国际经贸高级英语19

TEXT

Ⅰ.Introduction

Thereisasubtlebutpervasiverevolutiongoingoninthetheoryandpracticeofinvestment—arevolutioninthemostfundamentalassumptionswithwhichinvestorsframetheirnotionsoftheirinvestmentassets.Theoldregimeofsecurityanalysisemphasizedindividualassets,butoverthelastquartercenturyithasbeengraduallyreplacedbyanewregimeofportfoliomanagement,withcorrespondingemphasisoncompositeassets.ThenewemphasisoncompositeassetsisasrevolutionaryinrelationtotraditionalinvestmentperspectivesasanApolloastronaut’sphotographofthewholeEarthrisingabovetheSeaofTranquilityistoamapoftheNewYorkCitysubwaysystem.UnitNineteen

TheRevolutioninCompositeAssets

—DonaldL.Luskin

By“compositeassets”Imeandiversifiedinvestmentaggregates,suchasportfoliosofstocksorbonds,thatarethemselvesmadeupofindividualassets,butarenonethelessthoughtofglobally,asindivisibleunits.Thecompositeassetperspectiveoperatesonthemacrocosmic,whole-portfoliolevel,relegatingindividualassetstotheroleofmerebuildingblocks.

Ⅱ.InvestmentStrategieswithCompositeAssetsAsofthiswriting,approximately$200billionisinvestedonbehalfofAmerica’slargestandmostsophisticatedcorporateandpublicpensionplansandendowmentsinvariousequityandfixed-incomeindexfunds.Thephenomenalgrowthofindexfundsisonlypartiallyattributabletofrustrationwithtraditionalactivemanagement.Perhapsitisjustaswellexplainedbyapreferenceforsystematicdiversification,rigidinvestmentdisciplineandtightcostcontrolmadepossiblebyaperspectivethattreatsthebenchmarkindexasasinglecompositeasset.UnitNineteen

TheRevolutioninCompositeAssets

—DonaldL.Luskin

Theimpactoftheseenormousfunds,andtheattitudethathasmadethemsopopular,canbeseenwhenanewstockisaddedtoStandardandPoor’s500,themostwidelyfollowedbenchmarkindex.Intheweeksfollowingaddition,newstockscanbeobservedtoappreciablyoutperformthemarket,reflectingnotonlybuyingpressurefromindexfundsbutalsotheenhancementofthestock’scredibilityandprestigeresultingfrommembershipinthisexclusivecompositeassetclub.Manyindexfundsnowseeknotsimplytomimicorreproducepublishedindexesbutinsteadtoofferwhatamounttocompetingalternativecompositeassets.Somesuchfundsofferbiases,or“tilts,”inindexcompositionorweightinginfavorofparticularinvestmentattributes,suchasyieldorsize,whilestillmaintainingdiversificationandbroadmarketexposure.Othersusequantitativemodelstoselectsecuritiesthoughttobeunderpriced,combiningthemintoportfoliosdesignedtotrack,yetstilloutperform,apublishedindex.Inbothcasesinvestorsarestillpursuingtheholygrailofbetter-than-marketperformance,buttheyaredoingsoinanewcompositeassetframework.UnitNineteen

TheRevolutioninCompositeAssets

—DonaldL.LuskinAssetallocationstrategiesarebornnotonlyoftherecognitionthatitisdifficultorimpossibletobeatthemarketthroughstockselectionbutalsoofthebeliefthatsuchapursuitisessentiallytrivial.Allocationdecisionsbetweenbroadinvestmentclasses—thatis,compositeassets—arenowunderstoodtobetheprimecontributortorisksandreturns.Onthestrategiclevelpensionplansnowtypicallyretainspecializedconsultantstohelpstructureassetallocationtomeetlong-termobligationswhilemaximizingexpectedreturn.Onthetacticallevelinvestmentmanagersrecommendshort-termshiftsbetweencompositeassetsinresponsetomodelsoftherelativerisk-adjustedattractivenessofassetclasses.Stockindexfuturesarearguablythemostsuccessfulnewproductsinthehistoryofthesecuritiesindustry,tradingadailyvaluefarinexcessoftheunderlyingstockmarket.Theyareusedbyinstitutionsasgenericproxiesforcompositeassets—unitsfortransferringsystematicriskinallmannerofhedging,positioningandrestructuringactivitiesatthewhole-portfoliolevel.Arbitragebetweenindexfuturesandtheirunderlyingphysicalindexestreatsthestockandfuturesexchangesascompetingmarketplacesforequivalentandinterchangeablecompositeassets.UnitNineteen

TheRevolutioninCompositeAssets

—DonaldL.Luskin

Ⅲ.TradinginTermsofCompositeAssets

Unfortunately,thefuturesmarketremainstheclosestcurrentapproximationtoacompositeassetsexchange,leavingagrossmismatchbetweenthewayinvestorsthinkabouttheirinvestmentgoalsandthewaytheymustcarrythemout.Forinvestorswhocustomarilythinkintermsofcompositeassets,apreferencetotradeinthesamecompositetermsflowsinevitablyfromimportantfunctionalrequirementsoftheirinvestmentstrategies.Transactionsmustbemadeproportionatelyandsimultaneouslyacrossalltheassetscomprisingacompositeasset,yetinstitutionsliketheNewYorkStockExchangeandtheover-the-counternetworkofgovernmentbonddealersstillonlytradeindividualassets,oneatatime.Toredressthisdeficiency,thesecuritiesbrokerageindustryhasimprovisedseveralexofficioexchangemechanismsofitsown.In“package”tradingabrokeractsasanoff-floordealer/specialisttofacilitatesimultaneoustradingofalistofassets.Inequitiesithasbeenestimatedthatpackagetradingnowaccountsforupwardof25percentofdailyNewYorkStockExchangevolume.UnitNineteen

TheRevolutioninCompositeAssets

—DonaldL.LuskinIntheincreasinglypopular“crossingnetworks,”brokersprovideacentralcomputerizedbulletinboardfacilityonwhichinvestorsmayconfidentiallypostlistsofassetstobetraded.Executionsareconsummatedwhenlists,orcombinationsoflists,areabletobepairedoffinthecomputer.Althoughthesenetworksarestillintheirinfancy,theyhavealreadybeguntoattractsignificantinterestfrominvestors;theirtradingvolumeisnowreportedinthemillionsofsharesonmanydays.TherevolutionincompositeassetshascaughttheNewYorkStockExchangeinanuncomfortablecompetitiveposition.Ontheonehand,inthewakeoftheOctober1987crash,theNYSEisseekingtostrengthenitsinfrastructuretohandleordersmotivatedbycompositeassetstrategies.Thoughitrecentlyputinplacerulestoprohibituseofitscomputerizedorderentrysystemsforindexfuturesarbitrageondayswhenthemarketexperienceslargepricechanges,atthesametime,itwouldliketotakealeadershiproleintheinevitablegrowthoftradingofcompositeassets.Forexample,ithasadvocatedthecreationofaspecialistpostfortradingentirestandardizedportfoliosofstocksallatonce.UnitNineteen

TheRevolutioninCompositeAssets

—DonaldL.LuskinTherevolutionincompositeassetswillbecompletewhenexchangemechanismsallowinvestorstotradeandclearcompositeassetsentirelyincompositeterms.Forinstance,somedayinvestorswillbeabletoplaceanordertobuya$10millioncompositeassetcomprisingaspecifiednumberofindividualassets,withaspecifiedtheoreticaltrackingerrorversusaspecifiedindex,andspecifiedlevelsofbiasestowardspecifiedeconomicandriskfactors.Ultimately,clearinginstitutionsmayhavetoevolvetoaccommodatetransfersofwealthinunitssubtlerthansharecertificates.UnitNineteen

TheRevolutioninCompositeAssets

—DonaldL.LuskinⅣ.RootsoftheCompositeAssetRevolution

Likemostrevolutions,therevolutionincompositeassetshasbeengradual,progressinginevitablyoutofacomplexofeconomic,conceptual,regulatory,andtechnologicalfactors.Mostfundamentally,itwasnecessitatedbythesweepinginstitutionalizationofmarketsthathasoccurredoverthelast25years.Thevastmagnitudeofinstitutionalinvestmentfunds,andthecomplexitiesofaccommodatingtheirastonishingrateofgrowth,aregrosslyoutofscalewiththenotionoftraditionalanalysisofindividualassets.Diversificationofinstitutionalholdingsintocompositeassetsisvirtuallyautomatic,andamatchingconceptualframeworkisfunctionallyunavoidable.Beyondthissimpleargumentofnecessity,thereareanumberofother,subtlerreasonswhyinstitutionalinvestorshavecometoprefertothinkandactintermsofcompositeassets.First,UnitNineteen

TheRevolutioninCompositeAssets

—DonaldL.Luskin

theregulatoryenvironmenthasdevelopedinwaysthatincreasinglymandateit.Forexample,theEmployeeRetirementIncomeSecurityActof1974(ERISA)judgestheprudenceofindividualinvestmentopportunitiesintheirwhole-portfoliocontext,explicitlyacknowledgingtheaxiomthatuncorrelatedriskyindividualassetscanbecombinedintolessriskycompositeassets.Thustraditionalinvestmentdecisionsontheindividualassetleveltakeabackseattoconsiderationsofhowtheywillaffecttheoverallcompositeassetsofwhichtheyarebutcomponents.Asanotherexample,FinancialAccountingStandardsBoard(FASB)Statement87isforcingcorporationstoaccountforthevaluesoftheirpensionplansasthesurplusofassetsoverliabilities.FASB87mandatesthatthesurplusitselfbethoughtofasasingleasset(orliability)ownedbythecorporation,asupercompositeassetperspectivenotonlybeyondindividualassetsbutevenbeyondindividualassetclassesaswell.UnitNineteen

TheRevolutioninCompositeAssets

—DonaldL.Luskin

Second,institutionalinvestorshaveincreasinglycometobemeasuredbyunforgivingstandardsofperformance,denominatedbyindexesthatarethemselvescompositeassets.Therehasevenevolvedanewconsultingbusinessindesigningcustommeasurementindexes,callednormals,gearedtobenchmarkingparticularmanagementstyles.Whenthemeasureofsuccess—andthuscompensation,aswell—isdenominatedincompositeterms,eventraditionalinvestorswhosethinkingisdominatedbyindividualassetanalysisaresubtlyinducedtoadoptthecompositeassetsperspective.Third,institutionalinvestorsaredrawntoperceivedcostbenefitsofthecompositeassetperspective.Managementfeesforcomputer-drivencompositeassetstrategiessuchasindexingaregenerallymuchlowerthanthoseforhuman-laborintensivestrategiesdependentonactiveindividualassetanalysis.AndmanybelievethatcompositeassettradingtechniquessuchasUnitNineteen

TheRevolutioninCompositeAssets

—DonaldL.Luskin

packagetradingreducetheexplicitandimplicitcostsoftransacting.Becauseacompositeassetcanbethoughtofasasingletrade,muchlargerthananyofitscomponentstakenindividually,bypackagingthetransactioninasingleconceptualunitthetradershouldbeentitledtoaquantitydiscountresultinginlowerunitcommissions.Potentiallymoresignificant,thepercentagebid/offerspreadisthoughttobelowerforrelativelyinformationlesscompositeassetsthanitwouldbeforindividualassets,becausetheyarepresumablylessriskyforthemarketplacetofacilitate.Whatevertheeconomicorregulatorystimuli,therevolutionincompositeassetswouldnothavebeenpossiblewithoutthedevelopmentofaconstellationofnewconceptsandprocessesofquantitativeanalysis.AsGrahamandDodd’sSecurityAnalysisdrewforagenerationofinvestorsamapoftheworlddominatedbyindividualassets,Markowitz’sPortfolioSelectionintroducedanewgenerationto“ModernPortfolioTheory,”thelanguageofcompositeassets.Inthe25yearssinceMarkowitz’stheoreticalworkwasfirstUnitNineteen

TheRevolutioninCompositeAssets

—DonaldL.Luskin

published,hisbasicinsightshavebeenextendedtoacomplexofimplementation-orientedtoolsthatgiveportfoliomanagerstheconceptualframeworkinwhichassetscanbedescribed,measured,andmanipulatedascomposites.ModernPortfolioTheory(MPT)mighthaveremainednothingmorethananacademicartifacthaditnotbeenfortheparalleldevelopmentofinexpensivehigh-speedcomputerscapableofputtingMPT’sinsightsatthepracticaldisposalofportfoliomanagers.Withthedata-processingtoolsavailable25yearsago,merelyconstructingacensusindexfundwasaprohibitivelylaboriousexercise.Today’smicrocomputers,ontheotherhand,haveallowedMPTtobebroughttoapointofrefinementinwhichhugeportfolioscanbeconstructedandoptimizedinstantaneously,creatingthecapabilitytomakeandimplementthemostcomplexportfolio-leveldecisionsinamicrotimingframeworkappropriateevenforday-trading.UnitNineteen

TheRevolutioninCompositeAssets

—DonaldL.Luskin

Ⅴ.AfterwordLikethemountaineerwhoscalesthepeakonestepatatime,onlytobestartledwhenhelooksbackdownhispathandrealizesjusthowhighhehasclimbed,manyobserversaremadeuncomfortablebytherevolutionincompositeassets.Havetoday’scomputer-driven,compositeassetorientedinvestmentprocessessomehowgrowntoofarandtoofast,forgettingthattheindividualassetsthatmakethempossiblearethelifebloodofrealcorporationsandgovernments?Forsome,thestockmarketcrashofOctober1987wasthelong-awaitedproofthatthecompositeassetsrevolutionhasspunoutofcontrol.Thetruthisexactlytheopposite.Thinkingandtradingincompositeassetshas,infact,giveninvestorsanunprecedenteddegreeofcontrolovertheirinvestments.Itwasthisverycontrolthatallowedinvestorstoeffectalmostinstantlyadrasticnegativerevaluationofequitiesthat,inthepast,wouldhavetakenmonthstoUnitNineteen

TheRevolutioninCompositeAssets

—DonaldL.Luskinaccomplish.Astechnologiesofalltypes,fromtheautomobiletothetelephone,haveacceleratedalmosteveryaspectofcontemporarylife,thinkingandtradingintermsofcompositeassetshassimilarlyacceleratedtheinvestmentprocess.Ifmarketsare,primarily,mechanismsfortheexpressionofopinionsintheformofprices,oursocietyshouldendorsetechnologiesthatmakesuchexpressionsmoreefficientandmorefree.

(fromTheInstitutionalInvestorFocusonInvestmentManagement)UnitNineteen

TheRevolutioninCompositeAssets

—DonaldL.LuskinUnitNineteen

TheRevolutioninCompositeAssets

—DonaldL.LuskinExercisesⅠ.TranslatethefollowingintoEnglish,usingthewordsorphrasesinthetext:1.关于组合资产的一套新的理论体系2.引人瞩目的指数化证券投资基金的增长3.能够反映来自指数基金的购买压力的新股票UnitNineteen

TheRevolutioninCompositeAssets

—DonaldL.Luskin4.能够降低单一资产风险的多样化投资5.寻求最佳的资产投资策略6.取得长期投资的最大回报7.在证券经纪业中采用临时的交易机制UnitNineteen

TheRevolutioninCompositeAssets

—DonaldL.Luskin8.纽约股票交易中心25%的日交易量9.进行组合资产方面的投资决策10.依赖于特殊的管理体系的公司的未来11.对风险资产的定量分析UnitNineteen

TheRevolutioninCompositeAssets

—DonaldL.Luskin12.将重点放在组合资产而非单一资产上13.由于attributableto旧体制的失败而进行的组合资产改革14.远期投资战略的运用15.脱离spinoutof控制的组合资产改革UnitNineteen

TheRevolutioninCompositeAssets

—DonaldL.LuskinⅡ.TranslatethefollowingsentencesintoEnglish:1.尽管我国的风险资产riskyassets投资还处于起步阶段inone’sinfancy，但随着经济的发展