金融专业外文翻译

本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译原文：TheDeterminantsofCapitalStructureChoiceI.DeterminantsofCapitalStructureInthissection,wepresentabriefdiscussionoftheattributesthatdifferenttheoriesofcapitalstructuresuggestmayaffectthefirm'sdebt-equitychoice.Theseattributesaredenotedassetstructure,non-debttaxshields,growth,uniqueness,industryclassification,size,earningsvolatility,andprofitability.Theattributes,theirrelationtotheoptimalcapitalstructurechoice,andtheirobservableindicatorsarediscussedbelow.CollateralValueofAssetsMostcapitalstructuretheoriesarguethatthetypeofassetsownedbyafirminsomewayaffectsitscapitalstructurechoice.Scottsuggeststhat,bysellingsecureddebt,firmsincreasethevalueoftheirequitybyexpropriatingwealthfromtheirexistingunsecuredcreditors.ArgumentsputforthbyMyersandMajlufalsosuggestthatfirmsmayfinditadvantageoustosellsecureddebt.Theirmodeldemonstratesthattheremaybecostsassociatedwithissuingsecuritiesaboutwhichthefirm'smanagershavebetterinformationthanoutsideshareholders.Issuingdebtsecuredbypropertywithknownvaluesavoidsthesecosts.Forthisreason,firmswithassetsthatcanbeusedascollateralmaybeexpectedtoissuemoredebttotakeadvantageofthisopportunity.WorkbyGalaiandMasulis,JensenandMeckling,andMyerssuggeststhatstockholdersofleveragedfirmshaveanincentivetoinvestyettoexpropriatewealthfromthefirm'sbondholders.Thisincentivemayalsoinduceapositiverelationbetweendebtratiosandthecapacityoffirmstocollateralizetheirdebt.Ifthedebtcanbecollateralized,theborrowerisrestrictedtousethefundsforaspecifiedproject.Sincenosuchguaranteecanbeusedforprojectsthatcannotbecollateralized,creditorsmayrequiremorefavorableterms,whichinturnmayleadsuchfirmstouseequityratherthandebtfinancing.Thetendencyofmanagerstoconsumemorethantheoptimallevelofperquisitesmayproducetheoppositerelationbetweencollateralizedcapitalanddebtlevels.GrossmanandHartsuggestthathigherdebtlevelsdiminishthistendencybecauseoftheincreasedthreatofbankruptcy.Managersofhighlyleveredfirmswillalsobelessabletoconsumeexcessiveperquisitessincebondholders(orbankers)areinclinedtocloselymonitorsuchfirms.Thecostsassociatedwiththisagencyrelationmaybehigherforfirmswithassetsthatarelesscollateralizedsincemonitoringthecapitaloutlaysofsuchfirmsisprobablymoredifficult.Forthisreason,firmswithlesscollateralizedassetsmaychoosehigherdebtlevelstolimittheirmanagers'consumptionofperquisites.Theestimatedmodelincorporatestwoindicatorsforthecollateralvalueattribute.Theyincludetheratioofintangibleassetstototalassets(INT/TA)andtheratioofinventoryplusgrossplantandequipmenttototalassets(IGP/TA).Thefirstindicatorisnegativelyrelatedtothecollateralvalueattribute,whilethesecondispositivelyrelatedtocollateralvalue.Non-DebtTaxShieldsDeAngeloandMasulispresentamodelofoptimalcapitalstructurethatincorporatestheimpactofcorporatetaxes,personaltaxes,andnon-debt-relatedcorporatetaxshields.Theyarguethattaxdeductionsfordepreciationandinvestmenttaxcreditsaresubstitutesforthetaxbenefitsofdebtfinancing.Asaresult,firmswithlargenon-debttaxshieldsrelativetotheirexpectedcashflowincludelessdebtintheircapitalstructures.Indicatorsofnon-debttaxshieldsincludetheratiosofinvestmenttaxcreditsovertotalassets(ITC/TA),depreciationovertotalassets(DITA),andadirectestimateofnon-debttaxshieldsovertotalassets(NDT/TA).Thelattermeasureiscalculatedfromobservedfederalincometaxpayments(T),operatingincome(OI),interestpayments(i),andthecorporatetaxrateduringoursampleperiod(48%),usingthefollowingequation:NDT=OI-i-T/0.48whichfollowsfromtheequalityT=0.48(0I-i-NDT)Theseindicatorsmeasurethecurrenttaxdeductionsassociatedwithcapitalequipmentand,hence,onlypartiallycapturethenon-debttaxshieldvariablesuggestedbyDeAngeloandMasulis.First,thisattributeexcludestaxdeductionsthatarenotassociatedwithcapitalequipment,suchasresearchanddevelopmentandsellingexpenses.(Thesevariables,usedasindicatorsofanotherattribute,arediscussedlater.)Moreimportant,ournon-debttaxshieldattributerepresentstaxdeductionsratherthantaxdeductionsnetoftrueeconomicdepreciationandexpenses,whichistheeconomicattributesuggestedbytheory.Unfortunately,thispreferableattributewouldbeverydifficulttomeasure.GrowthAswementionedpreviously,equity-controlledfirmshaveatendencytoinvestsuboptimallytoexpropriatewealthfromthefirm'sbondholders.Thecostassociatedwiththisagencyrelationshipislikelytobehigherforfirmsingrowingindustries,whichhavemoreflexibilityintheirchoiceoffutureinvestments.Expectedfuturegrowthshouldthusbenegativelyrelatedtolong-termdebtlevels.Myers,however,notedthatthisagencyproblemismitigatedifthefirmissuesshort-termratherthanlong-termdebt.Thissuggeststhatshort-termdebtratiosmightactuallybepositivelyrelatedtogrowthratesifgrowingfirmssubstituteshort-termfinancingforlong-termfinancing.JensenandMeckling,SmithandWarner,andGreenarguedthattheagencycostswillbereducediffirmsissueconvertibledebt.Thissuggeststhatconvertibledebtratiosmaybepositivelyrelatedtogrowthopportunities.Itshouldalsobenotedthatgrowthopportunitiesarecapitalassetsthataddvaluetoafirmbutcannotbecollateralizedanddonotgeneratecurrenttaxableincome.Forthisreason,theargumentsputforthintheprevioussubsectionsalsosuggestanegativerelationbetweendebtandgrowthopportunities.Indicatorsofgrowthincludecapitalexpendituresovertotalassets(CE/TA)andthegrowthoftotalassetsmeasuredbythepercentagechangeintotalassets(GTA).Sincefirmsgenerallyengageinresearchanddevelopmenttogeneratefutureinvestments,researchanddevelopmentoversales(RD/S)alsoservesasanindicatorofthegrowthattribute.UniquenessTitmanpresentsamodelinwhichafirm'sliquidationdecisioniscausallylinkedtoitsbankruptcystatus.Asaresult,thecoststhatfirmscanpotentiallyimposeontheircustomers,suppliers,andworkersbyliquidatingarerelevanttotheircapitalstructuredecisions.Customers,workers,andsuppliersoffirmsthatproduceuniqueorspecializedproductsprobablysufferrelativelyhighcostsintheeventthattheyliquidate.Theirworkersandsuppliersprobablyhavejobspecificskillsandcapital,andtheircustomersmayfinditdifficulttofindalternativeservicingfortheirrelativelyuniqueproducts.Forthesereasons,uniquenessisexpectedtobenegativelyrelatedtodebtratios.Indictorsofuniquenessincludeexpendituresonresearchanddevelopmentoversales(RD/S),sellingexpensesoversales(SEIS),andquitrates(QR),thepercentageoftheindustry'stotalworkforcethatvoluntarilylefttheirjobsinthesampleyears.ItispostulatedthatRD/Smeasuresuniquenessbecausefirmsthatsellproductswithclosesubstitutesar'elikelytodolessresearchanddevelopmentsincetheirinnovationscanbemoreeasilyduplicated.Inaddition,successfulresearchanddevelopmentprojectsleadtonewproductsthatdifferfromthoseexistinginthemarket.Firmswithrelativelyuniqueproductsareexpectedtoadvertisemoreand,ingeneral,spendmoreinpromotingandsellingtheirproducts.Hence,SE/Sisexpectedtobepositivelyrelatedtouniqueness.However,itisexpectedthatfirmsinindustrieswithhighquitratesareprobablyrelativelylessuniquesincefirmsthatproducerelativelyuniqueproductstendtoemployworkerswithhighlevelsofjob-specifichumancapitalwhowillthusfinditcostlytoleavetheirjobs.Itisapparentfromtwooftheindicatorsofuniqueness,RD/SandSEIS,thatthisattributemayalsoberelatedtonon-debttaxshieldsandcollateralvalue.Researchanddevelopmentandsomesellingexpenses(suchasadvertising)canbeconsideredcapitalgoodsthatareimmediatelyexpensedandcannotbeusedascollateral.Giventhatourestimationtechniquecanonlyimperfectlycontrolfortheseotherattributes,theuniquenessattributemaybenegativelyrelatedtotheobserveddebtratiobecauseofitspositivecorrelationwithnon-debttaxshieldsanditsnegativecorrelationwithcollateralvalue.IndustryClassificationTitmansuggeststhatfirmsthatmakeproductsrequiringtheavailabilityofspecializedservicingandsparepartswillfindliquidationespeciallycostly.Thisindicatesthatfirmsmanufacturingmachinesandequipmentshouldbefinancedwithrelativelylessdebt.Tomeasurethis,weincludeadummyvariableequaltooneforfirmswithSICcodesbetween3400and4000(firmsproducingmachinesandequipment)andzerootherwiseasaseparateattributeaffectingthedebtratios.SizeAnumberofauthorshavesuggestedthatleverageratiosmayberelatedtofirmsize.WarnerandAng,Chua,andMcConnellprovideevidencethatsuggeststhatdirectbankruptcycostsappeartoconstitutealargerproportionofafirm'svalueasthatvaluedecreases.Itisalsothecasethatrelativelylargefirmstendtobemorediversifiedandlesspronetobankruptcy.Theseargumentssuggestthatlargefirmsshouldbemorehighlyleveraged.Thecostofissuingdebtandequitysecuritiesisalsorelatedtofirmsize.Inparticular,smallfirmspaymuchmorethanlargefirmstoissuenewequity(seeSmith)andalsosomewhatmoretoissuelong-termdebt.Thissuggeststhatsmallfirmsmaybemoreleveragedthanlargefirmsandmayprefertoborrowshortterm(throughbankloans)ratherthanissuelong-termdebtbecauseofthelowerfixedcostsassociatedwiththisalternative.Weusethenaturallogarithmofsales(LnS)andquitrates(QR)asindicatorsofsize.Thelogarithmictransformationofsalesreflectsourviewthatasizeeffect,ifitexists,affectsmainlytheverysmallfirms.Theinclusionofquitrates,asanindicatorofsize,reflectsthephenomenonthatlargefirms,whichoftenofferwidercareeropportunitiestotheiremployees,havelowerquitrates.VolatilityManyauthorshavealsosuggestedthatafirm'soptimaldebtlevelisadecreasingfunctionofthevolatilityofearnings.Wewereonlyabletoincludeoneindicatorofvolatilitythatcannotbedirectlyaffectedbythefirm'sdebtlevel.Itisthestandarddeviationofthepercentagechangeinoperatingincome(SIGOI).Sinceitistheonlyindicatorofvolatility,wemustassumethatitmeasuresthisattributewithouterror.ProfitabilityMyerscitesevidencefromDonaldsonandBrealeyandMyersthatsuggeststhatfirmspreferraisingcapital,firstfromretainedearnings,secondfromdebt,andthirdfromissuingnewequity.Hesuggeststhatthisbehaviormaybeduetothecostsofissuingnewequity.ThesecanbethecostsdiscussedinMyersandMajlufthatarisebecauseofasymmetricinformation,ortheycanbetransactioncosts.Ineithercase,thepastprofitabilityofafirm,andhencetheamountofearningsavailabletoberetained,shouldbeanimportantdeterminantofitscurrentcapitalstructure.Weusetheratiosofoperatingincomeoversales(OI/S)andoperatingincomeovertotalassets(OI/TA)asindicatorsofprofitability.II.MeasuresofCapitalStructureSixmeasuresoffinancialleverageareusedinthisstudy.Theyarelong-term,short-term,andconvertibledebtdividedbymarketandbybookvaluesofequity.8Althoughthesevariablescouldhavebeencombinedtoextractacommon"debtratio"attribute,whichcouldinturnberegressedagainsttheindependentattributes,thereisgoodreasonfornotdoingthis.Someofthetheoriesofcapitalstructurehavedifferentimplicationsforthedifferenttypesofdebt,and,forthereasonsdiscussedbelow,thepredictedcoefficientsinthestructuralmodelmaydifferaccordingtowhetherdebtratiosaremeasuredintermsofbookormarketvalues.Moreover,measurementerrorsinthedependentvariablesaresubsumedinthedisturbancetermanddonotbiastheregressioncoefficients.Datalimitationsforceustomeasuredebtintermsofbookvaluesratherthanmarketvalues.Itwould,perhaps,havebeenbetterifmarketvaluedatawereavailablefordebt.However,Bowmandemonstratedthatthecross-sectionalcorrelationbetweenthebookvalueandmarketvalueofdebtisverylarge,sothemisspecificationduetousingbookvaluemeasuresisprobablyfairlysmall.Furthermore,wehavenoreasontosuspectthatthecross-sectionaldifferencesbetweenmarketvaluesandbookvaluesofdebtshouldbecorrelatedwithanyofthedeterminantsofcapitalstructuresuggestedbytheory,sonoobviousbiaswillresultbecauseofthismisspecification.Source:SheridanTitman;RobertoWessels,1988.“TheDeterminantsofCapitalStructureChoice”.TheJournalofFinance.Vol.43,No.1,march.pp.1-19.译文:I、资本结构的决定因素在本节中，我们提出了一个简短讨论资本结构的不同理论认为可能会影响公司的债务权益选择的属性。这些属性表示的资产结构，非债务税盾，成长性，独特性，行业分类，规模，盈利波动性和盈利能力。它们之间的关系以最优的资本结构的选择，他们的观察指标在下面讨论。A、资产抵押品的价值大部分资本结构理论认为，由一个以某种方式公司国有资产的类型会影响其资本结构的选择。斯科特认为，通过出售抵押债务，公司增加了其现有的无抵押债权人的财富，他们的股票价值。迈尔斯和麦吉罗夫提出的理论也表明，企业可能会发现它有利的出售抵押债务。他们的模型表明，有可能与证券发行的有关该公司的内部人员比外部股东的享有更多的信息。发行债务与已知价值财产担保避免这些费用。出于这个原因，那些能用作抵押的资产的公司将利用这个机会可能会发行更多的债务预计。伽来和马苏利斯，詹森和麦克林，迈尔斯工作表明，杠杆企业的股东有动力投资还从该公司的债券持有人劫富济贫。这个激励可能也会引起一个积极的关系,有能力公司的债务比例主要负责评估其债券。如果债务抵押证券，借款人仅限于使用特定项目的资金。因为没有这样的保证抵押证券，债权人可能需要更多的有利条件，从而可能导致这些公司使用股权而不能债务融资。管理人员消耗比额外津贴最佳水平之间可能会产生抵押债券资本和债务水平相对关系更多。格罗斯曼和哈特表明，因为破产的威胁增加了较高的债务水平降低这一趋势。因为债券持有人（或银行）倾向于过度的特殊待遇，可能使用较少高杠杆密切监察这类公司。与此相关的代理关系可能对资产较少，因为这类公司的监管资本支出债券资本更高的成本是企业可能更加困难。出于这个原因，债券资本资产的公司可以选择较高的债务水平，以限制其经理人的额外补贴消费。模型采用了两个估计为抵押物的价值属性指标。它们包括以（INT/TA）的总资产的比率无形资产和存货加上机器及设备总值的比例（IGP/TA）的总资产。第一个指标是负相关抵押品的价值属性，而第二个是正相关的抵押品价值。B、 非债务税盾迪安杰洛和马修利斯提出了优化资本结构模型，结合了公司税，个人所得税，非债务税盾对相关企业的影响。他们认为，折旧和投资税收抵免税收减免是债务融资的税收优惠替代品。因此，非债务税盾公司在其资本结构债务较少相对其预期的现金流。非债务税盾的指标包括总资产超过（ITC/TA），折旧超过（DITA）总资产投资税收抵免比例，以及非债务税盾以上（NDT/TA）的总资产的直接估计。后者的措施是从观察到的联邦收入计算纳税（T）的营业收入（01），利息支付（i），而且整个样本期内（48%）使用下列公式，企业所得税率：NDT=OI-i-T/0.48它遵循的平等转换：T=0.48（0I-i-NDT）这些指标衡量现行的税收减免与资本设备相关，因此，迪安杰洛和马修利斯的建议只有部分捕获的非债务税盾变量。首先，这个属性不包括资本设备等的研发和销售费用扣除的税。（这些变量，作为其他属性的指标，在后面讨论。）更重要的是，我们的非债务税盾的属性表示减税再减税，而不是真正的经济折旧和建议变动费用。不幸的是，这最好的属性很难衡量。C、 增长正如我们前面提到的，股权控制的企业有一种倾向，不是最优的投资从该公司的债券持有人获取资金弥补。与此相关的代理关系的成本很可能是在增长的行业，这对他们更对企业未来投资选择的灵活性更高。因此，预计未来的增长长期的债务水平应该是负相关。但是，迈尔斯指出代理问题，如果公司发行短期而不是长期债务。这表明，短期债务比率可能实际上是对经济增长率正相关，如果越来越多的企业以短期长期融资。詹森和麦克林，史密斯和华纳，和格林认为，该机构将降低成本，如果公司发行可转换债券。这表明，可转换债券的比例可能是正相关的发展机遇。还应该指出，发展机会是资本增值的资产，一个确定的，但不能抵押，不产生应纳税所得额。由于这个原因，在以前的论据小节也提出债务和发展机会的负相关关系。成长指标包括资本支出超过的总资产和由在总资产变动率测得的总资产增长。由于企业普遍从事研究和开发，以创造未来的投资，研究和超过销售的发展，也可作为属性指标的增长。D、 唯一性蒂特漫指出了一种在一个公司的清算决策有因果联系的破产状态模式。因此，企业有可能给其客户，供应商，工人和清算有关的资本结构决策。顾客，工人和生产公司，具有独特性或专业化的产品供应商在事件可能遭受成本相对较高。他们的工人和供应商可能会有职业技能训练和资本，以及他们客户会发现很难找到替代服务对于他们相当特别的产品。由于这些原因，唯一性和负债比率负相关。其独特见解包括研究和销售的支出，销售费用超过销售费用，以及退出率，该行业的总劳动人口的百分比自愿留在样本几年的工作。我们假定RD/S措施，因为公司出售产品独特性以接近的替代品少可能去做研究和开发创新，因为他们可以更容易的复制。此外，成功的研究和发展项目导致从市场上现有的这些不同的新产品。相对独特的产品的企业，预计更多的宣传，并在一般情况下，花费在推广和销售自己的产品信息。因此，SE/S是预计正相关的独特性。不过，预计在较高退出率的行业的公司可能是唯一的，因为公司相对较少，产生相对独特的产品往往采用与特定工作的高层次，因此有了它昂贵，给他们的工作人员人力资本。