meditations on first philosophyepisyllogism：第一哲学的沉思——episyllogism

1、 Meditations on First PhilosophySummary ofDescartes argumentsMeditation I1. A firm foundation for the sciences requires a truth that is absolutely certain; for this purpose, I will reject all my beliefs for which there is even a possibility of doubt, and whatever truths are left will be absolutely c

2、ertain. I continued2. To this end it is not necessary to go through all my beliefs individually, since they are all based on a more fundamental belief. If there is any reason to doubt this foundation belief, then all the beliefs based on it are equally doubtful. Meditation I continued3. All my belie

3、fs about the world are based on the fundamental belief that the senses tell me the truth. But this belief is not absolutely certain. It is at least possible that everything my senses tell me is an illusion created by a powerful being. Therefore, there is some reason to doubt my foundation belief, an

4、d thus all my beliefs about the world are doubtful; none of them can serve as the foundation for science. Meditation II1. If all my beliefs about the world are doubtful, is there any truth which can be absolutely certain? Yes. Even if all of my experience is an illusion, it cannot be doubted that th

5、e experience is taking place. And this means that I, the experiencer, must exist. 2. Since the only evidence I have that I exist is that I am thinking (experiencing), then it is also absolutely certain that I am a thing that thinks (experiences), that is, a mind. Meditation II continued3. Since I am

6、 not certain (yet) that the physical world (including my body) exists, but I am certain that I exist, it follows that I am not my body. Therefore, I know with certainty that I am only a mind. 4. I am much more certain of my minds existence than my bodys. It might seem that in fact we know physical t

7、hings through the senses with greater certainty than we know something intangible like the mind. Meditation II continuedBut the wax experiment demonstrates that the senses themselves know nothing, and that only the intellect truly knows physical things. It follows that the mind itself is known with

8、greater certainty than anything that we know through the senses. Meditation III1. Every idea must be caused, and the cause must be as real as the idea. If I have any idea of which I cannot be the cause, then something besides me must exist. 2. All ideas of material reality could have their origin wi

9、thin me. But the idea of God, an infinite and perfect being, could not have originated from within me, since I am finite and imperfect. III continued3. I have an idea of God, and it can only have been caused by God. 4. Therefore God exists. Meditation IV1. Only an imperfect (less than perfectly good

10、) being could practice deliberate deception. Therefore, God is no deceiver. 2. Since my faculty of judgment comes from God, I can make no mistake as long as I use it properly. But it is not an infinite faculty; I make mistakes when I judge things that I dont really know. IV continued3. God also gave

11、 me free will, which is infinite and therefore extends beyond my finite intellect. This is why it is possible to deceive myself: I am free to jump to conclusions or to proclaim as knowledge things that I dont know with absolute certainty. IV continued4. I therefore know now that if I know something

12、with absolute certainty (clearly and distinctly), then I cannot be mistaken, because God is no deceiver. The correct way to proceed is to avoid mistakes and limit my claims to knowledge to those things I know clearly and distinctly. Meditation V1. Now I want to find what can be known for certain abo

13、ut material objects. Before deciding whether they exist outside me, I know that my ideas of them consist of shape, size, motion, etc. I also know that by thinking about these attributes I can discover certain facts that are necessarily true about them (the truths of geometry, for example). 2. I do n

14、ot invent ideas such as geometrical shapes, nor do I get them from sensory experience. Proof of this is the fact that I can discover geometrical truths about figures which I cannot imagine. V continued3. Just as, by thinking about my ideas of geometrical shapes, I can discover truths that necessaril

15、y belong to them, I can do the same with God. I have a clear and distinct idea of a perfect being. Perfect = lacking nothing. I cannot conceive of a being that is perfect but lacks existence. Therefore, existence necessarily belongs to God. V continued4. This doesnt mean that my thinking of somethin

16、g makes it exist. If I conceive of a triangle, I must conceive of a figure whose angles equal two right angles. But it doesnt follow that the triangle must exist. But God is different. God, being perfect, is the one being to whom existence must belong. Thus, when I conceive of God, I must conceive o

17、f a being that exists. V continued5. Because God, being perfect, is not a deceiver, I know that once I have perceived something clearly and distinctly to be true, it will remain true, even if later I forget the reasoning that led me to that conclusion. I could not have this certainty about anything

18、if I did not know God. Meditation VI1. All that is left is to determine whether material objects exist with certainty. I know that the abstract shapes representing them are real, since I perceive them clearly and distinctly in geometry. 2. Furthermore, I have a faculty of imagination, by which I can

19、 conceive of material objects, and which is different from my intellect. That it is different is proven by my ability to do geometry with unimaginable figures. Only intellect is necessary for my existence. VI continued3. The most likely explanation for the existence of my faculty of imagination is t

20、hat my mind is joined with a body that has sense organs. This is even more likely in the case of the faculty of sensation. 4. It formerly seemed that all my knowledge of objects came through the senses, that their ideas originated from and corresponded to objects outside me. It also seemed that my b

21、ody belonged especially to me, although I did not understand the apparent connection between mind and body. VI continued5. Then I found it possible to doubt everything. Now I am in the process of systematically removing doubts where certainty exists. 6. Now that I know God can create anything just a

22、s I apprehend it, the distinctness of two things in my mind is sufficient to conclude that they really are distinct. Thus I know I exist, I am a thinking thing, and although I may possess a body, it is certain that this I is entirely and absolutely distinct from my body, and can exist without it. VI

23、 continued7. My faculty of sensing is passive and thus presupposes a faculty of causing sensation, which cannot be within me, since some ideas come to me without my cooperation and even against my will; it therefore belongs to something else. This is either a body or God. But since God is not a dece

24、iver, he doesnt plant these ideas directly in me (doesnt make me believe in a nonexistent world). Therefore corporeal things exist. My senses might mislead me about the details, but I know at least that the ideas that I clearly and distinctly understand-geometrical properties-belong to these bodies.

25、 VI continued8. Nature is Gods order; thus it has truth to teach me. For example, that I am present to my body in a more intimate way than a pilot in a ship. And that there are other bodies around me that affect me in various ways, that should be pursued or avoided; the senses thus act to preserve a

26、nd maintain the body. VI continued9. But I also make some judgments on my own that are not justified by natures teachings, particularly in assuming objects and their qualities to be exactly as my senses report them, that sense qualities reside in them, etc. It is the fault of my judgment that I use sense perception as a direct apprehension of the essences of external bodies; there is nothing inh