微观经济管理学与财务知识分析规范课件

LaugherCurveQ. Howmanyeconomistsdoesittaketoscrewinalightbulb?A. Eight.Onetoscrewitinandseventoholdeverythingelseconstant.LaugherCurveQ. Howmanyecono1IntroductionShouldthegovernmentinterveneinthemarket?Theframeworkpresentedmightbecalledtheinvisiblehandframework.Invisiblehandframework–perfectlycompetitiveleadindividualstomakevoluntarychoicesthatareinsociety’sinterest.IntroductionShouldthegovernm2MarketFailuresAmarketfailureoccurswhentheinvisiblehandpushesinsuchawaythatindividualdecisionsdonotleadtosociallydesirableoutcomes.MarketFailuresAmarketfailur3MarketFailuresAnytimeamarketfailureexists,thereisareasonforpossiblegovernmentinterventionintomarketstoimprovetheoutcome.MarketFailuresAnytimeamark4MarketFailuresBecausethepoliticsofimplementingthesolutionoftenleadstofurtherproblems,governmentinterventionmaynotnecessarilyimprovethesituation.MarketFailuresBecausethepol5ExternalitiesExternalitiesaretheeffectofadecisiononathirdpartythatisnottakenintoaccountbythedecision-maker.Externalitiescanbebothpositiveandnegative.ExternalitiesExternalitiesare6ExternalitiesNegativeexternalitiesoccurwhentheeffectofadecisiononothersthatisnottakenintoaccountbythedecision-makerisdetrimentaltothethirdparty.Examplesincludesecond-handsmoke,waterpollution,andcongestion.ExternalitiesNegativeexternal7ExternalitiesPositiveexternalitiesoccurwhentheeffectofadecisiononothersthatisnottakenintoaccountbythedecision-makerisbeneficialtoothers.Examplesincludeinnovation,education,andnewbusinessformation.ExternalitiesPositiveexternal8NegativeExternalitiesWhennegativeexternalitiesensuethirdpartiesarehurt.Marginalsocialcostisgreaterthanmarginalprivatecost.NegativeExternalitiesWhenneg9NegativeExternalitiesMarginalsocialcostincludesallthemarginalcostsbornebysociety.NegativeExternalitiesMarginal10NegativeExternalitiesMarginalsocialcostiscalculatedbyaddingthenegativeexternalitiesassociatedwithproductiontothemarginalprivatecostsofthatproduction.NegativeExternalitiesMarginal11TheEffectofaNegativeExternalityMarginalsocialbenefitMarginalprivatecostMarginalsocialcostCostQuantity0Q0P0Q1P1MarginalcostfromexternalityTheEffectofaNegativeExter12PositiveExternalitiesPrivatetradescanbenefitthirdpartiesnotinvolvedinthetrade.Marginalsocialbenefitequalsthemarginalprivatebenefitofconsumingagoodorserviceplusthepositiveexternalitiesresultingfromconsumingthatgoodorservice.PositiveExternalitiesPrivate13APositiveExternalityCostQuantity0MarginalbenefitofanexternalityD0=MarginalprivatebenefitD1=MarginalsocialbenefitQ0P0Q1P1S=MarginalprivateandsocialcostAPositiveExternalityCostQuan14AlternativeMethodsofDealingwithExternalitiesExternalitiescanbedealtwithviadirectregulation,incentivepolicies,andvoluntarysolutions.AlternativeMethodsofDealing15DirectRegulationAprogramofdirectregulation

iswheretheamountofagoodpeopleareallowedtouseisdirectlylimitedbythegovernment.DirectRegulationAprogramof16DirectRegulationEconomistsdonotlikethissolutionsinceitdoesnotachievethedesiredendasefficiently(atthelowestcostpossibleintotalresourceswithoutconsiderationastowhopaysthosecosts)andfairlyaspossible.DirectRegulationEconomistsdo17DirectRegulationDirectregulationisinefficientbecauseitachievesagoalinamorecostlymannerthannecessary.DirectRegulationDirectregula18IncentivePoliciesIncentiveprogramsaremoreefficientthandirectregulatorypolicies.Thetwotypesofincentivepoliciesareeithertaxesormarketincentives.IncentivePoliciesIncentivepr19TaxIncentivePoliciesAtaxincentiveprogramusesataxtocreateincentivesforindividualstostructuretheiractivitiesinawaythatisconsistentwiththedesiredends.Oftenthetaxyieldsthedesiredendmoreefficientlythanstraightregulation.TaxIncentivePoliciesAtaxin20TaxIncentivePoliciesThissolutionembodiesameasureoffairnessaboutit–thepersonwhoconservesthemostpaystheleasttax.TaxIncentivePoliciesThissol21TaxIncentivePoliciesAnotherwaytohandleanegativeexternalityisthroughapollutiontaxoreffluentfees.Effluentfees–chargesimposedbygovernmentonthelevelofpollutioncreated.TaxIncentivePoliciesAnother22RegulationThroughTaxationMarginalsocialbenefitMarginalprivatecostMarginalsocialcostCostQuantity0Q0P0Q1P1EfficienttaxRegulationThroughTaxationMar23MarketIncentivePoliciesAnalternativetodirectregulationissometypeofmarketincentiveprogram.Marketincentiveprogram–aplanrequiringmarketparticipantstocertifytotalconsumption–theirownorother’s–hasbeenreducedbyaspecifiedamount.MarketIncentivePoliciesAnal24MarketIncentivePoliciesAmarketincentiveprogramissimilartotheregulatorysolutioninthattheamountofthegoodusedisreduced.MarketIncentivePoliciesAmar25MarketIncentivePoliciesAmarketincentiveprogramdiffersfromaregulatorysolutioninthatindividualswhoreduceconsumptionbymorethantherequiredamountaregivenamarketablecertificatethatcanbesoldtosomeoneelse.MarketIncentivePoliciesAmar26VoluntaryReductionsVoluntaryreductionsleaveindividualsfreetochoosewhethertofollowwhatissociallyoptimalorwhatisprivatelyoptimal.Economistsaredubiousofvoluntarysolutions.VoluntaryReductionsVoluntary27VoluntaryReductionsAperson’ssocialconscienceandwillingnesstodothingsforthegoodofsocietygenerallydependonhisorherbeliefthatotherswillalsobehelping.VoluntaryReductionsAperson’s28VoluntaryReductionsIfasociallyconsciouspersoncomestobelievealargenumberofotherpeoplewillnotcontribute,heorshewilloftenlosetheirsocialconscience.Thisisanotherexampleofafreeriderproblem–individuals’unwillingnesstoshareinthecostofapublicgood.VoluntaryReductionsIfasocia29TheOptimalPolicyAnoptimalpolicyisoneinwhichthemarginalcostofundertakingthepolicyequalsthemarginalbenefitofthatpolicy.TheOptimalPolicyAnoptimalp30TheOptimalPolicyShouldpollutionbetotallyeliminated?Someenvironmentalistssay“yes.”Economistswouldanswerthatdoingsoiscostlysomarginalcostsshouldbebalancedagainstmarginalbenefits.TheOptimalPolicyShouldpollu31TheOptimalPolicyThepointwhereMC=MRiscalledtheoptimallevelofpollution.Optimallevelofpollution–theamountofpollutionatwhichthemarginalbenefitofreducingpollutionequalsthemarginalcost.TheOptimalPolicyThepointwh32PublicGoodsApublic

goodisonethatisnonexclusive(noonecanbeexcludedfromitsbenefits)andnonrival(consumptionbyonedoesnotprecludeconsumptionbyothers.PublicGoodsApublicgoodiso33PublicGoodsTherearenopureexamplesofapublicgood.Theclosestexampleisnationaldefense.Technologycanchangethepublicnatureofgoods.Roadsareanexample.PublicGoodsTherearenopure34PublicGoodsOnceapurepublicgoodissuppliedtooneindividual,itissimultaneouslysuppliedtoall.Aprivategoodisonlysuppliedtotheindividualwhoboughtit.PublicGoodsOnceapurepublic35PublicGoodsWithpublicgoods,thefocusisongroups.Withprivategoods,thefocusisontheindividual.PublicGoodsWithpublicgoods,36PublicGoodsInthecaseofapublicgood,thesocialbenefitofapublicgoodisthesumoftheindividualbenefits.PublicGoodsInthecaseofap37PublicGoodsAddingdemandcurvesverticallyiseasytodointextbooks,butnotinpractice.Thisisbecauseindividualsdonotbuypublicgoodsdirectlysothattheirdemandisnotrevealedintheiractions.PublicGoodsAddingdemandcurv38TheMarketValueofaPublicGood0.50Price123Quantity.01.00MarketdemandDBDA0.100.400.100.600.50TheMarketValueofaPublicG39InformationalProblemsPerfectlycompetitivemarketsassumeperfectinformation.Real-worldmarketsofteninvolvedeception,cheating,andinaccurateinformation.InformationalProblemsPerfectl40InformationalProblemsWhenthereisalackofinformation,buyersandsellersdonothaveequalinformation,marketsmaynotworkproperly.InformationalProblemsWhenthe41InformationalProblemsEconomistscallsuchmarketfailuresadverseselectionproblems.Adverseselectionproblems–problemsthatoccurwhenabuyerorasellerhavedifferentamountsofinformationaboutthegoodforsale.InformationalProblemsEconomis42PoliciestoDealwithInformationalProblemsOnepolicyalternativetodealwithinformationmarketfailuresistoregulatethemarketandseethatindividualsprovidethecorrectinformation.PoliciestoDealwithInformat43PoliciestoDealwithInformationalProblemsAnotheralternativeisforthegovernmenttolicenseindividualsinthemarketandrequirethemtoprovidefullinformationaboutthegoodbeingsold.PoliciestoDealwithInformat44PoliciestoDealwithInformationalProblemsRegulatorysolutionsmaybeoverlysloworcostly.PoliciestoDealwithInformat45AMarketinInformationAmarketininformationisonesolutiontotheinformationproblem.Informationisvaluable,andisaneconomicproductinitsownright.AMarketinInformationAmarke46AMarketinInformationLeftontheirown,marketswilldeveloptoprovideinformationthatpeopleneedandarewillingtopayforit.AMarketinInformationLefton47AMarketinInformationEconomistswhodonotlikegovernmentinterferencepointoutthatinformationalproblemsarenotaproblemofthemarket;itisaproblemofgovernmentregulation.AMarketinInformationEconomi48LicensingofDoctorsLicensingofdoctorsisadebatethatismotivatedbyinformationproblems.Currentlyalldoctorspracticingmedicinearerequiredtobelicensed–thiswasnotalwaysso.Licensingofdoctorsisjustifiedbyinformationalproblems.LicensingofDoctorsLicensing49LicensingofDoctorsSomeeconomistsarguethatlicensingisasmuchaproblemofrestrictingsupplyasitistohelptheconsumer.LicensingofDoctorsSomeecono50LicensingofDoctorsWhy,iflicensedmedicaltrainingissogreat,doweevenneedformalrestrictionstokeepothertypesofmedicinefrombeingpracticed?LicensingofDoctorsWhy,ifli51LicensingofDoctorsWhomdotheserestrictionsbenefit:thegeneralpublicorthedoctorswhopracticemainstreammedicine?Whathavethelong-termeffectsoflicensurebeen?LicensingofDoctorsWhomdoth52AnInformationalAlternativetoLicensureAsanalternative,thegovernmentcouldprovidethepublicwithinformationaboutwhichtreatmentsworkandwhichdonot.Thiswouldgiverisetoconsumersovereignty–therightoftheindividualtomakechoicesaboutwhatisconsumedandproduced.AnInformationalAlternativet53AnInformationalAlternativetoLicensureInthisscenario,thegovernmentwouldprovidesuchinformationas:Gradesincollege.Gradesinmedicalschool.Successrateforvariousprocedures.References.Medicalphilosophy.Chargesandfees.AnInformationalAlternativet54AnInformationalAlternativetoLicensureThisinformationalternativewouldprovidemuchmoreusefulinformationtothepublicthanthepresentlicensingprocedure.AnInformationalAlternativet55AnInformationalAlternativetoLicensureHerearesomewordsofcautionabouttheinformationalalternative.Togetatruepictureofwhetherthepresentsystemisbestwouldrequireexpertsonreal-lifepracticesandinstitutions.Theproblemisthattheexpertsmayhaveavestedinterestinkeepingthingsjustthewaytheyare.AnInformationalAlternativet56GovernmentFailuresandMarketFailuresMarketfailuresshouldnotautomaticallycallforgovernmentintervention.Why?Becausegovernmentsfailtoo.GovernmentFailuresandMarket57GovernmentFailuresandMarketFailuresGovernmentfailureoccurswhenthegovernmentinterventioninthemarkettoimprovethemarketfailureactuallymakesthesituationworse.GovernmentFailuresandMarket58ReasonsforGovernmentFailuresGovernmentsdonothaveanincentivetocorrecttheproblem.Governmentsdonothavetheinformationtodealwiththeproblem.Interventioninthemarketsisalmostalwaysmorecomplicatedthanitinitiallylooks.ReasonsforGovernmentFailure59ReasonsforGovernmentFailuresGovernmentinterventiondoesnotallowfine-tuning,andso,whentheproblemschange,thegovernmentsolutionoftenrespondsfarmoreslowly.Governmentinterventionleadstomoregovernmentintervention.ReasonsforGovernmentFailure60GovernmentPolicyandMarketFailuresEndofChapter15GovernmentPolicyandMarketF微观经济管理学与财务知识分析规范课件62LaugherCurveQ. Howmanyeconomistsdoesittaketoscrewinalightbulb?A. Eight.Onetoscrewitinandseventoholdeverythingelseconstant.LaugherCurveQ. Howmanyecono63IntroductionShouldthegovernmentinterveneinthemarket?Theframeworkpresentedmightbecalledtheinvisiblehandframework.Invisiblehandframework–perfectlycompetitiveleadindividualstomakevoluntarychoicesthatareinsociety’sinterest.IntroductionShouldthegovernm64MarketFailuresAmarketfailureoccurswhentheinvisiblehandpushesinsuchawaythatindividualdecisionsdonotleadtosociallydesirableoutcomes.MarketFailuresAmarketfailur65MarketFailuresAnytimeamarketfailureexists,thereisareasonforpossiblegovernmentinterventionintomarketstoimprovetheoutcome.MarketFailuresAnytimeamark66MarketFailuresBecausethepoliticsofimplementingthesolutionoftenleadstofurtherproblems,governmentinterventionmaynotnecessarilyimprovethesituation.MarketFailuresBecausethepol67ExternalitiesExternalitiesaretheeffectofadecisiononathirdpartythatisnottakenintoaccountbythedecision-maker.Externalitiescanbebothpositiveandnegative.ExternalitiesExternalitiesare68ExternalitiesNegativeexternalitiesoccurwhentheeffectofadecisiononothersthatisnottakenintoaccountbythedecision-makerisdetrimentaltothethirdparty.Examplesincludesecond-handsmoke,waterpollution,andcongestion.ExternalitiesNegativeexternal69ExternalitiesPositiveexternalitiesoccurwhentheeffectofadecisiononothersthatisnottakenintoaccountbythedecision-makerisbeneficialtoothers.Examplesincludeinnovation,education,andnewbusinessformation.ExternalitiesPositiveexternal70NegativeExternalitiesWhennegativeexternalitiesensuethirdpartiesarehurt.Marginalsocialcostisgreaterthanmarginalprivatecost.NegativeExternalitiesWhenneg71NegativeExternalitiesMarginalsocialcostincludesallthemarginalcostsbornebysociety.NegativeExternalitiesMarginal72NegativeExternalitiesMarginalsocialcostiscalculatedbyaddingthenegativeexternalitiesassociatedwithproductiontothemarginalprivatecostsofthatproduction.NegativeExternalitiesMarginal73TheEffectofaNegativeExternalityMarginalsocialbenefitMarginalprivatecostMarginalsocialcostCostQuantity0Q0P0Q1P1MarginalcostfromexternalityTheEffectofaNegativeExter74PositiveExternalitiesPrivatetradescanbenefitthirdpartiesnotinvolvedinthetrade.Marginalsocialbenefitequalsthemarginalprivatebenefitofconsumingagoodorserviceplusthepositiveexternalitiesresultingfromconsumingthatgoodorservice.PositiveExternalitiesPrivate75APositiveExternalityCostQuantity0MarginalbenefitofanexternalityD0=MarginalprivatebenefitD1=MarginalsocialbenefitQ0P0Q1P1S=MarginalprivateandsocialcostAPositiveExternalityCostQuan76AlternativeMethodsofDealingwithExternalitiesExternalitiescanbedealtwithviadirectregulation,incentivepolicies,andvoluntarysolutions.AlternativeMethodsofDealing77DirectRegulationAprogramofdirectregulation

iswheretheamountofagoodpeopleareallowedtouseisdirectlylimitedbythegovernment.DirectRegulationAprogramof78DirectRegulationEconomistsdonotlikethissolutionsinceitdoesnotachievethedesiredendasefficiently(atthelowestcostpossibleintotalresourceswithoutconsiderationastowhopaysthosecosts)andfairlyaspossible.DirectRegulationEconomistsdo79DirectRegulationDirectregulationisinefficientbecauseitachievesagoalinamorecostlymannerthannecessary.DirectRegulationDirectregula80IncentivePoliciesIncentiveprogramsaremoreefficientthandirectregulatorypolicies.Thetwotypesofincentivepoliciesareeithertaxesormarketincentives.IncentivePoliciesIncentivepr81TaxIncentivePoliciesAtaxincentiveprogramusesataxtocreateincentivesforindividualstostructuretheiractivitiesinawaythatisconsistentwiththedesiredends.Oftenthetaxyieldsthedesiredendmoreefficientlythanstraightregulation.TaxIncentivePoliciesAtaxin82TaxIncentivePoliciesThissolutionembodiesameasureoffairnessaboutit–thepersonwhoconservesthemostpaystheleasttax.TaxIncentivePoliciesThissol83TaxIncentivePoliciesAnotherwaytohandleanegativeexternalityisthroughapollutiontaxoreffluentfees.Effluentfees–chargesimposedbygovernmentonthelevelofpollutioncreated.TaxIncentivePoliciesAnother84RegulationThroughTaxationMarginalsocialbenefitMarginalprivatecostMarginalsocialcostCostQuantity0Q0P0Q1P1EfficienttaxRegulationThroughTaxationMar85MarketIncentivePoliciesAnalternativetodirectregulationissometypeofmarketincentiveprogram.Marketincentiveprogram–aplanrequiringmarketparticipantstocertifytotalconsumption–theirownorother’s–hasbeenreducedbyaspecifiedamount.MarketIncentivePoliciesAnal86MarketIncentivePoliciesAmarketincentiveprogramissimilartotheregulatorysolutioninthattheamountofthegoodusedisreduced.MarketIncentivePoliciesAmar87MarketIncentivePoliciesAmarketincentiveprogramdiffersfromaregulatorysolutioninthatindividualswhoreduceconsumptionbymorethantherequiredamountaregivenamarketablecertificatethatcanbesoldtosomeoneelse.MarketIncentivePoliciesAmar88VoluntaryReductionsVoluntaryreductionsleaveindividualsfreetochoosewhethertofollowwhatissociallyoptimalorwhatisprivatelyoptimal.Economistsaredubiousofvoluntarysolutions.VoluntaryReductionsVoluntary89VoluntaryReductionsAperson’ssocialconscienceandwillingnesstodothingsforthegoodofsocietygenerallydependonhisorherbeliefthatotherswillalsobehelping.VoluntaryReductionsAperson’s90VoluntaryReductionsIfasociallyconsciouspersoncomestobelievealargenumberofotherpeoplewillnotcontribute,heorshewilloftenlosetheirsocialconscience.Thisisanotherexampleofafreeriderproblem–individuals’unwillingnesstoshareinthecostofapublicgood.VoluntaryReductionsIfasocia91TheOptimalPolicyAnoptimalpolicyisoneinwhichthemarginalcostofundertakingthepolicyequalsthemarginalbenefitofthatpolicy.TheOptimalPolicyAnoptimalp92TheOptimalPolicyShouldpollutionbetotallyeliminated?Someenvironmentalistssay“yes.”Economistswouldanswerthatdoingsoiscostlysomarginalcostsshouldbebalancedagainstmarginalbenefits.TheOptimalPolicyShouldpollu93TheOptimalPolicyThepointwhereMC=MRiscalledtheoptimallevelofpollution.Optimallevelofpollution–theamountofpollutionatwhichthemarginalbenefitofreducingpollutionequalsthemarginalcost.TheOptimalPolicyThepointwh94PublicGoodsApublic

goodisonethatisnonexclusive(noonecanbeexcludedfromitsbenefits)andnonrival(consumptionbyonedoesnotprecludeconsumptionbyothers.PublicGoodsApublicgoodiso95PublicGoodsTherearenopureexamplesofapublicgood.Theclosestexampleisnationaldefense.Technologycanchangethepublicnatureofgoods.Roadsareanexample.PublicGoodsTherearenopure96PublicGoodsOnceapurepublicgoodissuppliedtooneindividual,itissimultaneouslysuppliedtoall.Aprivategoodisonlysuppliedtotheindividualwhoboughtit.PublicGoodsOnceapurepublic97PublicGoodsWithpublicgoods,thefocusisongroups.Withprivategoods,thefocusisontheindividual.PublicGoodsWithpublicgoods,98PublicGoodsInthecaseofapublicgood,thesocialbenefitofapublicgoodisthesumoftheindividualbenefits.PublicGoodsInthecaseofap99PublicGoodsAddingdemandcurvesverticallyiseasytodointextbooks,butnotinpractice.Thisisbecauseindividualsdonotbuypublicgoodsdirectlysothattheirdemandisnotrevealedintheiractions.PublicGoodsAddingdemandcurv100TheMarketValueofaPublicGood0.50Price123Quantity.01.00MarketdemandDBDA0.100.400.100.600.50TheMarketValueofaPublicG101InformationalProblemsPerfectlycompetitivemarketsassumeperfectinformation.Real-worldmarketsofteninvolvedeception,cheating,andinaccurateinformation.InformationalProblemsPerfectl102InformationalProblemsWhenthereisalackofinformation,buyersandsellersdonothaveequalinformation,marketsmaynotworkproperly.InformationalProblemsWhenthe103InformationalProblemsEconomistscallsuchmarketfailuresadverseselectionproblems.Adverseselectionproblems–problemsthatoccurwhenabuyerorasellerhavedifferentamountsofinformationaboutthegoodforsale.InformationalProblemsEconomis104PoliciestoDealwithInformationalProblemsOnepolicyalternativetodealwithinformationmarketfailuresistoregulatethemarketandseethatindividualsprovidethecorrectinformation.PoliciestoDealwithInformat105PoliciestoDealwithInformationalProblemsAnotheralternativeisforthegovernmenttolicenseindividualsinthemarketandrequirethemtoprovidefullinformationaboutthegoodbeingsold.PoliciestoDealwithInformat106PoliciestoDealwithInformationalProblemsRegulatorysolutionsmaybeoverlysloworcostly.PoliciestoDealwithInformat107AMarketinInformationAmarketininformationisonesolutiontotheinformationproblem.Informationisvaluable,andisaneconomicproductinitsownright.AMarketinInformationAmarke108AMarketinInformationLeftontheirown,marketswilldeveloptoprovideinformationthatpeopleneedandarewillingtopayforit.AMarketinInformationLefton109AMarketinInformationEconomistswhodonotlikegovernmentinterferencepointoutthatinformationalproblemsarenotaproblemofthemarket;itisaproblemofgovernmentregulation.AMarketinInformationEconomi110LicensingofDoctorsLicensingofdoctorsisadebatethatismotivatedbyinformationproblems.Currentlyalldoctorspracticingmedicinearerequiredtobelicensed–thiswasnotalwaysso.Licensingofdoctorsisjustifiedbyinformationalproblems.LicensingofDoctorsLicensing111LicensingofDoctorsSomeeconomistsarguethatlicensingisasmuchaproblemofrestrictingsupplyasitistohelptheconsumer.LicensingofDoctorsSome