英语报刊选读第3课military affairs 全文+翻译.doc

Army Study of Iraq War Details a Morass of Supply Shortages by Eric Schmitt陆军研究伊拉克战争的细节的泥沼供应短缺埃里克施密特The first official Army history of the Iraq war reveals that American forces were plagued by a morass of supply shortages, radios that could not reach far-flung troops, disappointing psychological operations and virtually no reliable intelligence on how Saddam Hussein would defend Baghdad. 第一次伊拉克战争的正式军队的历史表明，美国军队被困扰的“泥潭”的供应短缺，收音机无法到达遥远的部队，令人失望的心理作战，几乎没有可靠的情报关于萨达姆侯赛因将如何保卫巴格达的。Logistics problems, which senior Army officials played down at the time, were much worse than have previously been reported. While the study serves mainly as a technical examination of how the Army performed and the problems it faced, it could also serve as a political document that could advance the Armys interests within the Pentagon. 物流问题，高级陆军官员遇到的，在那时，比以前报道的糟糕得多。主要研究了如何在军队进行的技术审查和它所面临的问题作为服务的同时，它也可以作为一个政治文件，在五角大楼可以提前陆军的利益。Tank engines sat on warehouse shelves in Kuwait with no truck drivers to take them north. Broken-down trucks were scavenged for usable parts. Artillery units cannibalized parts from captured Iraqi guns to keep their howitzers operating. Army medics foraged medical supplies from combat hospitals. 在科威特坦克发动机坐在仓库货架上，没有卡车司机把他们带到北部。清理破旧的卡车可用的部分。炮兵部队拆组部分被俘的伊拉克枪零件，以保持他们的榴弹炮正常运作。陆军军医寻找作战医院的医疗用品。In most cases, soldiers improvised solutions to keep the offensive rolling. But the study found that the Third Infantry Division, the Armys lead combat force, was within two weeks of being halted by a lack of spare parts, and Army logisticians had no effective distribution system. 在大多数情况下，士兵们想出了即兴的解决方案，保持进攻的持续。但研究发现，第三步兵师，陆军的主要作战力量，缺乏备件停止在两个星期了，军队的后勤没有有效的分配制度。The morass of problems that confounded delivering parts and supplies - running the gamut of paper clips to tank engines - stems from the lack of a means to assign responsibility clearly, the study said. 研究报告说，问题的泥沼是“混淆了提供零部件和用品 - 运送坦克发动机缺乏明确分配责任的一种手段。It also found that the Pentagons decision to send mostly combat units in the weeks before the invasion had the unintended consequence of holding back support troops until much later, contributing greatly to the logistics problems. 调查还发现，五角大楼决定在接下来的几周派送大多作战部队，解决后勤问题，支持部队的“意外后果”。The findings are contained in a 504-page internal Army history of the war written by the Armys Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. The unclassified study, a draft of which was obtained by The New York Times, was ordered last spring by the former Army chief of staff, Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, who clashed with Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld over troop strength for postwar Iraq. It draws on interviews with 2,300 people, 68,000 photographs and nearly 120,000 documents. 结果载于504页，由陆军联合武器中心在沃思堡，堪萨斯州的非机密的研究，这是由纽约时报获得的草案编写的内部战争的军队的历史，被责令由去年春天工作人员的前陆军参谋长将军埃里克K.辛塞奇以上的兵力，与国防部长拉姆斯菲尔德为伊拉克战后冲突。它引起了2300人，68,000照片和近12万份文件的采访。Its senior author was Gregory Fontenot, a retired Army colonel who commanded a battalion in the Persian Gulf war in 1991 and a brigade in Bosnia. The Marine Corps, Air Force and Navy are all conducting similar reviews of their forces performance. 其资深作者是一位退休的陆军上校，格雷戈里，于1991年在海湾战争和波斯尼亚指挥一个营。海军陆战队，空军和海军都进行类似的检讨（回顾）自己的力量活动。Army officials said the timing of the study was not intended to influence passage of a proposed military budget the Bush administration submitted to Congress on Monday. But it could fuel a debate on Capitol Hill over whether the military, and the Army in particular, has enough troops to carry out missions in Iraq, Afghanistan and other trouble spots. 陆军官员说，研究的时间并不打算通过布什政府周一向国会提交拟议的军事预算的影响。但它可能加剧国会的辩论：军方，特别是军队，是否有足够的兵力，在伊拉克，阿富汗和其他麻烦点开展任务。Senior Army officials say lessons from the study - from revamping how soldiers are deployed to overhauling battlefield supply-distribution networks - are being incorporated into Army training centers and among the 110,000 troops now replacing 130,000 soldiers in Iraq. 军方高级官员说，从研究的经验教训 - 士兵是如何被部署到大修战场供应的分销网络改造 的，正在进入陆军训练中心，现在在伊拉克的13万士兵之间的11万军队并纳入更换。The bulk of the study, a book entitled On Point, is a lucid narrative devoted largely to detailed accounts of several pivotal battles. For the most part, it praises the Armys combat operations and the ability of soldiers and commanders to adapt to rapidly shifting battlefield conditions. 大量的研究，一本，题为“On Point ，的书” ，主要致力于几个关键战役的详细描述。在大多数情况下，它赞扬军队士兵的作战行动的能力，和适应迅速变化的战场条件的指挥官。The report refers only glancingly to two of the most contentious issues of the war: Iraqs suspected illicit weapons and the Pentagons preparations for securing and rebuilding the country after major combat ended. 该报告指，只有最有争议的两个关于战争的问题：伊拉克涉嫌非法武器和五角大楼为伊拉克的安全和战后国家重建准备。The study does note, however, that the strategy of starting the war before all support troops were in place, in order to achieve an element of surprise, taxed the postwar resources of local commanders, who in many cases were shifting back and forth between combat operations and the task of restoring civil services.研究表明，在战争开始之前，所有支持部队的战略都到位了，为了实现一个意外收获。地方指挥官，在许多情况下被转移在作战征税战后资源操作和恢复民事服务的任务之间。Local commanders were torn between their fights and providing resources - soldiers, time and logistics - to meet the civilian needs, the report concluded. Partially due to the scarce resources as a result of the running start, there simply was not enough to do both missions.“该报告总结到：“当地指挥官被分散在他们的战斗和提供资源上- 士兵，时间和后勤 - 满足民用需求。 而且部分资源还特别短缺。他们根本没有足够的精力去同时完成两个任务。The studys authors saved their most biting critique for the logistics operations. When the combat forces raced ahead, the supply lines - force flow in military jargon - could not keep pace. As the campaign progressed, the force flow never caught up with the operational requirements, it found. 这项研究的作者，为后勤供应保存最刺骨的批判。当作战部队用力进攻时，供应线路- 在军事术语中的军力调配 - 无法跟上。 “随着战斗的进展，军力调配永远不会赶上需求，发现。”Put more bluntly elsewhere in the study, it said that no one had anything good to say about parts delivery, from the privates at the front to the generals at the command headquarters. 说得更直白一点就是在其他地方的研究，在司令部，从在前线的士兵到将军没有人说部分交货有什么好的。Other problems cropped up. While divisional commanders could communicate with one another, officers at lower levels often could not. Units separated by long distances in the fast-moving offensive found their radios suddenly out of range, leaving troops to improvise solutions using mobile phones or secure e-mail messaging. 在出现的其他问题上。虽然分区指挥官可以互相沟通，但较低水平的往往不能。组织的长距离的分隔和快速移动的攻势，发现他们的收音机突然不在范围内了，让军队自己准备解决使用移动电话或邮件消息。Commanders were relying on an extensive psychological operations campaign of leaflets and broadcasts to coax Iraqi soldiers into surrendering, as they did in large numbers in the 1991 gulf war, and to refrain from sabotaging Iraqs oil fields. 指挥官们依靠广泛的传单和广播等心理运作方式教唆伊拉克士兵投降，因为在1991年的海湾战争中也是的，并避免破坏伊拉克的油田。The study found that those messages either had failed to reach many of the intended Iraqi units or had baffled the Iraqi soldiers who got them. In addition, Saddam Fedayeen paramilitary fighters inserted in Iraqi Army units threatened and, in many cases, killed Iraqi soldiers who tried to desert or surrender. 研究发现，这些信息在许多伊拉克部队或困惑的伊拉克士兵身上预期内无法达成的。此外，萨达姆敢死队武警战士给伊拉克军队的威胁，在许多情况下，（杀死了伊拉克士兵）试图逃跑或投降。Leaflets were prepared for the first 48 hours of combat, but the system to approve new written messages was so cumbersome that psychological operations teams on the ground were forced to rely solely on loudspeakers. “It is clear that on the whole, psyop produced much less than expected and perhaps less than claimed,” the report found. 小叶编写了第一个48小时的战斗，但制度批准新的书面信息是如此繁琐，在地面上的心理战人员被迫完全依赖扬声器。”很显然，在整个广告制作，远低于预期，也许没有声称中那么好，“报告发现。Despite elaborate Army planning for a final battle in Baghdad - including the mapping of every section and building in the city of 5.5 million people - commanders and intelligence analysts were at a loss to determine how the Iraqis would defend Baghdad, if at all. 尽管部队为最后的在巴格达的战斗精心规划-包括测算每节和建筑在城市中的5500000人-指挥官和情报分析人员无法确定如何保卫在巴格达的伊拉人。Intelligence officers at all echelons continued to have great difficulty accurately describing the threat in the city, the study concluded. “各级情报人员继续准确地描述城市中的威胁有很大的困难，该研究结论。Not until armored columns carried out probes, called thunder runs, through Baghdad, the study fou