TimeforconventionalarmscontrolontheKoreanP.

1、Time for Conventional Arms Control On the Korean PeninsulaYong-Sup Han, Paul K. Davis, and Richard E. DarilekThe first-ever Korean summit in June2000 was a remarkable event, concluding with a joint statement by the two heads ofstate that included language on reunification. South Korean President Kim

2、 Dae Jung dramatized the results afterward bysaying that war would no longer be possible on the Korean Peninsula, but noticeably absent from the joint statement wasany mention of the need to ease military tensions and build a durable peace on the peninsula.It should not be forgotten that North Korea

3、 presently has massive forward-deployed offensive forces, including missiles,long-range artillery, and mechanized forces. If Pyongyangs circumstances or intentions changed for the worse-as issurely possible given its basket-case economy and political system-North Korea could initiate a surprise atta

4、ck accordingto its traditional military strategy, perhaps trying to seize Seoul with the intention of subsequently bargaining fromstrength.The diplomatic breakthrough achieved at the inter-Korean summit and the subsequent missile talks between Pyongyangand Washington are important, but the absence o

5、f conventional security issues at the negotiating table should be a majorconcern-especially to South Korea. The potential for immediate and massive violence that exists between the two Koreasis not a natural state of affairs for nations attempting to normalize relations.Conventional arms control mea

6、sures can play an important role in reducing tensions and lessening the likelihood of adevastating conflict. The inter-Korean breakthrough provides a positive diplomatic atmosphere-and therefore animportant opportunity-to pursue such measures, but there are a number of other reasons why it is import

7、ant to moveforward as quickly as possible.First, the reduced sense of threat in South Korea stemming from political detente with the North may lead to complacencyor even heightened anti-Americanism as South Koreans reassess the costs and benefits of having American troops intheir country. In time, s

8、uch attitudes could lead the U.S. Congress to likewise reconsider the wisdom and necessity ofhaving U.S. soldiers in Korea. The result could be a premature weakening of both U.S. forces in Korea and of theU.S.-R.O.K. security relationship. It is therefore best to address the threat of North Koreas c

9、onventional forces now,while the parties political will to do so remains strong.A second reason for raising security issues immediately is that the South is currently planning economicassistance and investments that are exceedingly valuable to the North, including the construction of an industrialco

10、mplex and related transportation infrastructure in Kaesong. If Seoul gives away too much economically beforeachieving concessions on military threat reduction, the result could be a somewhat invigorated North Korea with thesame unacceptable military capabilities it has today and perhaps even a weake

11、ned relationship with Washington.A third reason is that it is impossible as yet to judge Kim Jong Ils long-term intentions or abilities, much less those oflesser officials and military figures in the D.P.R.K. South Korea would be well advised to pursue an ambitious, probing,and adaptive strategy tha

12、t clarifies intentions and reduces the risks of war while preserving the ability to back away,toughen up, and prepare for difficulties if developments sour. By reducing the North Korean threat, conventional armscontrol could prove extremely useful, and even if political developments subsequently wor

13、sened, its accomplishmentsmight nevertheless endure and reduce the risks of war.The current U.S. and South Korean approaches to negotiating with North Korea have been too timid and therefore toorisky. Seouls engagement policy thus far has been a step-by-step approach that starts with political and e

14、conomic issuesand proceeds to security issues-eventually. For its part, Washington will not pay attention to conventional security issuesuntil the nuclear and missile questions are resolved.Dealing with the security threat on the Korean Peninsula requires a more ambitious, holistic, and adaptive app

15、roach thatproceeds from the belief that a sustainable and productive engagement policy should include concrete steps to reduceconventional military threats on the peninsula now. Simultaneous political, economic, and security negotiations have thebest chance of inducing the desired behavioral changes

16、 in the North and reducing the threat of war.As illustrated by the European experience during the 1990s, arms control can be a powerful instrument for change oncethe circumstances and decisions allow, but nothing more. If the trends on the Korean Peninsula are in fact as favorable asthey seem, conve

17、ntional arms control should be feasible. However, if the underlying realities are in fact less auspicious,then it is better to know sooner rather than later.Rather than waiting for an uncertain future, it is important to seize the opportunity provided by the interKoreanbreakthrough now to bring down

18、 the source of military tensions as part of changing the hostile relationship. Fortunately,there is also groundwork on which to build.Background on Korean Arms ControlIt is often forgotten that a broad scope of Korean arms control issues were discussed seriously nearly a decade ago. In1991 and 1992,

19、 the South and the North addressed how to improve their overall relationship and how to reduce militarytension in the wake of the Cold Wars end. They agreed to resolve differences peacefully through dialogue andnegotiation, pledged not to use force against each other, and agreed to establish a South

20、-North Joint Military Commissionto discuss and carry out steps to build military confidence and realize arms reduction. These were to include the mutualnotification and control of large- scale military maneuvers and exercises; the peaceful utilization of the Demilitarized Zone(DMZ); exchanges of mil

21、itary personnel and information; phased arms reductions, including the elimination of1weaponsof mass destruction and offensive capabilities; and verification of such elimination.In large part because it regarded discussing U.S. forces as out of the question, the South demanded that confidencebuildin

22、g take place before any arms reduction talks, whereas the North demanded that arms reduction take place first.The South proposed that the two Koreas agree to notification and observation of military exercises and maneuvers,peaceful utilization of demilitarized zones, exchange of military personnel a

23、nd information, verification, and elimination ofweapons of mass destruction. The North proposed prohibiting military exercises with foreign countries, changing the DMZinto a peace zone, staging force reductions from 300,000 soldiers to 100,000 (with the phased withdrawals of U.S. forcesin Korea bein

24、g proportional to the reductions made by the two Koreas), reducing offensive weapons in proportion tomanpower reduction, and suspending the acquisition of advanced weapons from abroad. Although the Norths proposalswere patently one-sided in many respects, they were ambitious and discussions proved p

25、ossible. The two sides agreedthat subsequent negotiations would take up confidence-building and arms-reduction measures at the same time.The sides appeared to be making progress, but the measures were never implemented for several reasons. First, theissue of North Koreas nuclear program emerged and

26、the U.S. focus on that blocked progress on conventional armscontrol. Second, South Korea and the United States decided to resume Team Spirit military exercises in 1993 when NorthKorea refused to accept inspection of its nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency. (The Team Spiritex

27、ercises, annual military maneuvers symbolic of the highly developed U.S.-R.O.K. alliance, had been cancelled in 1992to promote Pyongyangs cooperation on nuclear issues.) Third, the North unilaterally violated its commitment not to vilifyand antagonize the South and not to intrude forces secretly int

28、o the Souths territory or its territorial waters. And, finally,the North learned from the nuclear discussions that it could go over the head of the South, thereby reducing its incentiveto negotiate with South Korea.Although the inter-Korean arms control discussions yielded important results, a net a

29、ssessment of the progress made isnot encouraging. North Korea achieved some of its aims in the conventional military arena and gained a good deal fromthe nuclear discussions. Consistent with its objectives, Pyongyang saw a complete pullout of U.S. nuclear weapons fromKorea and, in 1997, a unilateral

30、 cancellation of Team Spirit exercises by the United States and South Korea. Moreover, itachieved its goal of direct security talks with the United States, rather than South Korea. North Korea now contends thatthere are two remaining tasks: withdrawal of U.S. forces and cessation of the U.S.-R.O.K.

31、military alliance.In contrast, South Korea and the United States ultimately gained nothing from the 1991 conventional arms control efforts,though they did make some gains on nuclear and missile issues. During the inter-Korean nuclear talks of December 1991,prompted by unilateral withdrawal of U.S. t

32、actical nuclear weapons, the two Koreas agreed to the principle ofdenuclearization of the peninsula. In 1994, the United States was able to freeze North Koreas nuclear weaponsdevelopment program in exchange for heavy fuel oil and light-water nuclear reactors.More recently, North Korea agreed to a mo

33、ratorium on its missile test launches, and relations between Washington andPyongyang eased in the wake of Junes North-South summit as the United States lifted economic sanctions and changedthe grating rogue state appellation to the less offensive state of concern. There is still no permanent agreeme

34、nt on thedevelopment, testing, or export of missiles, but Kim Jong-Il reportedly promised Secretary of State Madeleine Albright inOctober that North Korea would conduct no further tests of the Taepo Dong-1 ballistic missile. However, thesedevelopments will largely benefit the United States, not Sout

35、h Korea.One other diplomatic development of note has been the Four Party talks, which were convened in December 1997 towork toward replacing the armistice ending the Korean War with a permanent peace agreement. The talks-envolvingNorth Korea, South Korea, the United States, and China-served as a for

36、um for addressing confidence-building measuresuntil August 1999. Unfortunately, North Korea resisted movement on security issues because of Washington and Seoulsrefusal to include U.S. forces in the agenda. The joint communiquthat followed North Korean Vice Marshal Jo MyongRoks visit toWashington th

37、is October mentioned the Four Party talks, but it seems unlikely that they are the most promising forum foraddressing conventional arms control. The conventional arms control process needs to be hammered out between thetwo Koreas without the often overbearing presence of the United States, particula

38、rly in light of the conflicting securityinterests between Beijing and Washington.2Against this background, what is the context for new negotiations? The Kim Dae Jung government still believes thatconfidence building should take place before any arms reduction talks. It worries that any premature arm

39、s reduction talkswill entail reconfiguration and reduction of U.S. troops in Korea, thus jeopardizing deterrence on the Korean Peninsula.Some officials believe that such talks would also bemore than the traffic could bear, an opinion often expressed over the years by U.S. officials focused on nuclea

40、r issues.In contrast, North Korea probably still believes that arms reduction should take place first, although, notably, it hasindicated willingness to compromise on the future role of U.S. forces in Korea so long as they change their status to oneof neutrality or peacekeeping.Nevertheless, the Jun

41、e summit and subsequent meetings suggest that many changes can occur in the security premisesheld by the South and by the North. This suggests that defense planners in Seoul and Washington can think anew aboutreciprocal conventional threat reduction and how to make headway for a peaceful unification

42、, while maintaining Koreaslong-term stability and regional status in East Asia. The first chance for conventional threat reduction failed in the early1990s, but the conditions are more auspicious now.Objectives for Arms Con trolA renewed attempt at conventional arms control on the Korean Peninsula s

43、hould pursue the following major objectives:Facilitating peace, normalization, and potential eventual reunification.Deterring invasion or other acts of attempted aggression.Avoiding crisis and, if that fails, assuring crisis stability.Cutting back on arms competition to enhance strategic stability a

44、nd permit increased allocation of resources for socialand economic development.Laying the groundwork for a military transition consistent with the strategic interests of a postnormalization Korea (or twoKoreas) in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region.Although it may seem like fluff to some, the fir

45、st objective is important given Koreas long history of rancor.If the D.P.R.K. has taken the strategic decision to forego unification by force and instead to pursue peace andnormalization, then it is important to shift perceptions at all levels of society. Conventional arms control could help. Afterf

46、ive decades of ideologically based hostility and mistrust, even modest confidencebuilding activities could be useful.There are times when perceptions are reality and when changing those perceptions is both feasible and desirable.That said, the crux of the issue is that the North poses a serious and

47、immediate threat to the South, and deterring invasionand other acts of aggression must therefore remain a top priority. Theoretically, the South could invade the North, but it isnot a realistic possibility. It is hard to imagine the United States seeing such an invasion as in its interest under almo

48、st anycircumstances, and South Korea would have substantial difficulties operating by itself since its military system has longbeen so intertwined with that of the U.S.-led UN command. Given the number and character of U.S. interventions ornear-interventions in the last decade, the North could be le

49、gitimately concerned about air and missile strikes by the UnitedStates. But the severity of that threat is not a function of the nature of conventional forces on the Korean Peninsulabecause such strikes could be launched from aircraft carriers or distant bases.Because the D.P.R.K. has systematically

50、 mounted an immediate surprise-attack threat against the South by establishingforward-deployed invasion forces and because that threat is made more acute by geographic asymmetries, conventionalarms control should first focus on reducing the danger to the South. If its objectives were traditionally g

51、randiose-as inconquering South Korea-any full-scale D.P.R.K. invasion of the South would be doomed to failure. The only issue wouldbe how long it would take for R.O.K. and U.S. forces to devastate the Norths army. However, the North could besuccessful if it had more limited objectives, such as the c

52、apture or siege of Seoul. That scenario remains a nightmare.In short, the only serious conventional military threat on the peninsula is that of the North launching a surprise attack onthe South. Thus, while the overarching objective is an evenhanded one ? hat neither side should fear surpriseattack-

53、addressing the Souths invasion concerns has special importance.Another component of enhancing military security is avoiding crises or, failing that, assuring that crises do not lead to waras the result of misperceptions or instabilities. In particular, there should be no significant real or perceive

54、d advantage ininitiating hostilities. This is related to the issue of surprise attack but goes well beyond it. It relates to the ability of the sidesto defend against attack.Moving beyond the core security concerns, the sides should have every incentive to reduce the magnitude of defenseexpenditures

55、 so that national resources can be put to more productive ends. Given the very large levels of current Koreanforces, normalization should include substantial reductions in force levels and a significant reduction in absolute defenseexpenditures.In pursuing conventional arms control on the peninsula,

56、 the parties need also to recognize that some well- intentionedactions taken under the rubric of peace, normalization, and arms control could prove harmful to Koreas long-term securityinterests. When normalization is achieved, Korea (or two cooperating Korean states) will exist in a highly dynamic r

57、egionof the world, confronted by many opportunities, issues, and challenges. To the north will be a massive neighbor, China,whose long-term behavior may range from that of a good and powerful neighbor and competitor to that of an ambitiousregional hegemon. Continuing tensions will exist among China,

58、 Japan, and Korea; and problems may arise involvingother regional states. A question, then, is how Korea views its long-term regional role.This question is easy enough to ask, but it deals with a different U.S.-Korean relationship than currently exists. Today, U.S.military leaders dominate planning

59、for the security of South Korea, U.S. ground forces are permanently stationed in theheart of Korea itself, and the United States would in some respects (e.g., air forces, naval forces, and command andcontrol) play the lead role in any defense. In the postnormalization world, that relationship would

60、be history. But whatrelationship would be suitable?Korea will probably want to emerge with a much smaller but highly competent military suitable for assuring nationalsovereignty, participating in regional security affairs, and-as an important part of that-working in long-term partnershipwith the Uni