企业环境保护外文翻译文献

1、 企业环境保护外文翻译文献（文档含英文原文和中文翻译）企业环境管理基于市场奖励的管理企业保护环境的办法已经从被规章条例驱动的被动模式演变为积极主动的方式，即通过自愿管理做法，将环境问题与传统的管理职能结合起来。作为公司决策的一种行为模式，通过econometrically假设测试取得影响公司积极进行环境管理的因素。对这些假设进行测试时，使用的样本是标准普尔500指数公司的调查数据。分析结果表明，经济因素，如环境负债的威胁和符合预期规定的高成本以及生产最终消费品和拥有大量资本产出率给企业带来的市场压力，都在促使这些企业进行环境保护的过程中发挥了显著作用。此外，企业外部关于企业转移有毒物质的报道和

2、社会大众对企业内部有毒物质单位排放量的压力都对企业通过创新实现环境管理的实践有重大影响。导论传统上，美国依赖强制性的指挥和环境控制的规章来保护环境质量。这种做法虽然保护了环境，但是也导致了政策框架的僵硬和高昂的成本，并且还会降低长远上改进环境质量的效率。这种认识已经导致越来越多基于市场的手段应用于为企业提供灵活选择用最低成本控制污染的环境保护方式，例如排污许可证制度、存款还款计划和公众的环境信息披露自愿程序。在这些措施中，信息披露的自愿性程序通过非强制性的措施鼓励企业控制污染。监管机构向社会提供的关于产品环境属性和公司环境绩效的信息能触发产品和资本市场的反应和社会的行动，建立以市场为基础的激励

3、机制，帮助企业改进其环境绩效。美国环保局每年向社会公布的有毒物质排放清单就是信息提供的一个例子。此外，争取让企业在环境自我调节的自愿性项目已经成为美国环保局的一个主要政策工具。1999年，在联邦级别上，这样的项目已经在短短的三年中由28项增长到54项。这两种做法已经被很多政策分析家看成是对抗性超越“政府推动”的“下一代环境政策”，其依靠企业自身在环境友好政策上的积极努力和社会公众，例如公民和社区的积极参与，来达到保护环境的目的。这种自律也体现在“企业主导”的倡议被越来越多的企业和行业协会接受和采纳。一些企业已经起草了环保计划，通过重新设计产品和工艺防止污染；其他企业通过标准化的环境管理和带有生

4、态环保标签的产品从国际标准化组织申请了ISO140001系列标准化证书。调查显示，很多企业都有针对性的通过自己混合管理的做法达到环境目标。这些做法包括进行环境内部审计，使企业员工补偿金的一部分取决于他们在环境保护中的表现，把环境影响的集中评价置于企业较高的等级以及为环境管理提供总体质量管理的原则。这些做法代表了企业内部的组织变革，企业比以往任何时候都更大程度地把企业内部自我激励机制引入到企业目标中。这种“企业主导”的环境管理模式作为一种创新且更有效保护环境的模式，已经引发了政策制定者广泛的兴趣。现在，很多州的环保机构和美国环保局通过提供技术援助、认可以及其他福利来鼓励企业建立环境管理体系。但是

5、，监管机构和社会因企业建立环境管理体系而给企业的福利待遇还有待于调查和评价。对企业建立环境管理体系的兴趣可以从1999年由11国环保机构官员组成的多国工作组举办的关于环境管理体系的国家首脑会议的广泛参与中推断出来。与会者来自不同的学术机构、环保局、布鲁金斯学会、全国公共管理学院以及国家政府委员会，他们强调需要对推动企业建立环境管理体系的影响因素和依靠环境管理体系能在多大程度上改善环境质量进行更多的研究。美国环保局还赞助建立了环境管理的国家数据库，其中包括在美国的100个志愿者机构实施环境管理体系的多方面信息，以了解他们给企业和社会带来的成本和福利。正如下文所述，对推动企业建立环境管理体系的影响

6、因素很少有系统的实证研究分析。个案研究表明外部影响因素很重要，例如消费者对环境的而关注以及股东和社会公众在环境保护中起的重要作用。如果被视为对环境不“友好”，不良声誉带来的影响以及吸引的金融投资者关注，对企业来说变得越来越重要。1989年的一份调查显示，77%的美国人说企业的环境信誉影响他们买什么。使用环保营销的新产品从1989年仅有3%上升到1991年的12%。银行越来越多的意识到他们可能会因为借款企业的环境问题承担法律责任。所以，银行已经把环境因素纳入到贷款的决策中，并视环境绩效差的企业有财务风险。本研究的目的是对推动企业建立全面的环境管理体系的经济激励措施进行一次系统的分析，并解释观察到

7、的企业建立环境管理体系水平上的多样性。我们侧重研究建立环境管理体系的范围，而不是决定的个人的做法，因为每个人的做法只不过是一种工具，如果没有环境管理体系，个人的做法起到的效果可能很小。例如，环境审计本身只不过是一种审查业绩的手段，如果不同时采取其他措施，如从企业管理层得到提供资源、奖励员工防止污染的承诺，环境审计在控制污染中可能是没有效果的。本文为econometrically测试提供了关于经济奖励推动企业建立一个全面的环境成本管理体系的假设的行为框架，利用建立环境管理体系的调查数据以及可获取的标准普尔500公司的特定特征的样本，来对这些假设进行测试。更具体地说，本文试图探讨来自外部的压力在多

8、大程度上推动企业更积极地保护环境，并认识到改进环境管理是企业经济上成功的一个基本影响因素。这项分析的结果对政策制定者有重要的作用，帮助他们寻求促进企业领导层、政策分析家和社会大众确定社会政策以及利益相关者在根本上改变企业开展业务的方式，以及更受这些因素影响的企业类型。此外，现有的或预期的强制性指挥和控制规章能够为环保组织提供激励机制，在企业内部实际实施。但是，人们对强制性条例的关注由于其不灵活和高成本已经大大减少。过去的文献越来越多的理论文献分析了企业主动进行环境保护相对于强制性条例的社会效率。本文表明，企业可能通过奖励自愿改善环境的行为，因为他们能导致直接和间接形式的私人利益回报。这些利益可

9、能产生于企业针对强制性标准先发制人的行动以及针对排污税进行的自愿减排。卢茨、里昂和麦克斯韦分析了未来章程对企业自愿生产环保产品提供奖励的可能性，麦克斯韦、里昂和哈克特研究了企业自我约束的奖励和福利，所罗拉和gangopadhya证明了消费者愿意为环保产品支付保险费的意愿导致企业更加遵守环保制度。一些研究试图研究企业参加由环保局设立的志愿者项目的动机，如美国的33/50号项目和美国的气候挑战项目。这些研究表明，参加通过美国环保局新闻稿、简报被社会认可的以及受美国环保局资助和技术援助的项目对预防污染有十分重要的作用。Khanna、Quimio和Bojilova向我们说明，企业收到的消极的股市回报是

10、社会对企业不良环保表现的回应，这导致企业自愿减少现场排放污染物。一些研究特别分析了企业内部组织变化的动机，如采取环境友好做法的决定。Henriques和Sadorsky研究企业采取这样的做法或环保计划的影响因素。King和Lenox分析了美国化学工业企业参加化学制造商协会的责任关怀计划并接纳其行为准则。Henriques和Sudorsky使用强烈感知到来自于消费者、政府和社区的压力的企业排名作为解释性变量。King和Lenox研究是否环保表现差并被社会更加关注的企业更有可能加入责任关怀计划。关于影响企业建立环境成本管理体系影响因素的分析很少，尤其是在美国。Dasgapta、Hettige和Wh

11、eeler分析了墨西哥企业采用ISO14001环境管理做法的程度。他们表明，环境成本管理体系的建立受企业规模、员工素质以及管理水平的显著影响，而企业落伍的技术和社会间接的压力的作用并不重要。下一部分为本文提供了实证分析的基础概念框架。此框架以建立了高质量环境管理体系企业的奖励情况作为资源，建立一套广泛的解释性变量。这些变量包括负债、遵循强制性条例的威胁以及获取建立在环境属性基础上的产品差异的竞争优势。第三部分和第四部分分别介绍了基于这些假设的实证方法和数据描述。第五部分介绍了实证的结果，随后介绍了本文的结论。概念框架我们把企业产生的污染物质(如化学品)用x表示，把投入的资本性设备用k表示，把产

12、出用y表示。再生产过程中用到的污染物质x的有效性用表示。企业产生的产出y是企业大量的投入在生产(x)中的有效利用和存量资本k的函数：TOC o 1-5 h zy=f(x,k);fx0,fk0,fxx0,fkk0,0,0,0。但是，Pq的规模在企业之间可能不同。生产最终消费品并且直接面对消费者的企业更能从“绿色消费”中获益。这里讨论的主要问题是，企业认识到这种情况并努力寻求环境友好的声誉，而不是消费者是否确实能够区分企业是否遵循环境友好的做法。企业在投入市场上被假设成是价格接收者。投入变量的单位成本是w。年均成本被假设成是企业环境管理质量下降的函数，用r(q)表示。一些研究表明，投资者对信息披露

13、中环保表现差的企业有消极的反应，这很可能导致企业股票市场上的负面影响，使其在资本市场上的成本上升。这个消极反应很可能是因为投资者对企业不良的环保表现，由于执法行动导致更大的风险和来自美国环保局执行减少污染的战略形成的压力，以及更大的环境负债和环境诉讼风险。这些企业在资本市场在资本市场上可能有更高的成本。所以，我们认为环境管理不善的企业为筹借资金要付出更多的成本，因此，rq0,fk0,fxx0,fkk0,0,0,0.ThemagnitudeofPq,however,couldvaryacrossfirms.Firmsthatareproducingfinalgoodsanddealingdire

14、ctlywithconsumersmayperceivelargerbenefitsfromgreenconsumerism!thanthoseproducingintermediategoods.Therelevantissuehereisnotwhetherconsumersareindeedabletodifferentiateproductsbasedontheenvironmentalpracticesfollowedbyfirmsbutwhetherfirmsperceivethattobethecaseandthereforeseektobuildanenvironmentall

15、yfriendlyreputation.Thefirmisassumedtobeaprice-takerintheinputmarket.Theperunitcostofthevariableinputisw.Theannualizedcostofcapitalisr(q)andisassumedtobeadecreasingfunctionofafirmsqualityofenvironmentalmanagement.Anumberofstudieshaveshownthatinvestorsreactnegativelytodisclosuresaboutpoorenvironmenta

16、lperformancebyfirmsandthatthisleadstoasignificantnegativeimpactonthestockmarketreturnsofthefirmswhichislikelytoraisetheircostofraisingcapitalinthemarket(Hamilton,1995;KonarandCohen,1997;Khanna,QuimioandBojilova,1998).Thisobservednegativereactionispossiblybecauseinvestorsviewfirmsthatarenotenvironmen

17、tallyfriendlyasbeingmoreriskysincetheyaremorelikelytofacepenaltiesduetoenforcementactionsandgreaterpressurefromtheUSEPAtoimplementstrategiesforreducingtheirwastegenerationinthefutureandagreaterriskofenvironmentalliabilitiesandlawsuits(GAO,1994).Suchfirmsarelikelytohaveahighercostofraisingcapitalinth

18、emarket.Wethereforeassumethatfirmswithpoorenvironmentalmanagementpracticeshavetopayahigherpriceforborrowingcapital,thereforerq0.DESCRIPTIONOFDATAPrimarydataonmanagementpracticesusedinthisstudyareobtainedfromtheCorporateEnvironmentalProfileDirectories1994and1995,compiledfromasurveyofS&P500firmsconduc

19、tedbytheInvestorResearchResponsibilityCenter(IRRC).Informationfromthesurveysincludeswhetherornotthecompanyhademployedspecificenvironmentalmanagementpractices,numberofenvironmentalstaff,environmentalauditingandreportingprocedures.EnvironmentalperformancedataareprimarilyobtainedfromtheToxicsReleaseInv

20、entory(TRI)databasethatcontainsfacility-levelinformationonon-sitereleasesandoff-sitetransfersofchemical-specifictoxicpollutants.TheTRI,firstreleasedin1989,ismandatedbytheEmergencyPlanningandCommunity-Right-to-knowActof1986andrequiresproductionfacilitiestoreportannualquantitiesofon-sitetoxicemissions

21、toair,waterandlandandundergroundinjectionandthequantitiesofoff-sitetransfersonachemical-specificbasis.TheTRIismadeavailabletothepublicwithalagoftwoyears.FinancialinformationaboutfirmsisobtainedfromthepubliclyavailableStandard&Poor(S&P)500andSuperCompustatdatabaseswhichprovidecompanyspecificinformati

22、ononallpubliclytradedfirmsthatfile10-KformswiththeSecuritiesandExchangeCommission.Ofthe500firmsincludedintheIRRCsurvey,onlyfirmsthatcompletedthesurveyin1994and1995andreportedtotheToxicsReleaseInventoryandforwhichfinancialinasampleof176firmsperformancedataareavailableareincludedinthisstudy.Thisresult

23、sfor1995and159firmsfor1994.Alltimedependentexplanatoryvariablesaremeasuredwithafive-yearlag.Thisisdonetoavoidendogenousregressorssinceadoptionofsomepractices,mayhaveoccurredbetween1991-95.Basedonthetheoreticalframework,weconsiderthefollowingdeterminantsofthequalityoftheenvironmentalmanagementsystem.

24、VariableConstructionThedependentvariableinthisstudyistheadoptionofanEMS,definedasasystemof13practicesthatindicatemultifacetedefforts,thatareproactiveandanticipativeinorientation,targetedtowardsimprovingenvironmentalperformance.Thepracticesconsideredhereincludehavinganenvironmentalpolicy,trainingandr

25、ewardingworkerstofindopportunitiestopreventpollution,settingcorporation-wideinternalstandardsthataremaintainedevenbyfacilitiesinothercountrieswithlowerenvironmentalstandards,undertakinginternalenvironmentalauditstoidentifyopportunitiesforpreventingpollutionandensuringthatmanufacturingoperationsarein

26、compliancewithregulatoryrequirements.SomefirmsalsoadoptedthephilosophyofTQM,thatseekstominimizequalitydefectswhilemakingcontinuouseffortsatimprovingperformanceacrossthefirmsactivities,toimprovingenvironmentalmanagement.Firmsmayalsochoosetosetasidefundstoreducetheirrisksoffutureenvironmentalliability

27、costsandbuyinsurancetocoverliabilityorremediationcostsofenvironmentalincidents.ThesepracticesarelistedinTable1andtheadoptiondecisionofeachpracticeisrepresentedbyadummyvariable.AsshowninTable1,92%ofthefirmshaveaformalenvironmentalpolicywhile70%applyTQMprinciplestoenvironmentalmanagement.Otherpractice

28、s,however,areadoptedlessfrequently,withlessthan40%offirmshavingauniformcorporateenvironmentalpolicyandregularlyreleasingenvironmentalreportstothepublic.Ofthefirmsincludedinthetwo-yearsample,156firmshadobservationsforbothyears.Overthetwo-yearperiod,62ofthesefirmsincreasedthenumberofpracticestheyadopt

29、ed,while12firmsdecreasedthenumberofpracticesadopted.Ofthe335observationsoverthetwo-yearperiod,17%indicatedanadoptionoflessthan3practices,while38%indicatedadoptionof4to7practices.Themodeofthedistributionis9practicesandlessthan2%offirmsadoptedall13practices.Wefindthattheadoptiondecisionsforthesepracti

30、ceswerepositivelycorrelatedwitheachotherindicatingthatthesepracticesarecomplementarytoeachotherratherthansubstitutesforeachother.Forexample,firmsadoptingTQMweremorelikelytohaveanenvironmentalpolicy,corporatestandards,provideenvironmentalperformancerelatedcompensationtoemployeesandconductenvironmenta

31、laudits.We,therefore,useasummatedscale,bysummingthedummyvariablesindicatingadoptionofthevariouspracticestoobtainatotalscoreforeachfirm,whichisusedasanindicatorofthequalityorcomprehensivenessofafirmsenvironmentalmanagementsystem.Theexplanatoryvariablesarecategorizedintothoseproxyingregulatorypressure

32、s,marketbasedpressuresandfirm-specificcharacteristics.ThesevariablesaredescribedbelowandtheirdescriptivestatisticsareprovidedinTable2.RegulatoryPressuresWeproxytheimpactofexistingandanticipatedmandatoryenvironmentalregulationsusingseveralexplanatoryvariables.TheaccumulatedNUMBEROFSUPERFUNDSITESforwh

33、ichafirmisnamedasapotentiallyresponsiblepartyundertheprovisionsoftheComprehensiveEnvironmentalResponse,CompensationandLiabilityActareusedasaproxyforthepotentialthreatofliabilityafirmfacesifitcontinuestogeneratepollutionatthesamelevelsinthepast.ThesedataareobtainedfromtheSiteEnforcementTrackingSystem

34、(USEPA,1996).Facility-specificdataareaggregatedtotheparentcompanylevelbyobtainingthelistofsubsidiariesanddivisionsofeachparentcompanyfromvariousCorporateDirectories.Additionally,severalmajorenvironmentalstatutes,suchastheCleanAirAct,theCleanWaterAct,andRCRAhaveprovisionsforseverepenaltiesincasesofvi

35、olationsofregulations,releasesofhazardouspollutantsandrecordkeepingviolations.Firmsarealsosubjecttoperiodicinspectionstoenforcecompliancewithmandatoryregulations.Firmsthathavereceivedcivilpenaltiesfornotcomplyingwithmandatoryregulationsarepresumablytheonesthathavehighcostsofcompliance;hencetheyprefe

36、rtobepenalizedratherthanbeincompliancewithregulations.Suchfirmsmayalsoconsiderthemselvesashavingahigherlikelihoodofreceivingpenaltiesinthefutureiftheydonotmakeeffortstoimprovetheirenvironmentalperformance.Dataonthecivilpenaltiesreceivedbyafirmunder10differentenvironmentalstatuteswereobtainedfromtheI

37、RRCdirectory.ThevariableCIVILPENALTYisadummyvariableequalto1,ifthefirmreceivedatleastonecivilpenaltyforviolationwithanyoftheenvironmentalstatutes.InformationonthenumberoftimesafacilitywasinspectedisobtainedfromUSEPA4publiclyavailabledatabaseIDEA,IntegratedDataforEnforcementAnalysis.TheIDEAisacompreh

38、ensivesingle-sourceofenvironmentalperformanceonregulatedfacilitieswithinUSEPA.ItincludesinspectionsmadeonfirmcompliancewithvariousenvironmentalstatutessuchastheCleanWaterAct,EmergencyPlanningandCommunityRight-to-KnowAct,EmergencyResponseNotificationSystemandtheToxicSubstancesControlAct.ThevariableIN

39、SPECTIONSisadummyvariableequalto1,ifthefirmwassubjecttoatleastoneinspectioninthecourseofayear.TocapturethestringencyoftheexistingregulatoryenvironmentforafirmtheratioofPollutionAbatementCostsandExpendituresfortheindustrytototalindustryshipments(PACE/INDUSTRYSALES)atthetwo-digitSIClevelisconstructed.

40、Pollutioncapitalexpendituresincludeexpensesassociatedwiththepurchaseandexpansionofplantandequipmentusedtocontrolairandwaterpollutantsandsolidwaste.Abatementcostsconsistofallcostsandexpensesnecessarytooperateandmaintainpollutionabatementequipment.Thevalueoftotalindustryshipmentsisdefinedasthereceipts

41、forallprimaryandsecondaryproductsmanufacturedandshipped,servicesrenderedandresaleofproductsboughtandresoldwithoutfurtherprocessing.FirmsthatbelongtoindustriesthatareheavilyregulatedasindicatedtheirPACEtoindustryoutputratioarelikelytohavehighcostsofcomplianceandgreaterincentivestoimprovetheirenvironm

42、entalmanagement.ThesedataareobtainedfromtheAnnualSurveyofPollutionAbatementCostsandExpenditurescompiledbytheBureauofCensus.Inordertoproxytheincentivestoseekstrategicadvantagesovercompetitorsbyreducingemissionsofhazardousairpollutantsaheadoftimethroughimprovedenvironmentalmanagement,weusetheratioofha

43、zardousairpollutantstothetollon-sitetoxicreleases(HAP/ON-SITERELEASES).TitleIIIofthe1990CAAAmendmentshaslisted189toxicchemicalsthatwillberegulatedundertheNationalEmissionStandardsforHazardousAirPollutants(NESHAP).Firmshavebeenawaresince1990thatairemissionsofthesechemicalswillbesubjecttoMaximumAvaila

44、bleControlTechnology(MACT)standardsthatwouldbebasedonemissionslevelsalreadyachievedbythebest-performingsimilarfacilities(USEPA,2000).Reducingthesepollutantsaheadoftimeusingflexiblemethodsisexpectedtolowerthefuturecostsofcomplianceandmayalsogivethefirmastrategicadvantagerelativetoitscompetitorsifitsp

45、erformanceinfluencesthestandardsthataresetforotherfirms.WewouldthereforeexpectthatfirmswithalargerratioofHAPtoon-sitetoxicdischargesaremorelikelytoadoptacomprehensiveEMS.ThedataonHAPemissionsbyfirmswereobtainedfromtheTRIafteraggregatingacrossallchemicalscategorizedasHAPandacrossallfacilitiesbelongin

46、gtoaparentcompany.MarketPressuresMarketpressuresemanatefromconsumers,investorsandcompetingfirms.Firmsthatproducefinalgoodsandareinclosercontactwithconsumersarelikelytofeelgreaterpressureorbenefitmorefromimprovingtheirenvironmentalfriendliness.Thus,strategicconsiderationstoimprovemarketshareorchargep

47、remiumpricesfromgreenconsumersmaymotivatecorporateenvironmentalmanagementamongsomefirms.Weusethe4-digitsecondarySICcodeofthesamplefirmstoclassifythemintofinalgoodsandintermediategoods.FirmsarerepresentedbyadummyvariableFINALGOODequalto1,ifthatfirmisprimarilysellingfinalproductssuchaspharmaceuticalpr

48、eparations,cosmetics,andfoodproductsconsumeddirectlybyconsumers.Italsoincluderetailstores,restaurantsandbanksthatprovidedirectservicestoconsumers.Firmswithahighercapitalstockperunitoutputaremorelikelytobeconcernedaboutnegativeinvestorreactionsabouttheirenvironmentalpracticesandperformance.Weproxythi

49、simpactbytheSALES-ASSETratioforthefirmandexpectthatfirmswithahighervalueofthisratiowillhavelowerincentivestoadoptamorecomprehensiveenvironmentalmanagementsystem.TheimpactofmarketstructureoftheindustryonincentivesforenvironmentalmanagementismeasuredbytheHerfindahl-Hirschmanindex(HHI),whichequalsthesu

50、mofthesquaredpercentagesofmarketsharesofeachfirmintheindustry.AhighvalueofHHIimpliesthattheindustryismoreconcentratedandlesscompetitivethanonewithlowHHI.TheimpactofexposuretoglobalcompetitionandawiderpressuretodifferentiateitsproductsonafirmsincentivesforadoptinganEMSiscapturedbytheratioofitsfacilit

51、iesthatacountriestoitstotalfacilities(MULTINATIONALSTATUS).AcountofthenumberofU.S.andnon-U.S.facilitiesforeachparentcompanyisobtainedfromvariousCorporateDirectories.Firm-specificCharacteristicsAssuggestedbythetheoreticalanalysis,firm-specificcharacteristics,suchasitspollution-outputratio,technicalkn

52、owledgeandthecostofimprovingenvironmentalmanagementarealsoexpectedtoinfluencethequalityofenvironmentalmanagement.Dataonallthevarioustypesofpollutiongeneratedbyfirmswerenotpubliclyavailable.Theonlyinformationavailableatafacilityandchemical-specificlevelisonthevolumeoftoxicreleasesemittedandreportedto

53、theTRI.Eachfacilityisidentifiedbyitsname,itsprimarySICcode,itsparentcompanynameandaDunandBradstreet(D&B)numberassignedtoeachparentcompany.Weusedthisinformationtogroupfacilitiesbytheirparentcompanyandaggregatetoxicreleasestoair,land,waterandundergroundinjectionsofallTRIchemicalsbyeachfacilityofaparen

54、tcompanytoobtainon-sitetoxicreleasesattheparentcompanylevel.Weaggregatedalloff-sitetransfersforenergyrecovery,recycling,treatmentanddisposaltoobtainoff-sitetransfers.Wedistinguishbetweenon-sitedischargesandoff-sitetransfersbecauseon-sitedischargesrepresentemissionsintotheenvironment,whileoff-sitetra

55、nsfersrepresentend-of-pipeabatementanddisposalofwaste.Toallowfortheirdifferentialimpactonincentivesforenvironmentalmanagement,whilecontrollingforfirmsize,weuseON-SITERELEASES/SALESandOFF-SITERELEASES/SALESasexplanatoryvariables.Thetechnologyofthefirmanditscostofimprovingenvironmentalmanagementarepro

56、xiedbytwovariables,technicalknowledgeandageofassets.FirmsthataremoreinnovativearemorelikelytohavetheknowledgetoimplementchangesinprocessandproductdesigntoaccompanytheiradoptionofinnovativemanagementpracticesandachievethebenefitsofinputoffirmsismeasuredbytheannualR&D.costsavingsandreducedwaste.Techni

57、calknowledgeexpenditure.Wealsousetheageofassetsasaproxyforthecostofreplacementofequipmentthatmayberequiredtoimprovetheprocessandproductdesigntorealizethebenefitsofenvironmentalmanagement.Firmswitholderassetsareexpectedtofacelowercostsofreplacementthanfirmswithnewerassetsandmaythusbemorewillingtotake

58、aproactiveapproachtowardstheenvironment.ThevariableAGEOFASSETSismeasuredbydividingthetotalassetsofafirmbyitsgrossassets(KhannaandDamon,1999).Totalassetsaredefinedascurrentassetsplusnetpropertyplantandequipmentplusothernon-currentassets.Grossassetsaredefinedastotalassetsplusaccumulateddepreciationonp

59、roperty,plant,andequipment.Ageofassetstakesavaluebetween0and1,withhighervaluesindicatingnewerplantandequipmentwithmorecurrentassetsandsmalleraccumulateddepreciation.CONCLUSIONSThereisgrowingevidenceofatransformationinthecorporateresponsetoconcernsforenvironmentalprotectionawayfromanadversarialapproa

60、chbasedonaviewofenvironmentalcostsasnon-productivetowardsoneofcorporateenvironmentalism.Firmsarecraftingenvironmentalmanagementsystemstoanticipateandaddressenvironmentalproblems.Thereis,however,considerablediversityinthecomprehensivenessorscopeofthesesystemsacrossfirms.Thispaperdevelopsabehavioralmo