37福尔克.doc

Chapter 6 New Liberalism37. Falk理查德福尔克（Richard A. Falk, 1930-），美国著名国际政治学家，国际秩序学派的重要代表。相继执教于俄亥俄大学、哈佛大学和普林斯顿大学，1965年后任普林斯顿大学伍德罗威尔逊公共和国际关系学院国际法讲座教授。世界秩序学派关注全球问题，如核不扩散、环境污染、生态平衡、失业贫困、个性自由等，主张在国际上大力推行国际法、正义和民主，实现集体安全，并在国际道义和公众意愿基础上建立新的国际秩序。从二十世纪六十年代末七十年代初期起，福尔克等人以普林斯顿大学国际问题研究中心为基础，以国际组织（International Organization）和世界事务（World Affairs）为学术阵地，开始从事“世界秩序模型研究”，不仅为了实现他们所主张的国际秩序，而且是要找到研究国际关系的正统方法。自其时以来，该研究项目的组织者和精神领袖福尔克出版了许多著述，其中较有影响的是争取建立公正的世界秩序（Toward a Just World Order）和世界秩序的终结（The End of World Order）。福尔克指出，当代以主权国家为基本单位的国际秩序弊端百出，显得过时了；一个稳定、有效、正义的国际体系应当建立在这样一套价值观念的基础上：将直接冲突和战争减小到最低程度的和平；满足所有人基本需求的经济福利；基本的人权要求得以实现的社会和政治公正；足以维持人类环境质量和实现可持续发展的生态平衡；各个社会组织层面上的权威和管理都是富有效率和人道的。他进一步说，他所主持的研究项目，就是要找到实现上述价值观念的方式和途径。毫无疑问，福尔克所列出的这一套用来指导建立世界新秩序的价值观念，是地道的西方自由国际主义的基本信条，但它们即使对于要求建立公正合理的世界政治经济新秩序的广大第三世界国家来说，也是富有启发意义的。本篇选自世界秩序的终结，介绍了世界秩序模型研究的目标和基本观点。The World Order PerspectiveThe World order approach to the study of global politics has had its principal intellectual development, to date, in North America. Its perspectives and goals, although not its methodology or rhetorical style, is closely aligned to work done under rubrics of peace research, conflict resolution, and alternative political futures. The United States, of course, is a global presence whose intellectual fashions, for better or worse, exert great influence even as they arouse antagonism elsewhere. Therefore, the global spread of the world order studies and the suspicions engendered by its point of origin are inseparable.Founded on dissatisfaction with the professional judgment that a statist framework of world politics is here to stay, the world order approach critically examines the durability and adequacy of statism, proposes alternative political frameworks, and considers strategies and scenarios that might facilitate the transition to a post-statist type of world order. Furthermore, it takes the realization of values (peacefulness, economic well-being, social and political justice, ecological balance, and humane governance), rather than materialistic and technological gains, as the decisive criterion of progress in human affairs.It has been only a decade since “world order studies” has begun to be taken seriously as an academic focus for teaching and research, and throughout this period, its acceptance has been fitful and controversial. As is often the case, this resistance is expressive of a variety of concerns, some acknowledged, some not.International relations as disciplined inquiry, following Machiavelli and Hobbes, has been preoccupied with the global dynamics of interaction among principal pilitical actors. Since the seventeenth century, states have been the predominant political actors, and a few of these have played especially predominant roles at various stages of international history. As a result, international relations has been, above all else, a study of the state system and its fundamental features at different stages of evolution, with special attention, until recently, being given to the role of the great powers in Europe. This tradition of inquiry sought to establish an intellectual identity separate from that of lawyers and moralists, who tended, it was alleged, to confuse the “is” with the “ought”, and thereby impairs perception of actual patterns of practice, as well as blur requirements for reform. Besides, theorists of state behavior have consistently maintained that normative pressures are virtually negligible in international society, because no governmental institutions of enforcement exist and no global community sentiment of any strength exists. Essentially, state power is subject only to the restraints imposed by other states (sometimes alleging a higher purpose) and to self-restraint. In the nuclear age, this basis of order is more exposed and controversial than ever before. This mainstream international relations tradition has also tended to view drastic modifications in the state system as unrealistic or utopian, expressions of desire rather than of assessed probability. Hence, disarmament, world government, and the like are cursorily dismissed from consideration by most serious students of international relations. Even statist experiments in international cooperation, such as the League of Nations and the United Nations, have been regarded as marginal innovations in the world system, a kind of ornamental extension of the old order, not a challenge to it. Henry Kissingers spectacular success as a statesman was attributable, in part, I believe, to his clarity about the centrality of state power in international relations, especially welcome in American statecraft which has so often fooled itself and others by masking self-interested policies with an elaborate pretension of moral exceptionalism.The Machiavellianism of this dominant tradition has always had its opponents who questioned both the descriptive and prescriptive aspects of such an image of international relations. This questioning has grown in intensity and scope in recent decades, originally as a response to the terrible costs of war and more recently in relations to the capacity of the world as a whole to accommodate the interplay between demographic and industrial trends. The interactive complexity of international relations, especially along transnational axes of interaction, has encouraged others to emphasize the need for a more sophisticated view 1 这里指罗伯特基欧汉和约瑟夫奈的跨国关系研究及其方法，参见Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little Brown, 1977). of the dynamics of international behavior than derives from the state-centric view of the world.Against this background, a sub-tradition of inquiry has emerged in recent years that devotes attention to the possibilities for “system change”. Usually such an outlook is premised on the conviction (for which there is no proof or disproof) that present trends and tendencies are likely to eventuate in catastrophic results some time in the next half century or so. Sometimes the present order is also repudiated on moral groundsbecause too many people live unnecessarily in misery, because the present structures rest on violence and threats of violence, or because human potential, both individual and societal, could be more fully and happily realized in an alternative framework. These conviction, whether prudential or moral, can be proved plausible. Novelists have depicted with greater power than social scientists the disintegrative implications of present realities. The task of depicting “a promised land”, that is, an alternative to the presently dangerous and unacceptable arrangement of global power, is a challenging one. The most prosaic response is to envision a world state governing all of humanity safely and equitably. Again, creative writers rather than futurologists engage our being more successfully when they imagine utopian societies in which human relations are established in an imaginative, but not simplistic, fashion. But such utopian aspirations, whether literary or not, offer no serious answers to the question of transitionhow to get from here to there. The writing of utopians assumes that the envisioned state has been achieved, thereby eliminating political constraints on its attainment.The transition question is central to World Order Models Projects (WOMPs) inquiry. It also acknowledges the difficulty of the question at every level of discoursepolitical, intellectual, and psychological. That is, WOMP shares with the utopian tradition both a rejection of incremental approaches and a search for existent, appealing images of alternatives to the present system of world order. What distinguished WOMP, to date, is its emphasis on linking diagnosis of the present to prescription for the future through an inquiry into transition process. Such an inquiry is beset by difficulty as we do not know enough to establish a persuasive causal model of the future. So far WOMP has managed to produce a series of first-generation efforts to depict preferred worlds and associated transition strategies. These efforts intentionally reflect some of the diversity of perspectiveideological, cultural, regional, epistemological (or methodological)that exist in the world. At this stage, studying transition more closely approximated taking an inventory of representative attitudes than it does the formulation of testable hypotheses as to the nature of global transformation. There is no coherent body of theory to draw upon. What coherence WOMP possesses comes from a shared commitment by its participants to evolve longer-range strategies to promote humane politics than is common for governments and academic specialists. For Professor Tom Farer 2 Tom Farer, 汤姆法里尔，美国国际政治学家，自由主义倾向的现实主义者，世界秩序学 派的主要批评者。法里尔的观点，参见他对福尔克的批评性文章， “The Greening of the Globe: a Preliminary Appraisal of the World Order Models Project (WOMP)”, International Organization, vol. 31 (1977), pp.129-147., a leading international lawyer in the liberal realist tradition, to label the self-styled skepticism in Carl Friedrich von Weizsackers 3 Carl Friedrich von weizsacker, 卡尔威沙克尔，美国国际政治学家，世界秩序学派的批评者。 essay as “the most penetrating contribution” in the volume is self-serving in the extreme; it is the one contribution that rejects the enterprise and was included to show that WOMP did not exclude distinguished critics from its work process.Since 1968, by means of meetings, exchanges of papers and criticisms, and a series of books, WOMP has been seeking to evolve a new orientation toward the subject matter of international relations. This orientation is normative (intent on making goals explicit), futuristic (concerned with trends and counter-trends), systemic (focused on the interrelations of the overall system in a planetary scale of inquiry), constitutive (concerned with design of alternative institutions and procedures), and transdisciplinary (including politics, economics, sociology, philosophy, religion, and cultural anthropology). It is also an academic exercise that has aspirations as yet mainly unrealized.WOMP is addressing a clear message to the world: the present system does not work; it cannot be incrementally repaired; it can be replaced by one that does work, but not quickly or easily; the prospects for replacement are not encouraging, but are themselves a function of the seriousness and representativeness of the search.More to the point, however, is the controversy over agents of change. In truth, WOMP as a whole is ambivalent, some authors placing their bets on official elites and their moderate competitors, some being more convinced that the energy for change will come, if at all, from counter-elites who challenge established centers of political and economic power. I believe that WOMP suffers from this ambivalence both pragmatically (failure to create a clear constituency) and intellectually (failure to develop a theory of global change). Although favorable to the diversity of time and place appropriate for normative discipline of global scope, I believe WOMP would benefit from an increase in ideological coherence vis-vis agents of change. My own convictions, here, lead me to favor resolving the ambivalence in direction