彼得森经济研究所-将世贸组织从国家安全例外中拯救出来（英）

WORKINGPAPER

23-2SavingtheWTOfromthe

nationalsecurityexception

WarrenMaruyamaandAlanWm.Wolff

May2023

ABSTRACT

ForanymemberoftheWorldTradeOrganization(WTO)notmakingalternativearrangements,enforceabilityoftherulesoftheglobaltradingsystem,adistinguishingfeatureoftheWTO,ceasedtoexistonDecember11,2019,becausetheUnitedStatesblockedappointmentstotheAppellateBodyoftheWTOdisputesettlementmechanism.AmajorobstacletotheUnitedStatesacceptinganyresolutionofthisimpasse—thuspermittingdisputesettlementtoonce

againbebindingonallWTOmembers—issettlingtheissueofwhetherclaimsofnationalsecuritytolegitimizetrademeasuresarereviewable.ThisisaredlinefortheUnitedStates,whicharguesthisclaimisnonreviewable.Intheemergingareaofgreatpowercompetition,theUnitedStatesisunlikelytoacceptareturntofullyeffectiveWTOdisputesettlementabsentacompromisethatfindsdeterminationsofnationalsecuritynonjusticiable.Thispaperoffersacompromise:TherewouldbenoadjudicationofwhetherameasurewasjustifiedundertheWTO’snationalsecurityexception,butthoseWTOmembersadverselyaffectedwouldhaveanimmediaterighttorebalancetradeconcessionsthemselvesbyimposingretaliatorytrademeasuresagainsttheWTOmemberinvokingtheexception.

JELCodes:K33,K41,K49,N40,N70

Keywords:nationalsecurity,WTO,disputesettlement,GATTArticleXXI,AppellateBody

WarrenH.Maruyama,senior

counselatHoganLovells,served

asUSTRgeneralcounselfrom

2007to2009andasassociate

directorforinternational

economicpolicyontheWhite

Housestafffrom1989to1992.

Theviewsexpressedhereare

personalandarenotthoseof

HoganLovellsoranyother

institutionwithwhichheis

affiliated.

AlanWm.Wolff

isa

distinguishedvisitingfellow

atthePetersonInstitutefor

InternationalEconomics.He

wasdeputydirector-generalof

theWorldTradeOrganization,

deputyUStraderepresentative,

andUSTRgeneralcounsel.He

wasaprincipaldraftsmanfor

theadministrationoftheTrade

Actof1974,whichprovidedthe

basicUSnegotiatingmandate

forfutureUStradenegotiations.

Hisbook,

RevitalizingtheWorld

TradingSystem

(Cambridge

UniversityPress),isforthcoming

inJune2023.

1750MassachusettsAvenue,NW|Washington,DC20036-1903USA|+1.202.328.9000|

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INTRODUCTION

ThemembersoftheWorldTradeOrganization(WTO)agreethattheirinstitution

mustbereformed.1Itisgenerallyfeltthatthemostessentialreformistofinda

solutiontorestoringadisputesettlementmechanismthatallmemberswillagain

acceptasfinalandbinding.2Lastyear,theUnitedStatesundertookthetaskof

consultingwithothermemberstoresolvetheissue.Thesediscussionsturnedout

tohavebeenaninitialphase,withnocompleteresolutioninsight.Theprocess

nowcontinuesunderthenewleadershipofGuatemalaasitsfacilitator,withthe

EuropeanUnionandothersexpressinghopethatanegotiatedsolutioncould

bereachedbythe13thWTOMinisterialConference(MC13),scheduledforAbu

DhabiinlateFebruary2024.3

FullenforceabilitywasakeyfeaturethatdistinguishedWTOagreements

frommostotherinternationalinstitutions.ItwasacentralfeatureoftheWTO

whentheorganizationwasfoundedonJanuary1,1995.PanelandAppellate

Bodydecisionsweremadefinalandbinding.Itspredecessor,theGeneral

AgreementonTariffsandTrade(GATT)of1947,hadadisputesettlementsystem

thatgenerallyledtotheenforcementofobligations,withacrucialdifference:

Arecalcitrantlitigantcouldpreventapaneldecisionfrombeingadopted,

leavingthelegalresultinlimbo.DuringthelastGATTnegotiation,theUruguay

Round,boththeEuropeanUnionandtheUnitedStatesregardedthisfeatureas

adefectthatneededtoberemedied.TheEuropeanUnionandothersdesired

tocurbUSunilateralismthroughthelatter’suseofSection301,andtheUnited

StateswishedtodiminishtheadverseeffectsoftheEuropeanUnion’sCommon

AgriculturalPolicy(CAP)onworldtradeandtheEU’sabilitytoblockGATTpanel

reportschallengingEUagriculturalbarriers.TheEuropeanUnionandUnited

Statesworkedtogethertopreventmemberswholostacasefromblockingthe

adoptionofpanelreports.Theyachievedthisthroughtheautomaticadoption

ofdisputesettlementreportsby“anegativeconsensus,”meaningthatallWTO

memberspresentatameetingoftheDisputeSettlementBody(DSB)wouldhave

tounanimouslyagreenottoadoptareportforittofailtobeadopted.Thiswasa

nullset,inthatawinnerbeforeapanelinapoliticallysensitivedisputewouldbe

unlikelytojoinaconsensusagainstadoption.4

OnDecember11,2019,theWTO’sbindingdisputesettlementprocess

ceasedtoexist.ThroughtheexerciseofavetooverappointmentstotheWTO

1WorldTradeOrganization,

MC12OutcomeDocumentWT/MIN(22)/24WT/L/1135

,June22,

2022.TheG7tradeministersreiteratedthisobjectiveintheirvirtualmeetinghostedbyJapanonApril4,2023.

2Ibid.TheMC12containedthefollowingagreementontheissuesofdisputesettlementreforminitsoutcomedocument:“WeacknowledgethechallengesandconcernswithrespecttothedisputesettlementsystemincludingthoserelatedtotheAppellateBody,recognizetheimportanceandurgencyofaddressingthosechallengesandconcerns,andcommittoconductdiscussionswiththeviewtohavingafullyandwell-functioningdisputesettlementsystemaccessibletoallMembersby2024.”

3WorldTradeOnline,

WTODisputeSettlementReformTalksEnter‘NewPhase,’withNon-U.S.

Facilitator

,February28,2023.

4TheGATTdisputesettlementsystemhadagoodtrackrecordinrun-of-the-millcommercialdisputesbuttendedtorunintoproblemsinpoliticallysensitivedisputeswithhighstakes,

particularlythoseinvolvingagriculture.

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AppellateBody(AB),5theUnitedStatesendedthereviewstageofWTOdispute

settlement.GiventhatatleastthreesittingABmemberswereneededtohearan

appeal,theABcouldnolongermusteraquorum.ThesubstantiveUSconcerns

werethat(1)ABdecisionscurbedmembers’abilitytousetraderemedies

(antidumpingduties,countervailingduties,andsafeguardstoaddressunfairor

otherwiseinjurioustradethatcausedharmtodomesticindustries),contraryto

theintentionofGATTnegotiators;and(2)theABcouldnotfindsubsidiesunder

the“publicbody”doctrinewheremonieswerepassedthroughvariousstate-

controlledentitiestostate-ownedenterprisesengagedincommerce,nullifying

inthosecasestheuseoftheWTOSubsidiesandCountervailingMeasures

Agreementasaremedy.6Bothofthesefaultsweremagnifiedbythecompetition

betweenWesternmarketeconomiesandChina.Thesetwochallengeswould

bedifficultenoughtoresolveoratleastaddress;butthenanotherissuearose

that,ifleftunresolved,wouldlikelypreventtherestorationoftheenforceability

ofWTOobligations.Thisistheuseofnationalsecurity(alsocalled“essential

securityinterests”)tojustifytraderestrictions.Aseriesofdecisionshavebeen

reachedbydisputesettlementpanelsinthelastfouryearssincethedecision

oftheRussia—MeasuresConcerningTrafficsinTransit7panelwasadopted

inApril2019andopenedthedoortopanelreviewofwhethertheuseofthe

nationalsecurityexceptionisjustifiedunderWTOrules.Theredlineposition

oftheUnitedStatesisthatwhatisinacountry’snationalsecurityinterestisa

nonjusticiableissue,amatterthatonlyasovereigncandecide,andadecision

thatcannotbereviewed.

Providingauthoritativeandenforceableoutcomesistheessenceofany

disputesettlementsystem,whetheritisaprocessofadjudicationorarbitration

beforeaneutralpanel(withorwithoutarightofappeal),mediation,orother

formsofconciliation.ThecurrentobjectiveofWTOmembers,asdecidedby

themattheirlastMinisterialConference(MC12inGeneva,June2022),isto

restoredisputesettlementattheWTOthatisbindingandsupportedbyall.

Clearly,anysolutionwillneedtohavesufficientrespectforeachmember’s

sovereignty(whichdevelopingcountrymembersoftenterm“policyspace”)

inherentintheconceptofthenation-state,8andbeconsistentwiththeessential

natureoftheWTOitself,whichisacollectionoftradeagreements,anacquis,

containingawidevarietyofnegotiatedrightsandobligationsaffectingthe

commerceofeachmember.

5AppointmentstotheABandevenbeginningthenominationprocessweredeemedtorequireapositiveconsensus,whichtheUnitedStatesrefusedtojoin.

6OfficeoftheUnitedStatesTradeRepresentative,

ReportontheAppellateBodyoftheWorld

TradeOrganization

,February2020,Washington.The“publicbody”issue:UndertheWTOSubsidiesandCountervailingMeasuresAgreement,asubsidycannotbefoundwithoutfinding“afinancialcontributionbyagovernmentoranypublicbody.”TheABheldthatgovernmentownershipoftheentityprovidingthefinancingwasinsufficienttofindthatitwasapublicbody.Theentityhadtoalsohaveothergovernmentfunctionsassignedtoit.

7Panelreport,Russia—MeasuresConcerningTrafficinTransit,WT/DS512/R(April5,2019).

8NotallWTOmembersarecountriesorrecognizedbyallassuch.TheEuropeanUnionisnotacountry.HongKongandMacaoarenotrecognizedascountries.TaiwanisnotrecognizedasacountryandisreferredtoformallyintheWTOastheSeparateCustomsTerritoryofTaiwan,

Penghu,KinmenandMatsu.EachoftheseentitieswasadmittedtotheWTObecauseithas

sovereignty,control,overitstrade.Forthepurposesofthispaper,foreaseofcommunication,

theuseof“member”and“country”areinterchangeable.

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Participationinthemultilateraltradingsystemisbasedonanegotiated

balanceofconcessionsamongparticipants.Antitheticaltothisbalanceisa

memberunilaterallywithdrawingfrompartofthebargainithadagreedtofor

areasonitdeemsjustifiable,withlittlepossibilityofothersresponding.This,

however,iswhatoccursifaWTOmembercitesnationalsecurityasareason

foritsaction,andthenclaimsthatitsownjudgmentofwhatisinitssecurity

interestsisbothnonreviewableandnonactionableasaviolationoftherules.

RespectforsovereigntyisnotdebateddailyineithertheWTOorelsewhere

intraderelations,butwhenitemergesindiscussion,itisclearthatmembersare

deeplyattachedtopreservingtheirfreedomofaction.Themostrecentexample

isBrexit.TheUKTreasuryestimatedthatthecostofBrexittotheBritisheconomy

wouldbeover5percentofGDP,ashockinglylargepricetopayforleavingthe

EuropeanUnionandthecommonmarket.WhentheUKAmbassadortotheWTO

wasaskedwhythispricewasacceptable,hisone-wordanswerwas“sovereignty.”

OnceBrexitbecameareality,oneofthemostdifficultissuesthatremainedwith

respecttoNorthernIrelandwastheroleoftheEuropeanCourtofJusticeasthe

finalbodythatwouldjudgewhetherEUruleswerebeingadheredto.

Likewise,thesinglemostimportantissue—whichinfactdominatedthe

congressionaldebateonthebillauthorizingtheUnitedStatestojointheWTO—

waswhetherWTOmembershipwouldhaveanadverseeffectonUSsovereignty.9

ThediscussioncametoaheadinthePresidentClinton’sacceptanceofa

domesticjudicialreviewmechanismofallfutureWTOdisputesettlementrulings

againsttheUnitedStates,withthepossibilityofUSwithdrawalfromtheWTOif

decisionswerefoundtobedecidedimproperlyundertheWTO’srulesonatleast

threeoccasions.10

AstheCommercePowerundertheUSConstitutionlieswiththeCongress,

andthekeytoUSmembershipintheWTOwasresolvingboththeissue

ofsovereigntyandthereliabilityofdisputesettlement,therestorationof

bindingdisputesettlementisclearlyahighlysensitivetradeissueforany

USadministration.TheseriousnessoftheissuefortheUnitedStatesshould

havebeenclearfromittakingtheunusualstepofunilaterallydismantlingthe

WTOdisputesettlementsystem,despitehavingbeenoneofthemultilateral

system’sleadingproponentsformostofthelastsevendecades.Evenifother

WTOmembersmightviewblockingABappointmentsasanactofpetulance

fromanadministrationthatdidnotvaluetradeagreements,theyshouldby

nowunderstandthatthisconcernisbipartisanandhasbeenarticulatedby

thepastfourUSadministrations,RepublicanandDemocraticalike.Therefore,

reconstructingabindingdisputesettlementsystemthatincludestheUnited

Stateswillbedifficultandcannotbeachievedbysimplydemandingthatthe

UnitedStatesreturntothefold.Rather,thetaskdemandsconsideringthe

UScomplaintsontheirmeritsandseeingwhetherthereisamutuallyagreed

resolutionthatpreservestheenforceabilityofobligationsaswellasthebalance

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WP23-2|MAY2023

ofconcessions,anddoesnotopenthedoortowidespreadabuseofanopen-

endednationalsecurityexception.

ComplicatingtheprospectsofreachingasolutionisthefactthattheUnited

StatesandChinaarelockedinwhatiseuphemisticallytermed“astrategic

competition.”TheconceptistakingonsomeflavorofanewColdWarintermsof

notjustrhetoricbuttheimpositionofrestrictionsontrade.Whileingrossterms,

tradebetweenthetwocountriesremainsstrongandisinfactgrowing,inspecific

areasitisdecreasing,andforsomeproductssharply,inwhatisthebeginningof

astrategicdecoupling.11TherestrictiveactionstakenbytheUnitedStateseither

havebeenorwouldlikelybe,ifalegaldefensewereneeded,deemednecessary

toserveUSnationalsecurity.Litigatingwhetherthenationalsecurityexception

appliedwoulditselfposesystemicrisks.

THENATIONALSECURITYEXCEPTION

Thetradingsystem,aspromulgatedbyGATTandtheWTO,isbasedon

reciprocity—abalanceofconcessions.Thesetradebenefitsareoftenmeasuredin

termsofperceivedadditionalaccesstoforeignmarketsinreturnforaparticipant

cedingadditionalaccesstoitsownmarket.Howexceptionsareusedisavery

seriousmatter.Itisuntenabletohaveanexceptionthatisnonreviewablesimply

basedonitsbeinginvoked.

ThenationalsecurityexceptioniscontainedinWTOGATTArticleXXI(b),

whichreadsinrelevantpart:

NothinginthisAgreementshallbeconstrued

(b)topreventanycontractingpartyfromtakinganyactionwhichitconsiders

necessaryfortheprotectionofitsessentialsecurityinterest…

(iii)takenintimeofwarorotheremergencyininternationalrelations12

Likemostsuccessfulsystemsofrules,theglobaltradingsystemhas,formost

ofits75years,dependedonvoluntaryandgoodfaithcompliance.Ithasalso

requiredtheself-restraintofitsparticipantsininvokingexceptions,andonlyvery

rarelyresortingtothenationalsecurityexception.Anadditionalconcernisthat

WTOmembers,andGATTcontractingpartiesbeforetheWTOera,havesought

toavoidcedingtoadjudicatorsanyauthoritytodefinetheircountry’score

sovereigninterests,oftenbysettlingwiththoseadverselyaffected,13ornarrowing

thescopeforreviewofthemeasure.14

11ChadP.BownandYilinWang,

FiveYearsintotheTradeWar,ChinaContinuesItsSlow

DecouplingfromUSExports

,RealtimeEconomicsblog,PetersonInstituteforInternationalEconomics,March16,2023.

12WorldTradeOrganization,

GeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade

.

13WorldTradeOrganization,

DS38:UnitedStates—TheCubanLibertyandDemocraticSolidarity

Act

.UndertheHelms-BurtonAct,theUnitedStatesappliedsanctionstofirmsfromitsothertradingpartnersthatdealtwithCuba.TheUnitedStatesandtheEuropeanCommunities(the

predecessororganizationtotheEuropeanUnion)wereengagedinadisputeontheHelms-

Burtonextraterritorialapplicationofsanctions,acaseinwhichthepartiesdecidedtoallow

thepaneltolapse.TheDSBestablishedapanelatitsmeetingonNovember20,1996.On

April25,1997,thechairofthepanelinformedtheDSBthat,attherequestoftheEuropean

Communities,thepanelhadsuspendeditswork.Thepanel’sauthoritylapsedonApril22,1998,

pursuanttoArt.12.12oftheDisputeSettlementUnderstanding.

14WorldTradeOrganization,

GeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade:UnitedStates—Trade

MeasuresAffectingNicaragua

,PanelReportL/6053,October13,1986,Geneva.

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ThecurrentargumentintheWTOwithrespecttothenationalsecurity

exceptionhasfocusedonwhetheramembershouldbefreetojudgeforitselfthe

validityofitsclaimofnationalsecurityasajustificationforimposingitstrade-

restrictingmeasure.ThereisanequallystrongviewheldbymanyWTOmembers

thatitisintolerableforanycountrytoimposetraderestrictionssimplyby

declaringthatitisintheirnationalsecurityinteresttodoso.Thisclashofviews

isunresolvable.WhiletheUnitedStateshashintedthatArticleXXIdisputes

shouldbeaddressedthroughnonviolationdisputes,ithasneverarticulated

howthiscouldworkandignored,atleasttodate,whethercountriesadversely

affectedbyatrademeasureimposedinthenameofnationalsecurityshould

haveanautomaticrightofresponse.Sincethenonviolationprovisionsofthe

WTOandGATTdisputesettlementmechanismshaverarelybeenused,theidea

hasnevergottenmuchattentionortraction.

WTODISPUTESETTLEMENTPRACTICEREGARDINGTHENATIONAL

SECURITYEXCEPTION

Fromitsbeginningsintheearlypostwarera,theGATT/WTOsystemhas

struggledwiththescopeofArticleXXI’snationalsecurityexceptionandits

potentialforabuse.Fordecades,governmentsshowedadmirablerestraintinthe

useofArticleXXIinordertoprotecttheintegrityoftheGATT/WTOsystem.But

inrecentyears,asWTOdisciplineshaveeroded,theuseof“nationalsecurity”

asajustificationfortraderestraintshasproliferated.15Someoftheseactions

havebeenclearlylegitimate,butsomehavebeenhighlyquestionable.Starting

withRussia—MeasuresConcerningTrafficinTransit,16WTOpanelshavesoughtto

limitthenationalsecurityexceptionbysubjectingitsusetodisputesettlement

review.WhiledoingsohasexposeddubiousclaimsunderArticleXXI,thepanel

decisionshavecomeattheexpenseoffurthercontroversyoverthescopeof

theWTO’sdisputesettlementmechanismitself,particularlyonthepartofthe

UnitedStates,whichwasonceoneofitsbiggestproponentsandisnowits

biggestcritic.

Itisnotsurprisingthatpanelshavechosentoreviewtheattemptsbysome

WTOmemberstoinvoketheWTO’snationalsecurityexception.Russia’sseizure

ofUkraine’sterritoriesintheDonbasandCrimeaandPresidentDonaldTrump’s

Section232tariffsonimportedsteelandaluminumpresentedparticularly

unsympatheticsetsoffacts.TheRussia—MeasuresConcerningTrafficinTransit

disputetookplaceinthemidstofPresidentVladimirPutin’s2014invasion

ofUkraineinviolationoftheUNCharterandpostwarinternationalnorms,

foreshadowinghismorerecentinvasionofUkraineinFebruary2022.Invading

theterritoryofaneighboringcountryandthenclaimingaWTOrighttoalso

applytrademeasurestoforcethelattertoyieldlandisaparticularlyheinous

15Nationalsecurityisreferenced,forexample,inthefollowingWTOdisputesettlementcases:

•DS526:UnitedArabEmirates—MeasuresRelatingtoTradeinGoodsandServices,andTrade-RelatedAspectsofIntellectualPropertyRights

•DS567:SaudiArabia—MeasuresConcerningtheProtectionofIntellectualPropertyRights

•DS597:UnitedStates—OriginMarkingRequirement

•DS615:UnitedStates—MeasuresonCertainSemiconductorandOtherProducts,andRelatedServicesandTechnologies

16AtitsmeetingonApril26,2019,theDSBadoptedthepanelreport.

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departurefromservingthepurposesofinternationalobligations.President

Trump’sSection232tariffswerewidelyviewedinGenevaandbyUStrading

partnersasanefforttoinvokeGATTArticleXXIandSection232oftheUSTrade

ExpansionActof1962forblatantlyprotectionistandself-servingpurposes,so

thesemeasureswereeffectivelydoomedinanyadjudicationonthemerits.

Buthavingventuredintothispreviouslyunexploredterritory,WTOpanelsare

nowconfrontingevenhardercases,includingtheUSdecisiontotreatHongKong

aspartofChinaafterChina’sadoptionoftheLawofthePeople’sRepublicof

ChinaonSafeguardingNationalSecurityintheHongKongSpecialAdministrative

RegionandarrestsofleadingHongKongdemocracyactivists,aswellasChina’s

recentchallengetoUSexportcontrolsonsemiconductors,supercomputers,and

semiconductormanufacturingequipmentinUnitedStates—MeasuresonCertain

SemiconductorandOtherProducts,andRelatedServicesandTechnologies.17

ThereisnodeclaredstateofwarbetweentheUnitedStatesandChina,andyet

therelationshipisclearlynotoneofuntroubledpeace.

Whiletheoreticallysubjectingtheuseormisuseofnationalsecurityto

disputesettlementreviewsuperficiallyadvancestheruleoflaw,towhatextent

doesitreallyfurtherthisobjective?Asapracticalmatter,theWTOislikelyto

finditextraordinarilydifficulttosecurecompliancewithfuturenationalsecurity

rulings,whichcomewithhighinstitutionalcostsforanorganizationthatis

alreadystruggling.Whileinvoking“nationalsecurity”isatime-honoredway

forgovernmentstoabusetheirpowersandcircumventscrutinyinadomestic

setting,thisisnotacceptableintheadministrationofamultilateraltrade

agreement.Agovernmentthatmaintains(andmayevenbelieve)thatameasure

relatestotheprotectionofitsessentialsecurityisunlikelytocomplywitha

contraryWTOpanelrulingbycurrentorformertradediplomats,government

lawyers,andacademicswhothinkotherwise.Indeed,eveninhighlydubious

cases,governmentsarelikelytodigintodefendtheiractions,havingpresented

anationalsecurityrationaleforthem.18

WTOpaneldecisionsonnationalsecurityalsoriskvalidatingdeeplytroubling

actionsbymembergovernments.TheRussia—MeasuresConcerningTrafficin

Transitpanelwentoutofitswaytoconstructapathfordisputesettlement

reviewofnationalsecuritymeasures,butendedupfindingthatRussiawas

entitledtoinvokeArticleXXI(b)tojustifyrestrictionsonthemovementof

Ukrainiangoodsthroughitsterritoryinatimeofwarornationalemergency,

adecisionthatdidnothingtocurbfurtherRussianabusesandindeedrisked

emboldeningPresidentPutin’sclaimstoUkraine.InUnitedStates—Origin

MarkingRequirement,apanelfoundthatakeypartoftheUSresponsetoChina’s

crackdownonHongKong’sdemocracyactivistswasaWTOviolationandcould

notbejustifiedunderGATTArticleXXI(b)(iii),effectivelyinsulatingactionsby

ChinaandtheHongKongadministration,whichmanyfounddeeplyrepugnant

fromahumanrightsstandpoint.Inthelargerframeofmeasuresimposedin

thenameofessentialsecurityinterests,alabelingrequirementthatrecognized

theeffectivecontrolofHongKongbyChinaisarelativelymildmeasure.Ifthe

17WorldTradeOrganization,

DS615:UnitedStates—MeasuresonCertainSemiconductorand

OtherProducts,andRelatedServicesandTechnologies

.

18CouncilonForeignRelations,

Meeting:C.PeterMcColoughSeriesonInternationalEconomics

withKatherineTai

,December19,2022.

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UnitedStatesengagedinamoreaggressivemanner,militarilyorbydeclaring

thatastateofhostilitiesexistedbetweenChinaandtheUnitedStates,thepanel,

followingthereasoninginRussia—MeasuresConcerningTrafficinTransit,might

haveexoneratedtheUnitedStatesfromaWTOviolation.Thatisabizarreresult.

Currentrulingsprovideallthewrongincentives—blessingamoreaggressive

actwheninvokingthenationalsecurityexceptionandgivingafreepassto

egregiousconduct.

PaneldecisionsonArticleXXIcaseshavedonelittletoraiseconfid