公司治理与公司绩效 外文翻译

外文文献：CorporategovernanceandfirmperformanceSanjaiBhagat,BrianBolton来源：JournalofCorporateFinance,2008(14):257–273，本文翻译的是第二部分和第六部分Abstract：Howiscorporategovernancemeasured?Whatistherelationshipbetweencorporategovernanceandperformance?Thispapershedslightonthesequestionswhiletakingintoaccounttheendogeneityoftherelationshipsamongcorporategovernance,corporateperformance,corporatecapitalstructure,andcorporateownershipstructure.Wemakethreeadditionalcontributionstotheliterature:First,wefindthatbettergovernanceasmeasuredbytheGompers,Ishii,andMetrick[Gompers,P.A.,Ishii,J.L.,andMetrick,A.,2003,Corporategovernanceandequityprices,QuarterlyJournalofEconomics118(1),107–155.]andBebchuk,CohenandFerrell[Bebchuk,L.,Cohen,A.,andFerrell,A.,2004,Whatmattersincorporategovernance?Workingpaper,HarvardLawSchool]indices,stockownershipofboardmembers,andCEO-Chairseparationissignificantlypositivelycorrelatedwithbettercontemporaneousandsubsequentoperatingperformance.Second,contrarytoclaimsinGIMandBCF,noneofthegovernancemeasuresarecorrelatedwithfuturestockmarketperformance.Inseveralinstancesinferencesregardingthe(stockmarket)performanceandgovernancerelationshipdodependonwhetherornotonetakesintoaccounttheendogenousnatureoftherelationshipbetweengovernanceand(stockmarket)performance.Third,givenpoorfirmperformance,theprobabilityofdisciplinarymanagementturnoverispositivelycorrelatedwithstockownershipofboardmembers,andboardindependence.However,bettergovernedfirmsasmeasuredbytheGIMandBCFindicesarelesslikelytoexperiencedisciplinarymanagementturnoverinspiteoftheirpoorperformance.Corporateownershipstructure,corporategovernance,firmperformance,andcapitalstructureInagencymodels,adivergenceintheinterestsofmanagersandshareholderscausesmanagerstotakeactionsthatarecostlytoshareholders.Contractscannotprecludethisactivityifshareholdersareunabletoobservemanagerialbehaviordirectly,butownershipbythemanagermaybeusedtoinducemanagerstoactinamannerthatisconsistentwiththeinterestofshareholders.GrossmanandHart(1983)describethisproblem.Adverseselectionmodelsaremotivatedbythehypothesisofdifferentialabilitythatcannotbeobservedbyshareholders.Inthissetting,ownershipmaybeusedtoinducerevelationofthemanager'sprivateinformationaboutcashfloworherabilitytogeneratecashflow,whichcannotbeobserveddirectlybyshareholders.AgeneraltreatmentisprovidedbyMyerson(1987).Intheabovescenarios,somefeaturesofcorporategovernancemaybeinterpretedasacharacteristicofthecontractthatgovernsrelationsbetweenshareholdersandmanagers.Governanceisaffectedbythesameunobservablefeaturesofmanagerialbehaviororabilitythatarelinkedtoownershipandperformance.AtleastsinceBerleandMeans(1932),economistshaveemphasizedthecostsofdiffusedshare-ownership;thatis,theimpactofownershipstructureonperformance.However,Demsetz(1983)arguesthatsinceweobservemanysuccessfulpubliccompanieswithdiffusedshare-ownership,clearlytheremustbeoffsettingbenefits,forexample,betterrisk-bearing.Also,forreasonsrelatedtoperformance-basedcompensationandinsiderinformation,firmperformancecouldbeadeterminantofownership.Forexample,superiorfirmperformanceleadstoanincreaseinthevalueofstockoptionsownedbymanagementwhich,ifexercised,wouldincreasetheirshareownership.Also,ifthereareseriousdivergencesbetweeninsiderandmarketexpectationsoffuturefirmperformancetheninsidershaveanincentivetoadjusttheirownershipinrelationtotheexpectedfutureperformance.Inaseminalpaper,GrossmanandHart(1983)consideredtheexanteefficiencyperspectivetoderivepredictionsaboutafirm'sfinancingdecisionsinanagencysetting.NovaesandZingales(1999)showthattheoptimalchoiceofdebtfromtheviewpointofshareholdersdiffersfromtheoptimalchoiceofdebtfromtheviewpointofmanagers.Whiletheabovefocusesoncapitalstructureandmanagerialentrenchment,adifferentstrandoftheliteraturehasfocusedontherelationbetweencapitalstructureandownershipstructure;forexample,seeGrossmanandHart(1986)andHartandMoore(1990).Thisbriefreviewoftheinter-relationshipsamongcorporategovernance,managementturnover,corporateperformance,corporatecapitalstructure,andcorporateownershipstructuresuggeststhat,fromaneconometricviewpoint,tostudytherelationshipbetweencorporategovernanceandperformance,onewouldneedtoformulateasystemofsimultaneousequationsthatspecifiestherelationshipsamongtheabovementionedvariables.Wespecifythefollowingsystemoffoursimultaneousequations:Performance=f1(Governance;Ownership;CapitalStructure;Z1;ε1)Governance=f2(Performance;Ownership;CapitalStructure;Z2;ε2)Ownership=f3(Governance;Performance;CapitalStructure;Z3;ε3)CapitalStructure=f4(Governance;Performance;Ownership;Z4;ε4)wheretheZiarevectorsofcontrolvariablesandinstrumentsinfluencingthedependentvariablesandtheεiaretheerrortermsassociatedwithexogenousnoiseandtheunobservablefeaturesofmanagerialbehaviororabilitythatexplaincross-sectionalvariationinperformance,ownership,capitalstructureandgovernance.Theestimationissuesfortheaboveequationsarediscussedinthenextsection.SummaryandconclusionsOurprimarycontributiontotheliteratureistheconsistentestimationoftherelationshipbetweencorporategovernanceandperformance,bytakingintoaccounttheinter-relationshipsamongcorporategovernance,corporateperformance,corporatecapitalstructure,andcorporateownershipstructure.Wemakefouradditionalcontributionstotheliterature:First,insteadofconsideringjustasinglemeasureofgovernance(aspriorstudiesintheliteraturehavedone),weconsidersevendifferentgovernancemeasures.WefindthatbettergovernanceasmeasuredbytheGIMandBCFindices,stockownershipofboardmembers,andCEO-Chairseparationissignificantlypositivelycorrelatedwithbettercontemporaneousandsubsequentoperatingperformance.Also,interestingly,boardindependenceisnegativelycorrelatedwithcontemporaneousandsubsequentoperatingperformance.ThisisespeciallyrelevantinlightoftheprominencethatboardindependencehasreceivedintherecentNYSEandNASDAQcorporategovernancelistingrequirements.Weconductabatteryofrobustnesschecksincluding(a)considerationofalternateinstrumentsforestimatingthesystemofequations,(b)considerationofdiagnosticteststoensurethatourinstrumentsarevalidandoursystemofequationsiswell-identified,and(c)alternativeestimatesofthestandarderrorsofourmodel'sestimatedcoefficients.Theserobustnesschecksprovideconsistentresultsandincreaseourconfidenceintheperformance–governancerelationasnotedabove.Second,contrarytoclaimsintheliterature,noneofthegovernancemeasuresarecorrelatedwithfuturestockmarketperformance.Inseveralinstancesinferencesregardingthe(stockmarket)performanceandgovernancerelationshipdodependonwhetherornotonetakesintoaccounttheendogenousnatureoftherelationshipbetweengovernanceand(stockmarket)performance.Third,givenpoorfirmperformance,theprobabilityofdisciplinarymanagementturnoverispositivelycorrelatedwithstockownershipofboardmembers,andwithboardindependence.However,bettergovernedfirmsasmeasuredbytheGIMandBCFindicesarelesslikelytoexperiencedisciplinarymanagementturnoverinspiteoftheirpoorperformance.Fourth,thisstudyproposesagovernancemeasure,namely,dollarownershipoftheboardmembers,thatissimple,intuitive,lesspronetomeasurementerror,andnotsubjecttotheproblemofweightingamultitudeofgovernanceprovisionsinconstructingagovernanceindex.Considerationofthisgovernancemeasurebyfutureaccounting,finance,andcorporatelawresearcherswouldenhancethecomparabilityofresearchfindings.Canasingleboardcharacteristicbeaseffectiveameasureofcorporategovernanceasindicesthatconsidermultiplemeasuresofcorporatecharterprovisions,managementcompensationstructure,andboardcharacteristics?Corporateboardshavethepowertomake,oratleastratify,allimportantdecisionsincludingdecisionsaboutinvestmentpolicy,managementcompensationpolicy,andboardgovernanceitself.Itisplausiblethatboardmemberswithappropriatestockownershipwillhavetheincentivetoprovideeffectivemonitoringandoversightofimportantcorporatedecisionsnotedabove;henceboardownershipcanbeagoodproxyforoverallgoodgovernance.Furthermore,themeasurementerrorinmeasuringboardownershipcanbelessthanthetotalmeasurementerrorinmeasuringamultitudeofboardprocesses,compensationstructure,andcharterprovisions.Finally,whileboardcharacteristics,corporatecharterprovisions,andmanagementcompensationfeaturesdocharacterizeacompany'sgovernance,constructionofagovernanceindexrequiresthattheabovevariablesbeweighted.Theweightsaparticularindexassignstoindividualboardcharacteristics,etc.isimportant.Iftheweightsarenotconsistentwiththeweightsusedbyinformedmarketparticipantsinassessingtherelationbetweengovernanceandfirmperformance,thenincorrectinferenceswouldbemaderegardingtherelationbetweengovernanceandfirmperformance.Theabovefindingshaveimportantimplicationsforresearchers,seniorpolicymakers,andcorporateboards:Effortstoimprovecorporategovernanceshouldfocusonstockownershipofboardmembers—sinceitispositivelyrelatedtobothfutureoperatingperformance,andtotheprobabilityofdisciplinarymanagementturnoverinpoorlyperformingfirms.Proponentsofboardindependenceshouldnotewithcautionthenegativerelationbetweenboardindependenceandfutureoperatingperformance.Hence,ifthepurposeofboardindependenceistoimproveperformance,thensucheffortsmightbemisguided.However,ifthepurposeofboardindependenceistodisciplinemanagementofpoorlyperformingfirms,thenboardindependencehasmerit.Finally,eventhoughtheGIMandBCFgoodgovernanceindicesarepositivelyrelatedtofutureoperatingperformance,policymakersandcorporateboardsshouldbecautiousintheiremphasisonthecomponentsoftheseindicessincethismightexacerbatetheproblemofentrenchedmanagement,especiallyinthosesituationswheremanagementshouldbedisciplined,thatis,inpoorlyperformingfirms.外文翻译：公司治理与公司绩效摘要：公司治理如何衡量？公司治理和公司绩效之间是什么关系？本文考虑到公司治理、公司绩效、公司资本结构和公司所有权结构的内生性关系阐明了这些问题。我们阐述这些文献的三个额外贡献：第一，从Gompers,Ishii,andMetrick①衡量的更好的公司治理，以及Bebchuk,CohenandFerrell②指数，我们发现董事会成员的股权和总裁—主席的分离使当期和以后更好的经营业绩显著正相关。第二，在GIM和BCF指标的相反要求下，没有治理措施与未来股票市场的表现相关。在一些情况下推论出股票市场的表现和治理的关系依据于是否把治理和股票市场表现的内生性关系考虑在内。第三，公司业绩不佳，营业额的纪律管理的可能性与董事会成员的股权和董事的独立性正相关。然而，GIM和BCF指标衡量的较好的公司治理比较不可能经历营业额的纪律管理，尽管他们的表现并不好。公司所有制结构、公司治理、公司绩效和资本结构在代理模型中，管理者利益和股东利益间的背离引起管理者采取使股东付出高代价的行为。如果股东不能直接观察管理者的活动，那么合同不能排除这种行为，但是管理者的所有权可以促使管理者的行为方式与股东的利益一致。GrossmanandHart(1983)描述了这个问题。逆向选择模型被股东不能观察到的假设能力的差别所激励。在这种背景下，所有权会导致股东不能直接观察到管理者的关于现金流和他创造现金流能力的私人信息披露。Myerson(1987)提供了一个全面的论述。上述情况中，公司治理的某些特征可以用治理管理者和股东之间关系的合同特征来解释。管理权受同样不能观察到的与所有制和绩效相关的管理行为或能力的特征的影响。至少从BerleandMeans(1932)开始，经济学家开始强调扩散股份所有权的成本，即公司绩效对所有制结构的影响。然而Demsetz(1983)指出自从我们看到很多分散股东所有权的上市公司，显然肯定会抵消收益，例如更好的风险承担能力。当然基于绩效薪酬和内幕信息的原因，公司绩效成为所有权的决定因素。例如，优越的公司业绩会导致管理者所持有的股权价值的上升，如果正确操作会增加他们的股权。如果内部和市场对公司未来价值的期望存在严重分歧，内部人有激励使所有制和预期未来公司绩效相适应。在开创性论文中，GrossmanandHart(1983)考虑从事前效率的角度预测机构设置中公司金融决策。NovaesandZingales(1999)表明从股东角度和管理者的角度对债务的最佳选择有所不同。上述研究集中于资本结构和管理防御，其他不同文献集中于研究资本结构与所有制结构之间关系，例如GrossmanandHart(1986)andHartandMoore(1990)。这里简要回顾了公司治理间的内部关系，管理营业额、公司绩效、公司资本结构和公司所有权结构表明，从计量经济学角度研究公司治理和绩效的关系，需要建立一系列联立方程，指定上述变量之间的关系。我们指定以下四个联立方程：公司绩效=f1(公司治理;所有权结构;资本结构;Z1;ε1)公司治理=f2(公司绩效;所有权结构;资本结构;Z2;ε2)所有权结构=f3(公司治理e;公司绩效;资本结构;Z3;ε3)资本结构=f4(公司治理;公司绩效;所有权结构;Z4;ε4)其中Zi表示控制变量矢量和影响因变量的因素，εi指外源噪声和不可观察的管理行为的特点或解释公司绩效、所有权结构、资本结构或公司治理的横断面变化能力的误差项。上述方程的估计问题在下一节讨论。总结和结论文献研究的主要贡献是公司治理和绩效之间关系的一致性估计，考虑到公司治理、公司绩效、公司资本结构和公司所