全球金融危机期间日本中小企业融资doc译文

1、 全球金融危机期间日本中小企业融资： 来自公司调查的证据 在远和上杉威一郎 摘 要 从一个独特的公司的调查数据使用，本文考察了日本小型和中型企业（SME）在日本的全球金融危机期间的融资。本文的主要调查结果是双重的。首先，在信贷供应方面，由主要银行提供的扩张贷款是大多数日本中小企业应对危机的“第一道防线”。相反，由公司的主要供应商所提供贸易信贷的作用相对有限。该政府在应对这场危机紧急出台信贷担保（ECG）计划也有助于增加信贷投放。其次，在企业的事后条款性能，由公司的主银行提供的贷款延长和政府政策措施支持的贷款支持延长没有任何可衡量的影响。而获得这些贷款的企业平均盈利能力的恶化超过了这些公司200

2、9年没有获得贷款时的水平，这两个群体之间的差异在2010年后消失。 中图分类号：G21，G28，G30，G38 关键词：中小企业融资，主要的银行，贸易信贷，信用担保 1 简介 当全球金融危机在雷曼兄弟这个很大的投资银行于2008年9月破产后爆发 ， 导致日本经济陷入严重的衰退。在与美国和欧洲银行的对比，日本的银行由于持有大量债务抵押债券或信用资产负债表衍生产品挂钩于美国次级抵押贷款并没有严重损害受苦。尽管如此，日本经济保持着连续四个季度负的GDP增长率记录，从2008年第二季度到2009年第一季度，日本的出口由于经济大衰退急剧下降。虽然许多中小型企业（SMEs）的并没有直接出口，他们不过被通过

3、冲击其交易伙伴受到严重影响，即客户，供应商和贷款人。 本文的目的是在提供日本中小企业在全球金融危机融资的概述。为此，我们使用一个公司的调查数据集的描述性统计数据来研究中小企业在危机期间融资和通过使用这一数据集提供深入讨论的经验研究。特别是，我们重点关注以下三个问题。首先，我们要论证影响中小企业冲击（需求，供给和金融冲击）的本质，并研究如何应对公司受到的这些冲击。其次，我们研究关系贷款（主要银行），商业上的债权人（主要供应商），和政府在危机时期中小企业融资的的作用。对于政府的作用，我们主要关注在2008年秋季退出的应对这次危机的紧急信贷担保计划（）。第三，我们比较信贷可用性和依靠关系贷款 的性能

4、，贸易债权人和政府计划的中小企业在2008年至2012年的事后表现。我们采用的数据集，是基于经济研究协会和贸易和工业（经济产业研究所）两项调查，它对研究上述问题时特别有用。该问卷调查是通过学者和研究人员，包括我们与经济产业研究所合作精心构建以匹配实证策略从而来回答有关的研究和政策问题。我们这篇文章中调查的实证研究是为这个深思熟虑的研究设计的产品。在此外，结合经济产业研究所的调查数据集和从应诉企业在危机发生后的财务数据声明，目前的研究提供了关于关系贷款人，贸易债权人和政府如何贷和款信贷延长了对于提高信贷的可用性和期间和危机之后提高企业绩效是很有用的一个事后评价 。 本文的主要结果，包括用经济产业

5、研究所的调查所得到的实证研究的结果，现报告如下。首先，我们发现，在在全球金融危机对中小企业融资的影响方面最重要内容是通过对客户的需求冲击而不是任何供给面的融资冲击。为了应付需求面冲击，许多中小企业依靠银行贷款，尤其是通过他们的主要银行提供的贷款。由主要供应商所提供的贸易信贷的作用是相对有限的。第二，虽然我们发现，从主银行贷款对于大多数中小企业来说是应对危机的“第一道防线”，我们也发现，一些企业遇到从他们的主要银行获得贷款的困难。后者的一个可能的原因是，这些企业危机前从非主银行取得事务性贷款，这削弱了它们与主银行的关系 。我们还发现，银行突然收紧在危机期间放贷的态度是针对事务性贷款者。第三，虽然

6、我们发现因为非主银行减少贷款而引起的主银行贷款增加紧急信贷担保计划在增加中小企业在危机中取得贷款可得性很有用，正是主银行在提供紧急信贷担保计划。这一发现表明，公司和银行保持紧密的关系可能对公共信用担保的有效性产生负面影响。最后，虽然由主要银行提供的贷款延长和贷款要不是由任何政府下属的金融机构提供的或通过政府信贷担保方案包括紧急信贷担保计划提供，一般来说都有助于增加中小企业取得的信贷投放，他们并没有帮助改善所获得贷款的这些中小企业的事后表现。接受这些贷款公司的平均盈利能力比公司在2009年没有接受贷款时更加恶化，而这两个群体之间的差别 在2010后消失。此外，接受这些贷款公司的员工人数，特别是从

7、主银行取得的贷款的员工人数比没有取得贷款的公司减少了更多，特别是再年之后。综合考虑这些，这些结果表明，主要银行，政府金融机构，和信用担保公司借款敦促这些公司通过削减成本的重组增加他们的盈利能力，从而导致在员工数量的减少。然而，该这些企业的盈利能力仍然没有显示出任何改善显著，大概是因为他们的总销售额也有所下降比例。通过提供贸易信贷主要的供应商也没有对企业事后的表现产生较大的影响。 在本文的其余部分的结构如下。第2节提供了日本中小企业在全球金融危机期间融资一个概述。第3节说明了经济产业研究所调查和我们使用的TSR数据库。部分4检查来自危机的冲击的本质与中小企业如何应对它们。第5，6，和7然后分别考

8、察了由主银行提供，由主要供应商提供贸易信贷贷款，和并由ECG项目担保的贷款信贷的作用。接下来，第8节调查这些贷款是否有助于增加贷款的可得性，以及提高中小企业的事后表现。第9节总结。 2 日本中小企业在全球金融危机期间融资概述 全球金融危机使日本经济陷入严重的经济衰退和对很多中小企业造成了负面影响。图1显示了从1991年到2012年日本各种不同大小规模的企业的ROA（资产利润率=营业利润/总资产），这里公司的大小规模是用总资产来衡量。该图显示，自从90年代初“泡沫”经济的爆发， 缴足资本小于千万日元这些最小的公司表现出最坏的ROA。此外，由于在它们的销售额的急剧下降，它们的ROA 在2008年后

9、急剧下降。在此背景下，许多中小企业面临融资困难，正如由日本央行提供的 公司的财务状况扩散指数的恶化所表示的那样。 图1在这附近 图2在这附近 虽然全球金融危机对日本经济的影响经济是相当大的，增加企业破产的数量是适度的当与21世纪初相比，当时日本经济由于不良贷款而瘫痪（图3）。还应当指出，中小企业贷款2008年后没有出现急速下滑（图4）。这表明，经过恶化中小企业的财务状况2008如图2所示主要是由于企业利润的下降（即在内部下降基金），而不是由于紧固贷款供应（即，在外部资金的下降），说明银行通过提供救援资金，可能会在防止全球金融危机传播到中小企业的冲击中发挥了作用 - 这个问题，我们会在下文详细研

10、究。 图3在这附近 图4在这附近危机期间银行对中小企业贷款也没有下降的原因之一是相比于美国和欧洲的银行，这次危机对日本银行的财务健康的损害是相对有限。例如，与证券化产品相关联的损失额在2008年9月底日本银行合共为3.3万亿日元，远低于其总的一级资本（50.0万亿日元）和他们的每年的利润（61000亿日元）.1相比之下，西方银行挂钩于证券化产品的损失为均高于日本银行十倍，从而对它们的资产负债表造成严重的损害（图1-10，日本银行，2010年a）。另外一个帮助缓解了金融危机的影响的因素是日本央行和政府在应对金融危机时的大规模的干预（见amori等人（2013年）了解详细信息）。特别是在应对资本市

11、场故障方面，日本央行暂时推出涉及到回购交易和商业票据直接购买措施和企业债的特殊货币政策。2此外，在2008年10月底，日本政府扩大了政府下属金融机构可以扩展的直接贷款的总金额，同时增加了它们被授权直接购买量。此外，关于中小企业融资，政府出台了紧急信贷担保计划。此计划是有史以来实施的在任何地方都实施的最大的信用担保问题之一，当该计划在2011年4月结束时总担保的金额达到27.1万亿日元（约300十亿美元）。除了金融爆发之后采取这些政策措施 ，日本政府2009年12月实施了利融资的中小企业（简称“中小企业融资法”以下）上临时法案措施，然而大多数的危机之后出台的政策措施，旨在方便为中小企业提供新贷款

12、，中小企业融资法案旨在减轻现有中小企业贷款的债务负担。具体而言，中小企业融资法案要求金融机构使客户通过借款人的中小企业积极响应的请求修订其最大努力贷款合同条款，通常表现为推迟偿还贷款的形式。为了鼓励金融机构接受借款人这样的请求，只要借款人作出修订贷款可信的业务重组计划（或致力于使业务重组计划一年之内），就在法律允许不将上述贷款归类为不良贷款。的中小企业融资法案是作为一项临时措施，是最初计划在2011年3月结束。然而它被延长了两次，最终在2013年3月结束。 企业所能请求申请到的修改贷款贷款条约的累计数 超过了430万美元，其中其中3和93的请求分别被接受。这种申请被接受的贷款累积量120000

13、0亿日元。在这种情况下，需要注意的是，虽然中小企业融资法案可能有助于保持企业破产的数量比否则没有中小企业融资法案的情况下减少，它也有可能使“僵尸”企业生存（Yamori等人，2013年）。此外，该法案可能会削弱日本银行的报表的融资公告的透明度和可信度，因为它可能已经向主管报告的真实的贡献不良贷款的数量。 3 数据集在我们将在下面调查的现在所使用的和先前的研究使用的数据都来自于以下调查： Kinyukikan to no Torihiki Jittai Choss(公司间和公司银行的交易调查）于2008年2月进行，Kinyukikika ni okeru Kinyukikan to no Tor

14、ihiki Jittai Chosa ( 金融危机期间在公司间和公司银行间交易的调查）这两次调查都是在在2009年2月 进行的。调查均是在的经济研究协会，贸易和工业（经济产业研究所），一个政府下属的研究机构下执行的，以下将它称为“经济产业研究所调查”。2008年的经济产业研究所的调查被送往从对由中小企业机构编写的以前政府调查做出回应的公司中挑选的17018 企业。调查公司随机从东京商工研究数据库抽取（以下简称TSR数据库），它是一个商业数据的公司。该TSR数据库涵盖了超过1.2万家日本公司，它保持这对公司的财务报表信息，以及他们的主要特征，包括企业年龄，企业的股权结构，以及银行与他们的交易身份

15、。受访企业对2008年的调查数量是6079。 2009年的经济产业研究所的调查问卷发送到对2008年调查做出回应的公司2008年这里调查不包括拖欠违约。对于5979家公司，该问卷被送到了的 2009年的调查，其中4103家公司做出回应。关于这些样本公司特性的详细摘要（日语）和这些调查的结果可以在上杉（2009年）等人研究中发现。 可以明确在这里说，绝大多数受访企业在2008年调查中的93.5企业和在2009年的调查94.7的企业 - 是不超过300个员工的中小企业 。因此，经济产业研究所的调查是对于用于检查中小企业如何度过金融危机是非常有用的。但请注意，这与这些应诉企业的规模分布与含有1701

16、8公司原始样品公司相比较的略微更围绕中心。也就是说，无论是落入哪个尾部，非常大的企业，还是很小企业的反应速度，都比它们之间落在中间的企业要低。关于本研究的目的，经济产业研究所调查的一个显着特征是，它们会询问调查的企业一些关于交易伙伴，也就是客户，供应商和银行的问题，此外，2009年的调查明确询问企业自己与交易伙伴的关系如何受到继雷曼兄弟在2008年秋季破产后的这次金融危机的影响，并在下面我们大多使用的数据集从2009年的调查构造审查交易伙伴在中小企业中的作用融资。此外，经济产业研究所的调查要求企业确定与他们有贷款余额的最大和第二大的量的两家银行。在本文中，我们将吧与公司有突出的贷款金额最大的银

17、行称为其“主银行”，并与一个公司有第二大数额贷款的银行为称为其“第二主银行”。我们也假设一个银行主要是公司“主银行”，因而是有关系的贷款人。因为自从2008年秋季雷曼兄弟的破产，已经5年多过去了，我们也可以根据公司的财务报表追踪应诉企业的信用情况和在危机后的表现变化。这些数据可以从上述的TSR数据库得到。通过上诉的TSR(交易伙伴)数据库可以得到。 4 通过交易伙伴和中小企业的回应看危机的影响4.1 危机通过交易伙伴的影响 在全球金融危机通过与交易伙伴各个环节，具体表现形式为客户的需求冲击，供应着的供给冲击，以及银行的融资冲击对中小企业造成负面影响。为了理解的在此期间，中小企业面临的困难的实质

18、，因此量化这些不同的冲击的相对重要性是重要的。为此，2009年的经济产业研究所的调查会询问自从2008年9月全球金融危机之后，公司与自己的关系客户和供应商，并与他们有最大的放贷贷款余额的有放贷态度的银行（即他们的主要银行），第二大贷款余额（第二原发银行）量等银行等的关系是否“改良”，“没有改变”，或“恶化” 。 表1示出了结果，其中该扩散指数（DI）表示的回答与客户关系变差的企业 是最低的（-24.7个百分点）。 那些回答与交易客户关系“恶化”的公司的比例更少，D.I.仅登记了-6.8个百分点。最后，在该扩散系数（DL）银行“贷款的态度 范围在-3.0个百分点（主要银行）-8.9个百分点（其他

19、银行 ）之间变动。总的来说，结果表明，最普遍的冲击是从客户需求的的冲击，而估计的从供应商和银行发出的冲击要比以前更少。 SME Financing in Japan during the Global Financial Crisis: Evidence from Firm Surveys Arito Ono and Iichiro Uesugi Employing data from a unique firm survey, this article examines small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) financing in Japan du

20、ring the global financial crisis. The major findings of the article are two-fold. First, in terms of credit availability, loans extended by main banks were the “first line of defense” for most Japanese SMEs to deal with the crisis. In contrast, the role of trade credit provided by firms main supplie

21、rs was relatively limited. The Emergency Credit Guarantees (ECG) program introduced by the government in response to the crisis also helped to increase credit availability. Second, in terms of firms ex-post performance, loans extended by firms main bank and loans backed by government policy measures

22、 did not have any measurable impact. While the average profitability of firms that received these loans deteriorated more than that of firms that did not in 2009, the difference between these two groups vanished after 2010. JEL classifications: G21, G28, G30, G38 Keywords: SME financing, main bank,

23、trade credit, credit guarantees 1. Introduction The global financial crisis that erupted after the failure of Lehman Brothers, a large U.S. investment bank, in September 2008 led the Japanese economy into severe recession. In contrast with U.S. and European banks, Japanese banks did not suffer from

24、severe damage to their balance sheets due to massive holdings of collateralized debt obligations or credit derivatives linked to U.S. subprime mortgages. Nevertheless, the Japanese economy recorded negative GDP growth rates for four consecutive quarters, from the second quarter of 2008 to the first

25、quarter of 2009, as Japans exports fell drastically due to the Great Recession. Although many small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) were not exporting directly, they were nevertheless badly affected via shocks to their transaction partners, that is, customers, suppliers, and lenders. The aim of

26、this article is to provide an overview of SME financing in Japan during the global financial crisis. To this end, we use descriptive statistics from a firm survey dataset to examine SME financing during the crisis and provide in-depth discussions of empirical studies that employed this dataset. In p

27、articular, we focus on the following three issues. First, we identify the nature of shocks (demand, supply, and financial shocks) that affected SMEs and examine how firms responded to each of these shocks. Second, we investigate the role of relationship lenders (main banks), trade creditors (main su

28、ppliers), and the government in SME financing during the crisis period. Regarding the role of the government, we primarily focus on the Emergency Credit Guarantee (ECG) program that was introduced in the fall of 2008 in response to the crisis. Third, we compare credit availability for and the ex-pos

29、t performance of SMEs that relied on relationship lenders, trade creditors, and government schemes from 2008 to 2012. The dataset we employ, which is based on two surveys by the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI), is particularly useful for examining the above issues. The ques

30、tionnaire for the surveys was prepared by academics and researchers including ourselves in cooperation with RIETI and therefore was carefully constructed so as to match empirical strategies to answer relevant research and policy questions. The empirical studies we survey in this article were the pro

31、ducts of this well thought out research design. In addition, by combining the RIETI survey dataset with data from respondent firms financial statements after the crisis, the present study provides an ex-post evaluation of how loans and credit extended by relationship lenders, trade creditors, and th

32、e government were useful in increasing credit availability and improving firm performance during and after the crisis. The major findings of this article, including the results of empirical studies that used the RIETI survey, are as follows. First, we find that in terms of the impact on SMEs the mos

33、t important element of the global financial crisis was the demand shock through their customers rather than any supply or financial shocks. In order to cope with the demand shock, many SMEs relied on bank loans, especially loans provided by their main bank. The role of trade credit provided by main

34、suppliers was relatively limited. Second, while we find that a loan from the main bank was the “first line of defense” for most SMEs to deal with the crisis, we also find that some firms experienced difficulties in obtaining a loan from their main bank. A likely reason for the latter is that these f

35、irms had obtained “transactional” loans from non-main banks before the crisis, which undermined the close relationship with their main bank. We also find that banks that abruptly tightened their lending attitude during the crisis were transactional lenders. Third, while we find that the ECG program

36、was useful in increasing loan availability for SMEs in the midst of the crisis, we also find evidence that increased credit availability as a result of the ECG program was partially offset by a decrease in non-ECG loans when it was a main bank that extended an ECG loan. The finding suggests that clo

37、se firm-bank relationships may have perverse effects on the efficacy of public credit guarantees. Finally, while loans extended by main banks and loans either provided by government affiliated financial institutions or guaranteed through government credit programs, including the ECG program, helped

38、to increase credit availability for SMEs in general, they did not help to improve the ex-post performance of SMEs that obtained these loans. The average profitability of firms that received these loans deteriorated more than that of firms that did not in 2009, while the difference between these two

39、groups vanished after 2010. In addition, the number of employees of firms that received these loans, especially loans from their main bank, decreased more than that of firms that did not, even after 2010. Taken together, these results suggest that main banks, government financial institutions, and t

40、he credit guarantee corporations urged borrowing firms to increase their profitability through cost-cutting restructuring, resulting in a reduction in the number of employees. However, the profitability of these firms nevertheless did not show any significant improvement, presumably because their gr

41、oss sales also declined proportionately. Trade credit provided by main suppliers also did not have a measurable impact on firms ex-post performance. The structure of the rest of the article is as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of SME financing in Japan during the global financial crisis. Se

42、ction 3 explains the RIETI surveys and the TSR database that we use. Section 4 examines the nature of shocks from the crisis and SMEs responses to them. Sections 5, 6, and 7 then respectively examine the role of loans extended by main banks, of trade credit supplied by main suppliers, and of loans g

43、uaranteed by the ECG program. Next, Section 8 investigates whether these loans helped to increase loan availability for and improve the ex-post performance of SMEs. Section 9 concludes. 2. Overview of SME financing in Japan during the global financial crisis The global financial crisis threw the Jap

44、anese economy into severe recession and negatively affected many SMEs. Figure 1 shows the ROA (return on assets = operating profit/total assets) of Japanese firms of various sizes, where firm size is measured in terms of firms capital, from 1991 to 2012. The figure shows that since the burst of the

45、“bubble” economy in the early 1990s, the smallest firms with paid-in capital of less than 10 million yen exhibit the worst ROA. In addition, their ROA further declined sharply after 2008 due to a rapid drop in their sales. Against this background, many SMEs faced difficulties in their finances, as i

46、ndicated by the deterioration in the diffusion index for firms financial position provided by the Bank of Japan. Figure 1 near here Figure 2 near here Although the economic impact of the global financial crisis on the Japanese economy was substantial, the increase in the number of corporate bankrupt

47、cies was modest when compared with the early 2000s, when Japans economy was paralyzed by the bad loan problem (Figure 3). It should also be noted that there was no abrupt decline in loans to SMEs after 2008 (Figure 4). This suggests that the deterioration in SMEs financial position after 2008 seen i

48、n Figure 2 was mostly due to a decline in firms profit (i.e., a decline in internal funds) and not due to a tightening of loan supply (i.e., a decline in external funds), indicating that banks, by providing rescue finance, may have played a role in preventing shocks from the global financial crisis

49、from propagating to SMEs an issue that we examine in detail below. Figure 3 near here Figure 4 near here One reason why bank loans to SMEs did not decline during the crisis period is that the damage to the financial health of Japanese bank through the crisis was relatively limited compared to U.S. a

50、nd European banks. For example, the amount of losses associated with securitized products at the end of September 2008 for Japanese banks in aggregate was 3.3 trillion yen, which was far below their aggregate tier 1 capital (50.0 trillion yen) and their annual profits (6.1 trillion yen).1 In contras

51、t, losses linked to securitized products for Western banks were about ten times larger than those of Japanese banks, resulting in severe damage to their balance sheets (Chart 1-10, Bank of Japan, 2010a). Another factor that helped to alleviate the effects of the financial crisis was the massive inte

52、rventions by the Bank of Japan and the government in response to the financial crisis (see Yamori et al. (2013) for details). Specifically, in response to the malfunctioning of capital markets, the Bank of Japan temporarily introduced extraordinary monetary policy measures that involved repo transac

53、tions and outright purchases of commercial paper and corporate bonds.2 In addition, at the end of October 2008, the Japanese government expanded the total amount of direct loans that government affiliated financial institutions could extend and increased the amount of CP they were authorized to purc

54、hase outright. Further, regarding financing for SMEs, the government introduced the ECG program. This program was one of the largest credit guarantee problems ever implemented anywhere, with total guarantees amounting to 27.1 trillion yen (about 300 billion U.S. dollars) by the time the program ende

55、d in April 2011. In addition to these policy measures taken right after the outbreak of the financial crisis, the Japanese government in December 2009 implemented the Act on Temporary Measures to Facilitate Financing for SME (referred to as the “SME Financing Act” hereafter). While most of the polic

56、y measures introduced after the crisis erupted aimed to facilitate the provision of newloans to SMEs, the SME Financing Act aimed to lighten the debt burden of existingloans to SMEs. Specifically, the SME Financing Act required financial institutions to make their best effort to respond positively to requests by client SME borrowers to amend loan contract terms, typically in the form of deferring loan repayments. In order to provide an incentive for financial institutions to accept such requests from borrowers, the law a