02第二周Unit1 A Financial InstitutionVIP

Unit 1 Money and BankingPart 1 Reading and Translating: Bank中国银联China UnionPay中国银行BOC（Bank of China)中国工商银行ICBC （Industrial & Commercial Bank of China）中国农业银行ABC（Agricultural Bank of China）中国建设银行CCB （China Construction Bank）中国招商银行CMB （China Merchants Bank ）中国光大银行CEB （China Everbright Bank）中国民生银行CMBC （China Minsheng Banking Corp. Ltd.）中国进出口银行EXIMBC (The Import-Export Bank of China)中信实业银行CITIC Industrial Bank(China International Trust and Investment Corporation)福建兴业银行CIB （China Industrial Bank）交通银行Bank of Communications华夏银行Bank of Communications深圳发展银行Shenzhen Development Bank上海浦东发展银行Shanghai Pudong Development Bank广东发展银行Guangdong Development Bank国家开发银行China Development Bank商业银行Commercial BankJokes:中国建设银行CBC (Construction Bank of China) “存不存？”中国银行BC （Bank of China）“不存。”中国农业银行ABC (Agricultural Bank of China) “啊，不存”中国工商银行ICBC (Industrial and Commercial Bank of China)“爱存不存”中国招商银行CMBC(China Merchants Bank)“存吗？白痴！” 兴业银行CIB( Industrial Bank )“存一百”北京市商业银行BCCB (Beijing City Commercial Bank)白存存不？”汇丰银行HSBC (The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation)还是不存”Financial Institutions:The term “financial intermediary” can be applied to a variety of institutions, some of which are commercial banks商业银行mutual savings banks互助储蓄银行savings and loan associations 储蓄贷款协会credit unions信用社life insurance companies人寿保险公司pension funds养老基金mutual funds互助基金finance companies金融公司governmental credit agencies政府借贷机构Insurance Companies：中国人寿保险股份有限公司China Life Insurance Company Limited中国人民财产保险股份有限公司PICC Property and Casualty Company Limited天安保险股份有限公司Tianan Insurance Co., Ltd中国太平洋保险（集团）股份有限公司China Pacific Insurance(group)Co.,Ltd新华人寿保险股份有限公司New China Life Insurance Co.,Ltd.华夏人寿保险股份有限公司Huaxia Life Insurance Co. LtdPart 2: Vocabulary and Useful Expressions Part 3: Text Reading1. Definition:Financial institutions or financial intermediaries are very simply economic units whose main function is to handle the financial assets of households and firms in our society. Basically, these institutions bring savers and borrowers together by selling securities to savers for money and lending that money to borrowers.2. Characteristics:1) Firstly, financial intermediaries could not exist without intermediation, the process that occurs when firms and households place funds in institutions ( banks, savings and loans, etc.).2) Another important attribute of financial intermediaries is their ability to bear and spread the risk of primary security ownership. Financial intermediaries are more easily able to diversify their security portfolios, thereby reducing the total risk of the portfolio. Lower-than-expected returns on one issue may be offset by higher-than-expected returns on another.3) Another interesting attribute of financial intermediaries is their ability to offset receipts and withdrawals because of the phenomenon of the “law of large number”3. Conclusion:It should be apparent that financial intermediaries facilitate a more efficient flow of funds from lenders to borrowers. It should also be apparent that this lowering of interest rates would be highly beneficial to a countrys rate of economic growth and development.Part 4: Related texts（一）中国银行业改革面临倒退危险While Western governments debate how to reform their banking sectors, Beijing is now facing a different problem: how to keep from gutting the last decade of banking reform its already been through. Theres a very real danger that policy makers will undo their earlier efforts in the name of short-term stimulus. 眼下，在西方国家政府争论应如何改革它们的银行体系之际，中国政府却面临着一个不同的问题：如何避免让它过去10年来已获得的改革成果前功尽弃。现在的确存在着一种危险，即：决策者有可能在短期刺激计划的名义下毁掉他们早些时候做出的努力。The central problem is the Chinese governments strategy of stimulating the economy through an enormous expansion of bank lending. The government has turned to the banks to finance half of its four trillion yuan ($586 billion) stimulus package. In addition to that, the government has set high targets for commercial lending to support businesses. Chinas lenders pumped out more than 4.5 trillion yuan in new loans in the first quarter of 2009, 8% more than in all of 2008. 问题的核心是中国政府正在实行的通过大规模扩大银行信贷来刺激经济的策略。政府4万亿元人民币(合5,860亿美元)经济刺激计划的一半资金都有赖银行提供。除此之外，政府还为支持企业的商业借贷制定了高目标。今年一季度，中国银行业新增贷款超过4.5万亿元，较2008年全年的数字还高出8%。This is eerily reminiscient of an earlier era when the government leaned heavily on banks to finance economic growth, and especially large state-owned enterprises. In the 1980s and 90s, Chinese banks piled up a colossal tangle of politically directed bad debts that either could not be repaid, or were never meant to be repaid in the first place. In 2003 nonperforming loans made up 20.4% of banks total loan books, a face value equivalent to 16.5% of GDP. This threatened to swamp the entire economy. 这种局面会令人不禁回想起前些年的情形，当时中国政府严重依赖银行资金来支撑经济增长，特别是大型国有企业的发展。上世纪八、九十年代，中国银行业积累了大量行政指令导致的呆坏帐，这些债务要么没法得到偿还，要么当初就根本没打算偿还。2003年，不良贷款占中国银行业贷款总额的20.4%，相当于中国国内生产总值(GDP)的16.5%。如此之高的坏帐让整个中国经济面临着陷入困境的危险。Beijing managed to clean up that problem with the help of the new China Banking Regulatory Commission, $100 billion in new government capital, and foreign strategic partners to train banks in global best practices. Nonperforming loans were brought down to 2.5% by the end of 2008. This was accompanied by a deeper change in corporate culture, as bank staff started thinking like bankers instead of like agents of government policy. A decade of difficult reform culminated in Hong Kong stock listings for three of the big four - Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and China Construction Bank - with the fourth, Agricultural Bank of China, on the way. Yet despite this hard-won progress, Beijing is now in danger of backsliding. 中国政府后来设法扭转了这种局面，当时，中国新成立了银行业监督管理委员会(China Banking Regulatory Commission)，政府又拿出1,000亿美元资金注入银行业，此外，还通过外国“战略合作伙伴”向中国银行业传授全球最佳经营管理规范。到 2008年末，不良贷款比率降到了2.5%。与此同时，中国银行业在企业文化方面也发生着更深层的变化。银行业人士开始像银行家而不是像政府官员那样来考虑问题。经过十年的艰苦改革，中国四大国有银行中的三家中国银行(Bank of China)、中国工商银行(Industrial and Commercial Bank of China)和中国建设银行(China Construction Bank)先后在香港挂牌上市，中国农业银行(Agricultural Bank of China)的上市工作也在进行中。然而，在取得这番来之不易的进步之后，中国的银行业改革现在面临着倒退的危险。On the surface, Chinas banks appear to be remarkably healthy. The CBRC reports that this year, despite the economic slowdown, nonperforming loans have continued falling, not only as a percentage of the rapidly expanding base but in absolute terms. Chinas banks, the story goes, are a well-tuned engine capable of lifting the Chinese economy up. 从表面上看，中国银行业似乎已经相当健康。据银监会称，尽管经济出现下滑，但今年银行业不良贷款将继续下降，不论是绝对规模，还是占贷款总额的比例。看上去，中国银行业俨然是一台运转良好、有能力继续推动中国经济前行的发动机。A closer look, however, raises several red flags that regulators havent been able to address satisfactorily. Take existing loan portfolios even before the rash of new stimulus lending. Given the severe drop-off in Chinese exports, along with the worldwide widening of credit spreads (reflecting increased risk of defaults), it strains credulity to believe that the health of these portfolios could be improving. In reality, the CBRC recently allowed Chinese banks to minimize the recognition of nonperforming loans by rescheduling loans before maturity and evergreening troubled loans by rolling them over into new ones. In contrast, NPLs recognized by foreign banks operating in China - which generally follow the stricter rules of their home regulators - have more than doubled since the start of 2008. 不过，进一步研究会发现，中国银行业还存在几个监管机构尚未能妥善解决的问题。就以银行业大规模发放新的刺激性贷款之前已存在的贷款组合来说。鉴于中国出口的大幅下滑，还有全世界范围内信用价差的扩大（这意味着违约风险的上升），人们很难轻易相信这些贷款组合的质量还能不断改善。事实上，银监会最近已允许中国银行业对未到期贷款重新安排偿债条款，将不良贷款展期成为不到期的新贷款，从而降低列为不良贷款的贷款额。相比之下，在华经营的外资银行认定的不良贷款自2008年初以来已经增加了一倍多。这些银行一般都会遵守他们本国监管机构的严格规定。（二）中国影子银行隐藏的风险金融时报双语新闻 Within a few minutes of driving into Langfang, it is clear that Chinas property boom is still going strong. At a traffic light, a tout knocks on the car window with a leaflet advertising a new housing development, Lion City. A second leaflet for the sprawling 19 City States villa complex is inserted under the windscreen wiper, followed quickly by a third, for Happy City. 驱车驶入廊坊，不出几分钟就能感受到中国房地产市场繁荣依旧。等待红灯时，一位推销员敲打着我的车窗，手里拿着一张新开发楼盘“狮子城”的小广告。第二张小广告被插到了风挡雨刷上，是“旭辉十九城邦”的，接着又有张“幸福城”的小广告插了上来。 A red-hot housing market might not seem unusual in China, where real estate prices have soared over the past decade. But what is happening in Langfang, one hours drive from Beijing, and other cities is new and potentially far riskier than anything that came earlier. Since 2010, the government has tried to cool the property market and made it virtually impossible for developers to secure loans from banks. Starved of cash, developers were forced to slow down. 火爆的楼市在中国可能不算罕见，毕竟过去十年中国房地产价格已经大幅攀升。然而，在距北京一小时车程的廊坊以及其他城市正在出现一种新的现象，其中隐含的风险比起早先任何情况都要大得多。2010年以来，中国政府已经试图给楼市降温，导致开发商几乎不可能从银行获得贷款。由于缺乏资金，开发商不得不放慢开发节奏。 But as the Langfang boom shows, property companies are finding funds again. The money is not coming from banks as the regulatory controls on loans to developers remain. Instead, developers are turning to Chinas shadow banking system, a complex network of financing channels outside the formal banking sector. 然而廊坊房市的繁荣说明地产公司又找到了资金。开发商的资金并不是来自银行，因为监管机构对于向开发商发放的贷款依然严格控制。相反，开发商们正转而求助于中国的影子银行系统一个由游离于正规银行部门之外的融资渠道组成的复杂网络。 Shadow banking is flourishing in China, helping to make non-bank institutions as big a source of credit as banks themselves since July something that has never happened before. Chinese bankers, leading rating agencies and the International Monetary Fund have all warned about risks from the surge in loosely regulated lending, with some even pointing to parallels with developed economies before the global financial crisis. But the Chinese government itself has taken a permissive stance. 影子银行在中国的繁荣，导致非银行类机构自7月以来成为与银行一样的主要信贷源头这在过去是从未有过的。中国银行家、各主要评级机构以及国际货币基金组织(IMF)都曾对监管松散的放贷活动猛增所隐含的风险发出过警告，有些人甚至将中国当前这种状况与全球金融危机前的发达经济体相提并论。然而中国政府对此却是默许的。 “The vast majority of the financial activities conducted by Chinas non-bank institutions are regulated,” says Zhou Xiaochuan, Chinas central bank governor. “Its not like other countries where they completely escaped regulation.” 中国央行行长周小川表示：“在中国，绝大多数非银行金融机构的金融活动多数都处在监管之下，而不是像有些国家那样完全脱离了监管。” Despite this note of confidence, the depth and effectiveness of regulatory control is a matter of open controversy. The chairman of Bank of China, a big commercial lender, is far more candid about the potential hazards of shadow banking. “To some extent, this is fundamentally a Ponzi scheme,” Xiao Gang wrote in the China Daily. “The music may stop when investors lose confidence.” 然而尽管有如此强烈的信心释放出来，监管的深度及有效性如何仍然饱受争议。大型商业银行中国银行(BoC)董事长肖钢对于影子银行的潜在危险要坦率得多。 肖钢在中国日报(China Daily)的一篇文章中写道：“某种程度上说，这基本上就是个庞氏骗局(Ponzi shcme)，投资者一旦失去信心，这种击鼓传花就会停止。”中国影子银行有着各种伪装。最基本的就是非法地下钱庄，主要分布于沿海富裕地区，向被主流银行忽略的小企业提供高息贷款。 Shadow banking in China assumes various guises. The most basic are the illegal loan sharks who operate mainly in wealthy coastal regions, providing high-interest loans to small businesses that are often ignored by mainstream banks.中国影子银行有着各种伪装。最基本的就是非法地下钱庄，主要分布于沿海富裕地区，向被主流银行忽略的小企业提供高息贷款。 But most of Chinas shadow banking is legal. The biggest of the non-bank institutions are trusts, companies akin to hedge funds. They cater to rich investors and promise high returns by lending to risky customers, especially property developers. A range of industrial companies, from shipbuilders to oil majors, also engage in shadow banking as a side business. 然而中国多数影子银行是合法的。非银行金融机构中规模最大者当数信托公司，一种类似于对冲基金的公司。信托公司迎合富有投资者的需求，通过放贷给高风险客户特别是房地产开发商来确保它们允诺的高额回报率。另外，包括造船企业和大型石油公司在内的许多实业公司也把从事影子银行业务当做一项副业。 Estimates about the size of shadow banking vary widely depending on how it is defined. Tying together various threads of official data, UBS economist Wang Tao believes it is no smaller than Rmb13.6tn ($2tn), or about one quarter of this years gross domestic product, and could be as big as Rmb24.4tn, or nearly 50 per cent of GDP. 对影子银行规模的估计依定义的不同而有巨大的差异。瑞士银行(UBS)经济学家汪涛通过对不同来源的官方数据进行整合分析，判断中国影子银行的规模不小于人民币13.6万亿元（合2万亿美元），相当于今年国内生产总值(GDP)的四分之一，最高可能达到人民币24.4万亿元，接近GDP的50%。 For all the difficulties of making a calculation, one thing is apparent: its rapid growth. Trusts, the backbone of the shadow sector, had Rmb6.3tn of assets under management at the end of the third quarter, up 54 per cent from a year earlier and five-times more than at the start of 2009. KPMG says trusts could surpass insurance this year as the second-biggest institutional component of Chinas financial system, smaller only than banks. 不论统计上有多困难，有一点是确定的：影子银行发展迅速。作为影子银行中的主力，信托公司第三季度末管理的资产达6.3万亿人民币，同比增长54%，是2009年初的五倍。毕马威(KPMG)表示，今年信托业规模可能超过保险业，成为中国金融系统内仅次于银行的第二大产业。 A senior commercial banker who worked as a regulator until last year says the complexity of the shadow products was also increasing. “It has begun to get to a degree like we saw in the financial crisis in the west. Products are being created that regulators dont fully understand, banks dont fully understand and customers dont fully understand,” he says. 一位去年还在监管机构任职的高级商业银行家表示，影子银行提供的产品复杂度也在增加。他说：“这些产品的复杂度正开始匹敌金融危机中西方的那些产品。这些产品被设计得令监管者无法完全理解，银行无法完全理解，顾客也无法完全理解。” When wealthy Chinese invest directly in trust products, it is clear that they are getting into shadow finance. That is far less clear with wealth management products, or WMPs but these are the rocket fuel behind the surge in shadow finance. 当中国有钱人直接投资于信托产品时，很明显他们正参与影子金融。在理财产品(WMP)领域，这一点远远没有这么明显，但是这些理财产品实际上正在为影子金融的迅猛发展提供弹药。 Banks market WMPs to ordinary customers as higher-yielding alternatives to plain deposits. Even though these are highly visible mainstream lenders, they do not disclose in detail that these higher yields are obtained by putting much of the money to work in shadow finance. 银行将理财产品作为普通存款的高收益替代品推销给普通顾客。虽然银行是高度透明的主流贷款机构，但其实它们并未向客户透露以下详情：这些高收益是通过将许多资金投入影子金融业务带来的。 Banks issued just Rmb800bn of WMPs in 2007 but are expected to surpass Rmb20tn this year, according to CN Benefit, a wealth management consultancy. In effect, for every three renminbi saved in ordinary banks, Chinese households and companies will soon be depositing one with shadow banks. 根据理财顾问公司CN Benefit的数据，2007年，中国各银行发行的理财产品总计不过人民币8000亿元，而今年预计会超过人民币20万亿元。实际上，中国家庭和企业在普通银行每存三块钱，就有一块钱很快被存入影子银行系统。 China Construction Bank, the countrys second-biggest bank by assets, is typical of its peers in marketing its WMPs. Outside one branch in the Chaoyang district of Beijing, a long screen stretches over the windows advertising the latest WMP deals. But a saleswoman is at a loss to explain what the WMPs actually finance: “Its the investment banking department that manages these funds. Even we dont know what they invest in.”按资产额计为中国第二大银行的中国建设银行(CCB)是同行中推销理财产品的典范。在北京市朝阳区一家建行分行外面，窗口上方的一块长条形显示屏正显示着最新理财产品的广告。然而一位女销售员却说不清这些理财产品所募集资金的去处：“管理资金的是投资银行部门，我们也不知道他们会投资什么。” The IMF flagged the opacity as a concern in its global financial stability report in October: “As detailed information on those assets is not disclosed, it is difficult to gauge the underlying credit risk.” 国际货币基金组织(IMF)在10月发布的全球金融稳定报告中特别提到了对缺乏透明度的担忧：“由于这些资产的详细信息没有公开，很难判断其中隐藏的信贷风险。” For this article, the Financial Times examined more than 50 WMPs available at Chinese banks. The vast majority gave hazy descriptions of how the money would be used. The Bank of Communications, for example, explained that 30 per cent to 100 per cent of the funds raised through one of its WMPs would be invested in bond, money-market instruments or the interbank market and that up to 70 per cent might go to trust products. It provided no further details. 为撰写这篇文章，英国金融时报考察过中国的50多种银行理财产品。它们绝大多数对于资金的使用方案都语焉不详。以交通银行为例，该行解释说其一款理财产品募集的资金中，30%到100%将投资于债券、货币市场工具或银行同业拆借市场，可能投资于信托产品的资金比例最高不超过70%。除此以外，该行没有提供进一步的细节。 Of the WMPs surveyed, the FT identified only one that specified its target investment. When the Bank of Hebei sold a 5.5 per cent one-year WMP in October, the fine print said it would finance a trust loan to RiseSun Holding Company, the parent of RiseSun Real Estate Development, one of Langfangs biggest property companies.在所调查的理财产品中，英国金融时报发现只有一款产品明确说明了投资目标。河北银行在10月推出了一款收益率为5.5%的一年期理财产品，相关细则中说明所募集资金将用来向荣盛控股集团(RiseSun Holding Company)提供一笔信托贷款。荣盛控股集团是荣盛房地产发展股份有限公司(RiseSun Real Estate Development)的母公司，而后者正是廊坊最大的房地产开发公司之一。 Langfang, a city of about 700,000 people, sits under a thick blanket of smog between Beijing and Tianjin, both of which have populations of more than 10m. At Green Mansion, a 10,000-apartment complex that is one of six RiseSun developments under construction in Langfang, a sales agent enthuses about the citys potential as a commuter hub. But RiseSun is far from alone in pursuing the market, a fact shown by the touts handing out property advertisements. 有70万人口的廊坊笼罩在浓重的烟雾之中，该市位于北京与天津这两座人口超千万的大城市之间。有一万套公寓的格林郡府(Green Mansion)是荣盛发展在廊坊在建的六个楼盘之一，在这里，一位售楼人员热情洋溢地描绘着廊坊作为通勤中心的前景。荣盛发展的市场推广活动不是个例，那些发放楼盘广告的推销员就是明证。简单来说，这意味着，在河北银行购买声称与存款同样安全的理财产品的顾客们，实际上正在为一笔影子贷款提供资金，而这笔影子贷款的发放目标是在一个拥有泡沫化楼市的城市中不断举债的地产开发商。 To stay ahead of the competition, RiseSun has been scaling up quickly. Moneyweek, a Chinese financial magazine, said it had been “crazily buying up land”, funded by obtaining money from its parent company, which in turn had pledged equity as collateral to trust companies. The deal structure could allow RiseSun Real Estate, the listed entity, to appear less indebted since it is RiseSun Holding, the parent company, that is borrowing from outside sources. 为保持竞争优势，荣盛发展进行了迅速扩张。一家中国财经杂志理财周报 (Moneyweek)写道，荣盛发展一直在“疯狂买地”，买地的资金是由其母公司通过将股权质押给信托公司筹集的。采取这种交易结构，作为上市实体的荣盛发展报表上显示的债务要少许多，因为从信托公司贷款的是母公司荣盛控股而不是它。 Put simply, this means that customers at the Bank of Hebei who have been buying