ORG THEORY 2004 PHD SEMINAR

1、course syllabusph.d. seminar: organization theory (02814600)15:40-18:40, friday, room 115guanghua school of managementpeking universityfall 2004 sememsterprofessor: fanmin kong , dr.office:rm. 448, guanhua school of managementtelephone:6275-3198email: fkongoffice hour:by appointmentorganization theo

2、ry is concerned with the study of the behavior and performance of groups and units in organizations, and the behavior of organizations in markets and the economy, predominantly from the perspectives of economics, sociology and political science. the related field of organizational behavior concentra

3、tes on the behavior and performance of individuals in organizations, mostly from the perspective of psychology. however, in order to understand how groups and organizations behave, interact, and perform, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of how individuals operate in different situations

4、. the purpose of this seminar is to explore a few topics, impart key economic concepts necessary for understanding important ideas in organization theory, and help bring an organization-theoretic perspective on various issues in human resources and industrial relations. the weekly seminar meetings w

5、ill be dedicated to discussion, under the guidance of a discussion leader. this is a reading and writing-intensive seminar. some of the technical economic writing, particularly mathematical models, may be difficult to comprehend fully; you will need to read beyond the math and jargon. i welcome conv

6、ersations about the seminar materials and about your work (and mine); please feel free to drop by my office at any time (or make an appointment in advance).i. seminar topicsthe topics that will be covered in the seminar belong to two broad areas: (1) different approaches to the study of organization

7、s, emphasizing economics-inspired approaches, and (2) selected topics in growing areas of research in hrir-oriented organization theory. this seminar will not cover the topics and perspectives covered in the alternate-year ob/ot seminar, taught by a psychologist. the principal topics that will be co

8、vered in the seminar are:basic issues in organizations different approaches and tools in organization theory the firm and the market individual behavior: self-interest, identity, values, and rationalitygoverning relationships: hierarchies, contracts, trust, and reciprocity agency theory and game the

9、ory: tools and substanceincentives, profit sharing, team theory, and employee involvementthe determinants and consequences of organizational structure: practices, programs, bundles, and systemsownership of the firm and alternative forms of organization: for-profit firms, nonprofit organizations, emp

10、loyee ownership, cooperatives, and government-owned firmsorganizational life cycles: birth, growth, and demiseadditional topics will be covered by students thesis proposals. i am providing a minimal reading list; i will suggest more readings as we go along. in addition, each of you will provide a re

11、ading list, as described below. here are some details and readings.ii. weekly three-page commentary on the readingsevery week seminar members will write three pages summarizing their observations about the readings. each commentary will include a critical summary of the required readings. iii. discu

12、ssion leadersthe weekly seminar meetings will be led by a discussion leader. the discussion leader will identify key issues, and will lead the group discussion. the discussion leader will have therefore to read the materials more carefully, and read a little beyond the assigned readings. each semina

13、r member will lead two class meetings. please forward to me your choice of three topics you would like to lead i will try to schedule the discussions on the basis of your preferences before the first class meeting. some topics will require two discussion leaders.iv. ph.d. theses proposalsevery semin

14、ar member will prepare a ph.d. thesis proposal on a topic related to organization theory, but which may be principally grounded in any other hrir area. this is a mock proposal only, intended to help students to prepare for writing a real one. it may be useful to consult also with your advisor regard

15、ing the topic of the mock proposal. the proposal will be at least 30 pages long, and will include the following points and considerations:(1) a review identifying the accomplishments of the literature dealing with your topic,(2)an outline identifying the important open questions that the thesis woul

16、d address, or the old questions that should be answered differently,(3)an explanation of how the questions outlined in (2) can be addressed, specifyinga)the theoretical framework,b)what data would be optimal for investigating theoretical hypotheses,c)what kind of data are readily available,d)what ki

17、nd of data can be collected, where, how and at what cost, ande) how the data will be analyzed.v. tentative schedule and readingsweek 1basic issues in organizations ben-ner, avner, john michael montias, and egon neuberger. 1993. “basic issues in organizations: a comparative perspective,” journal of c

18、omparative economics, 17:207-42. putterman, louis and randall s. kroszner, 1996, “the economic nature of the firm: a new introduction,” in putterman, louis, and randall kroszner (eds.), the economic nature of the firm, cambridge university pressweek 2discussion leaders:different approaches and tools

19、 in organization theory nohria, nitin. 1992. “introduction: is a network perspective a useful way of studying organizations?” in nitin nohria and robert eccles (eds.) networks and organizations: structure, form and action, harvard business school press. hirsch, paul m., ray friedman, and mitchell p.

20、 koza. 1990. “collaboration or paradigm shift? caveat emptor and the risk of romance with economic models for strategy and policy research.” organization science 1(1):87-97. cohen, michael, james march, and johan olsen. 1972. a garbage can model of organizational choice. administrative science quart

21、erly 17:1-25. dimaggio , paul, 1988. “interest and agency in institutional theory.” in institutional patterns and organizations: culture and environment, ed. lynne g. zucker, 3-21. cambridge, mass.: ballinger publishing co. robert gibbons, 2003, “team theory, garbage cans, and real organizations: so

22、me history and prospects of economic research on decision-making in organizations,” industrial and corporate change, volume 12, number 4: 753-787.week 3 discussion leader:the firm and the market chandler, alfred, from the visible hand; reprinted in putterman and kroszner coase, ronald, 1937, “than n

23、ature of the firm,” economica vol. 4, pp. 386-405, reprinted with minor abridgements in putterman, louis, and randall kroszner (eds.). 1996. the economic nature of the firm, cambridge university press williamson; reprinted in putterman and krosznerweeks 4 and 5every seminar member prepares and distr

24、ibutes to other seminar members in advance (by the end of the day on friday before the monday of the fourth week of the seminar) a two-page outline of the contemplated ph.d. thesis proposal.discussion leaders:individual behavior: self-interest, identity, values, culture, and rationality williamson i

25、n p-k ben-ner, avner and louis putterman , 1998, values and institutions in economic analysis, in avner ben-ner and louis putterman, eds., economics, values, and organization, cambridge university press, 1998, pp. 3-72. akerlof, g. a., r. e. kranton, (2000). “economics and identity.“the quarterly jo

26、urnal of economics, 115(3), 715-753. greif, avner. 1994. “cultural beliefs and the organization of society: a historical and theoretical reflection on collectivist and individualist societies,” journal of political economy 102 (oct.), 912-950. randall, donna, 1993. “cross-cultural research on organi

27、zational commitment: a review and application of hofstedes value survey module,” journal of business research 26, 91-110. hofstede, geert (1994) cultures and organizations. london: harper-collins. (skim for basic familiarity) langlois, richard, 2003, cognition and the theory of the firm, journal of

28、economic psychologyweeks 6 and 7discussion leaders:governing relationships: hierarchies, contracts, trust, and reciprocity baker, george, robert gibbons, and kevin j. murphy, (2002) “relational contracts and the theory of the firm,” quarterly journal of economics, 117: 39-83. garicano, louis, 2000,

29、“hierarchies and the organization of knowledge in production,” journal of political economy, vol. 108, no. 5, october 2000, pp. 874-904 hayek, friedrich a. 1945, “the use of knowledge in society” the american economic review, vol. 35, no. 4. (sept.,); reprinted in putterman and kroszner williamson,

30、wachter, and harris; reprinted in putterman and kroszner akerlof; reprinted in putterman and kroszner williamson, oliver, the governance of contractual relations; reprinted in putterman and kroszner ernst fehr and simon gachter. 1998. “how effective are trust- and reciprocity-based incentives?” in a

31、vner ben-ner and louis putterman, eds., economics, values, and organization, cambridge university press.week 8discussion leaders:agency theory and game theory: tools and substance fama, eugene, agency problems and the theory of the firm; reprinted in putterman and kroszner jensen, michael and meckli

32、ng, william, theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure; reprinted in putterman and kroszner milgrom, paul and john roberts (1992), economics, organization, and management, prentice hall, engelewood hills, nj, chs. 5-6 (bounded rationality and private information,

33、 and moral hazard and performance incentives) prendergast, canice, 2002, “the tenuous trade-off between risk and incentives,” journal of political economy, vol. 110 (5): 1071-1102.week 9discussion leaders:incentives, profit sharing, team theory, and employee involvement ben-ner, avner, w. allen burn

34、s, greg dow and louis putterman, 2000, “employee participation in ownership: an empirical exploration,” in margaret blair and thomas a. kochan (eds.), the new relationship: human capital in the american corporation, brookings institution press, 2000, 194-240. ben-ner, avner and derek jones. 1995. “e

35、mployee participation, ownership, and productivity: a theoretical framework”, industrial relations, vol. 34, no. 4, october, pp. 532-554. richard freeman, joseph blasi and douglas kruse: monitoring colleagues at work: employee ownership, profit sharing, and workplace performance in the united states

36、 prendergast, canice. 1999. “the provision of incentives in firms.” journal of economic literature 37:1 (march): 7-63.week 10seminar members make 30-minutes presentations of their 25-page (approximately) draft papers. the papers should consist of a detailed literature review and a skeleton of a prop

37、osal. the paper and background literature (up to 45 pages) should be distributed by friday before the presentation.weeks 11 and 12discussion leaders:the determinants and consequences of organizational structure: practices, programs, bundles, and systems ichniowski, casey, thomas kochan, david levine

38、, craig olson, and george strauss. 1996. “what works at work: overview and assessment”, industrial relations, 35(2): 299-333. huselid, mark (1995) “the impact of human resource management practices on turnover, productivity, and corporate financial performance,” academy of management journal, vol. 3

39、8, no. 3, 635-672. cappelli, peter, and david neumark. 2001. “do “high-performance” work practices improve establishment-level outcomes?” industrial and labor relations review, vol. 54, no. 4, pp. 737-775. milgrom, paul and john roberts. 1995. “complementarities and fit: strategy, structure, and org

40、anizational change in manufacturing.” journal of accounting and economics, vol. 19, pp. 179-208. ben-ner, avner, fanmin kong, tzu-shian han, nien-chi liu, and yong-seung park “the organization of work: changes and their consequences,” nordic journal of political economy, vol. 27(2), 2002.week 13disc

41、ussion leaders:ownership of the firm and alternative forms of organization: for-profit firms, nonprofit organizations, employee ownership, cooperatives, and government-owned firms demsetz, harold, the structure of ownership and the theory of the firm; reprinted in putterman and kroszner hart, oliver

42、, an economists perspective on the theory of the firm; reprinted in putterman and kroszner hart, o., shleifer, a., & vishny, r. 1997. “the proper scope of government.” quarterly journal of economics, 112(4), 1127-1161. ben-ner, avner, 2003, “for-profit, state, and nonprofit: how to cut the pie among

43、 the three sectors.”week 14discussion leaders:organizational life cycles: birth, growth, and demise agarwal, rajshreee and michael gort, 2002, “firm and product life cycles and firm survival,” american economic review, papers and proceeding, may, pp. 184-190. ben-ner, avner, 1988, the life cycle of

44、worker-owned firms in market economies: a theoretical analysis, journal of economic behavior and organization, vol. 10, october, pp. 287-313. reprinted in producer cooperatives and labor-managed systems (david prychitko and jaroslav vanek, eds.), edward elgar publishing ltd., 1996. wang, hua, 2004, “the effects of employee stock ownership and profit sharing on firm survival,” dissertation p