观察家研究基金会-对欧盟印太战略的评估（英）-2021.11-20正式版

IssueBrief

ISSUENO.504NOVEMBER2021

©2021ObserverResearchFoundation.Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,copied,archived,retainedortransmittedthroughprint,speechorelectronicmediawithoutpriorwrittenapprovalfromORF.

AnAssessmentoftheEuropeanUnion’sIndo-PacificStrategy

GirishLuthra

Abstract

ThenewIndo-PacificstrategybytheEuropeanUnion(EU)followspreviousmeasurestoincreaseengagementwiththeregionintheeconomic,securityandconnectivitydomains.TheplanindicatesaclearintenttopositiontheEUintheemergingglobalandregionalgovernancestructures,focusingonstrategicautonomy,inclusivity,therules-basedorder,andcommonpublicgoods.Implementingtheactionplanbasedonthestrategyislikelytofacenumerouschallenges,includingevolvingandsustainingconsensusonitwithintheEU.Nevertheless,itholdspromiseincontributingtothestabilityanddevelopmentoftheIndo-Pacific.

Attribution:GirishLuthra,“AnAssessmentoftheEuropeanUnion’sIndo-PacificStrategy,”ORFIssueBriefNo.504,November2021,ObserverResearchFoundation.

01

Introduction

InApril2021,theEuropeanUnion(EU)releasedthe‘EUStrategyforCooperationintheIndo-Pacific,’adocumentoutliningacooperationplanwiththeIndo-Pacific.1ThestrategydefinestheregionasextendingfromtheeastcoastofAfricatothePacificIslandStates.ThisdiffersfromtheAmericanandAustralianconceptualisationoftheIndo-Pacificas

stretchingfromthewestcoastoftheUStothewesternshoresofIndia,andtheJapanese,FrenchandtheIndianinterpretationsthatseeitasextendingfromtheshoresofAfricatothatoftheAmericas.2Notwithstandingsuchinterpretations,theEU’sstrategyhassignalledaclearintenttoreorientthegrouping’sgeopoliticaloutlookandprovideguidanceforenhancedengagementwiththeIndo-Pacific.TheEuropeanCommissionandtheEUHighRepresentative/VicePresidentwererequestedtopresentafinalcommunicationforapprovalbasedontheproposedstrategy,whichwassubsequentlyreleasedon16September2021throughajointcommunicationtotheEuropeanParliamentandtheEuropeanCouncilthatoutlinedtherationaleforadeeperengagementwiththeIndo-Pacificandthekeyprinciplesthatwillguideit.3Abroadactionplantoimplementthestrategywasalsoincludedinthejointcommunication.

WhileFrance,GermanyandtheNetherlandsalreadyhadguidelinesandstrategydocumentsfortheIndo-Pacific,4theEU-wideumbrellastrategyisamajordevelopment.ItemphasisesthatEuropeaneconomicprosperity—andtheEU’svisionofitsroleinamultipolarworld—isstronglylinkedtotheIndo-Pacificregion.ItisanacknowledgementbyBrusselsoftheevolvinggeopoliticalrealities,andmarksarebalancefromthepreviousfocusonEasternEurope,theCaucasus,theLevantandNorthAfrica.5TheguidancedocumentexplicitlyoutlinesawidespectrumofpotentialengagementwithcountriesintheIndo-Pacific,withamoveawayfromanexclusivefocusontradeandinvestment-basedpartnerships.

Nevertheless,thenewstrategydocumentfortheIndo-PacificmustbeseeninthecontextoftheEU’sforeignandsecuritypolicyevolution.Withinthisbroadframework,thispaperwilloutlinethedistinctivefeaturesoftheEU’sIndo-Pacificstrategy,keyimperativesdrivingtheapproach,andthepotentialchallengesinitsimplementation.

3

StrategiesTheEU’sGlobal

TheEU’sexternalpolicieshaveevolvedgraduallysincethegrouping’sformationin1993,bringinginincreasedinternalcohesion.In2016,theEUpromulgatedtheEuropeanUnionGlobalStrategy(EUGS),whichreplacedtheEuropeanSecurityStrategy(adoptedin2003).TheEUGShighlightedthe

importanceofstrategicautonomyfortheEUandstressedtheneedtoenhanceitscredibilityasaglobalplayer.Keyaspectscoveredweretoimproveinternalandexternalsecurity;stabilisefragilestatesontheEU’sperimeter;developanintegratedapproachtoconflictandcrises;promotepeaceandintegration;displayacommitmenttomultilateralsystems;andpromotesustainabledevelopmentandrespectforhumanrights.6Inaddition,thestrategyexplicitlyhighlightedthedirectconnectionbetweenEuropeanprosperityandAsiansecuritysinceEuropeantradeandinvestmentinAsiadependedonstabilityintheregion.TheprogressoftheEUGShasbeenreviewedthroughannualimplementationreports,andtherehavebeencallstodevelopandpromulgateanewstrategyalignedmorewiththechangingenvironmentandchallenges.7

Around80percentofthegoodsenteringtheEUtransitthroughtheIndianOcean,andhencethesecurityoftransitroutes,freedomofnavigationandtheruleoflawarecriticalforthegrouping.8TheEuropeanUnionMaritimeSecurityStrategy(EUMSS)wasadoptedinJune2014aftermuchdeliberation,withanactionplanagreeduponinDecember2014underfivekeyareas:maritimeawareness;capabilitydevelopment;riskmanagement,protectionofcriticalmaritimeinfrastructure,andcrisisresponse;researchandinnovation;andeducationandtraining.9TheactionplanwasrevisedinJune2018toincluderegionalresponsestoglobalchallengesinthemaritimedomain.TheEUMSSanditsattendantactionplanshadasignificantroleinmainstreamingmaritimeaspects,withmaritimesecurityaccordedhighpriority,inEUpoliciesandengagementwithotherregions,particularlythewesternIndianOcean.

SecurityCooperation

Inthepost-ColdWarperiod,theEUdrewcomfortfromarepurposedNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO)andlimiteditssecuritycooperationindistantregions.ItsawprincipalthreatsfromarevanchistRussia,Islamistterrorism,civilwarsandinsurgenciesinitsperiphery,WestAsiaandNorthAfrica,andmigration.10However,inthelastdecade,therehasbeenanincreased

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StrategiesTheEU’sGlobal

recognitionthatsecurityandstabilityintheIndo-PacificregiondirectlyimpactEuropeansecurity.11DiplomaticengagementwithAsiawassteppedupthroughmultilateralandbilateralmechanisms,includingtheAsia-EuropeMeeting(ASEM).TheEUalsoparticipatesintheAssociationofSoutheastAsianNations(ASEAN)RegionalForumandEastAsiaSummit,isanobserverattheSouthAsianAssociationforRegionalCooperation,andcollaboratesextensivelywiththeAfricanUnionandtheIndianOceanRimAssociation.TheEUalsohasstrongbilateralpartnershipswithJapan,SouthKorea,China,andIndia.TheEUhasparticipatedinmilitaryoperationsinWestAsiaandNorthAfricaundertheNATOumbrellaorcoordinatedundertheCommonSecurityandDefencePolicy,withvoluntaryparticipationbythenationalmilitaries.12

TheEUhasprovidedthebulkoffundingtotheIndianOceanCommission(IOC),whichwascreatedin1982andinstitutionalisedin1984,andcurrentlycomprisesfiveisland-nations(Comoros,RéunionIsland,Madagascar,Mauritius,andSeychelles)andsevenobservers,includingtheEU.Since2005,maritimesecurityisakeypartoftheIOC-EUpartnership,withaspecialfocusonEasternandSouthernAfricaandtheWesternIndianOcean.13In2018,theEUlaunchedtheMaritimeSecurityprogrammetostrengthencapacity-buildingandinformationsharingwithcountriesineasternandsouthernAfricaandtheIndianOcean.14ThiswasfollowedbyacomprehensivedeclarationonmaritimesecurityinthewesternandsouthernIndianOceaninJune2019.15TheEUalsofundsseveralregionalprogrammesinthefieldofsustainablefisheries,portsecurityandmaritimeinfrastructureinthewesternIndianOceanregion.

UndertheEUMSS,membercountrieswereencouragedtodeploytheirnavalassetstostrengthenmaritimesecurityagainstincreasingthreats.Althoughhigh-leveldialoguesonmaritimesecuritywereinstitutedwithASEAN,IndiaandChina,thewesternIndianOceanwastheprimaryareaforEUnavalpresenceanddeployments.TheEUlauncheditsfirstnavaloperationundertheEUNavalForce(EUNAVFOR)inSomaliain2008(OpAtlanta)toprotectshippingheadingtoandfromthatcountry.16Thescopeofthemissionwaslaterexpandedtoincludecounterpiracy.InSomalia,theEUhasalsosustainedcapacitybuildingandtrainingmissions.EuropeannavalshipsalsoparticipateinUSandNATO-ledtaskforcesinthewesternIndianOcean.TheEU’sapproach

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StrategiesTheEU’sGlobal

tosecurityinthelastdecadeorsofocusedonthreatssuchasterrorism,piracyandarmedrobbery,organisedcrimeandunlawfulacts,illicittraffickingofarms,narcoticsandhumans,illegalfinancialflows,illegalandunreportedfishing,andmaritimemilitia.Otherchallengeslikemarineecology,biodiversity,climateandenvironmentwerealsooftenincludedindiscussionsonsecurity.

EconomicImperatives

InconjunctionwiththeUS,Europeplayedamajorroleinshapingthepost-1945tradingsystemandinthepromulgationoftheGeneralAgreementonTariffsandTradein1947.NumerousrulesandnormsrelatedtotradewereprogressivelymadebindingforEUmemberstatesthroughlegislation.Thenormativerootsofarules-basedsystemcanalsobeseenintheEU’seconomicintegrationandsingle-marketprinciples.Duetothenatureofitsstructuralandlegalprovisions,theEUcannotfollowpowerandthreat-basedtradepoliciesliketheUS,norcanitundertakelarge-scalestrategicinvestmentslikeChina.17AnymajorstructuralchangeinthecurrenttradingsystembasedonUSorChineseapproachescanjeopardiseEurope’seconomicstatureandinterests.Accordingly,in2021,Brusselsupdateditstradepolicytoemphasise“openstrategicautonomy,”18whichalignswellwiththefreeandopenIndo-Pacificconstructasitcontinuestofocusonpreferentialtradeagreementswithdevelopedandmiddle-incomeeconomiesandeconomicpartnershipagreementswithdevelopingcountries.TheEU’sMarketAccessStrategy19ismeanttocreatethebestpossibleconditionsforEuropeanfirms,intellectualpropertyrightsprotection,anddisputesettlement.IttrackstradeandinvestmentbarriersthroughannualreportsandsupportsthereformandstrengtheningoftheWorldTradeOrganization(WTO).

Asablock,theEUistheworld’slargesttraderofmanufacturedgoodsandservices(seeFigure1)andranksfirstininboundandoutboundinvestments.20

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StrategiesTheEU’sGlobal

Figure1:

GlobalTradeinGoodsandServices,2009-2019(inbillioneuros)

7000

Euros

6000

5000

Billion

4000

in

3000

Value

2000

1000

0

EU-27

USA

China

Japan

UK

Hong

South

IndiaSingaporeCanada

Kong

Korea

Countries

200920142019

Source:AdaptedfromtheEuropeanCommission’sDGTradeStatisticalGuide,August2020

However,theEU’sshareinglobaltradedeclinedfrom18.1percentin2009to16.4percentin2019(seefigure2)despiteanaveragegrowthof6percentoverthesameperiod.

Figure2:

PercentageShareinGoodsandServices,2009-2019(in%)

Canada

Singapore

India

Countries

SouthKorea

HongKong

UK

Japan

China

USA

EU-27

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20

ShareinPercentage(%)

201920142009

Source:AdaptedfromtheEuropeanCommission’sDGTradeStatisticalGuide,August2020,

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StrategiesTheEU’sGlobal

EU-ChinatradehasseenasignificantincreasesinceChinajoinedtheWTOinDecember2001,withtheEU’sexportsingoodsincreasingbyover10percentandinservicesbyover15percentperyear.Importsalsogrewrapidly,withtheEU’stradedeficitrisingtoUS$200billion.21TheEUisnowChina’slargesttradingpartner,andChinaistheEU’ssecond-largest.RisingconcernsaboutChina’stradeandinvestmentpoliciesanditsdisregardforhumanandlabourrightschangedEuropeanperceptionsoftheBeltandRoadInitiative.AbroaderhardeningofpoliticalstanceshascontributedtothedelayinratifyingtheEU-ChinaComprehensiveAgreementonInvestment(CAI).However,anin-principleagreementwasinkedinDecember2020betweenthetwosideswiththeincorporationofseveralsafeguards.22Nevertheless,theEUmustcontinuecooperationwithChina,particularlyintrade,investmentandclimatechange.

TheEUalsohashightradevolumeswithJapan,SouthKorea,India,SingaporeandAustralia(seeFigure3foracomparisonoftheEU’stotaltradewiththesefivecountries,andChinaandtheUS).

Figure3:

TotalEUTradein2019(inbillioneuros)

700

561.9

619

600

500

380

400

300

200

100

0

China

USA

Australia+India+Japan

+Singapore+SouthKorea

Source:AdaptedfromEuropeanCommission’sTradeStatistics

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StrategiesTheEU’sGlobal

TheEUhassignedregionaltradeagreementswithIndo-PacificcountrieslikeSouthKorea(2011),Singapore(2019),Japan(2019)andVietnam(2020),andeconomicpartnershipagreementswiththePacificstates(Fiji,PapuaNewGuinea,Samoa,andtheSolomonIslands).TheEUwillreapsignificanteconomicbenefitsfromtheexistingpacts,andpotentialtradedealswithASEANandSouthAsiancountriesandthefourQuadstates(India,Australia,Japan,andtheUS).23

Connectivity

In2014,theEUgavefreshimpetustoitsapproachtoconnectivitythroughdiscussionswithChinaandintheASEM.InOctober2018,theEuropeanCounciladoptedthe‘ConnectingEuropeandAsia-BuildingBlocksforanEUStrategy,’whichwasdevelopedaroundfourpillars—energy,transport,digital,andpeople-to-peoplelinks—andaimedforsustainable,secureandsmartconnectivity.24Thestrategyalsoaimedtoenhancetradeandinvestmentundertheexistingandevolvingrules-andnorms-basedframework.25TheEU’svaluepropositiononconnectivityfocusesontrade,businessandfinanceflowsthataresustainable,comprehensiveandrules-based.InSeptember2019,theEU’sfirstpartnershiponconnectivitywasfinalisedwithJapan.26InthejointministerialstatementissuedinDecember2020,theEUandASEANoutlinedtheobjectivetopromoteconnectivitybetweenthetworegions.27ThiswasfollowedbytheEU-IndiaComprehensiveConnectivityPartnershipinMay2021tosupport“resilientandsustainableconnectivityprojects”inIndiaandotherregionssuchasAfrica,CentralAsia,andtheIndo-Pacific.28

TheEU’snewIndo-Pacificstrategyisaprogressiononprevioussecurity,economicandconnectivityplans,suchastheEuropeanUnionGlobalStrategyandEuropeanUnionMaritimeSecurityStrategy.

9

TheEU’sIndo-PacificPlan

Inmanyways,theEU’snewIndo-PacificstrategyisaprogressionoftheEUGS,EUMSS,andotherregion-,country-,andsector-specificstrategydocuments.

ThenewIndo-PacificstrategyemphasisesthattheEUwillreinforceitsstrategicfocus,presence,andactionsinthatregion.Itstressestheneedforalong-termperspectivewhileretainingadequateflexibility,andhighlights

sevenpriorityareas:sustainableandinclusiveprosperity;greentransitions;oceangovernance;digitalgovernanceandpartnerships;connectivity;securityanddefence;andhumansecurity.

Thejointcommunicationstatesthat“intensecompetition,militarybuild-upandincreasingtensionsinhotspotssuchastheSouthChinaSea,theEastChinaSea,andtheTaiwanStrait,directlyimpactEuropeansecurityandprosperity.”29Notably,FranceistheonlyEUmembercountrywitharegularnavalpresenceinthewiderIndo-Pacificregion.AsaresidentpowerwithislandterritoriesintheIndianOceanandthePacificOcean,Francehasbeendeepeningitsmaritimesecuritycooperationwithcountriesintheregion,andmaintainsamilitarypresenceintheUAE,Djibouti,RéunionIsland,Mayotte,NewCaledonia,andFrenchPolynesia.30Ithasalsodelineatedjointregionalcommandsandmaritimezonesinbothoceansandhasconductedregularnavaldeploymentsandexercisesintheregion.Furthermore,FrancewasthefirstEUcountrytooutlineavisionfortheIndo-Pacificin2018,31andastrategyin2019.32IthaslongurgedforacomprehensiveEuropeanapproachtotheIndo-Pacific,33andwilllikelybeatorchbeareroftheEU’smilitarypresenceanddeploymentsintheregionintheneartomediumterm.

Thenewstrategydocumentalsoreferstoanincreaseinhybridthreats,andstressesthattheIndo-Pacificregionisvitalformitigatingclimatechangeandprotectingthedelicateecologicalbalance.

OnChina,thedocumentstatesthatamultifacetedengagementandtheCAIwillbemutuallybeneficialbutaddsthattheEUwillcontinueto“pushback”whererequired.TheEU’soverallChinastrategyseekstoaddresssometradechallengesthroughdefensivemeasuresandsuitablebalancingwithtransatlanticcooperationwiththeUS.34

10

TheEU’sIndo-PacificPlan

WithintheIndo-Pacific,theEUhasmajortradeandinvestmentrelationswithmanycountries.AccordingtotheSeptember2021jointcommunication,EuropeandtheIndo-Pacificaccountforover70percentofglobaltradeingoodsandservices,andover60percentofglobalforeigndirectinvestmentflows.ThestrategyalsoindicatesplanstoconcludetradeagreementswithAustraliaandNewZealandandmakeprogressontradetalkswithIndonesia,India,Malaysia,thePhilippines,andThailandandtheeconomicpartnershipagreementwiththeEastAfricanCommunity.

ThenewstrategyconsidersconnectivityasakeydrivingforceinitsoutreachtotheIndo-Pacificregion,andakeytoolforcooperationinthe21stcentury,andidentifiesJapan,India,andtheASEANas“coreIndo-Pacificpartners”.

WhenseenincomparisonwiththeIndo-Pacificstrategiesandoutlooksofothercountries,theEU’sstrategyhasseveraldistinctfeatures:

WideScope:WhilethefocusisontheIndo-Pacific,theEU’snewstrategyseekstopositiontheEUattheglobalstage,emphasisingstrategicautonomy.Differentsectionsoftheplancoveravastspace,withthepriorityareasnecessitatinginitiativesandactionsoveraverybroadrange.Thesearesoughttobeprogressedbybuildingupontheexistingpartnershipsandmechanismsandthroughnewpartnershipsandarrangements.

Multilateralism:Thenewstrategyispredicatedonstrengtheningtheexistingmultilateralrules-basedordertoaddressthreatsandchallengesfromintensegeopoliticalrivalryandcompetitionintheIndo-Pacific.ItstressesthattheEU’sengagementwiththeregionwillbeprincipledandlongterm.Keyprinciplesincluderules-basedinternationalorder,inclusiveandeffectivemultilateralcooperation,andrespectfordemocracy,humanrights,andtheruleoflaw.Anotherprincipleunderlinedisthepromotionofalevel-playingfieldandanopenandfairenvironmentfortradeandinvestment.Manypartnersintheregion,includingtheASEANandIndia,arelikelytowelcomethisapproach.35

GeographicalArea:Inanothervariation,theinterpretationofthegeographicalexpanseoftheIndo-PacificregionisindicatedastheareafromtheeastcoastofAfricatothePacificIslandStates.TheoverallgeographicalfocusisbalancedontheIndianandPacificOceans.AfricaandthewesternIndianOceanfindprominence.

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TheEU’sIndo-PacificPlan

Inclusivity:Thestrategyaimstodeepenregionalengagements,particularlywith“partnersthathavealreadyannouncedIndo-Pacificapproachesoftheirown”.36ThisincludestheASEAN,Australia,India,Japan,NewZealand,SouthKorea,theUKandtheUS.Thiscouldpromptothercountriestoissuetheiroutlooks/strategiesfortheregion,andkeepsthedooropenforthoseopposedtotheIndo-Pacificconstruct,includingChina.Theinclusionoftheword‘cooperation’inthetitle,theemphasisonflexibilityandinclusiveness,37andthesuggestionoffurtherdialogueontheEU-ChinaCAIindicateakeennesstoinvolve—andnotexclude—China.

SustainabilityandGreenTransitions:Sustainableandinclusiveprosperityandgreentransitionshavebeenaccordedahighpriority.PartnershipswithcountriesintheIndo-Pacifictocombatclimatechangeandenvironmentalandbiodiversitydegradationhavebeenemphasisedaskeyobjectives.Thisislikelytosignificantlyenhanceinteractionsatthelevelsofgovernments,theprivatesector,technology,andfinancialinstitutions.

LeveragingtheEU’sStrengths:ThestrategyseekstobuildonexistingEUstrengths,includingconsistentsupportformultilateralism,currentandpotentialtradelevels,investmentandconnectivity,andalignmentwithglobalissueslikeclimateaction,healthandgenderequality.

MaritimeDomain:Thestrategyincludesastrongmaritimefocusunderthesecurityanddefencepriorityarea.Likeotherstrategiesandoutlooksontheregion(suchasthoseofAustralia,India,Japan,theUS,France,Germany,theNetherlandsandtheASEAN),itstressesfreeandopenmaritimesupplyroutesincompliancewithinternationallawandtheneedforcapacitybuilding.However,itattemptstodistinguishbetweentheIndianOceanandthePacificOceanfromthegovernanceandpartnershipperspectivesandunderlinestheEU’sprioritiesinthewesternIndianOceanandAfrica.Thejointcommunicationmentionsthatmajorwaterwaysintheregion,includingtheMalaccaStraits,theSouthChinaSea,andtheBab-el-MandebStrait,arevitaltotheEU.ThestrategyemphasisesengagementwiththeSmallIslandStatesinbothoceansandacknowledgestheneedforameaningfulEuropeannavalpresenceintheIndo-Pacificregion.Italsoseekstoenhancecooperationonoceangovernance,includingmarineconservationandsustainablefisherypartnerships.

12

TheEU’sIndo-PacificPlan

ImplementationChallenges

Thejointcommunicationoutlinesakeyactionplantoimplementitsagenda.Amoredetailed,pillar-specificactionplanmaybeexpectedinthecomingmonths.However,theimplementationofsuchanelaborateactionplancouldfacesomechallenges,suchas:

ResourceAllocation:Giventhescope,theactionplanwillrequireanalignmentbetweenthematerialanddiscursivedimensionsofthestrategy.Abroad-basedmobilisationoffinance,includingfromGlobalEurope’sNeighbourhood,DevelopmentandInternationalCooperationInstrumentandthepublicandtheprivatesector,hasbeenindicated.ThefinalisationandallocationoffinancialandotherresourcesfortheagendawillneedtobeprocessedthroughdeliberationswithdiverseinstitutionsandstakeholderswithinandoutsidetheEU.Financialinstitutions,bothpublicandprivate,couldfaceroadblocksduetocompetingpriorities.

Consensus-BasedPoliticalWill:TheEU’sadoptionoftheIndo-Pacificstrategyissignificantasitrepresentsacommonlyacceptedposition.Theimplementationplanincludesdevelopingrelevantstandardsandregulations,progressingontradenegotiations,andconcludingnewagreementsandpartnerships.TheEUmembercountriesneedtohaveaunitedapproachandconsensuswhilebuildingontheactionagenda,butarecentsurveybytheEuropeanCouncilonForeignRelations(ECFR)indicatesthat27memberstatesarenotincompleteagreementonsomecrucialissues.38Forinstance,whileGermanyandSpainarekeentobolstertheEUmilitarypresenceintheIndo-Pacific,IrelandandGreecearenotmotivatedbyit,andHungarywantsnosecuritypresence.

TheChinaFactor:TheEU’sIndo-PacificstrategymayhaveasignificantconstraininginfluenceinitsdealingswithChina.EighteenEUcountriesaremembersoftheBeltandRoadInitiative,andin2016,Greece,HungaryandCroatiahadopposedtheEU’sfirmdeclarationagainstChina’smaritimeclaims.39TheinclusionofChinaintheEU’sconceptualisationoftheIndo-PacifichasbeendebatedinEurope,40andthechallengeiscompoundedbyChina’soppositiontotheIndo-Pacificframework.

13

TheEU’sIndo-PacificPlan

ThejointcommunicationstatesthattheEUseeksamultifacetedengagementwithChinawhilepushingbackwhererequired.EffortstomaintainafinebalancebetweenstandinguptoChinaandpromotingcooperation—particularlyeconomic—willcontinuetobeakeychallenge.AspertheECFRsurvey,13memberstates,notablyIrelandandSlovenia,seeChinaasakeypartner,and41%ofEUcountrieswillsupportafreetradepactwithChinaoraregionalonethatincludesit.Ontheotherhand,fivecountries,notablyLatviaandBelgium,seetheIndo-Pacificasananti-Chinastrategy,while48%donotwantanyfreetradedealthatincludesChina.41

NavalPresence:GiventhelimitedcapacityofallEUcountries’navalforces(barringFrance),enhancingandsustaininganavalpresenceanddeploymentsbeyondthewesternIndianOceanwillbedifficult.WhileFrancecanbesupportedinincreasingitsbasinganddeploymentsintheregion,visibilityundertheEUflagandcommand—muchliketheEUNAVFOR—willbeanuphilltask.

EnhancingAppealoftheEuropeanNarrative:TheEUiskeentopushforwardanarrativethatisdistinctlydifferentineconomic,political,security,connectivity,andenvironmentaldomains.Itemphasisesstrategicautonomywhiledealingwiththepresentandemergingchallenges.Enhancingtheappealofthisnewnarrativewillrequiresustainedeffortsinlightofotherkeynarrativesinareaslikeglobalgovernance,limitationsofmultilateralism,infrastructureandconnectivity,anddeterrenceandcounter-coercionstrategiesrelatedtoChina.

TheEUhasoutlinedanaction

plantoimplementitsIndo-Pacificagendathatcouldfaceseveralchallenges,includingevolvingandsustainingconsensusonitwithinthegrouping.

14

Conclusion

TheEU’sadoptionofacomprehensivestrategyontheIndo-Pacific,drivenbyitslong-termstrategicandeconomicinterests,isamajordevelopmentthatcanhavesignificantgeopoliticalimpacts.ItreflectstheEU’seffortstopromotearules-basedorderandatransparenttradingandinvestmentarchitecturethat

favoursEuropeaneconomicandpoliticalimperatives.AconnectivitystrategyintegratedwiththeEU’sbroadergeoeconomicoutlookandpartnershipscouldseewideracceptanceasaviablealternative.Theplansforgreenpartnerships,newtradeagreements,reconfiguringvaluechainsandaddressinghumansecuritycooperation(includinghealth)seektoleveragetheEU’sstrengthsandmultilateralapproach.

TheEU’sdefenceandsecuritydeploymentsremainrestrictedtoparticipationundertheNATOumbrellaandthesustainedpresenceinthewesternIndianOceanregion.ThecapacitytoextendthistothewiderIndo-Pacificregionislimited,andthebulkofnavaldeploymentstotheregionmaybetakenuponlybyFrance.Maritimesecurity,withanequalemphasisontraditionalandnon-traditionalthreats