新美国安全中心-长阴影：多极核时代的威慑英

MAY2022

LongShadows

DeterrenceinaMultipolarNuclearAge

StaciePettyjohnandJennieMatuschak

AbouttheAuthors

StaciePettyjohnisaSeniorFellowandDirectoroftheDefenseProgramatCNAS.Herareasofexpertiseincludedefensestrategy,posture,forceplanning,thedefensebudget,andwargaming.PriortojoiningCNAS,Pettyjohnspentover

10yearsattheRANDCorporationasa

politicalscientist.From2019–2021,shewasthedirectorofthestrategyandcoctrineprograminProjectAirForce.From2014–2020,sheservedastheco-directoroftheCenterforGaming.Shehasdesignedandledstrategicandoperationalgamesthathaveassessednewoperationalconcepts,testedtheimpactsofnewtechnology,examinednuclearescalationandwarfighting,andexploredunclearphenomena,suchasgrayzonetacticsandinformationwarfare.Previously,shewasaresearchfellowattheBrookingsInstitution,apeacescholarattheUnitedStatesInstituteofPeace,andaTAPIRfellowattheRANDCorporation.ShehasaPhDandMAinforeignaffairsfromtheUniversityofVirginiaandaBAinhistoryandpoliticalsciencefromtheOhioStateUniversity.

JennieMatuschakwasaResearchAssistantfortheDefenseProgramatCNAS.Previously,sheservedasaJosephS.NyeJr.InternfortheMiddleEastSecurityProgramatCNAS.PriortojoiningCNAS,sheworkedasaresearchinternfortheEnablingPeaceinIraqCenter,

whereshemonitoredthesecurity,political,economic,andhumanitarianaffairsinIraq.ShealsohasinternedwiththeMiddleEastPolicyCouncilandtheHouseofRepresentatives.ShegraduatedfromBucknellUniversitywithaBAinhistoryandaminorinArabic.In2018,shestudiedArabicandMiddleEasternpoliticsinAmman,Jordan.

Acknowledgments

TheauthorswouldliketothankJacobCohn,DavidFrelinger,AustinLong,JohnKoehn,andDavidShlapakfortheirfeedbackonthisreport.WealsothankShayanRaufandLilySchliemanfortheirresearchsupport;andMauraMcCarthy,EmmaSwislow,MelodyCook,andRinRothbackfortheirassistancewitheditinganddesign.ThisreportwasmadepossiblewithgeneralsupporttoCNAS.

Asaresearchandpolicyinstitutioncommittedtothehigh-eststandardsoforganizational,intellectual,andpersonalintegrity,CNASmaintainsstrictintellectualindependenceandsoleeditorialdirectionandcontroloveritsideas,projects,publications,events,andotherresearchactivities.CNASdoesnottakeinstitutionalpositionsonpolicyissues,andthecontentofCNASpublicationsreflectstheviewsoftheirauthorsalone.Inkeepingwithitsmissionandvalues,CNASdoesnotengageinlobbyingactivityandcompliesfullywithallapplicablefederal,state,andlocallaws.CNASwillnotengageinanyrepresentationalactivitiesoradvo-cacyonbehalfofanyentitiesorinterestsand,totheextentthattheCenteracceptsfundingfromnon-U.S.sources,itsactivitieswillbelimitedtobonafidescholastic,academic,andresearch-relatedactivities,consistentwithapplicablefederallaw.TheCenterpubliclyacknowledgesonits

website

annuallyalldonorswhocontribute.

AbouttheDefenseProgram

Overthepast15years,CNAShasdefinedthefutureofU.S.defensestrategy.Buildingonthislegacy,theCNASDefenseProgramteamcontinuestodevelophigh-levelconceptsandconcreterecommendationstoensureU.S.militarypreeminenceintothefutureandtoreversetheerosionofU.S.militaryadvantagesvis-à-visChinaand,toalesserextent,Russia.Specificareasofstudyincludeconcentratingongreat-powercompetition,developingaforcestructureandinnovativeoperationalconceptsadaptedforthis

morechallengingera,andmakinghardchoicestoeffectnecessarychange.ThispaperisapartoftheGamingLabatCNAS,alargerinitiativeledbytheDefenseProgramthatdevelopshighlytailoredunclassifiedgamesandexercisestohelppolicymakersandotherstakeholdersgaincriticalinsightsintokeynationalsecurityproblems.

TABLEOFCONTENTS

01ExecutiveSummary

02Introduction

04U.S.NuclearProfile

08RussianNuclearProfile

12ChineseNuclearProfile

16NorthKoreanNuclearProfile

20CountryComparison

24Recommedations

25Conclusion

28Appendix:American,Russian,Chinese,andNorthKoreanNuclearMissiles

WEAREENTERINGANUNPRECEDENTEDMULTIPOLARNUCLEARWORLDWHERE

THEUNITEDSTATESMUSTSIMULTANEOUSLYDETERTWONUCLEARGREATPOWERS,AND

THENUCLEARDANGERSAREGROWING.

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ExecutiveSummary

ThisreportexaminesthenuclearpoliciesandposturesoftheUnitedStatesanditsthreeprimarynuclearadver-saries,China,Russia,andNorthKorea.Itconcludesthattheworldisenteringamultipolarnuclearera,whichisunprecedented,andfarmorecomplexandchallengingthantheColdWar.Thecurrentnuclearorderhasbeengraduallyshiftingoverthepastdecade.RussiaremainstheUnitedStates’onlynuclearpeer,butthearmscontrolregimethatconstrainedthesuperpowers’nucleararsenalsisdisintegrating.RelationsbetweenWashingtonandMoscowhaveworsenedsinceRussia’sfull-scaleinvasionofUkraineandRussianPresidentVladimirPutin’snuclearsaber-rattling.China’snucleararsenalisgrowinginsizeandsophistication,potentiallyenablingBeijingtolaunchconventionalattacksbehinditsnuclearshield.ThisdevelopmentwillshapebothcompetitionamongBeijing,Washington,andMoscowandpotentialfuturemilitaryconfrontations.Similarly,NorthKoreahasasmallbutexpandingnumberofdeployednuclearweaponsandisimprovingitsmissiletechnology.

Inthisnewnuclearenvironment,theUnitedStatesmustdetertwonuclear-armedgreatpowersaswellasaregionalnuclearpowerfromlaunchingconventionalandnuclearattacksonitselfanditsallies.Asthenumberofnuclear-armedstatesgrow,interactionsbecomemorecomplexandtherisksofmiscalculationandmisperceptionincrease.Theramificationsofthisnewrealityarenotwellunderstood,asidefromtheimplica-tionthatthereisagrowingriskthatnuclearweaponsmightbeused.

Thestudy’sfindingshavefiveprimaryimplicationsforAmericanpolicyandnuclearposture.Toimprovestra-tegicstabilityandenhancedeterrence,theUnitedStatesshouldtakeseveralcoursesofaction.

¡First,PresidentJoeBiden’sadministrationshould

maintaincurrentU.S.declaratorypolicyandimple-

mentexistingmodernizationplansfortheU.S.triad

andnuclearinfrastructure.Thisisnottosuggestthat

theUnitedStatesshouldgiveupitslong-termgoalof

reducingtheroleofnuclearweaponsinU.S.national

strategy.ButAmericanleadersmustbeclear-eyed

aboutthecurrentsecurityenvironmentandaware

ofthepotentialrepercussionsofsuddenlychanging

itsnuclearpolicyandpostureinaverydynamicand

increasinglydangerousnuclearenvironment.

¡Second,theDepartmentofDefense(DoD)should

renewitsfocusonnucleardeterrenceasapartofits

strategyofintegrateddeterrence.Forseveraldecades,

theDoDhasfocusedondeterringconventionalor

grayzoneattacks,butthenuclearshadowfallsover

allformsofcompetitionandconflictwithRussia,

China,andNorthKorea.ThePentagonneedstotruly

integrateitsplanningacrossalllevelsofconflictand

recognizethatnuclearconsiderationsshapeactions

acrosstheentirespectrum.

¡Third,theUnitedStatesshouldtakestepstostrengthendeterrenceandcrisisstabilityagainstNorthKorea.

¡Fourth,theDoDmuststudyescalationrisksacross

arangeofconventionalandconflictscenarioswith

China,Russia,andNorthKoreatounderstandlikely

flashpointsandredlines.

¡Fifth,theUnitedStatesshouldpursuestrategicdialogueswithChinaandRussiaandestablishcom-municationlinksandcrisismechanismstoavoidmisperceptionandinadvertentescalation.

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DEFENSE|MAY2022

LongShadows:DeterrenceinaMultipolarNuclearAge

Introduction

BeforeinvadingUkraineinFebruary2022,RussianPresidentVladimirPutincautionedthat“thosewhomaybetemptedtointerfere...mustknowthatRussiawillrespondimmediately,andtheconsequenceswillbesuchasyouhaveneverseeninyourentirehistory.”Toensurethattherewasnomisunderstanding,Putinremindedhisaudiencethat“today’sRussiaremainsoneofthemostpowerfulnuclearstates”and“ithasacertainadvantageinseveralcutting-edgeweapons.”Thus,“thereshouldbenodoubt...thatanypotentialaggressorwillfacedefeatandominousconsequencesshoulditdirectlyattackourcountry.”1AfewdayslaterPutinreinforcedthesethreatsbyannouncinga“specialserviceregime”forRussia’sdeterrenceforces.2

ItwasnotclearexactlyifandhowthisnuclearalertshiftedthepostureofRussia’snuclearforces.ItmayhavesimplyentailedconnectingthecircuitsforRussia’snuclearcommandandcontrolnetwork,whicharenotlinkedduringpeacetime,3pairingnonstrategicortacticalnuclearweaponswiththeirwarheads,generatingstra-tegicnuclearforces,4orsimplyincreasingthenumberofpersonnelinnuclearcommandcenters.5Severaldaysafterthealertannouncement,Russiannuclear-armedsubmarinesconductedanexerciseintheBarents

Sea,andRussia’sStrategicRocketForcesdispersedroadmobileintercontinentalballisticmissile(ICBM)launchersinSiberia.6Whilesomedismissedthesemovesaspurebluster,Putin’sovertnuclearsaber-rattlingwasintendedtodetertheWestfrominterveningonthesideofUkraineandraisedtherisksofnuclearuse.Escalationcouldbeinadvertentif,forinstance,PutindecidedthatindividualvolunteersfromWesternnationsfightingwithUkrainianforcesconstitutedanoutsideintervention.7OrbecauseRussia’sinvasionofUkrainewasgettingboggeddown,PutincoulddeliberatelyemployanuclearweapontocompeltheWesttodesistandaUkrainiansurrender.Regardless,thewarinUkrainehasraisedthespecterofnuclearuse.

UnlikeduringtheColdWar,theUnitedStatescannotsimplyfocusitsattentiononRussia.ChinatooisexpandingitsnucleararsenallikelytodeterAmericaninterventioninaconflictoverTaiwanorintheSouthChinaSea.Insummer2021,opensourceanalystsdis-coveredthatChinawasdevelopingthreenewICBMsilofields.8TheninOctobertheFinancialTimesreportedthatBeijinghadtestedwhatmayhavebeenanorbitalweaponarmedwithahypersonicglidevehicle(HGV)thatcouldevadeU.S.missiledefenses.AdmiralCharlesRichard,theCommanderofU.S.StrategicCommand,characterized

these“breathtaking”developmentsasa“strategicbreakout”byChina,9whileGeneralMarkMilley,theChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff,saidthehypersonicweaponstestwas“veryclose”toa“Sputnikmoment.”10

Althoughtheseeventswereintheheadlines,theypointtolargershiftsintheinternationalenvironmentthatareunderappreciatedandwhoseimplicationsarenotwellunderstood.Chinaappearspoisedtoentertheeliteranksofnuclearsuperpowersbyfieldingasignificantlyexpandednuclearstockpileandatriadofdeliverysystems.AtthesametimeNorthKoreaisrapidlymovingfromanascentnuclearstatetoonewithanarrayofadvancedmissilesandasmallbutgrowingarsenalofwarheads,whileRussiannuclearmodern-ization,whichincludesfieldingadvancedtechnologies,suchashypersonicweapons,andupgradestoitslargestockpileofnonstrategicnuclearweapons,con-tinuesapace.11Thelongnuclearshadownowextendstomultipleadversaries,eachofwhichcouldcomeintoconflictwiththeUnitedStatesinanynumberofdifferentpossiblescenarios.12

Settingasidehyperbolicclaimsaboutanyoneofthesedevelopments,noneofwhichindividuallyisthatalarming,collectivelythesetrendsarecreatingatectonicstrategicshiftastheUnitedStatesmustdeter

twonuclear-armedgreatpowerssimultaneouslyandonenuclear-armedregionalpowerfromconventionalandnuclearattacksagainstitselfanditsallies.AstheRussianinvasionofUkrainehasrevealed,therisksofnuclearusearegrowing.Russiahasbrandisheditsnuclearweaponsasa“shieldforconventionalaggression,”andastheirnucleararsenalsexpandotheropponentsmayfollowsuit.13

BecausetheUnitedStatesretainsaquantitativeadvan-tageoverthegrowingnuclearpowersandrelativeparitywiththeRussians,strengtheningdeterrencemightnotrequirenewnuclearweaponsordeliverysystems.Butitwillrequirearenewedemphasisonnuclearstrategyandweaponsandtightlylinkingconventionalandnuclearstrategy,planning,doctrine,andcapabilities.14TotrulyrealizetheBidenadministration’sstrategyofintegrateddeterrence,Americanofficialsneedtostoptreatingnuclearweaponsasanafterthought,tofurtherexploretheconnectionbetweentheconventionalandnuclearbalances,andtogainabetterunderstandingofouradversaries’perceptionsontheseissuessothattheycanavoidinadvertentescalation.15

ForseveraldecadesafterthedissolutionoftheSovietUnion,U.S.nuclearpolicyhadbeenfocusedonreducingtheriskofnuclearwarthrougharmscontrolandlimitingtherolethatnuclearweaponsplayedin

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Americanstrategy.16Throughoutthisperiodtheriskthatnuclearweaponsmightbeemployedreceded—theprimarythreatswerenuclearproliferationandthataterroristgroupmightobtainanuclearweaponorfissilematerial.

By2018,thegeopoliticalenvironmenthadchangedsignificantly,andformerPresidentDonaldTrump’sadministrationassertedthattheprimarychallengetoAmericansecuritywasthe“reemergenceoflong-termstrategiccompetition”witharevisionistChinaandRussia.17Duetothesedevelopments,the2018NuclearPostureReview(NPR)concludedthatbuttressingdeter-rencerequiredtheUnitedStatestofieldalow-yieldwarheadforthesubmarine-launchedballisticmissile(SLBM)andanuclear-armedsea-launchedcruisemissile.Moreover,theUnitedStatesannouncedthatitmightconsideremployingnuclearweaponsinresponseto“non-nuclearstrategicattacks.”18

TheBidenadministration’sInterimNationalSecurityStrategicGuidance,however,seemstopromiseareturntotheObamaera’snuclearpolicy,pledgingto“reducetheroleofnuclearweaponsinournationalsecuritystrategy,”

facestodayandthepotentialshort-termconsequencesofsuddenchangestoU.S.nuclearpolicyorposture.Unilaterallypursuingthereductionofnuclearweaponsmayincreasetheriskofconventionalwarandnuclearuse.

The2018NPRsingledoutMoscowasthemostcon-cerningnuclearcompetitorbecauseofitsgrowingdependenceonnuclearweaponsandapparentlyreducedthresholdfornuclearuse.Inthepastfewyears,ithasbecomeclearthattheUnitedStatesalsomustsimulta-neouslybolsterdeterrenceagainstothercompetitors.Pyongyangviewsnuclearweaponsascriticaltoitssurvivalandhasagrowingstoreofnuclearwarheads.22Moreover,NorthKoreahasdemonstratednotableimprovementsinthequality,quantity,range,anddiversityofitsdeliveryplatforms.

AlthoughNorthKorea’sdevelopmentsareworrisome,ChinahasbeendeclaredtheDepartmentofDefense’s(DoD)“pacingchallenge.”23Untilrecently,thePeople’sLiberationArmy(PLA)wasviewedasincreasinglyproblematicbecauseofitsconventionalforcemoderniza-tionandexpansion,butitalsoissignificantlyincreasingitsnucleararsenalandupgradinganddiversifyingits

seeknewarmscontrolagreements“wherepossible,”and“engageinmeaningfuldialoguewithRussiaandChina,”while“ensuringourstrategicdeterrentremainssafe,secure,andeffectiveandthatourextendeddeterrent

Forthefirsttime,theUnitedStatesfacestwonuclear-armedgreatpowersaswellasanuclear-armedregionaladversarythatitseekstodeterfromattackingnotonlytheU.S.homeland,butalsoitsallies.

strategicdeliveryplat-

forms.Historically,China

hasfieldeda“limited

deterrent,”24withonly

afewhundrednuclear

weapons,butithasbeen

takingstepstoexpandthe

sizeofitsmodestnuclear

stockpileandtodevelop

atriadofsea-andair-

commitmentstoouralliesremainstrongandcredi-ble.”19Asacandidate,Bidenpledgedto“demonstrateourcommitmenttoreducingtheroleofnuclearweapons”andindicatedthatthe“solepurpose”ofnuclearweaponsshouldbe“deterring—and,ifnecessary,retaliatingagainstanuclearattack.”20ThusthereisspeculationthattheNPR,whichisembeddedinthelargerNationalDefenseStrategy(NDS),mightmodifyAmericandeclaratorypolicyortakeotherstepstofulfillBiden’spromises.

ProgressivemembersofCongressandnonproliferationadvocateshavecontinuedtopressBidentodiminishtheroleofnuclearweaponsinAmericanstrategybyadoptingano-first-useorsolepurposedeclaratorypolicy,termi-natingplanstomodernizeorreducingthesizeoftheground-basedlegoftheU.S.nucleartriad,andcuttingnewnuclearweaponsthatbeganundertheTrumpadmin-istration.21Whilereducingtheroleofnuclearweaponsisalaudablelong-termobjective,theUnitedStatesalsoneedstobesensitivetothesecurityenvironmentthatit

launcheddeliveryplatformstocomplementitsupgradedground-launchedmissiles.ThelatestDoDreportprojectsthatChinaisonpacetomorethantriplethesizeofitsdeliverablewarheadsby2027andtohave1,000nuclearwarheadsby2030.25

Forthefirsttime,theUnitedStatesfacestwonucle-ar-armedgreatpowersaswellasanuclear-armedregionaladversarythatitseekstodeterfromattackingnotonlytheU.S.homeland,butalsoitsallies.Althoughthefun-damentaltenetsofdeterrenceandtoolslikearmscontrolremainunchanged,thecurrentandfuturesituationismorecomplexandchallengingthantheColdWar.26Multiplenuclearpowerscomplicatethecalculusofhowmuchandwhatisneededtodeter,increasetheriskofmiscommunicationandmisperception,andreducethelikelihoodofmultilateralcooperation.Moreover,newtechnologiesanddomains,suchashypersonicweapons,cyber,andspace,couldfurtherweakenstrategicstabilityandincreasetheriskofnuclearescalation.

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LongShadows:DeterrenceinaMultipolarNuclearAge

Thisreportisthefirstinaseriesonnucleardeter-renceinamultipolarworld.ItaimstocontributetothediscussionbysurveyingthenuclearlandscapeoftheUnitedStatesanditsthreenuclearrivals.Itisimportanttoemphasizethatthisisanopen-sourceassessmentbasedonthebestinformationavailable,butbecauseRussia’s,China’s,andNorthKorea’snuclearprogramsareshroudedinsecrecy,thesenumbersshouldbetreatedwithcaution.Inparticular,thereislessconfidenceintheestimatesofNorthKorea’sandChina’snucleararsenalsthanRussia’s,becauseMoscowprovidesinformationonitsstrategicnuclearweaponsasapartofthe2010NewStrategicArmsReductionTreaty(NewSTART).Italsoisworthnotingthatobjectivebalanceofnuclearforcesmatterslessthaneachcountry’sperceptionsofothers’nuclearpoliciesandpostures,andthatperceptionscandivergesignificantlyfromreality.27

ThenextfoursectionsinturnoutlinethecurrentnuclearposturesoftheUnitedStates,Russia,China,andNorthKoreaandconsiderfutureprojectionsofthenucleararsenalsforChinaandNorthKorea.Sectionfivecomparativelyassessestheseposturesandcon-sidersfuturetrends.Thefinalsectionoffersconclusionsabouttheemergingstrategicenvironmentandcon-siderstheimplicationsforAmericannuclearpostureandforcestructure.

U.S.NuclearProfile

NuclearweaponshavebeenanimportantpartofU.S.nationalsecuritystrategysincetheiruseagainstJapanin1945.AttheheightoftheColdWar,whenconcernsaboutthestrategicbalancewiththeSovietUnionwereparamount,theU.S.nucleararsenalpeakedatmorethan30,000warheads.ThepurposeoftheseweaponswastodeternuclearattacksontheUnitedStatesanditsallies,andtodeteraSovietconventionalattackonWesternEurope.28TomakeAmerica’spledgetodefenditsNATOalliesagainstlargerWarsawPactconventionalforcescredible,theUnitedStatesreservedtherighttoemploynuclearweaponsfirstagainstthem.29

SincetheendoftheColdWar,successiveU.S.admin-istrationshavedramaticallyreducedthesizeoftheU.S.nucleararsenalaswellastheroleofnuclearweaponsinnationalsecuritystrategy.30TheObamaadministra-tionwentthefarthestbyembracingthelong-termgoalofachievinganuclear-freeworld—orreaching“globalzero”—andpledgedtomakeprogressonAmericannucleardisarmament.31AchievingthisgoalrequiredimprovingtheU.S.military’sconventionalcapabilitiessothattheyweresufficienttodeternotonlyconventional

attacks,butalsochemicalandbiologicalweapons

use.FormerPresidentBarackObamaaspiredtomovetowardapolicyinwhichthesolepurposefornuclearweaponswouldbetodeteranuclearattackagainsttheUnitedStatesoritsallies.Ultimately,however,theObamaadministrationshiedawayfromofficiallyshiftingU.S.declaratorypolicytooneof“nofirstuse”or“solepurpose,”andmaintainedthatWashingtonreservedtherighttoemploynuclearweapons“inextremecircum-stancestodefendthevitalinterestsoftheUnitedStatesoritsalliesandpartners.”32

TheTrumpadministration’s2018NPRexpandedonthisstatementbythreateningnuclearuseinresponseto“non-nuclearstrategicattacks,”whichcouldincludemajorcyberattacksagainstciviliansorcivilianinfra-structure.33ConcernedaboutpotentialRussianuseoftacticalnuclearweapons,theTrumpadministrationalsoinvestedinnewAmericannonstrategicnuclearweaponsthatwerebelievedtoofferflexibilityandanenhancedabilitytomaketailoreddeterrentthreatsmorecredible.34

PresidentBidenappearspoisedtoreversetheTrumpadministration’snuclearpolicyandtoresur-rectObama’semphasisonreducingtheroleofnuclearweaponsinnationalsecurity.35TheBidenadministra-tion’sInterimNationalSecurityGuidancetriestostrikeadelicatebalancebypromisingasmallerrolefornuclearweaponsandstressingtheneedtoavoidarmsraces,whilemaintainingasecurestrategicdeterrentandupholdingtheUnitedStates’commitmenttodefendsitsallies.36Onmultipleoccasions,PresidentBidenhasendorsednarrowingthecircumstancesunderwhichtheUnitedStateswouldconsideremployingnuclearweaponstoonlyonesituation:inresponsetoanuclearattackontheUnitedStatesoritsallies.Thisisthe

so-called“solepurpose”policy.37

Whilesimilartoa“nofirstuse”policy,somearguethat“solepurpose”policyismoreambiguousandcouldbeinterpretednarrowlyormorebroadly.Advocatesofsolepurposemaintainthatan“appropriatelycrafted”policycansupporttheUnitedStates’extendeddeterrentcommitmentsandnotoverlyconstrainU.S.employmentoptions,whileskepticscontendthatthisisameaning-lesschangebecausepracticallythereisnodifferencebetweennofirstuseandsolepurpose,anditis“unreal-istictohaveitbothways.”38WorriedallieshavevoicedtheiroppositiontoanychangeinU.S.nuclearpolicy,whichisviewedasdiminishingAmerica’scommitmenttoprotectthem,andashiftcouldspurnuclearprolif-erationamongU.S.partners.39Further,whilealliesmaybelievethatsolepurposereflectsamorerestrainednuclearpolicy,itisnotclearthatadversarieswouldfind

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suchapromisecredible,andthustheyareunlikelytoreciprocate.40Whilethe2022NDSandembeddednuclearposturereviewalmostcertainlywillbackawayfromtheincreasedemphasisonnuclearweaponsduringtheTrumpyears,itmightdecisivelyresolvetheseissuesofU.S.declar-atorypolicyorcontinuetoequivocate.

NuclearPosture

TheendoftheColdWarandsubsequentarmscontrolagreementswiththeSovietUnionanditssuccessorstate,theRussianFederation,significantlyreducedthenumberandtypesofU.S.nucleardeliverysystemsandtheirrespectivewarheads.41NewSTARTmandatestheexistinglimitsonstrategicwarheadsandinterconti-nentalrangedeliverysystemsthattheUnitedStatesandRussiahave.NewSTARTalsocapsthetotalnumberofdeployedandnon-deployeddeliverysystemsat800topreventeithernationfromquicklybeingabletoexpanditsstrategicarsenal.InMarch2021,BidenandPutinagreedtoextendNewSTARTforanotherfiveyearswithitexpiringin2026.42

BothnationshavemetorstayedbelowtheNewSTARTthresholdsof1,500treaty-accountablenuclearwarheadsand700deployedstrategicdeliverysystems.43AsofSeptember1,2021,theUnitedStatesreportedhaving665deployedlaunchersand1,389treaty-accountablewarheadsalongwithanother135non-deployedlaunchers.44

AsaresultofbilateralarmscontroltreatieswithRussia,theUnitedStateshasdecreaseditsnuclear