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FinanceandEconomicsDiscussionSeries

FederalReserveBoard,Washington,D.C.

ISSN1936-2854(Print)

ISSN2767-3898(Online)

AnOverviewofPersonalLoansintheU.S.

JessicaN.Flagg,SimonaM.Hannon

2023-057

Pleasecitethispaperas:

Flagg,JessicaN.,andSimonaM.Hannon(2023).“AnOverviewofPersonalLoansintheU.S.,”FinanceandEconomicsDiscussionSeries2023-057.Washington:BoardofGovernorsoftheFederalReserveSystem,

/10.17016/FEDS.2023.057

.

NOTE:StaffworkingpapersintheFinanceandEconomicsDiscussionSeries(FEDS)arepreliminarymaterialscirculatedtostimulatediscussionandcriticalcomment.TheanalysisandconclusionssetfortharethoseoftheauthorsanddonotindicateconcurrencebyothermembersoftheresearchstaffortheBoardofGovernors.ReferencesinpublicationstotheFinanceandEconomicsDiscussionSeries(otherthanacknowledgement)shouldbeclearedwiththeauthor(s)toprotectthetentativecharacterofthesepapers.

AnOverviewofPersonalLoansintheU.S.*

JessicaN.Flagg‡

FederalReserveBoard

SimonaM.Hannon§

FederalReserveBoard

August29,2023

Abstract

Personalloansusedforavarietyofpurposes,suchasdebtconsolidation,medicalbills,vaca-tions,orthepaymentofalargeticketitem,reached$356billionorabout10percentofnon-revolvingconsumercreditattheendof2022.Althoughdepositoryinstitutionssuchasbanks,thrifts,andcreditunionsdominatethepersonalloanmarket,financecompanies,institutionsthattypicallylendtononprimeconsumers,holdnearlyafourthoftheseloans.Thispaperpro-videsanoverviewofthisnascentbutrelativelyunderstudiedsectoroftheUnitedStatescreditmarket.

Keywords:ConsumerCredit,PersonalLoans,InstallmentLoans.

JELclassification:G21,G23

*WethankSarenaGoodman,GengLi,andKamilaSommerforhelpfuldiscussions,comments,andsuggestions,AnujShahaniforgeneroushelpwithMintelComperemediadata,andShannonLukforoutstandingediting.TheviewsinthispaperarethoseoftheauthorsanddonotnecessarilyreflectthoseoftheBoardofGovernorsoftheFederalReserveSystemoritsstaff.

‡Address:BoardofGovernorsoftheFederalReserveSystem,20thStreetandConstitutionAveN.W.,Washington,D.C.20551,U.S.A.E-mail:

jessica.n.flagg@.

§Address:BoardofGovernorsoftheFederalReserveSystem,20thStreetandConstitutionAveN.W.,Washington,D.C.20551,U.S.A.E-mail:

simona.m.hannon@.

1

1.Introduction

IntheaftermathoftheGlobalFinancialCrisis,personalloansreturnedtoprominenceasasourceofcredittoconsumers,partlyhighlightedbysomeofthetechnologicaladvancesintheconsumercreditspacecharacteristicofthepastdecade.Whilenewfinancialtechnology(FinTech)lendersenteredthemarketandsomeevenmorphedintoothertypesofinstitutions,traditionallenderscontinuedtoplayanimportantroleinprovidingpersonalloanstoconsumers.Astheoutstandingbalancesoftheseloanshaverecentlystartedtoaccelerate,weaimtoprovidemoreinformationonthisunderstudiedsector,employingtworelativelynewdatasources.

Asoftheendof2022,personalloans—alsoknownasinstallmentloansorotherloans,usedforavarietyofpurposes,suchasdebtconsolidation,medicalbills,vacations,orthepaymentofalargeticketitem—reached$356billionorabout10percentofnonrevolvingcredit.

1

Fromaninsti-tutionalperspective,thesectorisdominatedbydepositoryinstitutions—thatis,banks,thrifts,andcreditunions—andfinancecompanies,consistingofpersonalloancompaniesandsalesfinancecompanies.

2

Finally,somepaydaylendershaverecentlystartedtoofferinstallmentloans.Ourdataallowsustohighlightthisnewtrend.Eachlendertype’sdistinctcharacteristicsshapetheirunderwritingpractices,pricing,geographicalconcentration,andultimatelyloanholdings.

Althoughpersonalloanscanhaveavarietyofcharacteristics,theycanbebroadlycategorizedintosecured—backedbycollateralsuchasjewelry,savingsaccounts,orfineart—andunsecuredloans.Thatsaid,theycanalsotaketheformofnoteloansorpromissorynotes,whicharelessformalagreementsusuallyforsmalldollaramountsamongpartieswithanexistinglendingrela-tionship.

3

Alternatively,aconsumercouldalsoborrowfromafinancecompanyindirectlythroughaninstallmentsalescontract,anagreementwherebytheloanisissuedbyaretailerandthensub-sequentlypurchasedbyasalesfinancecompany.Personalloanscanhaveeitherfixedorvariableinterestrates.

Intheremainderofthispaper,wefirstreviewtheregulatoryenvironmentforpersonalloansintheUnitedStatesandthendiscussselectcharacteristicsoftheoutstandingbalancesandthe

1ThisestimateisbasedonthepersonalloanholdingsreflectedintheFederalReserveBankofNewYorkConsumerCreditPanel(CCP)/Equifaxdata.Itreflectsloanholdingsbytraditionallenderssuchasbanks,creditunions,andfinancecompaniesanddoesnotincludeestimatesofBNPL,paydaylenderorpawnshoploanholdings,northosethatarenotreportedtotraditionalcreditbureaus.(Forexample,banksalsooffertowealthierclientspersonalloansbackedbysecuritiesthatarenotreportedtocreditbureaus.Inaddition,asmorerecentlyselectpaydaylendersstartedtoofferinstallmentloans,someofthemoreestablishedonesreporttoalternativecreditscoringcompaniessuchasClarityServicesandDataX.NoneoftheseloansarereflectedintheCCP.)ThenonrevolvingcreditestimateissourcedfromtheG.19ConsumerCreditrelease:

/releases/g19/current/default.htm.

2Personalloancompaniesprovideloansdirectlytoconsumers,whilesalesfinancecompaniesbuyinstallmentcreditcontractsatadiscountfromretailersorfinanceretailsales.FinTechlendersalsoholdanotableshareofthepersonalloansector,but,giventheirbusinessmodelsandthatsomelendersmorphedintoothertypesofinstitutions,theirloanbalancesareaccountedforunderotherinstitutiontypeholdings.WewilldiscussmoreaboutFinTechlendersinasubsequentnote.

3Theseloanscanbemodifiedmoreeasilyifthepartiesagreeandtheyhavelegallybindingrequirementsfortheborrowerwhilenotlegallybindingthelendertolegalrequirements.Atthesametime,therearefewerlegalremediesforthelenderiftheborrowerdefaults.(Source:

/personal-finance/banking/loans/

promissory-note-vs-loan/

.)

2

supplyofpersonalloans,whileprovidingsomeestimatesforthesectorbasedonrelativelyrecentdatasources.

2.BriefRegulatoryOverview

TheUnitedStatesconsumercreditregulatoryenvironmentisdynamic,multilayered,andcom-plex,inparticularfornonbankissuedpersonalloans,withstateshavingfullflexibilitytoadoptandrepealpiecesoflegislation.

4

Themostimportantregulatoryelementsaffectingthepersonalloanspaceareinterestrateceilingsandbanks’interestrateexportationability.Inaddition,overthepastdecade,variousdevelopments,suchastheMaddenv.MidlandFundingruling,thePaydayRule,ortheadoptionofcapsforsmallloans,alsoputtheirmarksonthesector.

5

First,historically,thepersonalloansectorintheUnitedStateshasbeenregulatedbythestatesthroughinterestrateceilings.Statecreditpriceceilinglawsgenerallyincludedusurylawsandavarietyofspeciallawsallowinghigherratesthanthoseallowedunderusurylawsforspecifictypesofcreditfromcertainclassesoflenders.

6

Currently,15stateshavehighornointerestrateceilings.TheseareSouthCarolina,Georgia,Texas,Oklahoma,Louisiana,Tennessee,Missouri,Illinois,NewMexico,Kentucky,Alabama,Wisconsin,Indiana,Mississippi,andIdaho.Inadditiontostateinterestrateceilings,creditunionsaresubjecttotheirown18percentceilingfortraditionalpersonalloansimposedbytheNationalCreditUnionAdministration.Morerecently,after2010,creditunionsareabletomakesmall-dollarshort-termloans,labeledpaydayalternativeloansthatcanhaveinterestratesofupto28percent.

Second,in1978,theU.S.SupremeCourtinMarquetteNationalBankv.FirstOmahaServiceCorporationruledthatnationalbankscouldchargeinterestratespermittedbythelendingbank’shomestateregardlessoftheratepermittedbytheborrower’sstateofresidence.Untilmorere-cently,thissignificantcourtrulinghaditsgreatesteffectonthecreditcardmarketasitenabledcreditcardcompaniestoexpandtheirofferingsgeographicallytoconsumerslocatedacrossstateswithvariousinterestrateceilings.AsaresultoftheMarquetteruling,creditcardcompaniesmoved

4"Forexample,"notes

AmericanFinancialServicesAssociation

(2016),"inAlabama,traditionalinstallmentlenders

aregovernedbytheSmallLoanAct,theConsumerCreditAct,andtheInterestUsuryStatute.InArkansas,theyaregovernedbytheArkansasConstitution,theArkansasBusinessandCommercialLawProvisions,theInsuranceSalesConsumerProtectionAct,theCreditLifeandDisabilityProvisions,andtheUniformCommercialCode.InGeorgia,traditionallendersfollowtheUsuryStatuteandtheIndustrialLoanAct.InIllinois,theyfollowtheConsumerInstallmentLoanAct,ConsumerInstallmentLoanActRegulations,andtheInterestAct.Thelistgoesonforeachstate."

5DespiteitsnamethePaydayRuleaffectedthesupplyofallexpensivesmallloans,irrespectiveoftype.

6Forexample,the36percentinterestratecapemergedinthefirsthalfofthetwentiethcenturyinanefforttoallow(asanexceptionfromusurylaws)foralegalsmalldollarconsumerloanmarket,asbeforeitscreation,theprecursorsofpaydaylenders,the"salarylenders",wereillegallymakingsmallloanswithfour-digitannualinterestrates.TheRussellSageFoundationiscreditedwiththeideabehindthe36percentinterestratecap.Theadoptionofaninterestratecapof36percentatthestateandfederallevelhasbeendynamicwithstatesadoptingitatvariouspointsintimeandvariouspiecesoffederallegislationimposingit

(Saunders,

2013)

.TheTalentAmendmenttothe2007defenseauthorizationbillwasthefederallawimposinganovel36percentratecaponpaydayloansprovidedtomilitarymembersandtheirimmediaterelatives

(PewCharitableTrusts,

2012).Theadoptionofthe36percentinterestratecapdoesnotoutright

prohibitpaydaylenderactivity.Itmakespaydayloansunprofitableandillegal.

3

tostateswithhighornocreditcardrateceilingsandthecreditoperationsofmanylargeretailstoresandconsumerfinancecompanieswereacquiredbyorotherwisebecameaffiliatedwithnationalbanksandtheirsubsidiaries.Forawhilepaydaylendersalsousedthis"rentabank"modelinthe1990sandmanagedtocircumventrestrictivestatelegislationbypartneringwithbanks,untilthelegislativeloopholewasclosedforthem(

Stegman,

2007).Today,specializedfinancecompa

-niesand,especially,FinTechlenderspartnerwithbanksforthesamereason(

Bhattacharyya,

2021,

ElliehausenandHannon,

2023

).

Third,otherdevelopmentsalsoputtheirmarkonthepersonalloansectorinrecentyears,buttoasmallerextent.Amongthem,SecondCircuit’s2015Maddenv.Midlandruling(discussedatlengthby

DanisewiczandElard,

2018

)restrictedFinTech-bankpartnership-issuedloansinNewYorkandConnecticutbyrenderingloanswithinterestratesabovetheusuryratesinthosestatesnullifsoldtonon-banks,akeyfeatureoftheFinTech-bankpartnershipmodel(highlightedby

El-

liehausenandHannon,

2023

).TheConsumerFinancialProtectionBureau’stransientrulingtitledPayday,VehicleTitle,andCertainHigh-CostInstallmentLoans(thePaydayRule)temporarilyre-strictedtheavailabilityofexpensivepersonalloansbetweenthetimeitwasproposed,in2016,anditsrevocation,lessthanthreeyearslater.

7

Finally,morerecentlyIllinoisandNewMexicoadopted36percentcapsonsmallloans.

Withtheexceptionsofthecreditunion18percentinterestrateceilingandofthePaydayRule,whichactedlikea"stealth"interestrateceiling(

Calomiris,

2001

)andwasapplicabletohigh-costloansacrossallstates,theaforementionedregulatoryrestrictionsapplylocallyandthusshapelenders’geographicalconcentrationorcreditsupply.Forexample,financecompaniesrestricttheirlendingtohighornoconsumerfinanceinterestrateceilingstates,whileFinTechlenderspartnerwithbanksinordertocircumventlowinterestrateceilingsanddisproportionatelytargetriskierconsumerslivinginlow-ratestates(

ElliehausenandHannon,

2023

).

3.PersonalLoansOutstanding

Inordertoexaminethepersonalloanoutstandinguniverse,weuseanewly-releasedloan-levelversionoftheFederalReserveBankofNewYorkquarterlyConsumerCreditPanel(CCP),adatabaseonconsumers’credituseandpaymentperformancedrawnfromanonymizedEquifaxcreditbureaurecords.

8

Thesamplehascoverageofpersonalloan(oraccount)holdingsissuedby

7ThePaydayRulecoveredallshort-termloans,longer-termballoon-paymentloans,andotherlonger-termloanswithtermsofmorethan45daysandwithAPRsinexcessof36percentinadditiontopaymentmechanismsthatallowedthelendertowithdrawpaymentsdirectlyfromtheconsumer’saccount.Short-termloansarethosewithtermsof45daysorlessandinclude14-dayand30-daypaydayloans,vehicletitleloans,whichareusuallymadefor30-dayterms,andshort-termloanswithleveragedpaymentmechanisms.Inaddition,theRuleimposedabilitytorepayrequirements,asetofpayment-relatedrules,andadditionalrequirementsmeanttoprotectconsumers.ThePaydayRulewasproposedonJune2,2016,finalizedonOctober5,2017,andrevokedonFebruary6,2019.

8Thesamplingprocedureensuresthatthesameindividualsremaininthesampleineachquarterandallowsforentryintoandexitfromthesample,sothatthesampleisrepresentativeofthetargetpopulationineachquarter.See

LeeandderKlaauw

(2010)foradescriptionofthedesignandcontentoftheCCP.Seealso

https://www.newyorkfed.

org/medialibrary/interactives/householdcredit/data/pdf/data_dictionary_HHDC.pdf.

4

financecompaniesanddepositoryinstitutions—banks,thrifts,andcreditunions—andreflectsuptofouraccounts(orloans)perindividual.

Oursamplecontainsindustrycodeindicatorsthatallowustocategorizethepersonalloanholdingsbysector—financecompanies,banks,thrifts,andcreditunions.Inaddition,anewin-dicatorhasbeenrecentlyaddedtoallowtheidentificationofpersonalloansissuedbyFinTechlenders.Moreover,theseindicatorscanbeusedtofurtherdifferentiatethefinancecompanyhold-ingsbyfinancecompanytype:personalloancompanies,salesfinancecompanies,andamiscella-neouscompanycategory,thusofferingauniqueperspectiveintotheusuallyopaquefinancecom-panyuniverse.

9

Furthermore,ourdataincludenarrativecodesthatenablethegroupingofhold-ingsbyproducttype:securedandunsecured.Thelatteralsoincludes"other"loans,acategorythatprimarilyconsistsofnoteloans,linesorcredit,andinstallmentsalescontractsamongothers.Importantly,thenarrativecodesenableustoremovechargecardaccountsandclosedaccountsfromourestimates,whichisnotpossibleusingtheindividual-levelCCPdata.Thisisparamountbecausethechargecardbalancesarequitenotable.

10

AlthoughtheCCPdatadonotcontainin-terestrateinformation,thetradelinedatasetthatweareusingcontainsnarrativecodesindicatingwhethertheinterestrateonacertainloanisfixed.

Aspersonalloanstendtohavelowerincidencethanotherloantypes,toensurepropercover-age,weusea10percentrandomsamplefromthetotalavailable5percentsample,coveringtheperiodbetween2010:Q1and2022:Q4.Asoftheendofthefourthquarterof2022,theconsumerfinanceCCPloan-levelsampleshowedthatmorethan31millionindividualsorabout11percentoftheentireadultpopulationcoveredbytheCCPhadpersonalloans.

11

Thepersonalloansectorreached$356billionandconsistedof36.2millionaccounts.Themedianpersonalloanaccountbalanceis$4,198andthemedianmonthlypaymentis$202.Aboutone-fourthofloanbalancesaresecured,closeto60percentarefixedrate,and40percentareheldbynonprimeborrowers(thosewithEquifaxRiskScoreslowerthan720).

Lookingatoutstandingbalances(Table

1

,columnI),wenotethatdepositoryinstitutionsdom-inatethepersonalloanmarket,holdingof77percentofbalancesor$273.6billion,withbanksandthriftscovering49percentofthemarketandcreditunionscovering28percent.Theremaindermarketshare,of23percentor$82.5billion,belongstofinancecompanies.Althoughpersonalloancompanies—thoseprovidingloansdirectlytoconsumers—dominatethefinancecompanysector,ourdataallowsustohighlightthepresenceofsalesfinancecompanies,thosebuyinginstallmentcreditcontractsatadiscountfromretailersorfinancingretailsales,andrevealstheexistenceofgrowingnumberofmiscellaneousfinancecompanybalancesissuedbylendersnottraditionally

9Althoughweinquiredaboutthecompanytypesincludedinthemiscellaneouscategory,inordertopreservedataconfidentiality,nofurtherdetailscouldbemadepubliclyavailablebyEquifax.

10Allcalculationsexcludechargecardaccountsandbalances,debtowned,andnumberofaccountsheldbydeceasedborrowers,thosedebtsandaccountsthathavebeenchargedoff,andclosedaccountswithzerobalances,themajorityofwhichwerelikelysubjecttoCFPB’sNationalConsumerAssistancePlan.

11Asof2022:Q4,theCCPcovered282millionindividuals,237millionwithcreditscores.

5

Figure1.PersonalLoansOutstanding

ouarterly

Dollars(Billions,Real)

Banks

Thrifts

CreditUnions

PersonalLoanCompanies

SalesFinanceCompanies

MiscellaneousCompanies

2010201220142016201820202022

400

300

200

100

0

Note:Thisfigureshowsthetotalpersonalloansoutstandingbysector.

Source:FederalReserveBankofNewYorkConsumerCreditPanel(CCP)/Equifax.

classifiedasfinancecompanies,butthatofferpersonalloans.

12

FinTechlenderbalancescurrentlystandat$49.9billionor14percentofthemarket.AsFinTechloansaretypicallyofferedinpartner-shipwithbanks,dependingonthemomentinthelifecycleofthetransactioncapturedinthecreditbureaudata,FinTechbalancescanbereportedacrossthetraditionalsectorsdiscussedpreviously.WewilldedicateasubsequentnotetoFinTechlending.

Lookingatthenumberofoutstandingpersonalloanaccounts(Table

1

,columnII),wenotethatdepositoryinstitutionsandfinancecompaniesholdaboutthesamenumberofaccounts—about18million.Takentogetherwiththedepositoryinstitutions’muchlargerbalanceholdings,thispointstothelargerbalancesonaccountsheldbydepositoryinstitutionsversusthoseheldbyfinancecompaniesandlargermonthlypayments(Table

1

,columnsVandVI).

13

Indeed,themedianaccountbalancefordepositoryinstitutionsis$6,299withamedianmonthlypaymentof$251,while,incontrast,themedianaccountbalanceforafinancecompanyaccountis$2,864withamonthlypaymentof$163.FinTechlendershold7.7millionaccounts,withamedianaccountbalanceof$4,256andamedianmonthlypaymentof$197.

Next,whenexaminingthepersonalloansectorthroughtheborrowerscreditriskprofileslens(Table

1

,columnIII),wenotetheinfluenceofinstitutionalcharacteristics.Inlinewiththeirknownriskaversion,depositoryinstitutionsprimarilyofferpersonalloanstohighercreditscoreborrow-ers,while,incontrast,financecompaniesstaytruetotheirpositionasatraditionalsourceofcreditforriskierborrowers.Themediandepositoryinstitutionborrowerriskscoreis727,whiletheme-

12Assubsidiariesthatfinanceretailpurchasesfromtheparentcompany,captiveautofinancecompanies,notcoveredinthisstudy,haveafunctionsimilartothatofsalesfinancecompanies,butforautopurchases.

13Asof2022:Q4,themedianloanmaturityisfouryearsforloansissuedbydepositoryinstitutions,threeyearsforsalesfinance-andmiscellaneouscompany-issuedloans,andtwoyearsforthoseissuedbypersonalloancompanies.

6

dianborrowerriskscoreforafinancecompanyaccountholderis626.Amongdepositoryinsti-tutions,banksaremostriskaverse,evidencedbytheirborrowershavingthehighestmedianriskscore—741.Incontrast,amongfinancecompanies,thelargestcreditproviders—personalloancompanieshavethelowestmedianriskscore—610.AsFinTechlenderstypicallyfocusonnear-primeandlow-primeborrowers,themedianborrowerriskscoreis670,somewhereinbetweenthatforfinancecompanyborrowersanddepositoryinstitutionborrowers.

Lookingattheborrowers’agesreflectedintheCCPdata(Table

1

,columnIV),wefinddiffer-encesinaccountholdingsreflectingthebusinesspracticesofeachlender.Forexample,wefindthatdepositoryinstitutionstendtolendtoslightlyolderandmoreestablishedborrowers.Theme-dianageofaborrowertakingapersonalloanfromadepositoryinstitutionis48,twoyearsolderthanthatofafinancecompanyborrower.Moreover,withinthefinancecompanysector,wefindthatthesalesfinancecompanyborrowermedianageisnotablylowerthanthatofapersonalloancompanyborrower.Thismaybeareflectionofthenatureofgoodsfinancedbysalesfinancecom-panies,suchasappliances,acquisitionsmoreconsistentwithyoungerborrowerhabits.Incon-trast,personalloancompanyaccountsarelesslikelytobeheldbyyoungerconsumers,asolderborrowersaremorelikelytousepersonalloansfromtraditionalfinancecompaniestorefinancedebt.ThemedianborrowerageonaFinTech-issuedpersonalloanaccountis45.DatafromthetwolargestFinTechlenders—LendingClubandProsper—showthatastableshareoftheirloanis-suance,about70percent,isfordebtconsolidationpurposes.

14

Finally,lookingatpersonalloanholdingsbyproducttypeandborrowerriskprofile(Table

2

),wenotethataboutone-fourthoftotaloutstandingbalancesaresecured,about60percenthavefixedinterestrates,and40percentareheldbynonprimeborrowers(thosewithEquifaxRiskScoreslowerthan720).

15

Althoughintermsofaccountholdings,depositoryinstitutionsandfinancecom-paniestendtoholdsimilarsharesofsecured,unsecured,andotherloans,theirholdingsofunse-curedandotherloanbalancesdiffer.Depositoryinstitutionsholdmoreotherloanbalances,whilefinancecompaniesholdlargerunsecuredloanbalances.Moreover,wenotedifferencesinfixedrateloanholdings,withdepositoryinstitutionsholdinglargersharesoffixedrateloansandbal-ancesincomparisontofinancecompanies(about65percentrelativetoalittleover40percent).Exposurestononprimeborrowersalsovarybysector,withfinancecompaniesleadingthecreditofferingsforsuchborrowers.NearlyallFinTechloansandbalancesareunsecuredandaboutthree-fourthshavefixedrates.MorethanhalfofFinTechloanbalancesareloansextendedtononprimeborrowers.

14LendingClub’sLoanStatsdatawasavailabletoresearchersvia

/

untilDecember2017.

15Thenatureofthecollateralusedtosecureloanstendstovarybylendertype.Banksusuallyoffersecuredloanscollateralizedbysavingsaccountsorcertificateofdeposits,whilefinancecompaniesuseotherpersonalgoodstosecureloans.

7

Table1:PersonalLoanHoldings,bySectorasof2022:Q4

LenderType

Outstanding

Balance

(billion$)

I

Numberof

Accounts

(million)

II

BorrowerEquifax

RiskScore

(median)

III

Borrower

Age

(median)

IV

Balanceper

Account

(median)

V

AccountMonthly

Payment

(median)

VI

Depository

Institutions

273.6

18

727

48

6,299

251

Banks

172.4

8.9

741

49

8,348

293

Thrifts

2.5

0.1

720

50

5,058

242

CreditUnions

98.7

9

714

47

4,966

221

Finance

Companies

82.5

18.2

626

46

2,864

163

PersonalLoan

53.8

12

610

47

2,905

169

SalesFinance

7.7

1.4

632

41

2,861

164

Miscellaneous

21

4.8

654

44

2,713

147

InTotal

356.1

36.2

685

47

4,198

202

FinTech*

49.9

7.7

670

45

4,256

197

Note:*Althoughseparatelyidentifiedinthetable,becauseofFinTechlendersspecificbusinessmodels,FinTechbalancesarereflectedacrosssectors.Wewillprovidedetailsinasubsequentnote.Asof2022:Q4,themedianloanmaturityis2.9yearsforloansissuedbybanks,2.7yearsforloansissuedbythrifts,2.6forloansissuedbycreditunions,1.5forloansissuedbypersonalloancompanies,2.4forloansissuedbysalesfinancecompanies,and1.25forloansissuedbymiscellaneouscompanies.TheFinTechmedianloanmaturityis2.3years.ThemedianEquifaxRiskScorefortheentirecoveredpopulationis742,andthemedianageis49.

Source:FederalReserveBankofNewYorkConsumerCreditPanel(CCP)/Equifax.

Table2:PersonalLoanHoldingsbySector,ProductType,andRiskSharesasof2022:Q4

SectorHoldings

Secured

(%)

I

Unsecured

(%)

II

Other(%)III

FixedRate(%)

IV

Nonprime(%)

V

All

Balance

24

40

36

59

40

Accounts

22

57

21

53

67

Depository

Institutions

Balance

23

34

43

64

29

Accounts

20

57

23

65

49

Finance

Companies

Balance

27

60

13

43

79

Accounts

24

58

18

42

85

FinTech*

Balance

0.3

99

0.7

72

56

Accounts

0.15

97

2.85

75

71

Note:*Althoughseparatelyidentifiedinthetable,becauseofFinTechlendersspecificbusinessmodels,FinTechbalancesarereflectedacrosssectors.Wewillprovidedetailsinasubsequentnote.NonprimeisEquifaxcreditscoreunder720.

Source:FederalReserveBankofNewYorkConsumerCreditPanel(CCP)/Equifax.

8

4.TheSupplyofPersonalLoans

Inordertobetterunderstandthesupplylandscapeforpersonalloans,weturntoMintelCom-peremediadata(Mintelfromnowon),adatasetconsistingofmonthlyacquisitionoffers(solicita-tions)forpersonalloans.Asthesolicitationsarecreditoffers,theyareameasureofcreditsupply.

16

Thedatarepresentmonthlycampaign-levelmailvolumesenttoconsumers.Mintelrandomlyse-lectsroughly4,000consumersfromapoolof1millionconsumersthatMintelpurchasedfromalargesurveyserviceprovider.

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