UK Corporate Governance Code英国公司治理准则

UKCorporateGovernanceCodeFromWikipedia,thefreeencyclopediaJumpto:navigation,searchTheUKCorporateGovernanceCode2010(fromhereonreferredtoas"theCode")isasetofprinciplesofgood\o"Corporategovernance"corporategovernanceaimedatcompanieslistedonthe\o"LondonStockExchange"LondonStockExchange.Itisoverseenbythe\o"FinancialReportingCouncil"FinancialReportingCouncilanditsimportancederivesfromthe\o"FinancialServicesAuthority"FinancialServicesAuthority's\o"ListingRules"ListingRules.TheListingRulesthemselvesaregivenstatutoryauthorityunderthe\o"FinancialServicesandMarketsAct2000"FinancialServicesandMarketsAct2000[1]andrequirethatpubliclistedcompaniesdisclosehowtheyhavecompliedwiththecode,andexplainwheretheyhavenotappliedthecode-inwhatthecodereferstoas'complyorexplain'.[2]Privatecompaniesarealsoencouragedtoconform;howeverthereisnorequirementfordisclosureofcomplianceinprivatecompanyaccounts.TheCodeadoptsaprinciples-basedapproachinthesensethatitprovidesgeneralguidelinesofbestpractice.Thiscontrastswitharules-basedapproachwhichrigidlydefinesexactprovisionsthatmustbeadheredto.Contents

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1Origins2Contents2.1Schedules3Codecompliance?4Seealso5Notes6References7Externallinks[\o"Editsection:Origins"edit]OriginsTheCodeisessentiallyaconsolidationandrefinementofanumberofdifferentreportsandcodesconcerningopinionsongoodcorporategovernance.Thefirststepontheroadtotheinitialiterationofthecodewasthepublicationofthe\o"CadburyReport"CadburyReportin1992.Producedbyacommitteechairedby\o"SirAdrianCadbury"SirAdrianCadbury,theReportwasaresponsetomajorcorporatescandalsassociatedwithgovernancefailuresintheUK.Thecommitteewasformedin1991after\o"PollyPeck"PollyPeck,amajorUKcompany,wentinsolventafteryearsoffalsifyingfinancialreports.Initiallylimitedtopreventingfinancialfraud,when\o"BankofCreditandCommerceInternational"BCCIand\o"RobertMaxwell"RobertMaxwellscandalstookplace,Cadbury'sremitwasexpandedtocorporategovernancegenerally.Hencethefinalreportcoveredfinancial,auditingandcorporategovernancematters,andmadethefollowingthreebasicrecommendations:theCEOandChairmanofcompaniesshouldbeseparatedboardsshouldhaveatleastthreenon-executivedirectors,twoofwhomshouldhavenofinancialorpersonaltiestoexecutiveseachboardshouldhaveanauditcommitteecomposedofnon-executivedirectorsTheserecommendationswereinitiallyhighlycontroversial,althoughtheydidnomorethanreflectthecontemporary"bestpractice",andurgedthatthesepracticesbespreadacrosslistedcompanies.AtthesametimeitwasemphasisedbyCadburythattherewasnosuchthingas"onesizefitsall".[3]In1994,theprincipleswereappendedtothe\o"ListingRules"ListingRulesofthe\o"LondonStockExchange"LondonStockExchange,anditwasstipulatedthatcompaniesneednotcomplywiththeprinciples,buthadtoexplaintothestockmarketwhynotiftheydidnot.Beforelong,afurthercommitteechairedbychairmanof\o"Marks&Spencer"Marks&Spencer\o"SirRichardGreenbury"SirRichardGreenburywassetupasa'studygroup'on\o"Executivecompensation"executivecompensation.Itrespondedtopublicanger,andsomevaguestatementsbythePrimeMinister\o"JohnMajor"JohnMajorthatregulationmightbenecessary,overspiralling\o"Executivepay"executivepay,particularlyinpublicutilitiesthathadbeen\o"Privatised"privatised.In1996the\o"GreenburyReport"GreenburyReportwaspublished.ThisrecommendedsomefurtherchangestotheexistingprinciplesintheCadburyCode:eachboardshouldhavearemunerationcommitteecomposedwithoutexecutivedirectors,butpossiblythechairmandirectorsshouldhavelongtermperformancerelatedpay,whichshouldbedisclosedinthecompanyaccountsandcontractsrenewableeachyearGreenburyrecommendedthatprogressbereviewedeverythreeyearsandsoin1998\o"SirRonaldHampel(pagedoesnotexist)"SirRonaldHampel,whowaschairmanandmanagingdirectorof\o"ImperialChemicalIndustries"ICIplc,chairedathirdcommittee.Theensuing\o"HampelReport"HampelReportsuggestedthatalltheCadburyandGreenburyprinciplesbeconsolidatedintoa"CombinedCode".Itaddedthat,theChairmanoftheboardshouldbeseenasthe"leader"ofthenon-executivedirectorsinstitutionalinvestorsshouldconsidervotingthesharestheyheldatmeetings,thoughrejectedcompulsoryvotingallkindsofremunerationincludingpensionsshouldbedisclosed.ItrejectedtheideathathadbeentoutedthattheUKshouldfollowtheGermantwo-tierboardstructure,orreformsintheEUDraftFifthDirectiveonCompanyLaw.[4]Afurthermini-reportwasproducedthefollowingyearbytheTurnbullCommitteewhichrecommendeddirectorsberesponsibleforinternalfinancialandauditingcontrols.Anumberofotherreportswereissuedthroughthenextdecade,particularlyincludingthe\o"Higgsreview"Higgsreview,from\o"DerekHiggs"DerekHiggsfocusingonwhatnon-executivedirectorsshoulddo,andrespondingtotheproblemsthrownupbythecollapseof\o"Enron"EnronintheUS.\o"PaulMyners"PaulMynersalsocompletedtwomajorreviewsoftheroleof\o"Institutionalinvestors"institutionalinvestorsfortheTreasury,whoseprincipleswerealsofoundintheCombinedCode.Shortlyfollowingthecollapseof\o"NorthernRock"NorthernRockandthe\o"FinancialCrisis"FinancialCrisis,the\o"WalkerReview(pagedoesnotexist)"WalkerReviewproducedareportfocusedonthebankingindustry,butalsowithrecommendationsforallcompanies.[5]In2010,anew\o"StewardshipCode"StewardshipCodewasissuedbythe\o"FinancialReportingCouncil"FinancialReportingCouncil,alongwithanewversionoftheUKCorporateGovernanceCode,henceseparatingtheissuesfromoneanother.[\o"Editsection:Contents"edit]ContentsSectionA:LeadershipEverycompanyshouldbeheadedbyaneffectiveboardwhichiscollectivelyresponsibleforthelong-termsuccessofthecompany.Thereshouldbeacleardivisionofresponsibilitiesattheheadofthecompanybetweentherunningoftheboardandtheexecutiveresponsibilityfortherunningofthecompany’sbusiness.Nooneindividualshouldhaveunfetteredpowersofdecision.Thechairmanisresponsibleforleadershipoftheboardandensuringitseffectivenessonallaspectsofitsrole.Aspartoftheirroleasmembersofaunitaryboard,non-executivedirectorsshouldconstructivelychallengeandhelpdevelopproposalsonstrategy.SectionB:EffectivenessTheboardanditscommitteesshouldhavetheappropriatebalanceofskills,experience,independenceandknowledgeofthecompanytoenablethemtodischargetheirrespectivedutiesandresponsibilitieseffectively.Thereshouldbeaformal,rigorousandtransparentprocedurefortheappointmentofnewdirectorstotheboard.Alldirectorsshouldbeabletoallocatesufficienttimetothecompanytodischargetheirresponsibilitieseffectively.Alldirectorsshouldreceiveinductiononjoiningtheboardandshouldregularlyupdateandrefreshtheirskillsandknowledge.Theboardshouldbesuppliedinatimelymannerwithinformationinaformandofaqualityappropriatetoenableittodischargeitsduties.Theboardshouldundertakeaformalandrigorousannualevaluationofitsownperformanceandthatofitscommitteesandindividualdirectors.Alldirectorsshouldbesubmittedforre-electionatregularintervals,subjecttocontinuedsatisfactoryperformance.SectionC:AccountabilityTheboardshouldpresentabalancedandunderstandableassessmentofthecompany’spositionandprospects.Theboardisresponsiblefordeterminingthenatureandextentofthesignificantrisksitiswillingtotakeinachievingitsstrategicobjectives.Theboardshouldmaintainsoundriskmanagementandinternalcontrolsystems.Theboardshouldestablishformalandtransparentarrangementsforconsideringhowtheyshouldapplythecorporatereportingandriskmanagementandinternalcontrolprinciplesandformaintaininganappropriaterelationshipwiththecompany’sauditor.SectionD:RemunerationLevelsofremunerationshouldbesufficienttoattract,retainandmotivatedirectorsofthequalityrequiredtorunthecompanysuccessfully,butacompanyshouldavoidpayingmorethanisnecessaryforthispurpose.Asignificantproportionofexecutivedirectors’remunerationshouldbestructuredsoastolinkrewardstocorporateandindividualperformance.Thereshouldbeaformalandtransparentprocedurefordevelopingpolicyonexecutiveremunerationandforfixingtheremunerationpackagesofindividualdirectors.Nodirectorshouldbeinvolvedindecidinghisorherownremuneration.SectionE:RelationswithShareholdersThereshouldbeadialoguewithshareholdersbasedonthemutualunderstandingofobjectives.Theboardasawholehasresponsibilityforensuringthatasatisfactorydialoguewithshareholderstakesplace.TheboardshouldusetheAGMtocommunicatewithinvestorsandtoencouragetheirparticipation.[\o"Editsection:Schedules"edit]SchedulesScheduleAProvisionsonthedesignofperformancerelatedremunerationThisgoesintomoredetailabouttheproblemofdirectorpay.ScheduleBDisclosureofcorporategovernancearrangementsThissetsoutachecklistofwhichdutiesmustbecompliedwith(orexplained)underListingRule9.8.6.Itmakesclearwhatobligationsthereare,andthateverythingshouldbepostedonthecompany'swebsite.[\o"Editsection:Codecompliance?"edit]Codecompliance?Inits2007responsetoaFinancialReportingCouncilconsulationpaperinJuly2007\o"Pensions&InvestmentResearchConsultantsLtd"Pensions&InvestmentResearchConsultantsLtd(acommercialproxyadvisoryservice)reportedthatonly33%oflistedcompanieswerefullycompliantwithalloftheCodesprovisions.[6]Spreadoveralltherules,thisisnotnecessarilyapoorresponse,andindicationsarethatcompliancehasbeenclimbing.PIRCmaintainsthatpoorcompliancecorrelatestopoorbusinessperformance,andatanyrateakeyprovisionsuchasseparatingtheCEOfromtheChairhadan88.4%compliancerate.ThequestionthrownupbytheCode'sapproachisthetensionbetweenwantingtomaintain"flexibility"andachieveconsistency.Thetensionisbetweenanaversionto"onesizefitsall"solutions,whichmaynotberightforeveryone,andpracticeswhichareingeneralagreementtobetried,testedandsuccessful.[7]Ifcompaniesfindthatnon-complianceworksforthem,andshareholdersagree,theywillnotbepunishedbyanexodusofinvestors.Sothechiefmethodforaccountabilityismeanttobethroughthe\o"Market"market,ratherthanthrough\o"Law"law.AnadditionalreasonforaCode,wastheoriginalconcernofthe\o"CadburyReport"CadburyReport,thatcompaniesfacedwithminimumstandardsinlawwouldcomplymerelywiththeletterandnotthespiritoftherules.[8]TheFinancialServicesAuthorityhasrecently[\o"Wikipedia:ManualofStyle/Datesandnumbers"when?]proposedtoabandonarequirementtostatecompliancewiththeprinciples(underLR9.8.6(5)),ratherthantherulesindetailthemselves.[\o"Editsection:Seealso"edit]Seealso\o"CorporateGovernance"CorporateGovernance\o"CorporateSocialResponsibility"CorporateSocialResponsibility\o"StewardshipCode"StewardshipCode\o"OECDPrinciplesofCorporateGovernance2004(pagedoesnotexist)"OECDPrinciplesofCorporateGovernance2004\o"DeutscheCorporateGovernanceCodex(pagedoesnotexist)"DeutscheCorporateGovernanceCodex(online)Companyreformreports\o"WrenburyCommittee(pagedoesnotexist)"WrenburyCommittee(1918)(concernedwith"alienshareholders"andkeyindustries)\o"GreeneCommittee"GreeneCommittee(1926)ReportoftheCompanyLawAmendmentCommittee(Cmnd2657,1926)\o"CohenCommittee"CohenCommittee(1945)\o"JenkinsCommittee"JenkinsCommittee(1962)\o"AlanBullock"AlanBullock(1977)\o"Reportofthecommitteeofinquiryonindustrialdemocracy"Reportofthecommitteeofinquiryonindustrialdemocracy,onworkercodetermination\o"CorkReport"CorkReport,InsolvencyLawandPractice,ReportoftheReviewCommittee(1982)(Cmnd8558)\o"CadburyReport"CadburyReport(1992),FinancialAspectsofCorporateGovernance,oncorporategovernancegenerally.Pdffilehere\o"GreenburyReport"GreenburyReport(1995)Directors'Remuneration,ReportoftheStudyGroupPdfhere\o"HampelReport"HampelReport(1998),ReviewofcorporategovernancesinceCadbury,hereandonlinewiththeEGCIhere\o"TurnbullReport"TurnbullReport(1999)oninternalcontrolstoensuregoodfinancialreporting\o"MynersReport"MynersReport(2001),InstitutionalInvestmentintheUnitedKingdom:AReviewoninstitutionalinvestors,PdffilehereandReviewofProgressReporthere\o"HiggsReport"HiggsReport(2003)Reviewoftheroleandeffectivenessofnon-executivedirectors.Pdfhere\o"SmithReport"SmithReport(2003)onauditors.Pdfhere\o"MynersReview(pagedoesnotexist)"MynersReview(2004)Mynersprinciplesforinstitutionalinvestmentdecision-making:reviewofprogress.pdfhere\o"WalkerReview(pagedoesnotexist)"WalkerReview(2009)inresponsetothefinancialcrisis,andfocusingoninstitutionalinvestors,.pdfdocument[\o"Editsection:Notes"edit]Notes^\o"FinancialServicesandMarketsAct2000"FinancialServicesandMarketsAct2000s2(4)(a)andgenerallyPartVI^ListingRule9.8.6(6)^Seegenerally,VFinch,'BoardPerformanceandCadburyonCorporateGovernance'[1992]JournalofBusinessLaw581^SeeADignam,'APrincipledApproachtoSelf-regulation?TheReportoftheHampelCommitteeonCorporateGovernance'[1998]CompanyLawyer140^DavidWalker,AreviewofcorporategovernanceinUKbanksandotherfinancialindustryentities(2009)^PIRC,Reviewoftheimpactofthe