公司财务风险中英文对照外文翻译文献

中英文资料外文翻译外文资料FinancialfirmbankruptcyandsystemicriskInFall2008whentheFederalReserveandtheTreasuryinjected$85billionintotheinsurancebehemothAmericanInternationalGroup(AIG),themoneylenttoAIGwentstraighttocounterparties,andveryfewfundsremainedwiththeinsurer.AmongthelargestrecipientswasGoldmanSachs,towhomabout$12billionwaspaidtoundoAIG’screditdefaultswaps(CDSs).ThebailoutplanfocusedonrepayingthedebtbyslowlysellingoffAIG’sassets,withnointentionofmaintainingjobsorallowingtheCDSmarkettocontinuetofunctionasbefore.Thus,thegovernment’sefforttoavoidsystemicriskwithAIGwasmainlyaboutensuringthatfirmswithwhichAIGhaddonebusinessdidnotfailasaresult.Theconcernsareobviouslygreatestvis-a-visCDSs,ofwhichAIGhadover$400billioncontractsoutstandinginJune2008.Incontrast,thegovernmentwasmuchlessenthusiasticaboutaidingGeneralMotors,presumablybecausetheybelieveditsfailurewouldnotcausemajormacroeconomicrepercussionsbyimposinglossesonrelatedfirms.Thisdecisionisconsistentwiththeviewinmacroeconomicresearchthatfinancialfirmbankruptciesposeagreateramountofsystemicriskthannonfinancialfirmbankruptcies.Forexample,BordoandHaubrich(2009)concludethat“...moreseverefinancialeventsareassociatedwithmoresevererecessions...”Likewise,Bernanke(1983)arguestheGreatDepressionwassoseverebecauseofweaknessinthebankingsystemthataffectedtheamountofcreditavailableforinvestment.Bernankeetal.(1999)hypothesizeafinancialacceleratormechanism,wherebydistressinonesectoroftheeconomyleadstomoreprecariousbalancesheetsandtightercreditconditions.Thisinturnleadstoadropininvestment,whichisfollowedbylesslendingandawidespreaddownturn.Wereshockstotheeconomyalwaystocomeintheformofdistressatnonfinancialfirms,theseauthorsarguethatthebusinessdownturnswouldnotbesosevere.Weargueinsteadthatthecontagiousimpactofanonfinancialfirm’sbankruptcyisexpectedtobefarlargerthanthatofafinancialfirmlikeAIG,althoughneitherwouldbecatastrophictotheU.S.economythroughcounterpartyriskchannels.Thisisnottosaythatanepisodeofwidespreadfinancialdistressamongourlargestbankswouldnotbefollowedbyanespeciallysevererecession,onlythatsuchfailureswouldnotcausearecessionoraffectthedepthofarecession.Rathersuchbankruptciesaresymptomaticofcommonfactorsinportfoliosthatleadtowealthlossesregardlessofwhetheranyfirmfilesforbankruptcy.Pervasivefinancialfragilitymayoccurbecausethefailureofonefirmleadstothefailureofotherfirmswhichcascadesthroughthesystem(e.g.,DavisandLo,1999;JarrowandYu,2001).Orsystemicriskmaywreakhavocwhenanumberoffinancialfirmsfailsimultaneously,asintheGreatDepressionwhenmorethan9000banksfailed(Benston,1986).Intheformercase,thefailureofonefirm,suchasAIG,LehmanBrothersorBearStearns,couldleadtowidespreadfailurethroughfinancialcontractssuchasCDSs.Inthelattercase,thefactthatsomanyfinancialinstitutionshavefailedmeansthatboththemoneysupplyandtheamountofcreditintheeconomycouldfallsofarastocausealargedropineconomicactivity(FriedmanandSchwartz,1971).Whileaweakfinancialsystemcouldcausearecession,therecessionwouldnotarisebecauseonefirmwasallowedtofilebankruptcy.Further,shouldoneortheotherfirmgobankrupt,thenonfinancialfirmwouldhavethegreaterimpactontheeconomy.Suchextremerealeffectsthatappeartobetheresultoffinancialfirmfragilityhaveledtoalargeemphasisonthepreventionofsystemicriskproblemsbyregulators.Foremostamongthesepoliciesis“toobigtofail”(TBTF),thelogicofwhichisthatthefailureofalargefinancialinstitutionwillhaveramificationsforotherfinancialinstitutionsandthereforetherisktotheeconomywouldbeenormous.TBTFwasbehindtheFed’sdecisionstoorchestratethemergerofBearStearnsandJ.P.MorganChasein2008,itsleadershipintherestructuringofbankloansowedbyLongTermCapitalManagement(LTCM),anditsdecisiontopropupAIG.TBTFmaybejustifiediftheoutcomeispreventionofamajordownswingintheeconomy.However,ifthesystemicrisksintheseepisodeshavebeenexaggeratedorthesalutaryeffectsoftheseactionsoverestimated,thenthecosttotheefficiencyofthecapitalallocationsystemmayfaroutweighanypotentialbenefitsfromattemptingtoavoidanotherGreatDepression.Nodoubt,noregulatorwantstotakethechanceofstandingdownwhilewatchingoveranothersystemicriskcrisis,sowedonothavetheabilitytoexamineempiricallywhathappenstotheeconomywhenregulatorsbackoff.ThereareveryfewinstancesinthemodernhistoryoftheU.S.whereregulatorsallowedthebankruptcyofamajorfinancialfirm.Mostrecently,wecanpointtothebankruptcyofLehman,whichtheFedpointedlyallowedtofail.However,withonlyoneobviouscasewhereTBTFwasabandoned,wehaveonlyaninklingofhowTBTFpolicyaffectssystemicrisk.Moreover,atthesametimethatLehmanfailed,theFedwasinterveninginthecommercialpapermarketandaidingmoneymarketmutualfundswhileAIGwasdowngradedandsubsequentlybailedout.Inaddition,theFederalReserveandtheTreasurywerescaremongeringabouttheprospectsofasecondGreatDepressiontomakethepassageofTARPmorelikely.ThuswewillneverknowifthemarketdownturnthatfollowedtheLehmanbankruptcyreflectedfearofcontagionfromLehmantotherealeconomyorfearofthedepthsofexistingproblemsintherealeconomythatwerehighlightedsodramaticallybyregulators.Inthispaperweanalyzethemechanismsbywhichsuchriskcouldcauseaneconomy-widecol-lapse.Wefocusontwotypesofcontagionthatmightleadtosystemicriskproblems:(1)informationcontagion,wheretheinformationthatonefinancialfirmistroubledisassociatedwithnegativeshocksatotherfinancialinstitutionslargelybecausethefirmssharecommonriskfactors;or(2)counterpartycontagion,whereoneimportantfinancialinstitution’scollapseleadsdirectlytotroublesatothercred-itorfirmswhosetroublessnowballanddriveotherfirmsintodistress.TheefficacyofTBTFpoliciesdependscruciallyonwhichofthesetwotypesofsystemicriskmechanismsdominates.Counterpartycontagionmaywarrantinterventioninindividualbankfailureswhileinformationcontagiondoesnot.Ifregulatorsdonotstepintobailoutanindividualfirm,thealternativeistoletitfail.Inthecaseofabank,theprocessinvolvestheFDICasreceiverandtheinsuredliabilitiesofthefirmareveryquicklyrepaid.Incontrast,thefailureofaninvestmentbankorhedgefunddoesnotinvolvetheFDICandmaycloselyresembleaChapter11orChapter7filingofanonfinancialfirm.However,ifthenonbankfinancialfirminquestionhasliabilitiesthatarecoveredbytheSecuritiesIndustryProtectionCorporation(SIPC),thefirmisrequiredbylawundertheSecuritiesIndustryProtectionAct(SIPA)toliquidateunderChapter7(DonandWang,1990).ThisexplainsinlargepartwhyonlytheholdingcompanyofLehmanfiledforbankruptcyin2008anditsbroker–dealersubsidiarieswerenotpartoftheChapter11filing.Amajorfearofafinancialfirmliquidation,whetherdonethroughtheFDICorasrequiredbySIPA,isthatfiresaleswilldepressrecoveriesforthecreditorsofthefailedfinancialfirmandthatthesefiresaleswillhaveramificationsforotherfirmsinrelatedbusinesses,evenifthesebusinessesdonothavedirecttiestothefailedfirm(ShleiferandVishny,1992).ThisfearwasbehindtheFed’sdecisiontoextendliquiditytoprimarydealersinMarch2008–FedChairmanBernankeexplainedinaspeechonfinancialsystemstabilitythat“theriskdevelopedthatliquiditypressuresmightforcedealerstosellassetsintoalreadyilliquidmarkets.Thismighthaveresultedin...[a]firesalescenario...,inwhichacascadeoffailuresandliquidationssharplydepressesassetprices,withadversefinancialandeconomicimplications.”(May13,2008speechattheFederalReserveBankofAtlantaconferenceatSeaIsland,Georgia)ThefearofpotentialfiresalesisexpressedinfurtherdetailinthesamespeechasareasonforthemergerofBearStearnsandJPMorgan:“Bear...wouldbeforcedtofileforbankruptcy...[which]wouldhaveforcedBear’ssecuredcreditorsandcounterpartiestoliquidatetheunderlyingcollateraland,giventheilliquidityofmarkets,thosecreditorsandcounterpartiesmightwellhavesustainedlosses.Iftheyrespondedtolossesortheunexpectedilliquidityoftheirholdingsbypullingbackfromprovidingsecuredfinancingtootherfirms,amuchbroaderliquiditycrisiswouldhaveensued.”Theideathatcreditorsofafailedfirmareforcedtoliquidateassets,andtodosowithhaste,iscountertothebasictenetsofU.S.bankruptcylaws,whicharesetuptoallowcreditorstheabilitytomaximizethevalueoftheassetsnowundertheircontrol.Ifthatvalueisgreatestwhencontinuingtooperate,thelawsallowsuchareorganizationofthefirm.Ifthevalueinliquidationishigher,thelawsareinnowayprejudicedagainstsellingassetsinanorderlyprocedure.Bankruptcyactuallyreducesthelikelihoodoffiresalesbecauseassetsarenotsoldquicklyonceabankruptcyfilingoccurs.Cashdoesnotleavethebankruptfirmwithouttheapprovalofajudge.Withoutpressuretopaydebts,thefirmcanremaininbankruptcyformonthsasittriestodecideonthebestcourseofaction.Indeed,amajorcomplaintabouttheU.S.codeisthatdebtorscaneasilydelayreorganizingandslowdowntheprocess.If,however,creditorsandmanagementbelievethatspeedyassetssalesareintheirbestinterest,thentheycanpressthebankruptcyjudgetoapprovequickaction.ThisoccurredinthecaseofLehman’sassetsaletoBarclays,whichinvolvedhiringworkerswhomighthavesplitupweretheirdivisionsnotsoldquickly.金融公司破产及系统性的风险2008年秋，当美联邦储备委员会和财政部拒绝85亿美金巨资保险投入到美国国际集团时，这边借给美国国际集团的货款就直接落到了竞争对手手里，而投保人只得到极少的一部分资金。在那些大的受益人当中，高盛用12亿美金来撤销美国国际集团的信用违约互换。这一应急方案通过逐步售出美国国际集团的资产来偿还贷款，而不是保住岗位或者是确保短期贷款市场像之前那样持续运转发挥市场效能。因此，政府避免美国国际集团的系统性风险的目的，是为了确保美国国际集团的商业伙伴不至于破产。从这一出发点，很明显是信用违约互换当中最好的一个。也是因为这一点，相比2008年美国国际集团多赢得4000亿的合同。 在条款当中，美国政府在援助通用汽车时表现的并没那么积极，可能是因为政府确信，通用的破产把损失强加到相关的合作企业，这样不会对宏观经济产生太大的坏影响。这一决定和宏观经济调查的结果是一致的，即金融公司的破产比非金融公司的破产产生的系统性风险大很多。例如Bordo和Haubrich提到“越是严重的金融事件越是和严重的经济衰退联系在一起。”同样的，Bernanke反驳道，大萧条如此的让经济衰退是因为银行业的缺陷影响到投资的信用度。Bernanke假设一种金融加速器机制，在这样的机制中，经济的一个领域破产导致更多的不稳固的资产负债表和紧张的信贷状况。这反过来就导致投资的减少，随之而来的是变少的贷款和普遍的经济衰退。如果对非金融企业的经济冲击都是以破产的形式呈现，这些作者们在辩论经济低迷好似不会很严重的。我们反而认为非金融企业破产的连锁影响远比金融企业的大，就像美国国际集团。虽然通过竞争对手风险渠道，不会对美国经济产生毁灭性的打击。但并不是说一段时期在大银行间的经济低迷不会伴随冲击很大的经济衰退。只是因为这样是经济失利不会引起经济衰退，也不会影响经济衰退的深度。不管是哪一种类型的企业破产，这样的破产在企业股份中不是常见的导致经济损失的症状。因为一个公司的倒闭导致其他公司的倒闭形成系统内的一种联级，这样就会产生普遍的经济脆弱的现象。当许多金融公司同时倒闭，系统风险会减弱经济的破坏力度，就像在大萧条时期，9000多家银行倒闭。在前一种案例中，一家公司的倒闭，譬如像美国国际集团，雷曼兄弟，或者贝尔斯登这样的公司倒闭，会导致倒闭现象在金融界蔓延，例如信用违约互换。在后一种案例中，事实是许多金融机构的倒闭意味着不仅仅是货币的供应，而且只要经济活动中的破败，就会降低信用额度。当脆弱的金融系统引起经济的萧条时，经济萧条就不会产生，因为公司可以申请破产。而且如果只是一两个公司的破产，非金融企业会对经济产生更大的影响。这样极端且真实的影响是金融企业的脆弱性导致调控者特别强调对系统性风险的预防。这些政策当中，最突出的是“太大以至于破产”(TBTF的逻辑)，这一观点的思维方式是，一个大型的金融机构的倒闭将会影响到其分支的金融机构，因此，对经济的风险是很大的。太大而倒闭是2008年随着美国联邦储备委员会决定合并贝尔斯登公司和摩根大通银行之后产生的，在重建银行货代时期的领导是长期资金管理，这一政策的决定是支援美国国际集团。如果结果是阻止了经济的衰退，太大而倒闭的政策将会被证实。然而，如果在这一段时期系统性风险被夸大，或者所采取的措施的益处被高估，资金分配以避免另外一场大萧条的效率代价体系将远远超出任何潜在的利益。毫无疑问，在观察另外一个系统性风险的时候，没有管理者想乘机撤退。因此当管理者推到一边的时候，我们不能凭经验来考核决定经济状况。当今的美国，很少有管理者同意一家大的金融公司破产的。最近，我们可以看到雷曼兄弟的破产，这是美国联邦储备委员会，逼不得已同意破产的企业。然而，雷曼兄弟的破产是唯一一个显而易见的例子表明太大而倒闭的政策是名不副实的，我们只看到中意政策对系统性风险的微不足道的影响。此外，与此同时因雷曼兄弟的倒闭，此外,与此同时,雷曼兄弟的失败的情况下,美联储正在干预商业市场、促进货币资金,而美国国际集团是跳伞了。而且，美联邦储备局和财政局即将散布第二次大萧条的谣言，以彰显其采取的措施的有效性。因此，我们将永远不知道雷曼兄弟的破产是否会导致市场低迷，以及从雷曼兄弟破产致使人们对破产的恐惧反映到现实的经济上来或者管理者对人们的现实经济体中存在的问题的恐惧进行无限的夸大。在本论文中，我们分析会引起经济崩溃风险的经