战略经济学(四)

战略经济学(四)2024/3/26战略经济学(四)VerticalChainBeginswiththeacquisitionofrawmaterialsEndswiththesaleoffinishedgoods/servicesIncludessupportservicessuchasfinanceandmarketingOrganizingtheverticalchainisanimportantpartofbusinessstrategy战略经济学(四)VerticalBoundariesoftheFirmWhichstepsoftheverticalchainaretobeperformedinsidethefirm?Whichstepsoftheverticalchaintobeout-sourced?Choicebetweenthe“invisiblehand”ofthemarketandthe“visiblehand”oftheorganization(MakeorBuy)战略经济学(四)VerticallyIntegratedFirmsInaverticallyintegratedfirm,manyofthestepsintheverticalchainareperformedin-house.Example:UIBESomefirmschoosetooutsourcemanyoftheverticalchaintasksandbecomeverticallydisintegrated.Example:Nike战略经济学(四)MakeversusBuyDecisiondependsonthecostsandbenefitsofusingthemarketasopposedtoperformingthetaskin-houseOutsidespecialistsmayperformataskbetterthanthefirmcanIntermediatesolutionsarepossible(Examples:Strategicallianceswithsuppliers,Jointventures)战略经济学(四)上游下游战略经济学(四)SupportServicesAccountingFinanceLegalSupportMarketingPlanningHumanResourceManagement战略经济学(四)SupportServicesSupportservicescanbemajorsourcesofvaluecreationUPS–LogisticsToyota–HumanResourceManagerNike-Marketing战略经济学(四)DefiningBoundariesFirmsneedtodefinetheirverticalboundariesConsiderationsEconomiesofscaleachievedbymarketfirmsValueofmarketdisciplineEaseofcoordinationofproductionflowsin-houseTransactionscostswhendealingwithmarketfirms战略经济学(四)SomeMake-or-BuyFallaciesFirmshouldmakeratherthanbuyassetsthatprovidecompetitiveadvantagesOutsourcinganactivityeliminatesthecostofthatactivityBackwardintegrationcapturestheprofitmarginofthesupplierBackwardintegrationinsuresagainsttheriskofhighinputpricesItmakessensetotieupthedistributionchannelinordertodenyaccesstotherivals战略经济学(四)ReasonstoBuyratherthanMakeMarketfirms(outsidespecialists)mayhavepatents/proprietaryinformationthatmakeslowcostproductionpossibleMarketfirmscanachieveeconomiesofscalethatin-houseunitscannotMarketfirmsaresubjecttomarketdiscipline,whereasin-houseunitsmaybeabletohidetheirinefficienciesbehindoverallcorporatesuccess(Agencyandinfluencecosts)战略经济学(四)EconomiesofScale战略经济学(四)Make-or-BuyinInsuranceBuyinginsuranceutilizeseconomiesofscaleavailabletoinsurersLargefirmswithsufficientcapitalcan“self-insure”战略经济学(四)案例：Self-InsurancebyBritishPetroleumBPself-insureslargelossesbutbuysinsuranceforsmalllossesWhy战略经济学(四)AgencyandInfluenceCostsTheincentivestobeinefficientandinnovativeareweakerwhenataskisperformedin-houseAgencycostsareparticularlyproblematicifthetaskisperformedbya“costcenter”withinanorganization忽视代理成本优于消除代理成本Itisdifficulttointernallyreplicatetheincentivesfacedbymarketfirms战略经济学(四)InfluencecostsInadditiontoagencycosts,performingataskin-housewillleadto“influencecosts”aswell“InternalCapitalMarkets”allocatesscarcecapitalAllocationscanbefavorablyaffectedbyinfluenceactivitiesResourcesconsumedbyinfluenceactivitiesrepresent“influencecosts”为什么在过去几十年里，GM在拥有世界上最高生产量的同时，它的许多零部件供应部门的成本也是最高的战略经济学(四)ReasonstoMakeCostsimposedbypoorcoordinationReluctanceofpartnerstodevelopandsharevaluableprivateinformationTransactionscostthatcanbeavoidedbyperformingthetaskin-houseEachproblemcanbetracedtodifficultiesincontracting战略经济学(四)RoleofContractsFirmsoftenusecontractswhencertaintasksareperformedoutsidethefirmContractslistthesetoftasksthatneedtobeperformedtheremediesifonepartyfailstofulfillitsobligation战略经济学(四)ContractsContractsprotecteachpartytoatransactionfromopportunisticbehaviorofother(s)Contracts’abilitytoprovidethisprotectiondependsonthe“completeness”ofcontractsthebodyofcontractlaw战略经济学(四)CompleteContractAcompletecontractstipulateswhateachpartyshoulddoforeverypossiblecontingencyNopartycanexploitothers’weaknessesTocreateacompetecontractoneshouldbeabletocontemplateallpossiblecontingenciesOneshouldbeableto“map”fromeachpossiblecontingencytoasetofactionsOneshouldbeabletodefineandmeasureperformancesOneshouldbeabletoenforcethecontract战略经济学(四)CompleteContract(Continued)Toenforceacontract,anoutsideparty(judge,arbitrator)shouldbeabletoobservethecontingencyobservetheactionsbythepartiesimposethestatedpenaltiesfornon-performanceReallifecontractsareusuallyincompletecontracts战略经济学(四)IncompleteContractsIncompletecontractsInvolvesomeambiguitiesNeednotanticipateallpossiblecontingenciesDonotspelloutrightsandresponsibilitiesofpartiescompletely战略经济学(四)FactorsthatPreventCompleteContractingBoundedrationalityDifficultiesinspecifying/measuringperformanceAsymmetricinformation战略经济学(四)BoundedRationalityIndividualshavelimitedcapacitytoProcessinformationDealwithcomplexityPursuerationalaimsIndividualscannotforeseeallpossiblecontingencies战略经济学(四)Specifying/MeasuringPerformanceTermslike“normalwearandtear”mayhavedifferentinterpretationsPerformancecannotalwaysbemeasuredunambiguously战略经济学(四)AsymmetricInformationPartiestothecontractmaynothaveequalaccesstocontract-relevantinformationOnepartycanmisrepresentinformationwithimpurity战略经济学(四)ContractLawContractlawfacilitatestransactionswithincompletecontractsPartiesneednotspecifyprovisionsthatarecommontoawideclassoftransactions战略经济学(四)LimitationsofContractLawDoctrinesofcontractlawareinbroadlanguagethatcouldbeinterpretedindifferentwaysLitigationcanbeacostlywaytodealwithbreachofcontractLitigationcanbetimeconsumingLitigationweakensthebusinessrelationship战略经济学(四)CoordinationofProductionFlowsForsuccessfulcoordinationonepartyneedstomakedecisionsthatdependonthedecisionmadebyothersAgoodfitshouldbeaccomplishedinseveraldimensions.Someexamplesare:TimingSizeColorSequence战略经济学(四)CoordinationProblemsWithoutgoodcoordination,bottlenecksariseintheverticalchainToensurecoordination,firmsrelyoncontractsthatspecifydeliverydates,designtolerancesandotherperformancetargets战略经济学(四)DesignAttributesDesignattributesareattributesthatneedtorelatetoeachotherprecisely;significantlossineconomicvalueresultsSomeexamplesSequencingofcoursesinMBAcurriculumFitofautosunroofglasstoapertureTimelydeliveryofacriticalcomponent战略经济学(四)DesignAttributesIfcoordinationiscritical,administrationcontrolmayreplacethemarketmechanismDesignattributesmaybemovedin-house战略经济学(四)LeakageofPrivateInformationandOutsourcingWell-definedpatentscanhelpbutmaynotprovidefullprotectionContractswithnoncompeteclausescanbeusedtoprotectagainstleakageofinformationInpracticenon-competeclausescanbehardtoenforce例如竞业禁止条款战略经济学(四)TransactionsCostsIfthemarketmechanismimprovesefficiency,whydosomanyoftheactivitiestakeplaceoutsidethepricesystem?(Coase)Costsofusingthemarketthataresavedbycentralizeddirection–transactionscosts战略经济学(四)TransactionsCostsOutsourcingentailcostsofnegotiating,writingandenforcingcontractsCostsareincurredduetoopportunisticbehaviorofpartiestothecontractandeffortstopreventsuchbehaviorTransactionscostsexplainwhyeconomicactivitiesoccuroutsidethepricesystem战略经济学(四)TransactionsCostsSources