微观经济学（四川大学）知到章节答案智慧树2023年VIP

微观经济学（四川大学）知到章节测试答案智慧树2023年最新第一章测试Microeconomicsstudiestheallocationof

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scarceresources.Mostmicroeconomicmodelsassumethatdecisionmakerswishto

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makethemselvesaswelloffaspossible.Whatlinksthedecisionsofconsumersandfirmsinamarket?

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prices.Economicmodelsaremostoftentested

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usingdatafromtherealworld.Whichofthestatementsbelowis/arenormative?

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Economistsneedtoincludemorerealityintheirmodels.第二章测试Anindifferencecurverepresentsbundlesofgoodsthataconsumer

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viewsasequallydesirable.Convexityofindifferencecurvesimpliesthatconsumersarewillingto

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giveupmore“y”togetanextra“x”theless“x”theyhave.Iftwobundlesareonthesameindifferencecurve,then

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theconsumerderivesthesamelevelofutilityfromeach.Iftheutilityfortwogoods“x”and“y”ismeasuredasU=x+y,thenitcanbeconcludedthat

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“x”and“y”areperfectsubstitutes.Joe’sincomeis$500,thepriceoffood(F)is$2perunit,andthepriceofshelter(S)is$100.Whichofthefollowingrepresentshisbudgetconstraint?

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Alloftheabove.第三章测试Theconsumerisinequilibriumwhen

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Alloftheabove.ByselectingabundlewhereMRS=MRT,theconsumerissaying

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“IamwillingtotradeonegoodfortheotheratthesameratethatIamrequiredtodoso.”IfMRS>MRT,thentheconsumerisbetteroffthanatequilibrium.

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错Anindividual’sdemandcurveforagoodcanbederivedbymeasuringthequantitiesselectedas

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thepriceofthegoodchanges.Sandyderivesutilityfromconsuming“allothergoods,”g,andcleanair(measuredbyparticulatematterremovedperm3),a,asmeasuredbytheutilityfunctionU(g,a)=g0.6a0.4.Thepriceof“allothergoods”is$20andthepriceofcleanair(abatement)equals$10.Brianistheonlyotherconsumerinthemarketforcleanairanddemands10unitsofcleanair.Whatisthemarketdemandforcleanair?

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Totalmarketdemandis14unitsofcleanair.第四章测试Efficientproductionoccursifafirm

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Alloftheabove.Firmsmaximizeprofitwhen

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Alloftheabove.Withrespecttoproduction,theshortrunisbestdefinedasatimeperiod

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inwhichatleastoneinputisfixed.Inthelongrun,allfactorsofproductionare

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variable.Aproductionfunctiontellsthefirm

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themaximumitcanexpecttoproducewithagivenmixofinputs.第五章测试WhichofthefollowingstatementsisNOTtrue?

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AVC=wage/MPLSupposethetotalcostofproducingT-shirtscanberepresentedasTC=50+2q.Themarginalcostofthe5thT-shirtis

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2Ifaveragecostisdecreasing,

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marginalcostislessthanaveragecost.Variablecostsare

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null第六章测试TheCanadianmetalchairmanufacturingmarkethasn=78firms.Theestimatedelasticityofsupplyisηo=3.1,andtheestimatedelasticityofdemandisε=-1.1.Assumingthatthefirmsareidentical,calculatetheelasticityofdemandfacingasinglefirm.

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-324.5Iftheinversedemandfunctionfortoastersisp=60-Q,whatistheconsumersurplusifpriceis30?

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450marketwherenosinglebuyerorsellercaninfluencethepriceis

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nullIfacompetitivefirmmaximizesshort-runprofitsbyproducingsomequantityofoutput,whichofthefollowingmustbetrueatthatlevelofoutput?

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p≥AVCAssumeaconsumerhasahorizontaldemandcurveforaproduct.Hisconsumersurplusfrombuyingtheproduct

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equalszero第七章测试Thedeadweightlossgeneratedbyaperfect-price-discriminatingmonopoly

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equalszero.Monopolisticallycompetitivefirms

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havemarketpowerbecausetheycansetpriceabovemarginalcost.AmonopolistfacestheinversedemandcurveP=60-Q.IthasvariablecostsofQ^2sothatitsmarginalcostsare2Q,andithasfixedcostsof30.Themonopoly’smaximumprofitis

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420AmonopolistfacestheinversedemandcurveP=60-Q.IthasvariablecostsofQ2sothatitsmarginalcostsare2Q,andithasfixedcostsof30.Atitsprofitmaximizingoutputlevel,themonopoly’saveragecostis

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17Ifthedemandcurveamonopolistfacesisperfectlyelastic,thentheratioofthefirm’spricetothemarginalcostis

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1第八章测试dependonfollowingthree-playergame,whereplayer1choosesrows,player2columnsandplayer3matricesWhichstrategyofplayer1isstrictlydominated?

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strategiesTandB

dependonfollowingthree-playergame,whereplayer1choosesrows,player2columnsandplayer3matricesWhat’sNashequilibriumofthisgame?

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(M,R,r)

(First-pricesealed-bidauction)Aliceissellingher2000chevroletcavaliertoherfriends,BobandCharles.BobattachesavalueofS$8,000toAlice’soldcar,whileCharles’svalueofthecarisS$10,000.(ThesevaluationsarecommonknowledgebetweenBobandCharles.)Alicedesignsthefollowingauctiontosellhercar:First,sheaskseachofthemtowritehisbidonapieceofpaper.ThenBobandCharlesgivetheirbids(nonnegativeintegers)toAlice.NoticethatwhenBobandCharleswritedowntheirbids,theydon’tknoweachother’sbid(socalled“sealedbid”).AfterAlicereceivesthesealedbids,thebidsareshowntoeveryone,andthecarwillbesoldtothepersonwhohasthehigherbidatthepriceequaltohisownbid.Whenthereisatie(BobandCharlesbidthesameamount),thenAlicewouldflipafaircointodecidewhowillgetthecar.

Inthisgame,Bobhas8000strategiesandCharleshas10000strategies.

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错(First-pricesealed-bidauction)Aliceissellingher2000chevroletcavaliertoherfriends,BobandCharles.BobattachesavalueofS$8,000toAlice’soldcar,whileCharles’svalueofthecarisS$10,000.(ThesevaluationsarecommonknowledgebetweenBobandCharles.)Alicedesignsthefollowingauctiontosellhercar:First,sheaskseachofthemtowritehisbidonapieceofpaper.ThenBobandCharlesgivetheirbids(nonnegativeintegers)toAlice.NoticethatwhenBobandCharleswritedowntheirbids,theydon’tknoweachother’sbid(socalled“sealedbid”).AfterAlicereceivesthesealedbids,thebidsareshowntoeveryone,andthecarwillbesoldtothepersonwhohasthehigherbidatthepriceequaltohisownbid.Whenthereisatie(BobandCharlesbidthesameamount),thenAlicewouldflipafaircointodecidewhowillgetthecar.InthisgameBobbids8000andCharlesbids8000isaNashequilibrium.

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错(First-pricesealed-bidauction)Aliceissellingher2000chevroletcavaliertoherfriends,BobandCharles.BobattachesavalueofS$8,000toAlice’soldcar,whileCharles’svalueofthecarisS$10,000.(ThesevaluationsarecommonknowledgebetweenBobandCharles.)Alicedesignsthefollowingauctiontosellhercar:First,sheaskseachofthemtowritehisbidonapieceofpaper.ThenBobandCharlesgivetheirbids(nonnegativeintegers)toAlice.NoticethatwhenBobandCharleswritedowntheirbids,theydon’tknoweachother’sbid(socalled“sealedbid”).AfterAlicereceivesthesealedbids,thebidsareshowntoeveryone,andthecarwillbesoldtothepersonwhohasthehigherbidatthepriceequaltohisownbid.Whenthereisatie(BobandCharlesbidthesameamount),thenAlicewouldflipafaircointodecidewhowillgetthecar.

InthisgameBobbids7999andCharlesbids8000isaNashequilibrium.

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对第九章测试Player1chooseseitherUorD;player2simultaneouslychooseseitherL,MorR.Bothplayerknowonlythatgame1isplayedbyprobabilitypandgame2isplayedbyprobability1-pHowmanystrategiesplayer1has?

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4Player1chooseseitherUorD;player2simultaneouslychooseseitherL,MorR.Bothplayerknowonlythatgame1isplayedbyprobabilitypandgame2isplayedbyprobability1-p

Howmanystrategiesplayer2has?

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8Player1chooseseitherUorD;player2simultaneouslychooseseitherL,MorR.Bothplayerknowonlythatgame1isplayedbyprobabilitypandgame2isplayedbyprobability1-pWhatisthereducedgameafteriteratedeliminationofstrictlydominatedstrategiesofeachtype?

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****Player1chooseseitherUorM;player2chooseseitherLorC.Bothplayerknowonlythatgame1isplayedbyprobabil