2024年全球私募股权市场报告

GLOBALPRIVATEEQUITYREPORT2024

BAiN&CMPANY

AboutBain&Company’sPrivateEquitybusiness

Bain&Companyistheleadingconsultingpartnertotheprivateequity(PE)industryanditsstakeholders.PEconsultingatBainhasgrowneightfoldoverthepast15yearsandnowrepresentsaboutone-thirdofthefirm’sglobalbusiness.Wemaintainaglobalnetworkofmorethan2,000experiencedprofessionalsservingPEclients.Ourpracticeismorethantriplethesizeofthenext-largestconsultingcompanyservingPEfirms.

Bain’sworkwithPEfirmsspansfundtypes,includingbuyout,infrastructure,realestate,anddebt.Wealsoworkwithhedgefunds,aswellasmanyofthemostprominentinstitutionalinvestors,includingsovereignwealthfunds,pensionfunds,endowments,andfamilyinvestmentoffices.Wesupportourclientsacrossabroadrangeofobjectives:

Dealgeneration.Weworkalongsideinvestorstodeveloptherightinvestmentthesisandenhancedealflowbyprofilingindustries,screeningtargets,anddevisingaplantoapproachtargets.

Duediligence.Wehelpsupportbetterdealdecisionsbyperformingintegratedduediligence,assessingrevenuegrowthandcost-reductionopportunitiestodetermineatarget’sfullpotential,andprovidingapost-acquisitionagenda.

Immediatepost-acquisition.Afteranacquisition,wesupportthepursuitofrapidreturnsbydevelopingstrategicblueprintsforacquiredcompanies,leadingworkshopsthatalignmanagementwithstrategicpriorities,anddirectingfocusedinitiatives.

Ongoingvalueaddition.Duringtheownershipphase,wehelpincreasethevalueofportfoliocompaniesbysupportingrevenueenhancementandcost-reductioninitiativesandrefreshingtheirvalue-creationplans.

Exit.Wehelpensurethatinvestorsmaximizereturnsbypreparingforexit,identifyingtheoptimalexitstrategy,preparingthesellingdocuments,andprequalifyingbuyers.

Firmstrategyandoperations.WehelpPEfirmsdevelopdistinctivewaystoachievecontinuedexcellencebydevisingdifferentiatedstrategies,maximizinginvestmentcapabilities,developingsectorspecializationandintelligence,enhancingfund-raising,improvingorganizationaldesignanddecisionmaking,andenlistingtoptalent.

Institutionalinvestorstrategy.Wehelpinstitutionalinvestorsdevelopbest-in-classinvestmentprogramsacrossassetclasses,includingprivateequity,infrastructure,andrealestate.Topicsweaddresscoverassetclassallocation,portfolioconstructionandmanagerselection,governanceandriskmanagement,andorganizationaldesignanddecisionmaking.Wealsohelpinstitutionalinvestorsexpandtheirparticipationinprivateequity,includingthroughcoinvestmentanddirectinvestingopportunities.

Bain&Company,Inc.

131DartmouthStreet

Boston,Massachusetts02116USA

Tel:+16175722000

NetPromoter®,NPS®,NPSPrism®,andtheNPS-relatedemoticonsareregisteredtrademarksofBain&Company,Inc.,NICESystems,Inc.,andFredReichheld.NetPromoterScoreSMandNetPromoterSystemSMareservicemarksofBain&Company,Inc.,NICESystems,Inc.,

andFredReichheld.

Copyright©2024Bain&Company,Inc.Allrightsreserved.

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GlobalPrivateEquityReport2024

Contents

TheDarkbeforetheDawn

2

PrivateEquityOutlook2024:TheLiquidityImperative

3

Investments

9

Exits

15

Fund-raising

19

Returns

24

Move-InReady:RenovatingYourGrowthStrategy

28

HaveSecondariesReachedaTippingPoint?

35

BuildingaStrongerBuy-and-Build

39

HarnessingGenerativeAIinPrivateEquity

45

TheYearCashBecameKingAgaininPrivateEquity

52

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GlobalPrivateEquityReport2024

TheDarkbeforetheDawn

DearColleague:

Theyear2023wasoneofportent.Dealvaluefellby37%.Exitvalueslidevenmore,by44%.

Fund-raisingdroppedacrossprivatecapital,as38%fewerbuyoutfundsclosed.Interestingly,dollarcommitmentsinbuyoutssurgedasanumberofhigh-performingfundscametomarket.Butitwastrulyayearofhavesandhave-nots.Just20fundsaccountedformorethanhalfofallbuyoutcapitalraised.

Thewordforthismarketisstalled.Cuttingthroughallofthemacronoisewasthe525-basis-pointincreaseinUScentralbankratesfromMarch2022toJuly2023.Thespeedandmagnitudeofthisrisecausedgeneralpartnerstohitthepausebutton.

Thegoodnews?Interestratesappeartobestableandhavebeenforafewmonths.Recorddrypowderisstackedandreadyfordeployment.Asizablechunkofthisdrypowderisagingandneedstobeputtowork.Lookingintoportfolios,nearlyhalfofallglobalbuyoutcompanieshavebeenheldforat

leastfouryears.

Inshort,theconditionsappeartobeshiftinginfavorofhittingthegobutton.Wewillseewhat2024brings.

Bestwishes,

HughMacArthur

Chairman,GlobalPrivateEquity

3

PrivateEquityOutlook2024:

TheLiquidityImperative

Spikinginterestratesderaileddealmakingin2023andleftthecapital

flywheelsputtering.Gettingunstuckisjoboneintheyearahead.

ByHughMacArthur,RebeccaBurack,GrahamRose,ChristopheDeVusser,KikiYang,

andSebastienLamy

AtaGlance

Privateequitycontinuedtoreelin2023asrapidlyrisinginterestratesledtosharpdeclinesindealmaking,exits,andfund-raising.

Theexitconundrumhasemergedasthemostpressingproblem,asLPsstarvedfordistributionspullbacknewallocationsfromallbutthelargest,mostreliablefunds.

Thelong-termoutlookremainssound,butbreakingthelogjamwillrequiremorerobustapproachestovaluecreationandrapidinnovationinliquiditysolutions.

It’ssafetosaytheprivateequityindustryhasneverseenanythingquitelikewhat’shappenedoverthelast24months.

Whilethesharpdrop-offindealactivityinlate2022andinto2023echoestheperiodfollowingthe2008–09globalfinancialcrisis(GFC),thesituationtheindustryfacestodayislargelyunprecedented.

ThenumbersareallveryGFC-like:Dealvalueanddealcounthavefallen60%and35%,respectively,fromtheirpeaksin2021.Exitvalueisdown66%,andthenumberoffundsclosingisoffbynearly55%

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GlobalPrivateEquityReport2024

(seeFigure1).Yetwhat’sdrivingthesedeclinescouldn’tbemoredissimilartowhatwashappeningin2008–09,andmakingsenseofitrequiresadifferentlensaltogether.

Asdifficultasitwas,theaftermathoftheGFCfollowedapredictablepattern:Tocopewiththecrisis,centralbankersslashedinterestratestospuractivity,theeconomyslowlystabilized,andprivateequitywasabletoclawitswaybackfromwhatmanypredictedwouldbeitsunraveling.Theresultingperiodofgrowthintheyearsthatfollowedcreatedaprivateequityindustrythatisvastlylargerandmorecomplexthananyonein2008couldhavereasonablyexpected.

Yettodaythatsizeandcomplexitymagnifythechallengestheindustryfaces.Businessconditionsaremoreperplexingthanpredictable.Interestrateshaverisenfasterthanatanytimesincethe1980s,anditremainsunclearwhentheUSFederalReservewillreversecourseorwhererateswilleventuallysettle(seeFigure2).Concernsaboutwhatwedubbedlastyear“themostanticipatedrecessioninhistorythathasn’thappenedyet”continuetolinger.Yettothesurpriseofmostanalysts,theeconomyischuggingalongnicely.Record-lowunemployment,reasonablegrowth,andsurgingpublicmarketsintheUSsuggestthepossibilitythatwemightjustescapethesemonthsofturmoilwithnothingworsethanasoftlanding.

Thesecrossedsignalshaveleftprivateequityhamstrung.Thesheervelocityoftheinterestrateshockwassomethingfewintheindustryhadeverexperienced,andtheimpactonvaluehasdrivenawedgebetweenbuyersandsellers.

Figure1a:Investments,exits,andthenumberofbuyoutfundsclosedallcontinuedtoslidein2023astheindustryreeledfromrisinginterestrates

Investments

Globalbuyoutdealvalue

Dealcount

(–60%)

4,000

$1,250B

1,000

3,000

750

2,000

500

1,000

250

0

0

201320182023

Exits

Globalbuyout-backedexitvalue

Exitcount

$1,250B

1,000

750

500

250

0

(–66%)

3,000

2,000

1,000

0

201320182023

Fund-raising

Globalbuyoutcapitalraised

Countoffundsclosed

$600B

400

200

0

(–1%)

1,000

800

600

400

200

0

201320182023

Notes:Investments—excludesadd-ons;excludesloan-to-owntransactionsandacquisitionsofbankruptassets;basedonannouncementdate;includesannounceddealsthatarecompletedorpending,withdatasubjecttochange;Exits—includesfullandpartialexits;bankruptciesexcluded;IPOvalue

representsofferamountandnotmarketvalueofcompany;Fund-raising—datagroupedbytheyearinwhichfundsheldtheirfinalclose;countisofallfunds,includingthoseforwhichfinalclosedataisunavailable;buyoutcategoryincludesbuyout,balanced,coinvestment,andcoinvestment

multimanagerfunds;excludesSoftBankVisionFund

Sources:Dealogic;Preqin

5

+113basis+289bps+98bps+25bps

points

inUS

GlobalPrivateEquityReport2024

Figure1b:Activityduringthesecondhalfoftheyearwasanimprovementonthefirst,butnotbymuch

Investments

Globalbuyoutdealvalue,quarterly

Dealcount

$350B300250200150100

50

0

2020202120222023

1,000

800

600

400

200

0

Exits

Globalbuyout-backedexitvalue,quarterly

Fund-raising

Globalbuyoutcapitalraised,quarterly

ExitcountCountoffundsclosed

$350B300250200150100

50

0

2020202120222023

600

400

200

0

$200B

150

100

50

0

2020202120222023

400

300

200

100

0

Notes:Investments—excludesadd-ons;excludesloan-to-owntransactionsandacquisitionsofbankruptassets;basedonannouncementdate;includesannounceddealsthatarecompletedorpending,withdatasubjecttochange;Exits—includesfullandpartialexits;bankruptciesexcluded;IPOvalue

representsofferamountandnotmarketvalueofcompany;Fund-raising—datagroupedbytheyearinwhichfundsheldtheirfinalclose;countisofallfunds,includingthoseforwhichfinalclosedataisunavailable;buyoutcategoryincludesbuyout,balanced,coinvestment,andcoinvestment

multimanagerfunds;excludesSoftBankVisionFund

Sources:Dealogic;Preqin

Figure2:The525-basis-pointriseininterestratesfromMarch2022toJuly2023wasthesharpestmonetarytighteningindecades

Centralbankinterestratesbyregion(monthlyaverage)

6%

4

2

0

US

UK

Europe

Jan

Jul

Jan

Jul

Jan

Jul

Jan

Jul

2020

2020

2021

2021

2022

2022

2023

2023

Notes:USshowsfederalfundsrate;Europeshowseuroshort-termreporate;UKshowsclearingbanksbaserate(middlerate);basispointchangesoverasix-monthperiodaredisplayedfortheUSonlyandcalculatedbasedontheincreaseinaverageinterestratesbetweentheendofJuneandDecemberofeachyear

Source:LSEG

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GlobalPrivateEquityReport2024

Pricemultiples,whichtendtomoveinverselytointerestrates,havetippeddownwardoverthelastyear,butonlyslightlysofar.That’sbecausesellersarebringingtomarketonlythehighest-qualityassets,thosetheyareconfidentwillmoveatareasonablereturn.Otherwise,theexitchannelshavelargelydriedup,leavinggeneralpartners(GPs)withatowering$3.2trillioninunsoldassetsand

stanchingtheflowofcapitalbacktolimitedpartners(LPs).

Thesedeclinesinactivityhavehadachillingeffectonfund-raising.SlowerdistributionshaveleftLPscashflownegative,crimpingtheirabilitytoplowmorecapitalbackintoprivateequity.Theindustrystillraisedanimpressive$1.2trillioninfreshcapitalin2023,andthebuyoutcategoryattracted$448billion.ButLPswerehighlyselective.Whilecapitalflowedtothelargest“reliablehand”buyoutfunds,fund-raisingformostwasashardasit’severbeen.

SlowerdistributionshaveleftLPscashflownegative,crimpingtheirabilitytoplowmorecapitalbackintoprivateequity.

UntilGPscanbeginmovingassetsoutoftheirportfoliosinatimelyfashion,raisingthenextfundwon’tgetanyeasier.Andthethreattoreturnsisreal.Buyoutstypicallyinvolvetermloansthatexpireinfivetosevenyears.Already,interestcoverageratiosamongbuyout-backedportfoliocompaniesintheUShavedroppedto2.4timesearningsbeforeinterest,taxes,depreciation,andamortization(EBITDA),thelowestlevelsince2007.ThatispressuringGPstobothfindliquiditysolutionsanddevisenewwaystogenerateprofitsthroughoperatingleverage—notjustthemultipleexpansionandrevenuegrowththeindustryhasleanedonforyears.

Earlysignsofaturnaround?Themostdifficultaspectofthisgridlock,ofcourse,ispredictingwhatwillhappennext.Butinourview,thegreenshootsofarecoveryarestartingtopokethrough.Perhapsthemostimportantisthat,barringanynewmacroshocksorgeopoliticalcrises,ratesaremorelikelythannottomoderateinthecomingyear.

Evenslightcutsarelikelytospurondealmakingaslongasthemacrooutlookremainsrelatively

stable.Buyoutfundsalonearesittingonarecord$1.2trillionindrypowder,and26%ofthatisfouryearsoldorolder,upfrom22%in2022(seeFigure3).ThatcreatesaheavierincentivethannormalforGPstogetoffthesidelinesandstartbuying,evenifconditionsaren’tideal.Activityisalready

tickingupward,andwithhelpfromtheFedandtheEuropeanCentralBank,thebiasin2024islikelytotheupsidewhenitcomestodealcountandvalue.

Exitsareanothermatter.Barringasharper-than-anticipateddropinrates,sellerswillcontinueto

facehighhurdlestounloadingcompaniestostrategicbuyers,othersponsors,orthepublicmarkets.

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GlobalPrivateEquityReport2024

Figure3:Witharecord26%ofglobalbuyoutdrypowdernowfouryearsoldorolder,generalpartnersareundergrowingpressuretododeals

Globalbuyoutdrypowder,byyearssincecapitalraised($T)

1.2

1.0

1.0

0.9

0.8

0.7

$0.7T

Shareofcapitalthatisatleast

4yearsold(%)

2017

19

18

19

19

18

20

19

21

23

22

22

23

26

3yearsorless

4–5years

Morethan5years

Notes:Buyoutcategoryincludesbuyout,balanced,coinvestment,andcoinvestmentmultimanagerfunds;assumesaverageinvestmentperiodoffiveyears;percentagesplitofcapitalraisedin2023isasofQ2;discrepanciesinbarheightsdisplayingthesamevalueareduetoroundingdifferences

Sources:Preqin;Bainanalysis

WithsponsorsstrugglingtosendcashbacktotheirLPs,2024willlikelybedefinedbyhowcreativetheindustrycanbeinfindingwaystogenerateliquidity.

Actionrequired.What’sclearisthatpassivelywaitingforconditionstorecoverisnotaviablestrategy.Muchofthisreportisdevotedtoexploringhowthesedynamicsareplayingoutandwhatthemostforward-thinkingGPsareworkingon.Gettingunstuckwilldemandactioninseveraldirectionsatonce:

•Doublingdownonvaluecreation.Theexitsituationisshiningabrightlightonhowcriticalitistogenerateoperatingleverageinamarketwheretailwindsfrommultipleexpansionhaveturnedintoheadwinds.Youcan’tcontrolthedirectionofrates.Butyoucangetbetteratunderwritingvalueandcapturingitthroughcrispexecution.We’vetalkedaboutitforyears:Theindustryhasrelieddisproportionatelyonrisingmultiplesandrevenuegainstogeneratereturnswhilemarginimprovementhascontributedpracticallynothing.Thatnolongerworkswhenrisingratesserveasballastforassetmultiples.

Theportfoliocompaniesthatwillstandoutinthisdifficultmarketarethosethathaveused

everymeanspossibletoboostEBITDAefficientlyandcandemonstratetothenextownerthatthere’smoneyleftonthetable.Thatmeansfundshavetogetsharperatfindingandpullingthevalue-creation“levers”thatgenerateorganicgrowth—pricing,salesforceeffectiveness,and

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GlobalPrivateEquityReport2024

productinnovation,tonameafew.Iftheseinsightsweren’tpartoftheoriginalvalue-creationplan,nowisthetimetofocusonthem.Themarkethasbeenabundantlyclearonthis.Thecompaniesthataresellingarenotthosethathavemerelygottenbiggerand/orleaner.Thepremiumison

generatingstrong,profitable,organicgrowth.

•Managingacrosstheportfolio.WhilestrategiesfocusedonEBITDAgrowthtaketime,aballooningexitbacklogalsopresentsmoreimmediateconcerns.Fundsneedtodevelopaclear-eyed,pragmaticappraisalofwhereeachportfoliocompanysitsintermsofitsreturnprofile,itscapitalstructure,anditsfutureprospects.Aslongasratesstayelevated,GPshavechoicestomake:Whichcompanieswillreapanacceptablereturnifwesellnow?WhichshouldwesellanywaysowecanreturncashtoLPs?Whichcompaniesfaceloanexpirations,andwherecanweeffectively“amendandextend”toreshapeabalancesheetwithouttoomuchpain?Whatareouroptionsforgeneratingliquiditythroughtheburgeoningsecondarymarket?

Iftheindustry’sgrowinginventoryofunsoldassetsisn’tgoingtobeaproblem,thereareafewthingsyouhavetobelieve.First,withalargevolumeofportfoliocompaniesfacingrefinancinghurdles,itwillbecriticalthatdebtholderstakethestancetheydidin2008–09.Lendersclearlydidn’twantthekeystoabunchoftroubledportfoliocompaniesthenandprobablydon’twantthemnow.Thatleavesopentheopportunitytopayapenalty,addsomeequity,andarriveataworkablecapitalstructure.

Thesecondthingyouneedtobelieveisthatthereareenoughinnovativesolutionslikecontinuationfunds,securitizations,andNAVfinancingtohelpGPsrecapprizedassetsandwaitforreturnstoripenwhilekeepingeconomicinterestalignedbetweenGPsandLPs.Thesecondariesspaceisstillsmallandsomewhatcontroversial.Butitisgrowingrapidlyandrepresentsthekindof

financialinnovationthatisprivateequity’sspecialty.

•Professionalizingfund-raising.Aneffectiveportfolioscanshouldleadtoaclear,practicalroadmapforsteeringthefundthroughanimmenselydifficultperiod.ThenextstepiscommunicatingtoLPshowportfoliomanagersareusingallthetoolsattheirdisposaltoactasatrustedstewardofinvestorcapital.GPsaren’tparticularlyadeptatthiskindofcommunicationbecausetheyhaven’thadto

beinthepast.Adhoc,anecdotalconversationsaboutasingleportfoliocompanyweresufficientwhenperformanceoverallwasn’treallyinquestion.

Nowperformanceiseverything,andthecompetitionforalimitedpoolofcapitalhasneverbeenmorefierce.Thisisspurringthemostproactivefundstoconsidermakingastepchangeinhowtheyapproachinvestorsbyprofessionalizingprocessesandhoningtheirgo-to-marketcapabilities.Thefirmsout-raisingothersarestrategicallymappingoutwhotheirLPsshouldbeanddevelopingthecapabilitiesandtoolsnecessarytounderstandwhatittakestowinwiththemandexpandshareofwallet.TheyarebuildingthekindofcommercialorganizationsthebestB2Bsellersrelyondaily.

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GlobalPrivateEquityReport2024

Noneofthisiseasy,ofcourse,butnoneofitisinsurmountable.Privateequitysurvivedthe

overexuberanceoftheRJRNabiscoyears.Itlivedthrough9/11andthesubsequentrecession.Ittooktheworstblowsoftheglobalfinancialcrisisandcameoutevenstronger.Theindustry,inotherwords,hasconsistentlydemonstrateditsresilience.Thisisoneofthosemoments.Timetogettowork.

Here’samoredetailedlookatwhathappenedin2023.

Investments

Privateequitydealmakerstendtomakethemostofthecardsthey’redealt.Aslongastheyhavereasonableconfidenceinwhat’scoming,they’llfindawaytomakeagooddealwork.ButconfidencewasthefirstcasualtywhentheFedjackedratesatthefastestpacesincethe1980s,leavingtheindustrygaspingforair.Thefalloffthatstartedinthesecondhalfof2022bledoverinto2023.

Excludingadd-ons,buyoutinvestmentvaluedroppedto$438billion,a37%decreasefrom2022andtheworsttotalsince2016(seeFigure4).Overalldealcountdropped20%toaround2,500transactions.Thesteepslopeofthedeclinewassomethingtheindustryhadn’texperiencedsincetheglobalfinancialcrisis.Themalaiseinfectedregionsacrosstheworld,withEuropeandAsia-Pacificbothexperiencingsignificantdeclines(seeFigure5).

Figure4:Thetwo-yearfalloffinglobalbuyoutdealvaluemarksthesteepestdeclinesincetheglobalfinancialcrisis

Globalbuyoutdealvalue,byregion

Dealcount

$1,200B

1,000

800

600

400

200

0

1,086

726

694

699

499

519

532

332

438

463

397

369

240

295

305

231

195

222

94

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

0

2005060708

091011121314151617181920212223

Avg.

256476

1182603043495215421,029788

deal

494165

size($M)

229206278380604700801

Restofworld

Asia-Pacific

Europe

North

America

Total

Changeindealvalue

2023vs.2022

–22%

–8%

–46%

–38%

–37%

2023vs.5-yr.avg.

–47%

–32%

–38%

–31%

–34%

Notes:Excludesadd-ons;excludesloan-to-owntransactionsandacquisitionsofbankruptassets;basedonannouncementdate;includesannounceddealsthatarecompletedorpending,withdatasubjecttochange;geographybasedontarget’slocation;averagedealsizecalculatedusingdealswithdisclosedvalueonly

Source:Dealogic

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GlobalPrivateEquityReport2024

Figure5:Dealvalueandactivitydeclinedglobally

NorthAmerica

Buyoutdealvalue

Buyoutcount

Europe

Buyoutdealvalue

Buyoutcount

Asia-Pacific

Buyoutandgrowthdealvalue

Buyoutandgrowthcount

$600B

400

200

0

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

0

2023

2012

2,000

$600B

400

200

0

1,500

1,000

500

0

2012

2023

$600B

400

200

0

6,000

4,000

2,000

0

2023

2012

Notes:NorthAmericaandEurope—excludesadd-ons;excludesloan-to-owntransactionsandacquisitionsofbankruptassets;basedonannouncement

date;includesannounceddealsthatarecompletedorpending,withdatasubjecttochange;geographybasedontarget’slocation;Asia-Pacific—includesbuyout,growth,early-stage,privateinvestmentinpublicequity,andturnarounddeals;excludesadd-ons;excludesrealestate;dealvalueexcludesdealswithannouncedvaluelessthan$10million;includesinvestmentsthathaveclosedandthoseatagreement-in-principleordefinitiveagreementstage

Sources:Dealogic;AVCJ;Bainanalysis

Dealsofallkindsfelttheimpact,butthosethatdependedonbankfinancingsufferedthemost.Asyieldsonlargesyndicatedloansapproached11%intheUSand9%inEurope(both10-yearhighs),banksretreatedandissuanceofnewloansplunged(seeFigure6).

Thelackofaffordableleveragecutthenumberofmegadeals—thoseover$5billion—byalmosthalf,andtheaveragedealsizedroppedto$788million,downfromthepeakof$1billionin2021.Buyoutsbroadlysawdouble-digitdeclinesindealcount(seeFigure7).Technologydeals,whichbynature

requirelessleveragethandealsinothersectors,maintainedtheirdominantshareoftotalbuyout

count,butasset-heavytraditionalindustrieslikeindustrialgoodsandservicesexpandedtheirshareslightly,benefitingfromaflighttosafetyamonginvestorslookingforstabilitywherevertheycouldfindit(seeFigure8).

Thegrowthandventurecapitalsegments,meanwhile,continuedtodriftsideways.Bothfocuson

riskier,earlier-stagecompanieswhosegrowth-basedvaluationsareparticularlyvulnerabletointerestratepressure.Theywerealsobuffetedbythelingeringimpactofthecryptocollapsein2022andtheimplosionofSiliconValleyBankin2023(seeFigure9).

Elevatedinterestratescontributedtoseveralotherimportantshiftsinthefinancingenvironment.Privatecreditcontinuedtoaggressivelyfillgapsleftbythebigbanksandcaptured84%ofthemiddle

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GlobalPrivateEquityReport2024

Figure6:Withyieldsonleveragedbankloansshootingthroughtheroof,LBOloanissuanceplungedin2023,makingithardtofinancetransactions

Leveragedbuyout(LBO)yields

12.0%

10.0

8.0

6.0

4.0

2.0

0.0

10.9%

8.9%

20121314151617181920212223

USlargecorporateEuropeaninstitutional

SyndicatedLBOloanissuance($B)

223

$64B

107

104

91

106

145

176

134

100

(–56%)

113

50

121314151617181920212223

USEurope

Notes:EuropeaninstitutionalspreadincludesalltrackedLBOdeals,regardlessofsize;USlargecorporatedefinedasLBOswithmorethan$50millioninEBITDA;Europesyndicatedloanvolumeconvertedusingeuro/USdollarconversionrateof1.076

Sources:LCD;LSEG

Figure7:Dealsofallsizesdeclinedin2023andwerewellofffive-yearaverages

Shareofglobalbuyoutdealcount,bydealsize

100%

80

60

40

20

0

Avg.dealsize($M)

2018

604

19

542

20

700

21

1,029

22

801

23

788

2023vs.2022

–47%

–20%

2023vs.5-yr.avg.

Morethan$5B$1B–$5B

–34%

–32%

$0.1B–$1B–34%–33%

–43%

–46%

Lessthan$0.1B

–36%

–38%

Total

Notes:Includesdealswithdisclosedvalueonly;excludesadd-ons;excludesloan-to-owntransactionsandacquisitionsofbankruptassets;basedonannouncementdate;includesannounceddealsthatarecompletedorpending,withdatasubjecttochange;averagedealsizecalculatedusingdealswithdisclosedvalueonly

Sources:Dealogic;Bainanalysis

12

100

GlobalPrivateEquityReport2024

Figure8:Technologyremainedtheleaderindealcount,butindustrialsincreasedshareasinvestorslookedforstabilityinatraditionalsector

Shareofglobalbuyoutdealcount,bysector

100%

80

60

40

20

0

Technology'sshareof

total(%)

2018

28

19

31

20

30

21

29

22

27

23

24

Publicsector

Realestate

TelecommunicationsTransportation

MediaandentertainmentUtilitiesandenergy

Retail

ConsumerproductsFinancialservices

Healthcare

Services

Industrials

Technology

Notes:Excludesadd-ons;excludesloan-to-owntransactionsandacquisitionsofbankruptassets;basedonannouncementdate;includesannounceddealsthatarecompletedorpending,withdatasubjecttochange

Source:Dealogic

Figure9:Aftersoaringduringthepandemic,growthandlate-stageventureinvestinghascomebacktoearth

Globalgrowthcapitalinvested,byinvestmentstage