taylor rule has three parts: If real GDP rises 1 percent above potential GDP, the Fed should raise the Federal Funds rate(the interbank rate of overnight loans),relative to the current inflation rate, by .5 percent. If inflation rises by 1 percent above its target of 2 percent, then the Fed should raise the Federal funds rate by .5 percent relative to the inflation rate. When the real GDP is equal to potential GDP and inflation is equal to its target rate of 2 percent, the Federal funds rate remain at about 4 percent, which would imply a real interest rate of 2 percent.Taylor has neither suggested nor implied that a robot, programmed with the Taylor rule, should replace Alan Greenspan,chairman of the Federal Reserve System.The Feds discretion to override the rule(or “contingency plan for policy”)would be retained,but the Fed would renove the “mystery”associated with monetary policy and increase he Feds accountability.Also,says Taylor, ifused consistently, the rule would enable market participants to predice Fed behavior, and this would increase Fed credibility and reduce uncertainty.Critics of the Taylor rule admit it is more in tune with countercyclical Fedpolicy than with Friedmans simple monetary rule. But they bo reason to limitthe Feds discretion in adjusting interest rates as it sees fit to achievestabilization and growth.Monetary policy may be more art than science. The critics also point our that the Fed has done a remarkable job of promoting price stability, full employment, and economic growth over the past decade.In view of this succes, they ask,“Why saddle the Fed with a highly mechanicalmonetary rule?” 2、Petition of the Candlemakers, 1845 French Economist Fredric Bastiat(1801-1850) Devastated the Proponents of Prorectionism by Satircally Extending their Reasoning to Its Logical and Abusurd Conclusions.Petitogogo,Candlesticks,Street Lamps,Snuffers,Extinguishers,and of the Prodecers of Oil Tallow,Rosin,Alcohol,and,Generally,of Everything Connected with Lighting.TO MESSIEURS THE MEMBERS OF THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIESGentlemen-You are on the right road.You rreject abstract theories,and have little consideration for cheapness and plenty,You chief care is the interest of producer.You desire to emancipate him from external conpetition, and reserve thenational market for national industry.We are abour to offer you an admirable opportunity of applying your-what shallwe call it?No;nothing is more deceptive than theory;your doctrine?your system?your principle?but you dislike doctrines,you abhor systems,and as principles,youdeny that there are any in social economy:we shall say,then,your practice,yourpractice without theory and wothour principle.We are suffering from the intolerable competition of a foreign ribal,palced,it would seem,in a condition so far superior to ours for the prodection fo light,that the absolutely inundates our national market with it at a price fabulouslyreduced.The moment he shows himself,our trade leaves us-all consumer apply tohim;and a branch of native industry,having countless ramifications,is all at once rendered completely stagnant.This rival.is no other than the Sun.What we pray for is,that is mat please you to pass a law ordering the shuttlingup all of windows,skylights,dormer windows,outside and inside shutters,curtains,blinds,bulls-eyes;in a word,of all openings,holes,chinks,clefts,and fissures,byor thought which the light of the sun has been in ues to enter houses,to the prejudice of the meritorious magogo we have accommodated our country,-a country which,in gratitude,ought not to abandon us now to a strife so unequal.If more tallow is consumed,then there must be more oxen and sheep;and consequently,we shall be hold the multiplication of artificial meadows,meat,wool,hides,and,above all,manure,which is the basis and foundation of all agricultural wealth.The same remark applies to navigation.Thousand of vessels will proceed to the whale fishery;and,in a short time,we shall possess a navy capable of maintainingthe honor of France, and gratifying the patriotic aspirations of your petitioners,the undersigned candlemankers and others.Only have the goodness th relfect,Gentlemen,and you will be convinced that thereis perhaps,no Frenchman,from the wealth coalmaster to humblest vender of lucifermatches,whose lot will be ameliorater by success of this our petition. 2000专业英语1.The Battle to Be Your Online Bill Collector -Bankers hope cyberbilling can give them a toehold on the NetEvery year,American business sends out 29 billion bills.And by any measure,theexercise isnt much fun.For companies,printing,processing and posting a tipical consumer bill runs about 90.And for recipients ,theres not only a demand for payment,there s a wad of solicitations that nearly everyone throws away.But for banks trying to make it on the Internet,bills are cool .Bankers see bills as surefire eyeball-grabbers in an environment where its tough to commandconsumer attention-and a key to protecting their existing business managing cash for big companies.Increasingly,banks are battling high-tech competitors for control of Internet billing,or electronic-bill presentment,as it is called.To be sure,this is a fight over a business that is in its infancy.Few bills are now sent via the Net,and online payment systems often involve a paper check.But the technology exists to send bills from business to customers and route payments back on the Net.By the end of next year,industry analysts estimate upwards of 4.5 million households will be receiving bills online .Whats more, sending and handling bills over the Net should be about 40% cheaper than paper delivery, says the Gartner Group, a research firm in Stamford, Conn.The question is who will become the bill collector on the Net.Bankers reckon that if they can turn their Web sites into mailboxes for electronic bills ,theycan become key entry points on the Net-portals,even.That would enable them tosell other financial services online. The fear is that existing portals,such as Yahoo! or even American Online,will become centers of bill payment and , inturn ,siphon off existing bank business . banks have been slow to get into this, says Kenneth J.Kerr,a Garter analyst in Durham,N.C. But they realize there is a threat here and they need to get aboard .Banks have their advantages.They can offer custumers simultaneous access to their bills and their money. Banks have long relationships with the billers,suchas utilities and retailers,and centuries of experience in protecting peoplesmoney.Big banks also are worried that technology companies offering bill presentmentcould muscle into one of their fastest-growing business-managing cash for bigcompanies. After all ,distributing and collecting bills is a close cousin to cash management.At this point,predicting how the industry will shake out is premature . Banks and technology companies already have formed several alliances aimed a delivering bills on the net. More combinations are likely . Whats clear, though , isthe banks know they are running out of time to get their Internet billing acttogether._From Business Week/July 19,19992.Principles of RegulationThe following quotation describes the scope of regulation and how it affects individuals and businesses participating in a market.All market and transactions are in practice regulated by some kind of government laws or regulations , and without regulations of any kind,most markets andtypes of transactions would cease to exist.Without laws, the terms of many types of agreement and transaction between individuals would be unenforceable and would cease. The choice facing individuals and society is not between regulation and no regulation ; it is how much regulation and what kinds of regulation are desirable.This description portrays regulation as fully encompassing the systems of government and law with the power to control all markets and transactions . Economists and politicians would typically take a much narrower view of regulation,concentrating more on the targets of regulatory action or the regulatory process itself. An economist, focusing on thetargets of regulatory action, might describe regulation as government policy that exerts control over a firm to elicit a desired behavior as a producer of goods or employer of labor. An economist or politician focusing on regulatoty process, however, might express a viewsimilar to the following:Through regulation,society attempts to substitute the decidion-making processof a regulatory commission for the action of the market mechanism.It is clear that theprocess of regulation is to substitute administrative judgment for market-place judgement. In effect, an economic environment of legal rules and regulations is used as a surrogate for the free market,and economic decisions are made by a political process.The above description portrays regulation as a political process, substitutingasministrative judgement for marketplace judgement. The description identifies the important interaction between regulation and the market and raised an important issue:when, if at all, should marketplace judgment be replaced with asministrative judgement?Various answers to this question have been proposed. Of primary importance is the market being considered. Different market require different amounts and types of regulation._From The Regulation of Insurance3.Intervention Arrangements in the European Monetary SystemBilateral exchange rates within the European Monetary System have never been literally fixed; rather, they have fluctuated within specified limits called margins. Since August 1993 the margins for most bilateral exchange rates have been +_15 percent,although they were narrower before then. Each participating currency is also assigned a central exchange rate against the European Union currencies. When a currencys market xchange rate against the ECU diverges sufficiently from its cegogo the currency is expected to intervene and possibly take other actions to correct the situation.In return for contributing 20 percent of their gold and dollar holdings to a European Monetary Institute,central bank in the EMS receive equivalent holding of ECUs. ECUs can be used, along with other types of international reserves, to purchase domestic currency from member central banks that acquire it in intervention opertations but do not wish to hold it.Intervention burdens may be shared symmetrically within the EMS, but they neednot be. If the French franc depreciates to its lower limit against the DM, for example,the French central bank must rectify the situation by selling DM reserves; at the same time, the German central bank must lend the necessary DM tothe Bank of France.EMS rules thus call for a symmetric intervention procedurewhen an exchange rate reaches the limit of its range, one in which the weak-currency country loses reserves and the other gains them.Much intervention takes place within the EMS exchange rate margins, however,and such intervention does not oblige other central banks to take action. If thebank of France buys DM assets and adds them to its reserves, for example, theBundesbank is not require to intervene as long as the franc stays within its margins.In addition, the symmetry of intervention at the margins is no guarantee that the resulting adjustments in national money supplies are symmetric.There is little at present to prevent a central bank from trying to shift the burden of monetary adjustment onto its EMS partners by sterilizing its foreign intervention._From c Economics-Theory and Policy,4th Edition4.Freedom of ContractThe main principle of the law relating to commercial transactions is based on the freedom of the contracting parties to agree as they wish. This principle comprises the freedom to choose whether one wants to enter into a contract at all, the freedom to choose ones contracting party and to agree on the contentsof the contract and its general and specific terms. However, any freedom of contract is necessarily controlled by some fundamentals principles of the applicable national law which determine how contractual rights come into being and the effect on contractual undertaking of fraud, misleading statements, duress,coercion, mistake or other invalidating causes. It should also be observed that it may be impossible to obtain enforcement of some contracts and that the modalities of enforcement may differ in different jurisdictions.Generally one cannot expect enforcement of contracts which are illegal in the jurisdiction concerned or which may have such an object that redress to enforcement authorities is unavailable. This is true for most illegal contracts as one cannot very well expect organs of the state to extend a helpful hand to those who have engaged in prohibited of undesirable activities. The same reluctance may well apply to contracts which are not illegal but merely of such a nature that the contracting parties should have to arrange their affairs without the assistance of the authorities, e.g. wagering contract or games for money. In modern commerce, it would normally be impracticable to let the contracting parties individually negotiate each and every contract term. Instead, they would in most cases use ready-made texts appearing in different standard forms orclauses.It is also possible to use computerized texts available for differenttypes of contracts. If so, it is only theoretically possible to base contractinterpretation on the actual will and intention of the contracting parties themselves. Such standardised text have to be interpreted objectively and reference to contractual intent represents no more than a lip-service to the traditional paradigm of deriving the contents of contract solely from the will o