Work, education and civil society In need of a new paradigm

1、european meeting of university professors, rome, 21-24 june 2007ethical and rational underpinnings of work in the current economic contextwork, education and civil society: in need of a new paradigmjoan fontrodona*, manuel guilln and alfredo rodrguez sedanowork is a human reality that has taken on k

2、ey importance in todays world. the impact of human work on the world has increased considerably as a result of the technological advances of the last century. moreover, from a more existential point of view, work also has a major impact on people and society. however, precisely at a time when work p

3、lays such an important role, the concept we have of work may be losing importance compared to other moments in the history of thought. recovering all the aspects that make up a complete idea of work is important to be able to understand and value work in itself, and to define the educational process

4、 that takes place before and during our professional lives, as well as the social dynamics in which work takes place. this paper will first describe work from a phenomenological and anthropological perspective and then discuss the different aspects of work and the information gained during each step

5、 of the learning process. we will then present an evaluation of the educational framework for the development of competencies that is currently being prepared in the european union as an example of how the concept of work is losing sway and discuss the practical implications this may have on educati

6、on. finally, we will * associate professor, business ethics department, academic director, center for business in society, iese business school university of navarre, barcelona, spain associate professor, business organization department, university of valencia, valencia, spain associate professor o

7、f sociology, department of education, university of navarre, pamplona, spainreflect on social dynamics and propose that “practical reason” and the “logic of truth” be recovered as factors that can help understand the concept of work in all its detail. an anthropological look at work human activity h

8、as a number of characteristics that distinguish it from the activity performed by other living beings. first of all, human activity forces us to make contact with the environment. other living beings also make contact with their environment (umwelt), i.e. the world around them that takes on meaning

9、as dictated by their biological needs. but humans are capable of going beyond what is immediately significant and creating distance between what is around them and themselves. thanks to this distance, they are able to give this reality a different meaning. humans therefore not only have an umwelt bu

10、t a welt (universe), to which they give their own meaning while respecting reality for what it is. that is why art is such a quintessentially human concept, because it is the ability to turn reality into an object to be contemplated. animals kill and eat. humans have turned this biological need into

11、 a cultural event by creating gastronomy. in their relations with the world, humans are “non-specialists”. all other living beings specialize in one thing or another: some are designed to fly, others to spend their lives in water; some can withstand the cold, while others can tolerate tropical heat.

12、 however, humans are defined by their lack of specialization. humans can adapt to any environment and situation, not because of their biological conditions, but because they are capable of coming up with solutions that allow them to survive in different situations. when they want to fly, they invent

13、 the airplane. when they want to move underwater, they invent the submarine. when they are cold, they wear warm clothes. when they are hot, they invent air conditioning or freeze water to make ice. aristotle said that “humans have been given hands because they are the most intelligent of all animals

14、”. in other words, humans make up for their lack of biological conditions with their intelligence and ability to create devices with their hands. their ability to make things is strengthened by their ability to think. a second feature is that when humans take action, it not only produces external re

15、sults, but also modifies them and contributes to who they are. human life is not only a biological process, but a profoundly biographical one: by their very actions, human beings write their own history and that of all of humanity. in one of his discussions with his followers, socrates asks if it is

16、 worse to suffer injustice or commit it. you might think it is worse to suffer injustice because the person who commits it gets something out of it, whereas the person who suffers injustice has to put up with unexpected and unwanted distress. and yet socrates answers that committing injustice is wor

17、se because the person who commits it becomes less just. in other words, something inside the person who commits an act of injustice creates a change for the worse in that person. this is much worse than the positive results that person may gain from the unjust act. it may not be that easy to underst

18、and this important aspect of human action. it might console us to know that even socrates followers had trouble grasping the concept. when we evaluate the effects of our actions, we should not only think about the externally patent consequences, but also about the other consequences that remain insi

19、de the person who takes action. they may not have an immediate impact but more long-term effects, and their effects may be much more radical because they help shape our personality and determine who we are. someone who commits an act of injustice is preparing to commit the same act in the future. th

20、e next time it will be much easier and this person will be much closer to committing even more unjust acts. to look at it from the opposite perspective, someone who commits an act of justice, a magnanimous, charitable, generous or friendly act, is more predisposed to continue in the same vein, thus

21、making it easier to perform such an act again in the future. the greek philosophers referred to these predispositions we acquire as virtues. when we take action, we acquire virtues (or vices if our actions are bad). we are not only doing things, but creating the person we are. a third characteristic

22、 of human activity is that humans not only do things themselves, but do them with others. humans are also capable of having others do things for them. humans not only do things, but are able to manage others. managing others involves getting other people to do the things one wants. managing does not

23、 involve modifying inert materials (which is producing), but modifying someones will so that the person (who is an equal) does what one wants. objects and goods can be administered. people are managed. managing is the hardest job humans can do because it does not merely involve informing others (com

24、munication is a major part of management, but management cannot be reduced to merely transmitting information), but having an influence on their behaviour (making them do what one wants them to do) and at the same time respecting their condition as free, intelligent beings. when this is not respecte

25、d, management becomes manipulation. managing people is an art that cannot be reduced to a simple set of rules. it is not the application of a technique, but calls for a specific mind set from the manager and the people being managed. ultimately, management is based on the managers ability to generat

26、e trust. this trust not only arises from the managers technical knowledge (managers do not necessarily have to know more than the people they manage; in many cases, the opposite is true) or a kind of emotional collusion (managers do not have to be nice or share interests and tastes with the people t

27、hey manage), but is based on the perception that when managers manage, they are thinking about what is best for the people they manage, who trust them and put themselves in managers hands. to paraphrase aristotle, we could say that “i put myself in his hands because he is the most trustworthy of liv

28、ing beings”. these three characteristics indicate in one way or another the dimensions of work. in any job or professional activity there is an objective dimension, a result that is exteriorized and accomplished, and a subjective dimension, which is the result of the action in the person doing the a

29、ction. this subjective dimension is present in the person who does the action, as well as in the people who receive the action. we change through work and the people who we deal with also change. we can therefore say that a good job not only consists of doing what one should, but becoming a better p

30、erson as a result and improving the other people one works with. when these three dimensions are borne in mind, they result in positive synergies that contribute to the development of society because we become better people and make the world we share a better place. in his encyclical on work, pope

31、john paul ii pointed out two senses of work which have some relation to the dimensions discussed above. he first mentions work in the objective sense, which expresses the divine mandate of control over the earth, for which humans make use of technology. technology is mans ally in that “it facilitate

32、s his work, perfects, accelerates and augments it”, though it can also turn into his adversary (john paul ii, 1981, 5). with regard to work in a subjective sense, john paul ii indicated that the source of the dignity of work should be sought by the person actually doing the work. moreover, the purpo

33、se of work resides in man himself. st. josemara escriv, a saint of our days, understood work as the frame which supports the entire spiritual life of todays christians. using a description with a rather ascetic tone, he presents the three dimensions discussed above when he says, “it is we, men walki

34、ng in the street, ordinary christians immersed in the blood-stream of society, whom our lord wants to be saints and apostles, in the very midst of our professional work; that is, sanctifying our job in life, sanctifying ourselves in it and, through it, helping others to sanctify themselves as well”

35、(escriv, 1977, 119). he concludes by saying that “since christ took it into his hands, work has become for us a redeemed and redemptive reality. not only is it the background of mans life, it is a means and path of holiness. it is something to be sanctified and something which sanctifies” (escriv, 1

36、977, 47).an aristotelian approach to human actionin the nicomachean ethics, aristotle distinguishes between theory and praxis. theory is the knowledge of what is universal and necessary, of that which cannot be in another manner. on the contrary, praxis is the knowledge of what is particular and con

37、tingent. these two knowledge can refer to the same reality, but they do so in different ways, according to the well known example used by aristotle: “a carpenter and a geometer investigate the right angle in different ways; the former does so in so far as the right angle is useful for his work, whil

38、e the latter inquires what it is or what sort of thing it is; for he is a spectator of the truth” (nic. eth., i, 7, 1098 a 30-33).aristotle introduces a new distinction in the ambit of the contingent, when he affirms that “among the things that can be in another manner, is that which is the object o

39、f production and that which is the object of an action or an act” (nic. eth., vi, 4, 1140 a, 1-2). aristotle distinguishes between the production of artefacts and a moral action, which the subject is responsible for. for this second type he reserves the name of praxis, while he gives the name of poi

40、esis to the production (technical or artistic).therefore, we can say that for aristotle there are three types of knowledge, each one of them with its proper object:-theory, which occupies itself with universal and necessary objects-praxis, which occupies itself with actions which morally make perfec

41、t the subject. in latin it corresponds with the terms “agere”, “actio” (to do).-poiesis, which occupies itself with the material production. in latin it corresponds with the term “facere”, “factio” (to make). the concept of techne (ars in latin) corresponds with this ambit. therefore, both technical

42、 actions and artistic productions would be included here.for aristotle these are not only three ways of knowledge; they have to be understood in a much more vital way. they are three ways of life. theoretical life, proper of the philosophers, is a life of contemplating the eternal and the inherent.

43、practical life is expressed in a proper way, in the participation in public life, as in the case of politicians. the technical life corresponds with manual work, carried out by those who in the greek civilization did not really have the condition of citizens.hannah arendt has warned about the danger

44、 of this vision that devaluates the world of human action (the vita activa) subordinating it to the life of contemplation (the vita contemplativa). the task she set herself was to reinstate the life of public and political action by systematically elaborating what this vita activa might be said to e

45、ntail (yar, 2006). arendt argued for a tripartite division between the human activities of labour, work, and action (arendt, 1958):-labour is that activity which corresponds to the biological processes and necessities of human existence (animal laborans), the practices which are necessary for the ma

46、intenance of life itself. -work corresponds to the fabrication of an artificial world of things, distinguished by its durability, its semi-permanence and relative independence from the individual actors and acts which call it into being. homo fabers representatives are, for example, the builder, the

47、 architect, the craftsperson, the artist and the legislator, as they create the public world both physically and institutionally by constructing buildings and making laws.-action is defined by freedom, that is, as an end in itself and so as subordinate to nothing outside itself. to act means to take

48、 initiative, to begin, to set something in motion. so, intrinsic to the human capacity for action is the introduction of genuine novelty, the unexpected, unanticipated and unpredictable into the world. arendts theory holds that actions cannot be justified for their own sake, but only in light of the

49、ir public recognition and the shared rules of a political community. action is therefore the proper activity of the social character of the human being (zoon politikon) and requires a public space in which it can be realized, a context in which individuals can encounter one another as members of a c

50、ommunity (yar, 2006).here we arrive at a certain paradox. greek philosophy situated theory as the highest form of life. on the other hand, arendt wants to underline the value of active life, and states that man is only free when he moves about easily in the ambit of action (praxis). finally, nowaday

51、s the idea of production (poiesis) has acquired an important relevance. is there any way of relating all these three ambits? can theory and praxis (action) contribute something to poiesis (technique and art)? when defining the three types of knowledge, the differences between them have been underlin

52、ed. the first difference is that theory moves in the ambit of the universal, while praxis (action) and poiesis (technique and art) move about in the ambit of the particular. the second difference is that theory and praxis are inherent operations, i.e. actions of reason whose results revert on the su

53、bject. on the other hand, poiesis refers to transitive operations, whose results are modifications of exterior material (table 1).objectoperationtheoryuniversalinherentpraxis(action)particularinherentpoiesis(production or art)particulartransitivetable 1. differences between the three types of human

54、knowledgetherefore, praxis (action) is equally far apart from the technical or artistic skill (poiesis) and the sure knowledge of universal truths (theories). praxis shares with poiesis an interest for particular questions and is not interested in knowledge in itself, but unlike poiesis, its activit

55、y does not translate itself in exterior results. praxis asks how one knows what is alright, how to decide at every moment what has to be done, and what methods have to be used in order to achieve this.now, the question is not only how to distinguish these three kinds of knowledge, but if they are re

56、lated in any way. if these three kinds of knowledge are understood not as excluding, but in categorical terms, the hypothesis that the three kinds of knowledge could be found in one same action can be taken into account. aristotle contemplates this possibility when he alerts that through action the

57、flute players art improves, as well as that of the sculptor and all who produce or work on some thing, and which reveals a certain inherence of the act (nic. eth., i, 7, 1097 b 23-1098 a 20). in terms of the subject at hand, what we are interested in is the relationship that poiesis has with the oth

58、er two.poiesis (technique and art) needs theory. the homo faber cannot be understood only as that who executes or transforms the material in virtue of the perfection of his corporal organs. he is also homo sapiens, because without knowledge, technique or art is impossible (chirinos, 2002). in order

59、to produce artefacts, human being needs both, the sensorial knowledge of the material which is the object of the transformation process as well as the scientific knowledge of the laws of the process (chirinos, 2002).poiesis (production) needs praxis. poiesis has to be understood as an action which i

60、ntervenes in the course of a process. arendt underlines that work has essentially an instrumental character. work is essentially a means to achieve the thing which is to be fabricated (be it a work of art, a building or a structure of legal relations) and so stands in a relation of mere purposivenes