FRICA'S PULSE-对塑造非洲经济未来的问题的分析（英文）

APRIL2024|VOLUME29

ANANALYSISOFISSUESSHAPINGAFRICA’SECONOMICFUTURE

TACKLINGINEQUALITYTOREVITALIZEGROWTHANDREDUCEPOVERTYINAFRICA

THISREPORTWASPRODUCEDBYTHEOFFICEOF

THECHIEFECONOMISTFORTHEAFRICAREGION

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

ThisreportwasproducedbytheOfficeoftheChiefEconomistfortheAfricaRegionundertheoverallguidanceofVictoriaKwakwaandOusmaneDiagana.TheteamforthiseditionofAfrica’sPulsewasledbyAndrewL.DabalenandCesarCalderon.ThecoreteamincludedMegumi

Kubota,VijdanKorman,NicholasWoolley,SenaKimmGnangnon,andAyanQu(section1),andNisthaSinhaandGabrielaInchauste(section2).

ValuablecontributionstothereportwereprovidedbyMarielaCaychoArce,DawitMekonnen,DominikPeschel,andMellanyGeraldinePintadoVasquez(section1),andAzizAtamanov,TomBundervoet,ElwynDavies,ElizabethFoster,AlastairHaynes,RuthHill,ChristopherHoy,JeremyLebow,AmbarNarayan,HugoÑopo,OliveNsababera,AnaMariaOviedo,ReginaPleninger,MarianoSosa,LilianaSousa,DanielValderrama,andHaoyuWu(section2).

ThisreportwaspeerreviewedbyDominikPeschel(section1)andRinkuMurgai(section2).

SpecificcommentswerereceivedfromUmutesiAngelique,HeleneBa,MamadouTanouBalde,MatheusBueno,FloredePréneuf,RosaBritoDelgado,MariaElkhdari,JakobEngel,ElizabethMaryFoster,ChadiBouHabib,NazmusSadatKhan,StutiKhemani,SimeonKoffi,WilfredA.

Kouame,DorsatiMadani,NaomiMuthoniMathenge,PatrickJohnMcCartney,EmmanuelA.Mungunasi,StanleyKasangaMutinda,MiguelAngelSaldarriagaNoel,HayaanNur,DanielPajank,JorgeTudelaPye,SajjadAliShah,JosephSimumba,FulbertTchanaTchana,ClaudiaNoumedemTemgoua,SherinVarkey,andPreciousZikhali.

Communications,mediarelations,andstakeholderengagementwereledbyFloredePréneuf

withtheExternalandCorporateRelationsteam,includingCaitlinBerczik,PatriciaRiehnBerg,

KimberlyBumgarner,ChristelleChapoy,LauredePetiville,MarieDuffour,GeorgetteDwomoh-Appiah,TomasGonzalez,EisaGouredou,ArtemKolesnikov,PabsyMariano,LivianeUrquiza,andDaniellavanLeggeloPadilla.BeatriceBerman,AbrahDesireeBrahima,KennethOmondi,and

Rose-ClairePakabombaprovidedproductionandlogisticalsupport.

ThereportwaseditedbySandraGain.TheonlineandprintpublicationwasproducedbyBillPragluski,andthecoverdesignwasbyRajeshSharma.

APRIL2024|VOLUME29

ANANALYSISOFISSUESSHAPINGAFRICA’SECONOMICFUTURE

TACKLINGINEQUALITYTOREVITALIZEGROWTHANDREDUCEPOVERTYINAFRICA

WORLDBANKGROUP

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ISBN(electronic):978-1-4648-2109-7

DOI:10.1596/978-1-4648-2109-7

Coverdesign:RajeshSharma

TableofContents

ExecutiveSummary 1

GrowthissettobouncebackinSub-SaharanAfrica,buttherecoveryisstillfragile 1

Tacklingstructuralinequalitytorevitalizegrowthandacceleratepovertyreduction 3

Policyresponses 4

Section1.RecentDevelopmentsandOutlook 7

1.1GrowthOutlookinSub-SaharanAfrica 7

1.2TheGlobalEnvironment 16

1.3MacroeconomicPerformanceofSub-SaharanAfrica 20

1.4RiskstotheOutlook 35

Section2.Tacklinginequalityforinclusivegrowthandpovertyreduction 39

2.1Introduction 39

2.2GrowthinSub-SaharanAfrica:Low,volatile,andunstable 41

2.3PovertyandInequalityinSub-SaharanAfrica 52

Section3.PolicyImplications 68

Appendix:CountryClassifications 73

References 75

AFRICA’SPULSE>i

Box

2.1CountryExperiences:BangladeshandVietNam 6

1

ListofFigures

1.1GrowthperCapitainSub-SaharanAfrica,2015–2026f 7

1.2RealGDPperCapitainSub-SaharanAfricaunderDifferentScenarios 7

1.3PurchasingManagers’IndexinSub-SaharanAfricanCountries 8

1.4ContributiontoGDPGrowth:ExpenditureApproach 9

1.5ContributiontoGDPGrowth:SectoralOutputApproach 9

1.6ContributiontoRegionalGDPGrowthbytheLargestEconomiesintheRegion 10

1.7GrowthForecastsfortheAFESubregion 11

1.8GrowthForecastsfortheAFWSubregion 11

1.9GrowthacrossSub-SaharanAfricanCountries,2023–25 12

1.10ExternalDebtServiceinSub-SaharanAfrica,byCreditor 13

1.11ExternalFinancingInflowstoSub-SaharanAfrica 14

1.12NetDebtInflowstoSub-SaharanAfrica 15

1.13GlobalPurchasingManagers’Index 16

1.14EconomicGrowthinChina 16

1.15GlobalInflation 17

1.1610-YearTreasuryBondYields 17

1.17WorldBankCommodityPriceIndexes 18

1.18AverageMonthlyPricesofCocoa,Coffee,andTea 19

1.19InflationinSub-SaharanAfrica 20

1.20DistributionofSSACountries,byInflationRates 21

1.21HeadlineandFoodInflationacrossSub-SaharanAfricanCountries,February2024 21

1.22CurrenciesinSub-SaharanAfrica 22

1.23CentralBankPolicyRates 24

1.24FiscalBalancesinSub-SaharanAfrica 25

1.25DistributionofSSACountries,byFiscalBalances 26

1.26FiscalBalancesinSub-SaharanAfrica,2023–24 27

1.27SourcesofChangesintheFiscalBalancesofSub-SaharanAfricanCountries 27

1.28ExternalPPGDebtCompositioninSub-SaharanAfricanCountries,byCreditor 30

1.29ExternalRiskofDebtDistressinSub-SaharanAfricanCountries 30

1.30DebtDynamicsinLIC-DSFSub-SaharanAfricanCountries 31

1.31PublicDebtDynamicsinSub-SaharanAfricanCountries 31

1.32DebtServiceObligations 32

1.33GrossFinancingNeeds:EvolutionandDecomposition 33

1.34BondSpreadsinAfrica 33

1.35PPGExternalDebtServicein2024 34

ii>AFRICA’SPULSE

2.1RealGDPperCapitainSSA,1960–2022 41

2.2RelativeIncomeperCapitainSSA,1960–2022 42

2.3SSARelativeIncomeperCapita,1960–2022:ComparisonwithIncomeGroups 42

2.4SSARelativeIncomeperCapita,1960–2022:ComparisonwithEastandSouthAsia 43

2.5DifferentGrowthTopologiesacrossSub-SaharanAfrica 46

2.6MainFeaturesofExpansionsinSub-SaharanAfrica,1960–2021 47

2.7MainFeaturesofRecessionsinSub-SaharanAfrica,1960–2021 48

2.8GrowthAccountinginSub-SaharanAfricanCountries 49

2.9GrowthAccountingfor2000–14:TheRoleofNaturalCapital 50

2.10GrowthLeadstoGreaterPovertyReductioninCountrieswithLowLevelsofInequality.5

2

2.11ExtremePovertyintheAfricaRegionRelativetotheRestoftheWorld,2000–19 5

3

2.12MultidimensionalPovertyRates,byGDPperCapita 5

4

2.13ExtremePovertyinSub-SaharanAfricaSince2019 5

5

2.14PovertyTrends,byFragilityandResourceWealthStatus 5

6

2.15PovertyinUrbanandRuralAreasintheAfricaRegion 5

6

2.16DecompositionofPovertyReductionthroughIncomeGrowthversusIncome

Redistribution,2000–19 5

7

2.17ElasticityofPovertyReductiontoGrowth,byRegion 57

2.18InequalityinSub-SaharanAfrica 58

2.19InequalityofOpportunity

60

2.20AverageContributionsofCircumstancestoInequalityofOpportunities 62

2.21ShareofIncomefromAgriculture,HouseholdEnterprises,andWageJobs,

byConsumptionDeciles 6

4

2.22FirmSizeandEmploymentDistributionsinSub-SaharanAfricanCountries

andtheUnitedStates 6

4

2.23MainCustomersforOwn-AccountWorkersandHouseholdEnterprises 6

5

2.24ProductMarketRegulationsinSub-SaharanAfrica 6

5

2.25FiscalRedistributioninAfrica 66

2.26ImpactsofTaxesandTransfersandSubsidiesonPoverty 6

7

Map

1.1ReserveCoverageRatio,2023 23

ListofTables

1.1RevenueandExpenditureMeasuresIntroducedinSelectedAfricanCountries,2022–23.28

2.1Long-TermGrowthinSub-SaharanAfrica,1960–2022:BasicStatistics 44

A.1WesternandCentralAfricaCountryClassification 73

A.2EasternandSouthernAfricaCountryClassification 73

AFRICA’SPULSE>iii

ExecutiveSummary

GROWTHISSETTOBOUNCEBACKINSUB-SAHARANAFRICA,BUTTHERECOVERYISSTILLFRAGILE

uAfterbottomingoutat2.6percentin2023,economicgrowthinSub-SaharanAfricais

expectedtoreach3.4percentin2024and3.8percentin2025.Therecoveryisprimarilydrivenbygreaterprivateconsumptiongrowthasdeclininginflationbooststhepurchasingpowerofhouseholdincomes.Investmentgrowthwillbesubduedasinterestratesarelikelytoremainhighwhilefiscalconsolidationconstrainsgovernmentconsumptiongrowth.ThecontributionoftheglobaleconomytoAfrica’sgrowthwillremainmodest.Expectationsofmonetarypolicyratecutsinlargeglobaleconomiesmaystimulateinvestmentgrowthin2025.

Lowerinflationissupportingtheeconomicreboundintheregion

uInflationiscoolinginmostSub-SaharanAfricaneconomiesbutremainshigh.Themedian

inflationintheregionisprojectedtofallfrom7.1percentin2023to5.1percentin2024and5percentin2025–26.Thenormalizationofglobalsupplychains,steadydeclineofcommodityprices,andimpactsofmonetarytighteningandfiscalconsolidationarecontributingtoa

lowerrateofinflationintheregion.

uAlthoughinflationisrecedinginmostcountriesin2024,itremainshighcomparedtopre-pandemiclevels:inflationisprojectedtodecreaseinabout80percentofAfricancountriescomparedwith2023,butitisstillhigherthanpre-pandemiclevelsin32of37countries.Moreover,14countriesintheregionstillexhibitpersistentlyhighlevelsofinflation(twoormoredigits)thisyear—withamedianinflationratethathasdroppedmodestlyfrom25.9percentin2023to24.8percentin2024.

uThismixedpicturerequiresdifferentmonetarypolicyresponses.Apauseinmonetarypolicytighteningmightbewarrantedincountrieswithdeclininginflationthatareclosetoor

withinthetargetrange,whileacombinationofmonetarytighteningandfiscalconsolidationwillbeessentialforthosecountrieswithelevatedinflation.Fiscalprudenceisparticularly

recommendedtoavoidaresurgenceofinflationinthemanySub-SaharanAfricancountriesthatareholdingelectionsthisyear.

Thecontributionofglobaldriversofgrowthremainssubduedanduncertain

uTheglobalengineofgrowthisslowlyreactivating.Inthesecondhalfof2023,globalactivityremainedresilientasstrongerprivateandgovernmentspendingsustainedaggregate

demanddespitetightfinancialconditions.Greaterlaborforceparticipation,thenormalizationofsupplychains,andfallingenergyandcommoditypricescontributedtoglobal

economicactivityamiduncertaintiesarisingfromgeopoliticaltensionsandgeoeconomic

fragmentation.Still,headwindstogrowthinadvancedeconomieslieaheadthisyear.Globalpolicyratesremainelevated,leadingtotightcreditmarkets—whichcoulddampenprivate

investment.Moreover,continuedgrowthofhouseholdconsumptionmayberestrictedbyagradualdepletionofthestockofexcesssavingsthataccruedduringtheCOVID-19pandemic.InChina,subduedconsumersentiment,theriskofentrencheddeflation,andpersistentstrainsinthepropertysectorlimittheprospectsforareturntothegrowthlevelsoftheearly2010s.

AFRICA’SPULSE>1

Fiscalbalancesareimprovingbutatamoderatepace

uFiscalbalancescontinuetoimprove,thankstothefiscalconsolidationmeasuresunderwayinseveralSub-SaharanAfricancountries(forinstance,Ghana,Kenya,andNigeria).Debt

restructuringnegotiationsprovideanadditionalincentiveforprudentfiscalmanagementinGhanaandZambia.Themedianfiscaldeficitintheregionisprojectedtodeclinemodestlyfrom3.8percentofgrossdomesticproduct(GDP)in2023to3.5percentofGDPin2024.

Althoughthefiscalbalanceisexpectedtoimproveinmostcountriesintheregion(31of

46),theirdeficitsstillremainlarge:themedianfiscaldeficitofthese31countriesisprojectedtonarrowfrom4.8percentofGDPin2023to3.8percentofGDPin2024.Furthermore,thenumberofcountrieswithlargedeficits(exceeding3percentofGDP)hasdroppedmodestly,fromapeakof34in2022to27in2024.ThevulnerabilityofAfricangovernments’fiscal

positionstoglobalshocksremainsachallenge.Transformativepolicyactionstobuildfiscalbuffersareessentialtopreventand/orcopewithfutureshocks.

Growingdebtserviceobligationsarecreatingliquidityproblemsandcrowdingoutdevelopmentspending

uPublicdebtinSub-SaharanAfricaisexpectedtodeclinefrom61percentofGDPin2023to57percentofGDPin2024.However,theriskofdebtdistressremainshigh.MorethanhalfoftheAfricangovernmentsgrapplewithexternalliquidityproblems,faceunsustainabledebtburdens,orareactivelyseekingtorestructureorreprofiletheirdebts.Publicdebtservice

obligationshavesurgedasgovernmentsintheregionareexposedtomarketfinancingandnon–ParisClubgovernmentloans.Externalborrowingismoreexpensivethanitwasprior

tothepandemicdespitesovereignspreadsgraduallydecliningfromtheirpeakinMay2023.Forinstance,thecouponofthenewEurobondissuedbyKenyathisFebruaryis9.75percent,comparedtothe6.875percentoftheEurobondmaturingin2024.

Growthheadwindsarecompoundedbyescalatingconflictandviolence

uIncreasedconflictandviolenceintheregionwillcontinuetoweighoneconomicactivity.

Althoughconfinedtosmalleconomiessofar,militarycoupsandtheriskofcoupcontagionsignificantlyimpactinternationalinvestorsentimentandtheperceptionofrisktowardthe

entireregion.TensionsinWestAfricahaveescalatedwiththedecisionsofBurkinaFaso,Mali,andNigertoleavetheEconomicCommunityofWestAfricanStatesandSenegal’sdecisiontodelayelections.InSudan,theresolutionoftheconflictbetweentheSudaneseArmedForcesandtheRapidSupportForcesthroughmediationmayprovedifficult.InEthiopia,security

remainsuncertainasboutsofviolencecontinueintheAmharaandOromiaregions.

uPersistentconflictandorganizedviolencemaydisruptproductionandaccesstofoodstaplesinseveralcountries(BurkinaFaso,Mali,Niger,andSomalia,amongothers).Foodsecurity

problemsareamplifiedbyclimaticshocks—asfrequentdroughtsandfloodsarelashing

EasternandSouthernAfrica(Ethiopia,Kenya,Mozambique,Somalia,andZambia).Disruptions

ofrainfallpatterns,alongwiththeblackpoddisease,arethreateningcocoaproductionandthelivelihoodsoffarmersinCôted’IvoireandGhana.Moreover,factorslikesoildegradation,pests,andmarketfluctuationsexacerbatethedifficultiesfacedbyagriculturalcommunities.Withanestimated105millionpeopleintheregionpotentiallyexperiencingseverefoodinsecurityasofMarch2024,urgentandcomprehensiveagriculturalinterventionsandsupportareimperative.

2>AFRICA’SPULSE

Renewedurgencyaroundrevitalizinggrowthiscritical

uThepaceofeconomicexpansionintheregionremainsslowandinsufficienttohavea

significanteffectonpovertyreduction.GrowthpercapitainSub-SaharanAfricaissetto

acceleratefromamodest0.1percentin2023to0.9percentin2024and1.3percentin2025.However,theprojectedboostineconomicactivityremainswellbelowthelong-termgrowthrate.Indeed,theregionhasremainedstuckinalow-growthtrapoverthepastdecade:iftheregion’sgrowthratemaintainedthepaceof2000–14over2015–26,realoutputpercapita

wouldbeaboutone-thirdhigherthanitslevelatcurrentgrowthrates.

TACKLINGSTRUCTURALINEQUALITYTOREVITALIZE

GROWTHANDACCELERATEPOVERTYREDUCTION

uMostcountriesintheregionhavebeenunabletosustaingrowthoverthelongterm.Overthepastsixdecades,theevolutionofrealGDPpercapitacanbecharacterizedbylong-termswings.Moreover,growthisvolatileandunstablecomparedtothatinadvancedeconomiesandotherdevelopingcountries—particularlynon-Africanupper-middle-incomecountries.Thisvariabilityisespeciallytroublesomewhenmeasuredagainsttheregion’slowaveragegrowthrate.Overall,countriesintheregionareunabletosustainlongerexpansions.Infact,Sub-SaharanAfricahasshorterandweakerexpansionsrelativetotherestoftheworld.Existingevidencesuggeststhatthemoreegalitariansocietiestendtosustaingrowthforalongerperiodoftime.

uEconomicgrowthreducespovertyinSub-SaharanAfricalessthaninotherregions,asmeasuredbythegrowthelasticityofpoverty.PercapitaGDPgrowthof1percentisassociatedwith

povertyreductionofonly1percentintheregion,comparedto2.5percentintherestofthe

world.Thelowgrowthelasticityofpovertyprevailsevenaftercontrollingforinitialdifferencesinpoverty,incomelevels,andinequality.Meanwhile,thelimitedpovertyreductioninSub-SaharanAfricasince2000hasbeendrivenprimarilybygrowthasopposedtodistributionalchangesinincome,makingthelimitedimpactofgrowthonpovertyreductionespeciallyconcerning.

uHighinequalityintheregionislargelystructuralandnotsimplytheresultofdifferencesin

individualtalentsoreffort.Structuraldifferencesleadtoaccumulatingdisparitiesatthree

distinctstages.First,thesedisparitiesarisewhenpeoplebuildtheirproductivecapacities,

includinginaccesstoschoolingandotherbasicservices(thepre-marketstage).Second,whenpeopleengageinproductiveactivities,poorlyfunctioningmarkets,distortions,andfrictions

cansystematicallylimitcertaingroups’accesstoproductiveincome-generatingopportunities(thein-marketstage).Thislimitsmarketcompetition,increasesthemisallocationofresources,andunderminesstructuraltransformationandfirmgrowth.Third,disparitiescanbe

exacerbatedorredressedthroughtaxes,socialtransfers,andsubsidies(thepost-marketstage).Importantly,thesestagesareinterconnected,withspilloversoccurringfromonestagetotheother.Forexample,inequalityinaccesstoqualityeducationwillbecompoundedbylabor

marketdistortionsorlackofcompetition,whichcouldthenbeexacerbatedbyregressivetaxes.

uAccesstobasicservicesremainshighlyunequaldespitesignificantimprovementsincoverageoverrecentdecades.Critically,inequalityinaccesstoservicesisheavilyinfluencedbythe

circumstancesintowhichachildisborn,suggestingthatstructuralinequalitiesareprevalentearlyinthepre-marketstage.Onaverage,achild’slocationaccountsforaroundhalfofthestructuralinequalityatthepre-marketstage,especiallyinresourcerichcountries.Suchpre-marketstructuralinequalitiesarestrongdriversoflimitedintergenerationalmobility.

AFRICA’SPULSE>3

uMarketimperfectionsandinstitutionaldistortionshavethepowertolimitproductivityand

earnings.Firmsandfarmsfacepervasivecreditconstraints,withonlyaboutonein10firms

withfewerthan19workersrelyingonbankfinancing.Instead,mostown-accountworkers

andhouseholdenterprisesrelyontheirownresources,resourcesfromfamilyandfriends,

orinformalsourcestostartuptheirbusinesses.Similarly,accesstoproductmarketsis

constrained,whichpreventsfirmsandfarmsfromscalinguptheirproduction.Inparticular,

thelackofconnectivityandmarketintegrationmeansthatmarketsaresegmented,allowingfirmsorfarmswithmarketpowertocapturebenefits,contributingtoincomeinequality.Forinstance,tradecosts,includingcostsoftransportation,arefourtofivetimeshigherinEthiopiaandNigeriathanintheUnitedStates.Finally,frictionsinthelabormarketpreventworkers

fromaccessingproductiveopportunities.

uAlthoughtaxes,transfers,andsubsidiesreduceinequality,theymaynotreducepoverty.Thecombinedeffectoftaxes,transfers,andsubsidiesleadstoagreaterreductionininequalityinSub-SaharanAfricathaninnon-Africancountrieswithcomparablelevelsofincome.However,thelevelofinequalityafterthisfiscaleffortisstillhigherthanthepre-fiscallevelofinequalityinotherregions.Thepooroftenpaymoreintaxesthantheyreceiveinbenefits,evenif

taxesarehigherfortherich.TaxationpolicytendstoincreasepovertyratesinmostAfricancountriesforwhichfiscalincidenceanalysisisavailable.PoorlytargetedsubsidiesandlimitedsocialassistancedonotcompensatepoorAfricanhouseholdsfortheindirecttaxestheypay,evenafteraccountingforthefactthatlow-incomehouseholdslargelypurchasegoodsin

informalmarkets.

POLICYRESPONSES

Domesticresourcemobilizationandsupportfromtheinternational

communitycanplayaroleinalleviatingtheregion’sfundingsqueeze

uTheabilityofAfricancountriestofinancetheirdevelopmentandreprofiletheirdebtis

constrainedbylimitedaccesstocostlierexternalfunding.Amidhighlevelsofexternal

debtrepayments,asaresultofhighdebtlevelsandelevatedborrowingcosts,some

countriesintheregionmayfacetemporaryexternalliquiditypressuresin2024and2025.

Increaseddomesticresourcemobilizationiscriticaltowinbackthecountry’spolicyspace,channelingresourcestowardpro-growthpublicspendingandaddressingdebtrolloverrisks.Strengtheningtaxadministration,broadeningthetaxbase,andimprovingtheefficiencyofpublicspendingareessential.Theinternationalcommunitycanalsoplayarolebyprovidingmoreconcessionalfinancingtofacilitatetheimplementationofstructuralreformsand

supportingexternaldebtmanagement.

4>AFRICA’SPULSE

Tacklingstructuralinequalitiestofostergrowthandpovertyreduction

uStructuralinequalitiesinSub-SaharanAfricarequiremultisectoralactions—particularly

policiestocreatealevelplayingfieldandenhancetheproductivecapacityofthe

disadvantaged.Investmentsinhumancapital(foundationallearningandnutrition)and

strengthenedlocalcapacityforservicedeliverytounderservedpopulationsandregionscanbuildpeople’scapacitytoseizemarketopportunities.Removingsize-dependentdistortions,improvingjusticeservicedelivery,andboostingmarketaccesscansupportfairerand

morethrivingmarketplaces.Implementingregionaltradeagreements,suchastheAfricanContinentalFreeTradeArea,andinvestinginmoreefficientandaffordabletransportationcorridorspresentauniqueopportunitytoexpandmarkets.

uDomesticrevenuemobilizationeffortscanalsobedesignedtoprotectthepoor—throughtaxationofhigh-net-wort