海牙战略研究中心-北海的高价值（英）-2021-100正式版

TheHighValue

ofTheNorthSea

Authors:FrankBekkers,

JorisTeer,DorithKool,

LuciavanGeuns,PatrickBolder,

IrinaPatrahau,MaxSarel

TheHighValueofTheNorthSea

Authors:

FrankBekkers,JorisTeer,DorithKool,LuciavanGeuns,

PatrickBolder,IrinaPatrahau,MaxSarel

Design:

JellevanderWeerd(

OnlineDienstverlening

)designedthe

visualizationsandgraphswiththeHCSSlogo

ISBN/EAN:9789492102881

September2021

©TheHagueCentreforStrategicStudies

Allrightsreserved.

Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproducedand/or

publishedbyprint,photoprint,microfilmoranyothermeans

withoutthepreviouswrittenconsentofHCSS.

TheHighValueofTheNorthSea

3

TableofContents

ExecutiveSummary

4

1

Introduction

16

1.1

Whythisstudy?

16

1.2

Studyaim

18

1.3

Reader’sguide

19

2

Settingthestage:theNorthSeatowards2035

(andbeyond)

20

2.2

Maritimetraderemainsimportant

22

2.3

Securityinaneraofmajorpowerrivalry

25

3

TheEvolvingValueoftheNorthSea:Present,

FutureandBeyond

36

3.2

Today’sValueCreationintheNorthSea

38

3.3

FuturevaluecreationintheNorthSea

51

4

TheEvolvingThreatsFacingtheNorthSea

67

4.1

Criminal&terroristthreats

68

4.2

Hybridthreats

73

4.3

Militarythreats

79

4.4

Overallassessment

85

5

ImplicationsforCoastGuardandNavy

88

5.1

Legalandmanagerialframework

88

5.2

Securityfunctions

90

5.3

Cyber

93

5.4

Cooperation

94

5.5

Finalthoughts

95

AnnexA:Consultedexperts

98

AnnexB:Legendoverviewmaps

99

TheHighValueofTheNorthSea

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ExecutiveSummary

Studycontextandaim

Sea-basedeconomicprocessesrapidlyexpand,bothinsizeandcomplexity.ManyoftheexpandingactivitiesintheNorthSea,suchastheproductionofoffshoreenergy,arevitaltotheDutcheconomy:theyarepartofthe

criticalprocesses

definedintheDutch

National

SecurityStrategy

.Insidetheterritorialsea,thezonebetweenthecoastand12milesoutwherenationallegislationapplies,protectingthesecriticalprocessesagainstmaliciousactorsisanationalresponsibility.Asoffshoreeconomicvaluecreationsurges,theorganiza-tionofsecuritywithinthe12-milezoneshouldbecriticallyreviewed.ButasvitalactivitiesmovefurtherouttotheExclusiveEconomicZone(EEZ),afundamentaldilemmaarises.Under

theLawoftheSea,outsidethe12-milezone,thenationalmandateforprevention,detection,protectionandresponseinthefaceofsecurityrisksandthreatsislimited.Sohowandbywhomistheintegrityofthe–increasinglycriticalandvulnerable–processesandassociatedinfrastructureintheNorthSeaguaranteed?Currentpolicydocumentshardlyaddressthatcrucialquestion.

Withinthiscontext,thisstudyparticularlylooksatthefutureroleoftheNetherlandsCoastGuard(NLCG)andoftheRoyalNetherlandsNavy(RNLN)inprovidingsecurityintheNorthSea.Thefocusliesondeliberatesecurityrisksandthreats,plannedforandexecutedbymali-ciousactors.Inmoredetail,thestudyaimsto:

Identify,describe,andanalyzethetrendsanddevelopmentsinvalue-creatingactivitiesintheDutchpartoftheNorthSeatowards2035,withsomevistasfortheperiodupto2050.

Assesshowneworenhancedvulnerabilitiesassociatedwiththesevalue-creatingactivi-tiesatseaofferleverageformaliciousactorsintheperiodupto2035andbeyond.

Analyzeandinterpretwhatthedevelopmentsidentifiedin1.and2.mayimplyfortheNLCGandtheRNLN.TheseimplicationsarediscussedwithinthewidercontextofarangeofstakeholdersrelevantforthesecurityinandoftheNorthSea.

DrawconclusionsfortheNLCGandtheRNLNintermsofpossiblepolicydevelopmentandengagementwithotherstakeholders.

TheHighValueofTheNorthSea

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Developmentsinoffshorevaluecreation

Eventoday,largepartsoftheNorthSeaaredesignatedforspecific,sometimesoverlapping,usersandusages,seeFigure1.

SpatialuseoftheDutchpartoftheNorthSeain2015

PercentageoftheDutchcontinentalshelf

TradeandTransport

Gasandoilplatforms

Activewindparks

Telecommunicationcables

Militaryzones

ShippingLanes

Gasandoilpipelines

Highvoltagecables

Conservationzones

20%

18%

16%

14%

12%

10%

8%

6%

4%

2%

0

Figure1.SpatialuseoftheDutchpartoftheNorthSeain2015

Primarilyduetotheexpansivegrowthofoffshorewindenergy,thepatternofNorthSeausagesbecomesmorecoveringandmorecomplexinthedecadestocome,asvisualizedbytheoverviewmapsofFigure2.

TheHighValueofTheNorthSea

6

today

2035

2050

Figure2.ProjecteddevelopmentofusersandusagesintheNorthSea(legendinAnnexB)

ThreeparalleltransitionswilltransformtheuseoftheNorthSeatowards2035andbeyond.

Themostprominentofthethreeistheenergytransition.The

NationalClimateAgreement

(2019)statesthatgreenhousegasemissions,comparedto1990levels,mustdecreaseby

49%in2030andby95%in2050.The

NorthSeaAgreement

(2020)setsouthowawide

rangeofstakeholdersplantorealizetherequiredenergytransition.Inaddition,anaturetransi-

tionandasustainablefoodtransitionarenecessarytoensureahealthymaritimeenvironment

intheNorthSea.Table1summarizesthekeydevelopments.

Category

Keytake-aways

Tradeandtransport

•LikelyincreasesintrafficvolumeswillfurtheraggravatealreadybusyshippinglanesintheNorthSea.Otheractivi-

tieswillgrow,exertingspatialpressuresthatwillfurtherrestrainthefreedomofmovementfortradeandtransport.

•LNGactivitiescenteredaroundthePortofRotterdamhavegrownsignificantlyrecentlyandwillcontinuethat

growthtrajectory.

•CCS-relatedCO2-shippingwilllikelyhavecommencedbutonalimitedscale.

•Ship-propulsionwilldiversifyasless-pollutingmethodsareexplored.

Energy

•Gasproductionwillcontinuetodecline.

•Windpowerproductioncapacitywillincreasedramatically.

•By2035hydrogenproductionwilllikelyhavesurpassedtheexperimentationscale,withmaybe­thefirstmajor

projectjustcompleted.Largescaleapplication,however,ishighlyuncertain.

•CCSprojectsareexpectedtocommencesoon.LargescaleCO2sequestrationprojectsareexpectedinthe

2035-50timeframe.

Communicationandsensing

•WiththeNetherlandsbeingadigitalnodeforEurope,datatelecommunicationsareexpectedtoincreasewithnew

cablelayingplansalreadyconcrete.

•Sensorsatseawillbemovedfromoilandgasplatformstotransformerblocksinwindfarms.

Industryatsea

•Sanddrenchingremainstheprimaryindustryatseatosupporttheincreasedsanddemandforcoastaldefenses

andonshorebuildingactivities.

•FloatingnuclearplantsintheNorthSeaandSchipholatsearemainveryunlikelyby2035.

Fishingandaquaculture

•LargepartsoftheNorthSeacurrentlyavailableforfishingwillmakewayforotheruses,suchaswindfarmsand

sustainableaquaculture.Thismayleadto(further)unrestinthesector.

•Brexitisanaddedsourceofuncertaintyfortraditionalfishing.

Livingandrecreational­use

•RecreationaluseoftheNorthSeaismodestlyimportanttoDutchsocietybutaminorfactorinthegrander

schemeoftheanticipateddevelopmentsintheuseoftheNorthSea.

Conservation

•Toensureconservation,additionalrestrictionsonotheractivitiesareexpectedtobeimplemented.

Defenseuse

•Militaryexerciseareasremainimportantandwilllikelyincurlimitedalterations.

Table1.Expectedkeydevelopmentstowards-2035intheusageoftheNorthSea

TheHighValueofTheNorthSea

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Table2providesanoverviewoftheanticipatedtrendsinthespatialuseoftheNorthSeaintheperiod2015-2035.ThelastcolumnofTable2listssomepotentiallyimpactfuldevelopments/projectsthatmighttakeshapeintheperiod2035-2050,dividedinthreecategories.Probableprojectswilllikelybetechnicallyandeconomicallyfeasibleatalargescalebetween2035and2050,buildinguponexistingpolicy-plansandstrategydocuments.Possibleprojectsmightbetechnicallyandeconomicallyfeasibleatalargescaleinthefuture,butnotyetsupportedbypolicyandstrategyplans.Unlikelyprojectscurrentlylackaclearbusinesscase,aretechni-callyextremelychallengingand/ordependonveryuncertaindrivers.

Activity

Scale1(2015)

Trendtowards

Potentialkeydevelopments

2035

towards2050

Tradeandtransport

Shippinglanes

3600km²,6%

slightincrease

Possible:Arcticrouteopensup

Anchoragesites,

6260km²,11%

Probable:autonomousshipscommon

Possible:SchipholatSea

clearways,ports

Energy

Gasandoilplatforms

161,126km²,0.2%

sharpdecrease

Gasandoilpipelines

4500km²,8%

slightdecrease

Probable:somepipelinesrepurposedforCCS/

(incl.500mzones)

hydrogen

Windfarms

5parks471km²,0.8%

sharpincrease

Probable:furthersharpincrease

Otherrenewables

0%

slightincrease

Probable:hydrogensubstantialinenergymix

Probable:Tidalwaveenergyandotheralterna-

tiveenergy(e.g.floatingsolarpanels)

Highvoltagecables

<1%

sharpincrease

Probable:furthersharpincrease

(incl.500mzones)

Carboncapture

0%

slightincrease

Probable:CCSintroducedonalarge-scale

storage

Communication

Telecomcables(incl.

20(active)cables,

slightincrease

750mzones)

2000km;7%

Industryatsea

Sanddrenching

25millionm3

slightincrease

Probable:evenlargerscalesanddrenching

Possible:multi-purposeartificial­islands

createdoutofsea

Unlikely:nuclearreactorsatsea

Traditionalfishing

EEZexceptforprohibited

sharpdecrease

Aquaculture

areas

slightincrease

Probable:seaweedfarms,musselfarms

Livingandrecreationaluse

approx.thesame

Possible:artificialislandsforlivingpurposes

Conservationzones

6zones11.020km²,19%

slightincrease

Defensezones

5zones,4200km²,7%

approx.thesame

Table2.SpatialuseoftheDutchpartoftheNorthSeain2015;2andtrendstowards2035and2050

WemayconcludethatvaluecreationintheNorthSeaisrapidlyexpandingoverthenext10-15years,adevelopmentthatislikelytocontinueinthesubsequentperiodupto2050.Manyofthedevelopingoffshoreprocessesandassociatedinfrastructurecanbeclassifiedascriticalfornationalsecurity.

PercentagesindicatingthefractionoftheDutchcontinentalshelf(58,000km2)usedforthespecificactivity.SeealsoFigure1.

Forthesakeofcomparison,thefiguresof2015wereusedasthesewerecomprehensivelyavailable.Sources:

Windenergieopzee–Noordzeeloket

;

PolicyDocumentontheNorthSea2016-2021

,p34;

TheFutureofthe

NorthSea

,pp27,55,65;

OntwerpProgrammaNoordzee2022-2027

,pp77,82.Since2015manychangeshaveoccurred,asforinstanceadditionalwindfarmshavebeenconstructedandgasandoilplatformshavebeendecommissioned.Themaintextspecifiesmorerecentfigures.

TheHighValueofTheNorthSea

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Newandenhancedrisksinachangingsecurityenvironment

TheupsurgeofcriticalprocessesintheNorthSearequiresmoreattentiontothesecurityoftheseprocessesandtheunderlyinginfrastructure.Thisshouldbegaugedagainsttheback-dropofarapidlyevolvinggeopoliticalandsecurityenvironment.Overthepasttwodecades,wehavewitnessedthereturnofgeopoliticalcompetitionbetweenmajorpowers.Atthesametime,theroleofnon-stateactorsintheinternationalsystemisgrowing,forbetterandforworse.Armedgroups,insurgents,terroristorganizations,andcriminalnetworkscaninstigatelarge-scaleviolenceandthreatenorderandstability,eitherindependently­orincooperationwithstateactors(asproxies).Conversely,non-governmentalorganizations,internationalcorporations,andphilanthropicinstitutionscanpromoteresilienceandstabilityinsocieties.Othernon-stateactors,suchassocialmediaplatforms,playadualrole,fosteringcohesioninsocietybutalsogeneratingfragmentation.

Thechangingcharacterofconflictisanotherfactordrivingrapidtransformationintheinter-nationalsystem.Althoughaconventionalconflictbetweenmajorpowerscannotberuledout,statestendtooptforoptionsthatfallbelowthethresholdof(all-out)war.Oftenreferredtoas‘hybridthreats’or‘operationsinthegrayzone’,thisentailsthedeploymentofvariousinstrumentsofpowerinconcert.Theseinstrumentsrangefromdisinformationcampaignsandcyberoperations,viasupportingextremegroupsandproxies,tosabotageandtargetedkillings.Theorchestrateddeploymentofthesetoolsismostlycovertordisguised.Asaresult,thenatureofthethreatisoftenunclearanddiverse,andattributioncanbedifficult.

Inthenewsecurityenvironment,threatsandconflictshavecomeclosertohome.Withbordersdisappearingortakingdifferentformsinthedigitalworld,theNetherlands,withitsopeneconomyandsociety,hasinmanywaysbecomeafront-linestate.Giventheinterconnectednessofdomesticandinternationalsecurity,theNetherlandsmustconsidernotonlyconflictsfaraway,butalso–andperhapsprimarily–thesecurityandresilienceofitsownsocietyandterritoryagainstarangeofrisksandthreats.Atthesametime,securitychallengesarebecomingmorecomplex.Vulnerabilitiescompound,forinstanceinthecombinationoffunctions–energy,communication,sensors,datacenters–onmulti-purpose,offshoreplatformsorartificialislandswhichprovidemaliciousactorshigh-valuetargets.Onthethreatside,weseetheblendingofcrimeandterrorism,stateactorsemployingnon-stateproxies,andcyberandphysicalattackslinkedtogether.

Baseduponourdeskresearchandexpertconsultation,HCSSassessesthefollowingsecu-rityissuesthemostpressingforthesecurityinandoftheNorthSeatowards2035.

Diversityofrisksandthreatsrequiresacomprehensiveapproach.Offshoreprocessesandassetsfaceawiderangeofpossiblethreats.WehavecategorizedthesethreatsaslistedinTable3.Ourresearchindicatesthatallthesetypesofthreatarepossible;andthatallmaycausesubstantialconsequentialdamage.Thewholethreatpaletteisthereforerelevantfromanationalsecurityperspective.Furthermore,offshoreprocessesandinfrastructurestendtobecomemoreentangled,withthreatsalsoturningmorecomplexandintertwined,asdifferenttypesofmaliciousactorsjoinforces.Overall,weprojectmountingprobabilitiesthatincidentsintheNorthSeageneratecascadingeffectsleadingtoseveredisruptionsofcriticalprocesses,offshoreandonshore.Astherangeofhigh-consequencerisksandthreatsexpands,andriskandthreatstendtooverlapandmerge,acomprehensiveapproachofsecu-rityinandoftheNorthSeabecomesimperative.

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Criminal&terroristthreats

Piracyandhostagetaking.Criminalorterroristactivitiesdirectedatvesselsormaritimestructures

Cybercrime.Criminalor(statebacked)terroristactivitiesthatattackortakecontroloverICTsystemsofvesselsormaritimestructures

Smugglingandtrafficking.Criminalactivitiesthatareenabledusingtheseas,suchashumantraffickingandsmugglingofdrugsandarms.

Unauthorizedentry.Criminalactivitiesthatviolateacoaststate’ssovereignty,suchasillegalfishingandunauthorizedentranceofastate’sinternalwaters

Environmentalcrimes.Criminalactivitiesthatviolateinternationallaw,suchasdumpinganddischargingofpollutingmaterials

Hybridthreats

Sabotage.Hybridactionstodeliberatelydestroy,damage,orobstructvesselsorinfrastructureatseaforpoliticalormilitaryadvantageinpeacetime

Cyberoperations.HybridactionsthataredirectedatcovertlymonitoringorinterferingwithICTsystemsofvesselsormaritimestructures

Espionageandinterference.Hybridactionstogatherintelligenceinpeacetime,forinstancebyusingcivilvesselsequippedwithadvancedsensorsformilitarypurposesorbytappingorcompromisingcommunicationcablesatsea

Incursions.Hybridactions,oftenbymilitaryvessels,thatviolateacoaststate’ssovereignty,eitheropenlyorcovertly,toprobedefensesorto‘showtheflag’

Militarythreats

Physicalattacks.Militaryoperationstargetingcriticalmaritimefunctions,vesselsandstructures,militaryorotherwise.Includesstand-offanddirectattacksbymilitaryplatformsaimedatfollow-onforcestrans-portsfromNorthAmericaincaseofawarinEuropeinvolvingNATO

Cyberelectromagneticactivities.Militaryoperationstargetingtodestroy,degrade,ortakecontrolofICTsystemsofvesselsormaritimestructures,militaryorotherwise

Denyaccessanduse.MilitaryoperationstodisruptorhindertheaccesstoanduseoftheNorthSea,includingthroughtheuseminesorstand-offmeans

Militaryespionage.Militaryoperationstogatherintelligence,forexamplebytappingcommunication­cablesordeployingunmannedsensorplatformsatsea

Raidsandlandings.Militaryoperationstoaccessthelandfromthesea,rangingfromsmallscaleandcovertdeliveranceandextractionofunits(e.g.,SOF)tolargeramphibiousoperations

Table3:Varioustypesofthreatassociatedwiththreecategoriesofthreatactors

Counteringcyberrisksandthreatstoppriority.Cyberthreatscombinearelativelyhighlike-lihoodandimpact.Asthemaritimedomainbecomesmoredigitized,cybervulnerabilitiesareexpectedtoincrease.Clearly,cybersecurityconstitutesakeyissueinanyNorthSeasecuritystrategy.Atthesametime,whilstthereareveryspecificcharacteristicsinvolvedinmaritimecybersecurity,itisalsopartofthebroadercyberchallenge.Afirststepistofullyincorporateoffshorecriticalinfrastructureinnationalcybersecurityandcriticalinfrastructureprotectionplansandpractices,consideringthespecificcharacteristicssuchasjurisdiction,reducedphysicalaccessibility,andthewidevarietyofinternationalinterestsinvolvedwithassetsintheNorthSea,suchasflagstates,shipowners,andIT/OT-suppliers.

Sabotageandphysicalthreatspotentiallyhavethemostimpact.EvenifwejudgecyberthreatstoscorehighestinoveralllikelihoodXimpact,incurringphysicaldestructionmaywellhavethemostimmediateconsequentialdamage(notethatacyberattackcanbeachannelthroughwhichtoachievephysicaldamage).However,thesethreatcategoriesareconsideredlesslikelythancyberthreatsbecausetheyhave,ingeneral,ahigherthresholdforexecutionintermsofopportunityandcostsandaretypicallymoreattributable,moredefendable,andeasiertoretaliate.Payingmoreattentiontocybersecurityshouldcertainlynotleadtotheneglectoftraditionalphysicalprotectivemeasures.

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Protectcriticalinfrastructurehubs.Platformsthatfunctionasenergyhubsarelucrativetargetsforsabotage.Maliciousactorscantakecontroloverandoccupytheseplatforms.Incapacitatingelectricitytransformerstations,forinstance,hasthepotentialtocausepoweroutagesacrosstheNetherlands,forcingcriticalsocio-economicprocessestoastandstill.Thecombinationof,forexample,hydrogenproduction,CO2storage,sensinganddatacentersonartificialislandsmightbeeconomicallyadvantageousbutdangerousfromasecu-rityperspective.Thesefuturehubscouldbetargetedbystateactorsandterroristgroupsnotonlytocauseseveredamage,butalsotogathercrucialintelligence.Despiteitsimportancefornationalsecurity,criticalinfrastructureisoftenleftweaklyprotectedbecauseitsdesignisprimarilyeconomicallydriven.Muchmoreattentionshouldbegivento‘securitybydesign’rightfromtheinceptionofnewinfrastructureprojects.

Monitorchokepointsincriticalshippinglanes.TheincreasingcongestionintheNorthSealeadstomorecriticalchokepoints.Narrowshippinglanescanbeeffectivelyclosedusingarelativelysmallamountofseamines.DigitallyorphysicallyhijackingshipsandlettingthemdriftorsinkinchokepointsisanotherpossiblemodusoperanditoseverelyhittheDutchandEuropeaneconomy.Earlywarningandactionmustensureadequatedeterrenceandresponse.

Counterindustrial,political,andmilitaryespionage.Thenumerousoffshoreeconomic,industrial,andmilitaryactivitiesprojectedintheNorthSeamakeitalucrativetargetforespi-onageandintelligencegathering.Variousstateactorsareinvolvedinespionageoperationsaroundtheworld,inthecaseofChinaandRussiaknowntobeusinglook-alikecommercialvessels.Thesemaye.g.beequippedwithunmannedunderwatervehicles,targetingdatacablesontheseabed,whichcanbeinterceptedandtapped.State-OwnedEnterprisesthathaveacquiredasolidfootholdinharborandoffshoreprocessesmayactasaplatformforespionageandpoliticalinterference.Withmostdatadigitallystoredandprocessed,espio-nageintheinformationagehasconsiderableoverlapwithcyberthreats.This,onceagain,re-enforcescybersecurity’stoppriority.

Payattentiontohighlycombustibleandpoisonousenergy-relatedshipping.Thechangingenergymixintheongoingenergytransitionbringsnewrisks.AsanincreasingvolumeofcombustiblefuelssuchasLNGandhydrogen(storedine.g.,ammoniac)aretransportedatsea,theimpactofhijackingashipalsoincreases.Ifhydrogenproductionseriouslytakesoffafter2035,notonlythetransportbutalsoinfrastructuralelementsmightbecomeatargetformaliciousactors.Whereoilcancausemassiveenvironmentaldamageandpollution,thesenewenergysourcesareexplosiveand/orspreadpoisonousgas,withthepotentialtocauseharmtolifefarfromtheareaofexplosion.AdigitallyhijackedLNGtankerorevenanLNGpoweredshipcanthusbeusedforransombycriminalsorasafloatingbombbyterrorists.

Smugglingandtraffickingisanuisancethatrequiresaninternationalandchainapproach.Smugglingandtraffickingisnotahypotheticalscenariobutaneverydayfact.Theconsensusseemstobethatdrugtraffickingissomethingwemusthavetolivewith;butnotsomethingweshouldaccept.Tocontaintheimpact,enougheffortmustbeputindiscouragingthemostprofitableanddistressingbusinesscases.

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ImplicationsforCoastGuardandNavy

WhatdotheabovefindingsmeanfortheNetherlandsCoastGuardandtheRoyalNetherlandsNavyastheseorganizationspreparefor2035andbeyond?Belowsomeofthemostsalientimplications.

Legalandmanagerialframework

AssecurityinandoftheNorthSeahasmanystakeholders,thefunctioningoftheNLCGandtheRNLNmustbeseeninlightofthewidercontextinwhichthesetwoorganizationsoperate.

TerritorialseavsEEZ.Akeyissueistheseparationbetweentheterritorialseawhere,byandlarge,nationallegislationapplies;andtheEEZ,whereroomfornationalmeasuresinthefaceofsecurityrisksandthreatsislimited.3Nationalgovernanceoftheterritorialseamustbecriticallyreviewedandadjusted.Forpracticalreasons,securityatseashouldasmuchaspossiblebealignedwithexistingonshoresecuritystructuresandprocesses.Otherthanonland,theNorthSealacksalocalframeworkforsafetyandsecuritytasksandresponsibilities.Securityincidentsarehandledatthenationallevel,withtheNLCGasfirstresponder.ButtheNLCGisasmallnetworkorganization,neitherequippednortaskedtodealwiththefullspectrumofprevention,detection,protectionandresponseinthefaceofsecurityrisksandthreats.Inaddition,theNLCGlackstheauthority,constituencyandresourcestoactasthepubliccustodianofsecurityinandoftheNorthSeainthepoliticalandpolicybattlesforatten-tionandbudget.

IntheEEZ,theLawoftheSeaofferslimitedroomfornationalauthoritiestoexercisesecuritymeasures.Thus,ascriticalactivitiesmovefurtherouttosea,guaranteeingsecurityoutsidetheterritorialseaposesacrucialdilemma,withdifficultpolitical,judicial,administrative,economic,andtechnicalramifications.Thisdilemmaishardlyaddressed,ifatall,inthecurrentdebatesonthefutureoftheNorthSea.Thisstudyflagsthisasaseriousomission,whichhampersadequateresponsestomanyofthekeyissuesbelow.

A‘NorthSeaAuthority’(NSA).EstablishingasingleAuthoritytotakeresponsibilityovertherelatedissuesofspatialplanningandsecurityintheDutchpartoftheNorthSeawouldbeanimportantstepintakingmaritimesecuritymoreseriously(notethatthetwohaveaclearrelationship,as‘securitybydesign’isacrucialelementofresponsiblespatialplanning).Themandates,andthereforetasksandresponsibilities,ofsuchaNSAaredifferentfortheterri-torialseaandtheEEZ–whereouradvicewouldbetotryandminimizeorbridgethesediffer-encesasmuchaspossible.TheNLCGwouldactastheoperationalarmoftheNSA,broad-eningitsexecutiveresponsibilityandauthoritytoprevent,detect,protect,andresponseinthefaceofsecurityrisksandthreatsconsiderably.Riskanalysisandprevention,includingregula-tionandsupervision,­wouldbecomeanintegralpartofitstaskpackage.AnNSAwouldmakeiteasiertoswitchbetweenlocal,nationalandinternational­levelsofactionandresponse.Thisisimportantwhenitisunclearwhatthecauseandconsequentialdamageofanincidentis;orwhethertheincidentisastand-aloneeventorconnectedtootherincidents(e.g.,aspartofahybridcampaign).

Fortheso-calledcontiguouszone,12-24milesfromthecoast,coastalstatesclaimnoterritorialrightsbutmayassertlimitedjurisdictionforoneormorespecialpurposes.

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Securityfunctions

Prevent.TheNLCGandtheRNLNcanstrengthengeneralawarenessofsecurityrisksthroughoutthemaritimesectorbysettingupregularconsultationsbetweenrelevantgovern-mentbodies,theoffshoreenergyindustry,portoperators,andshippingcompanies.Togethertheymayclaimastructuraladvisoryroleintheformulationofstandards,legislation,andregu-lationsforactivitiesandinfrastructuresatsea,aimedatpromotingresilienceandenforcingsecurity.Andtheycanorganizenetworkeventsandjointexerciseswithindustryandtheintelligencecommunity.ManyoftheseactivitiesareaimedatcreatingaNorthSeasecurityconstituency,abodyofstakeholdersthatknowoneanot