信息不对称企业信息披露和资本市场信息披露的实证文献回顾外文翻译

外文翻译原文Informationasymmetry,corporatedisclosure,andthecapi Areviewoftheempiricaldisclosureliteratur MaterialSource:JournalofAccountingandEconomics31(2001)405–440Author:PaulM.Healy,KrishnaG.PalepuFinancialreportinganddisclosurearepotentiallyimportantmeansformanagementtocommunicatefirmperformanceandgovernancetooutsideinvestors.Weprovideaframeworkforanalyzingmanagers’reportinganddisclosuredecisionsinacapitalMarketssetting,andidentifykeyresearchquestions.Wethenreviewcurrentempiricalresearchondisclosureregulation,informationintermediaries, andthedeterminantsandeconomicconsequencesofcorporatedisclosure.Oursurveyconcludesthatcurrentresearchhasgeneratedanumberofusefulinsights.Weidentifyfundamentalquestionsthatremainunanswered,andchangesintheeconomicenvironmentthatraisenewquestionsforresearch.1IntroductionCorporatedisclosureiscriticalforthefunctioningofanefficientcapitalmarket.1Firmsprovidedisclosurethroughregulatedfinancialreports,includingthefinancialstatements,footnotes,managementdiscussionandanalysis,andotherregulatoryfilings.Insomefirmsengageaddition,involuntarycommunication,suchasmanagementforecasts,analysts’presentationsandconferencecalls,pressreleases,internetsites,andothercorporatereports.Finally,therearedisclosuresaboutfirmsbyinformationintermediaries,suchasfinancialanalysts,industryexperts,andthefinancialpress. Inthispaperwereview researchonfinancialreportingandvoluntarydisclosureofinformationbymanagement,summarizekeyresearchfindings,andidentifyareasforfuturework.Section2examinestheforcesthatgiverisetodemandfordisclosureinamoderncapital-marketeconomy,andtheinstitutionsthatincreasethecredibilityofdisclosures.Wearguethatdemandforfinancialreportinganddisclosurearisesfrominformationasymmetryandagencyconflictsbetweenmanagersandoutsideinvestors.Thecredibilityofmanagementdisclosuresisenhancedbyregulators,standardsetters,auditorsandothercapitalmarketintermediaries.Weusethedisclosureframeworktoidentifyimportantquestionsforresearch,andreviewavailableempiricalevidence.Section3reviewsthefindingsontheregulationoffinancialreportinganddisclosure.Muchofthisresearchdocumentsthatearnings,bookvalues,andotherrequiredfinancialstatementinformationis‘‘‘valuerelevant’’’. However,fundamentalquestionsaboutthedemandfor,andeffectivenessof,financialreportinganddisclosureregulationintheeconomyremainunanswered.ResearchoneffectivenessofauditorsandinformationintermediariesisdiscussedinSection4.Thereisevidencethatfinancialanalystsgeneratevaluablenewinformationthroughtheirearningsforecastsandstockrecommendations.However,therearesystematicbiasesinfinancialanalysts’outputs,potentiallyarisingfromtheconflictingincentivesthattheyface.Whiletheorysuggeststhatauditorsenhancethecredibilityoffinancialreports,empiricalresearchhasprovidedsurprisinglylittleevidencetosubstantiateit.Section5reviewstheeconomicdeterminantsofmanagers’financialreportinganddisclosuredecisions.Researchusingthecontractingperspectivefindsthataccountingdecisionsareinflbycompensationandlendingcontracts,aswellaspoliticalcostconsiderations.Researchusingthecapitalmarketperspectivedocumentsthatvoluntarydisclosuredecisionsarerelatedtomarkettransactions,corporatecontrolcontests,stock-basedcompensation,shareholderlitigation,andproprietarycosts.2TheroleofdisclosureincapitalmarketsInthissection,weexaminetheroleofdisclosureinmoderncapitalmarkets.Informationandincentiveproblemsimpedetheefficientallocationofresourcesinacapitalmarketeconomy.Disclosureandtheinstitutionscreatedtofacilitatecredibledisclosurebetweenmanagersandinvestorsplayanimportantroleinmitigatingtheseproblems.TheframeworkfordisclosurethatwediscussinthissectionisthenusedtodevelopimplicationsforresearchAcriticalchallengeforanyeconomyistheoptimalallocationofsavingstoinvestmentopportunities.Thereareusuallymanynewentrepreneursandexistingcompaniesthatwouldliketoattracthouseholdsavings,whicharetypicallywidelydistributed,tofundtheirbusinesWhilebothsaversandentrepreneurswouldliketodobusinesswitheachother,matchingsavingstobusinessinvestmentopportunitiesiscomplicatedforatleasttworeasons.First,entrepreneurstypicallyhavebetterinformationthansaversaboutthevalueofbusinessinvestmentopportunitiesaincentivesd tooverstatetheirvalue.Savers,therefore,facean‘‘‘informationproblem’’’whentheymakeinvestmensinbusinessventures. Second,oncesavershaveinvestedintheirbusinessventures,entrepreneurshaveanincentivetoexpropriatetheirsavings,creatingan‘‘‘agencyproblem’’’.3Managers’reportingdecisionsResearchonmanagers’reportingdecisionshasfocusedontwoareas.Thefirstarea,oftencalledpositive accountingtheory, focuses onmanagement’sfinancialreportingchoices.Weprovideabriefreviewofthisliterature;Fieldsetal.(2001)provideamorecomprehensivesurveyofrecentresearchinthisarea.Thesecondarea,thevoluntarydisclosureliterature,focusesonmanagementdisclosuredecisions.3.1PositiveaccountingtheoryliteratureThepositiveaccountingtheoryliteraturefocusesonmanagement’smotivesformakingaccountingchoiceswhenmarketsaresemi-strongformefficient,therearesignificantcostsinwritingandenforcingcontracts,andtherearepoliticalcostsarisingoutoftheregulatoryprocess(seeWattsandZimmerman,1978,1986).Thecentralfocusofthisliteratureistoexaminetheroleof contracting and politicalconsiderationsinexplainingmanagementaccountingchoiceswhenthereareagencycostsandinformationasymmetry.Twotypesofcontractsareexamined,contractsbetweenthefirmanditscreditors (debtcontracts),and contractsbetweenmanagementandshareholders(compensationcontracts).Politicalconsiderationsincludemanagement’sconcernaboutattractingexplicitorimplicittaxes,orregulatoryactions.Contractsarenottheonlymechanismsfordealingwithinformationasymmetrydiscussedinthe positive accounting literature.Forexample,WattsandZimmerman(1983,1986)discusstheroleofreputationasamechanismforresolvinginformationproblemsinthecontextofauditing.Empiricalstudiesofpositiveaccountingtheorytestwhethermanagersmakeaccountingmethodchangesoraccrualestimatestoreduce the costs ofviolatingbondcovenantswrittenintermsofaccountingnumbers,toincreasethevalueofearningsbasedbonusesundercompensationcontracts,ortoreducethelikelihoodofimplicitorexplicittaxes.Findingindicatethatfirmsthatuseaccountingmethodstoaccelerateearningsaresmallandhaverelativelyhighleverage.Also,firms’accrualdecisionsappeartobeaffectedbycompensationcontracts.Whileamajorityofpositiveaccountingstudiesfocusonanalyzingpostcontractingopportunisticaccountingchoices,somestudiesviewthechoiceofaccountinganddisclosureaspartofthecontractingprocessitself.HolthausenandLeftwich(1983),WattsandZimmerman(1990SmithandWatts(1992),andSkinner(1993)arguethattheuseofaccountinginformationinleandcompensationcontractsshouldbeviewedasendogenous.Consequently,thenatureofafirm’sassetsanditsinvestmentopportunitysetsimultaneouslydetermineitsoptimalcontractingrelationsanditsaccountingmethodchoices.andZimmerman(1983)examinetheroleofvoluntaryinterimreportingasanexantecontractingpartofcorporategovernance.TheexanteroleofaccountinginthecontractingproceisalsoexaminedbyZimmer(1986),ChristieandZimmerman(1994),andSkinner(1993).Althoughpositiveaccountingtheorystudiesgeneratedseveralinterestingempiricalregularitiesregardingfirms’accountingdecisions,thereisambiguityabouthowtointerpretthisevidence(seereviewsbyHolthausenandLeftwich,1983;WattsandZimmerman,1990).Forexample,sizeistypicallyviewedasaproxyforpoliticalsensitivity,butislikelytoproxyformanyotherfactors.Also,asPalepu(1987),HealyandPalepu(1990),andDeAngeloetal.(1996)P.M.Healy,K.G.Palepu/JournalofAccountingandEconomics31(2001)405–440419suggest,accountingdecisionsbymanagersofhighlyleveragedfirmsinfinancialdistressmayinpartreflectanattempttoconservecash,orchangesininvestmentopportunities.3.2VoluntarydisclosureliteratureResearchonvoluntarydisclosurefocusesontheinformationroleoffinancialreportingfor capital markets (seeHealy and Palepu,1993, 1995).Thisresearchsupplementsthepositiveaccountingliteraturebyfocusingonstock marketmotivesforaccountinganddisclosuredecisions.Disclosurestudiesassumethat,eveninanefficientcapitalmarket,managershavesuperiorinformationtooutsideinvestorsontheirfirms’expectedfutureperformance.Ifauditingandaccountingregulationsworkperfectly,managers’accountingdecisionsanddisclosurescommunicatechangesintheirf’sbusinesseconomicstooutsideinvestors.Alternatively,rmifaccountingregulationandauditingareimperfect,amorelikelypossibility,managerstrbetweenmakingaccountingdecisionsanddisclosurestocommunicatetheirsuperiorknowledgeoffirm’sperformancetoinvestors,andtomanagereportedperformanceforcontracting,politicalorcorporategovernancereasons.Managementmotivesformakingvoluntarydisclosureandtheircredibilityare,therefore,interestingempiricalquestions.4.ConclusionCapitalmarketsarebecomingincreasinglyglobalasaresultofavarietyofdevelopments.InstitutionalinvestorsarelookingtodiversifybyinvestingP.M.Healy,K.G.Palepu/JournalofAccountingandEconomics31(2001)405–440433aroundtheglobe;corporationsareseekingcapitalwhereverthetermsaremostattractive;andinternet-basedtradingismakingiteasierforindividualinvestorstoinvestininternationalcapitalmarkets.Financialderegulationisencouragingtheseactivities.Theglobalizationofcapitalmarketshasbeenaccompaniedbycallsforglobalizationoffinancialreporting.Thisraisesseveralinterestingquestions.First,isitoptimaaglobalaccountingstandardsettergivenwidedisparitiesinthedevelopmentoffinancialreportinginfrastructureacrosscounties?Second,whateconomicforceswilldeterminethespeedwithwconvergenceoffinancialreportinginstitutionswilltakeplace?Third,whatarethepoliticalandeconomicconsequencesofsuchaconvergence?Fourth,intheabsenceofconvergence,willfinancialreportinginformativenessbeenhancedbyglobalaccountingstandards?Insummary,theincreasedpaceofentrepreneurshipand economic changehasprobablyincreasedthevalueofreliableinformationincapitalmarkets.However,thetraditionalfinancialreportingmodelappearstodoapoorjobofcapturingtheeconomicimplicationsofmanyofthesechangesinatimelyway.Thereis,therefore,anopportunityforfuturedisclosureresearchtoexaminehowfinancialreportinganddisclosuresadapttochangesinbusinessandcapitalmarketenvironments.Inaddition,asearlier,therearemanyareaswhereourunderstandingofexistingdisclosureinstitutionsandphenomenaarelimited.Webelievethatbothopportunitiesmakethedisclosureareaanexcitingareaofstudyforaccountingscholars.译文信息不对称，企业信息披露和资本市场：信息披露的实证文献回顾资料来源:[J].会计和经济405-44031(2001)作者：PaulM.Healy,KrishnaG.Palepu财务报告和信息披露是有潜在的外来投资者的重要手段，企业绩效管理，沟通和治理。我们提供的分析框架设定管理者的报告和信息披露的资本市场在决定，并确定重点研究的问题。然后，我们检讨目前的实证调研与信息披露监管，信息中介，企业披露的决定因素和经济后果。我们的调查结论是，目前的研究已产生了若干有用的见解。我们确定的许多基本问题还没有答案，研究变化的经济环境，提出了新的问题。导言上市公司信息披露监管的关键是申请一个有效率的运作规范的公司提供资金市场通过披露的财务报告，包括财务报表，脚注，管理层讨论与分析等。此外，一些公司从事的工作之间自愿沟通，如管理的预测，分析师的报告和电话会议，新闻发布，互联网站，和其他企业的报告。最后，还有一些中介公司的信息披露，例如金融分析师，行业专家和金融媒体。本文回顾管理研究财务报告的披露和自愿性信息，总结主要研究成果，并确定今后的领域工作。第二节研究考察的是引起披露要求在现代资本市场经济体制，机构，增加披露信誉。我们认为，投资者要求财务报告披露来自于信息不对称和外部管理者和代理之间的冲突。信誉管理的披露增强了监管，标准制定者，审计员和其他资本市场中介机构。我们使用的披露制度，以确定研究的重要问题，并检讨现有的经验证据。第三节审查结果对披露监管的财务报告和。这个文件的研究，大部分盈余，帐面价值，财务报表和其他必要的信息价值相关‚是‛。然而，经济的根本问题有关的需求和成效，金融监管报告和信息披露仍然没有答案。调研与中介机构审计和信息的有效性，讨论在第四节。有证据表明，金融分析师和股票的建议产生有价值的新信息，通过他们的收益预期。但是，也有系统偏差在分析家的财务成果，有可能产生的，他们面对冲突诱因。虽然理论认为，加强审计的财务报告的可信性，实证研究的规定，实证研究提供证据证实很小。第五条意见和信息披露的经济因素决定的经理的财务报告。研究观点认为，会计决策的因素影响补偿和贷款合同，以及政治成本。研究资本市场的角度来看成本文件，自愿披露决策与资本市场交易，公司控制比赛，基于股票的报酬，股东诉讼，以及竞争劣势成本。披露在资本市场中的作用在本节中，我们要研究市场的作用在现代资本披露。信息和激励问题阻碍了市场经济的资本的有效分配资源。披露及投资者的机构和管理人员之间建立可靠的信息披露，以方便播放减轻这些问题的一个重要角色。披露框架，我们在本节讨论，然后用于开发研究的启示。一个关键的挑战，任何经济体的投资机会是最佳的分配，储蓄。通常有很多新的企业家和现有的公司，就是想吸引居民储蓄，这是典型的分布广，资助他们的经营理念。虽然储户和企业家都希望做其他业务，每一个匹配储蓄业务的投资机会是复杂的，至少有两个原因。首先，企业家通常有更好的信息，鼓励储蓄比约和商业投资机会的价值高估自己的价值。保护程序，因此，面临的‚信息问题‛时，他们使企业投资经营。其次，一旦储户投资企业在其业务中，企业家有自己的储蓄激励征用，创造一个‚代理问题。‛管理者报告的决定对管理人员的汇报决定研究主要集中于两个方面。第一个领域，通常被称为实证会计理论，集中管理的财务报告的选择。我们提供这些文献的简要回顾农田的文学学组（2001年）提供了一个最近关于这一领域研究的更加全面的调查。第二个领域，自愿披露的文献，着重于对管理信息披露的决定。3.1实证会计的理论文献在实证会计理论文献侧重于使会计选择管理的动机，因为当市场是半强势形成高效，有书面形式，并执行合同的大量费用，而且也发生在监管过程（瓦茨与Zimmerman出版,1978年版，1986年版）。在这种文学中央重点是检查有不对称的代理成本和信息的作用，承包和政治上的考虑在解释管理会计选择的时候。两种类型的合同的审查，）合同之间的公司及其债权人（债务合同），合同和合同管理和股东之间（补偿。政治上的考虑，包括管理部门的关注，吸引明示或隐含税，或管制行动。合约不是实证会计文献中讨论了不对称的唯一机制，处理信息。例如，瓦茨和齐默尔曼（1983，1986）讨论了审计方面的作用的信誉信息作为一种解决问题的机制。理论检验的实证研究，实证会计核算方法使管理者是否应计估计变更或减少成本键数占违反公约的书面条款，以增加收入的合同为基础的奖金下的价值补偿，或减少税收的可能性隐含或明确的。研究结果显示，企业使用的会计方法，以加快小，收