在环境政策中的公平效率均衡证明来自规定的选择权 外文翻译

本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译原文THEEQUITYEFFICIENCYTRADEOFFINENVIRONMENTALPOLICYEVIDENCEFROMSTATEDPREFERENCESTHEDESIGNOFENVIRONMENTALPOLICYRAISESSEVERALEQUITYISSUES,INPARTICULARTHEDISTRIBUTIONOFTHEBENEFITSANDCOSTSOFPOLICY,ATTHESAMETIME,THEPURSUITOFEQUITYOBJECTIVESMAYBEINCONFLICTWITHTHEPURSUITOFALTOGETHERSEPARATEPOLICYOBJECTIVESINPARTICULAR,ITHASOFTENBEENARGUEDTHATTHEREISATRADEOFFINENVIRONMENTALPOLICYASTHEREAPPEARSTOBEINMANYOTHERAREASOFPUBLICPOLICYBETWEENEQUITYANDECONOMICEFFICIENCY,WHICHBRINGSTHESEEQUITYISSUESFIRMLYTOTHEATTENTIONOFENVIRONMENTALECONOMICSWHERESUCHATRADEOFFEXISTS,THEQUESTIONARISESHOWBESTTOADDRESSIT,BUTTHEREDOESNOTSEEMTOBEASTRAIGHTFORWARDANSWERONEAPPARENTSOLUTION,OFTENRELIEDUPONINECONOMICSMOREGENERALLY,ISTOABSTRACTFROMEQUITYISSUESTOFOCUSONATTAININGALLOCATEEFFICIENCYBUTTHISARGUMENTRESTSONANUMBEROFRESTRICTIVEANDULTIMATELYUNREALISTICASSUMPTIONSABOUTREDISTRIBUTIONTHUSTHEREMAYINGENERALTERMSBEATRADEOFFBETWEENEQUITYANDEFFICIENCYMOREFUNDAMENTALLY,ITISIMPOSSIBLETOPERFECTLYSEPARATEEQUITYANDEFFICIENCYCONSIDERATIONSINWELFAREECONOMICSJUSTASEQUITYCANNOTBEIGNORED,NOTIONSOFWHATISEQUITABLE,“FAIR”OR“JUST”APPEARTOBEINTRINSICALLYSUBJECTIVE,EVENIFTHEYAREINSOMEWAYOBJECTIVE,ITISCERTAINLYTRUETHATCONTEXTMATTERSACROSSDIFFERENTAREASOFPUBLICPOLICY,AWIDEVARIETYOFDISTRIBUTIVEPRINCIPLESAREAPPLIED,SOTHATITISOFTENDIFFICULTTOIDENTIFYTHECOMMONALITIESANDPUTTHEMTOMUCHPRACTICALUSETHISSUGGESTSITISTHENIMPORTANTTOKNOWSOMETHINGABOUTPUBLICPREFERENCESOVERTHEEQUITYEFFICIENCYTRADEOFFSUCHANAPPROACHCANBESUPPORTEDBYANUMBEROFTHEORIESINMORALANDPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYTHUS,INTHISPAPERWEUSEASIMPLECHOICEEXPERIMENTTOELICITINDIVIDUALPREFERENCESOVEREQUITYEFFICIENCYTRADEOFFSINTHECONTEXTOFTWOENVIRONMENTALPROBLEMSOFDIFFERENTSCALES1THEMITIGATIONOFLOCALAIRPOLLUTIONFROMTRAFFICEMISSIONSAND2THEMITIGATIONOFGLOBALCLIMATECHANGEBYREDUCINGGREENHOUSEGASEMISSIONSWEGAININSIGHTSINTOPUBLICPREFERENCESOVERTHEKEYPOLICYDESIGNISSUESNOTABLYTHEEQUITYEFFICIENCYTRADEOFFANDWHATFACTORSDETERMINETHEDIFFERENCESINTHESEFROMONEPERSONTOTHENEXTOURCENTRALCONCLUSIONISTHATEQUITYMATTERSTOPEOPLEASMUCHASEFFICIENCYDOESINTHEDESIGNANDDELIVERYOFENVIRONMENTALPOLICYASMUCHASTHEREEXISTPOPULARPREFERENCESFORCOSTEFFECTIVEPOLICIES,PREFERENCESOVERTHEDISTRIBUTIONOFCOSTSCARRYSIMILARWEIGHTINTERMSOFTHENATUREANDDIRECTIONOFTHESEDISTRIBUTIVEPREFERENCES,TWOKEYTHEMESEMERGETHEFIRSTISTHATTHEPOLLUTEROUGHTTOPAYFORTHEDELIVERYOFANENVIRONMENTALIMPROVEMENTWITHRESPECTTOHOWPROPERTYRIGHTSAREALLOCATEDBETWEENTHEPOLLUTERANDTHEPOLLUTE,THEBALANCEISCLEARLYTIPPEDTOWARDTHEPOLLUTE,SUCHTHATTHEPOLLUTERPAYSTHESECONDISTHATINCOMEABILITYTOPAYSHOULDALSOBECONSIDEREDINDISTRIBUTINGTHECOMPLIANCECOSTSOFPOLLUTIONCONTROLPOLICYEQUITYANDEFFICIENCYINENVIRONMENTPOLICYITISALMOSTINEVITABLETHATPOLICIESANDPROJECTSWITHENVIRONMENTALIMPACTSWILLHAVEDISTRIBUTIONALCONSEQUENCES,WHICHWECOULDVERYGENERALLYDEFINEASANYRELATIVECHANGEINABROADNOTIONOFINCOMEORWEALTHBETWEENTWOORMOREINDIVIDUALSTHEREAREMANYDIMENSIONSTOTHESEDISTRIBUTIVEEFFECTS,INCLUDINGINCOME,LOCATIONINSPACEANDTIME,ANDETHNICITYINTHISPAPER,WEAREINTERESTEDINTHEALLOCATIONOFTHEOPPORTUNITYCOSTOFENVIRONMENTALPROTECTIONINPARTICULAR,WEFOCUSONTHEINTERPLAYBETWEENPRINCIPLESGUIDINGTHEALLOCATIONOFCOSTBETWEENPRODUCERSOFPOLLUTIONANDVICTIMSOFPOLLUTION,ANDTHEPRINCIPLEOFPAYMENTINPROPORTIONTOABILITYTOPAYMOREOVER,WEAREINTERESTEDINTHETRADEOFFTHATMAYWELLEXISTBETWEENTHESEDISTRIBUTIVEPRINCIPLESASAWHOLEANDTHEOVERALLEFFICIENCYOFENVIRONMENTALPOLICYTHEALLOCATIONOFCOSTBETWEENPRODUCERSOFPOLLUTIONANDVICTIMSOFPOLLUTIONWASCLASSICALLYCONSTRUCTEDASAPROBLEMOFLIABILITYANDTHEINITIALALLOCATIONOFPROPERTYRIGHTSBYCOASE1960THEPOLLUTERPAYSPRINCIPLEPPPASSIGNSPROPERTYRIGHTSTOTHEVICTIMSOFPOLLUTIONITHASPROVENTOBEHIGHLYINFLUENTIALINTHEDRAFTINGOFENVIRONMENTALLEGISLATIONATTHENATIONALANDINTERNATIONALLEVELSTHEDIAMETRICOPPOSITEOFTHEPPPISTHEBENEFICIARYPAYSPRINCIPLEBPPUNDERTHISPRINCIPLE,THEBENEFICIARIESOFANENVIRONMENTALIMPROVEMENTSHOULDPAYFORITEXAMPLESOFTHEBPPCANBEFOUNDININTERNATIONALENVIRONMENTALAGREEMENTS,ALTHOUGHFEWEXAMPLESCANBEFOUNDINNATIONALENVIRONMENTALPOLICY,NEVERTHELESS,THEPRINCIPLETHATPEOPLESHOULDPAYINPROPORTIONTOTHEBENEFITSTHEYOBTAINFROMPUBLICSERVICEPROVISIONISACCEPTEDANDESTABLISHEDINOTHERAREASASIDEFROMTHEALLOCATIONOFPROPERTYRIGHTSBETWEENPRODUCERSANDVICTIMSOFPOLLUTION,ONEOFTHEFOREMOSTDISTRIBUTIVECONCERNSINENVIRONMENTALPOLICYHASBEENTHATPOLICIESCOULDBEREGRESSIVE,SUCHTHATLOWINCOMEGROUPSPAYADISPROPORTIONATESHAREOFTHEOPPORTUNITYCOSTTHISMAYINPARTICULARBETRUEOFPOLICIESTHATINCREASETHECOSTOFHOUSEHOLDENERGY,ANDINSUCHCASESBURDENSMIGHTALSOBEALLOCATEDACCORDINGTOABILITYTOPAYWEWILLGENERALLYREFERTOTHISASTHEABILITYTOPAYPRINCIPLEINPRACTICE,THEREISMUCHEVIDENCETOSUGGESTTHATABALANCEISSOUGHTTHATATRADEOFFISMADEINTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHESEPRINCIPLESFOREXAMPLE,TOBEYANDSMETS1996ARGUETHATABARRIERTOIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHEPPPINAGRICULTURALPOLICYHASBEENADESIRETOPROTECTTHEINCOMESOFFAMILYFARMS,WHOARETHEPOLLUTERSINTHISCASEMOREOVER,THEREISALSOMUCHEVIDENCETOSUGGESTTHATATRADEOFFISMADEBETWEENTHEOVERALLEFFICIENCYOFENVIRONMENTALPOLICIESANDTHEDISTRIBUTIONOFTHEIRBENEFITSANDCOSTSFOREXAMPLE,WHILEITISWIDELYUNDERSTOODTHATTHE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