未来能源研究所-美国气候政策观点 American Climate Policy Opinions 2024

ClimateInsights2024|AmericanClimate

Report24-15

AmericanClimate

PolicyOpinions

JonA.KrosnickandBoMacInnis

AbouttheAuthors

JonA.KrosnickisasocialpsychologistwithaPhDfromtheUniversityofMichiganwhodoesresearchonattitudeformation,change,and

effects;psychologyofpoliticalbehavior;andsurveyresearchmethods.HeistheFredericO.GloverProfessorinHumanitiesandSocialSciencesandProfessorofCommunication,PoliticalScience,andPsychologyat

StanfordUniversity,wherehedirectsthePoliticalPsychologyResearchGroup.Krosnickhasauthoredtenbooksandmorethan210articlesandchapters,inadditiontoop-edessays.HeisthewinneroftheNevittSanfordAwardforhisworkinpoliticalpsychologyandtheAmericanAssociationforPublicOpinionResearchawardforhisworkonsurveyresearchmethodsandpublicopinion.HeisauniversityfellowatResourcesforthe

Future.

BoMacInnisisaneconomistwithaPhDfromtheUniversityof

CaliforniaatBerkeley.Herresearchfocusesonclimatechangeandsurveyresearchmethods.SheisalecturerintheDepartmentof

Communication,andregularlycollaborateswithDr.Krosnickonclimatechangeresearch.

AboutRFF

ResourcesfortheFuture(RFF)isanindependent,nonprofitresearchinstitutionin

Washington,DC.Itsmissionistoimproveenvironmental,energy,andnaturalresourcedecisionsthroughimpartialeconomicresearchandpolicyengagement.

RFFiscommittedtobeingthemostwidelytrustedsourceofresearchinsightsandpolicysolutionsleadingtoahealthyenvironmentandathrivingeconomy.TheviewsexpressedherearethoseoftheindividualauthorsandmaydifferfromthoseofotherRFFexperts,itsofficers,oritsdirectors.

AbouttheProject

Since1997,StanfordUniversityProfessorJonA.KrosnickhasexploredAmerican

publicopinionontheseissuesthroughaseriesofrigorousnationalsurveysofrandomsamplesofAmericanadults,oftenincollaborationwithRFF.Thislatestreportisthe

secondinthe2024ClimateInsightsreportseriesbyresearchersatStanfordUniversityandRFFexaminingAmericanpublicopinionononissuesrelatedtoclimatechange.

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ClimateInsights2024|AmericanClimatePolicyOpinions

Forthe2024iterationoftheClimateInsightssurvey,1,000Americanadultswereinterviewedduringthe130-dayperiodfromOctober16,2023,toFebruary23,2024.

ThisClimateInsightsreportfocusesonAmericans’publicopiniononarangeof

climate-relatedpolicies.FutureinstallmentsinthisserieswilladdressAmericanpublicopiniononenvironmentaljusticeandareasofpartisanagreementanddisagreement.Thisseriesisaccompaniedbyaninteractivedatatool,whichcanbeusedtoview

specificdatafromthesurvey.Pleasevisit

/climateinsights

or

/

formoreinformationandtoaccessthedatatool,reportseries,andmore.

Note:Whenthisresearchprogrambeganin1997,“globalwarming”wasthetermin

commonparlance.Thattermwasusedthroughoutthesurveysoverthedecadesandwasalwaysdefinedforrespondentssoitwasproperlyunderstood.Theterm“climatechange”hasriseninpopularity,sobothtermsareusedinthisreportinterchangeably.Whendescribingsurveyquestionwordingsandresults,theterm“globalwarming”isused,tomatchthetermreferencedduringinterviews.Empiricalstudieshaveshownthatsurveyrespondentsinterprettheterms“globalwarming”and“climatechange”tohaveequivalentmeanings(VillarandKrosnick2011).

Acknowledgments

TheauthorsandcontributorsthankAngeliqueUglow(ReconMR),JaredMcDonald

(MaryWashingtonUniversity),andRossvanderLinde(Mappica).Inaddition,the

authorsthankresearchersandstaffatResourcesfortheFuture(RFF):KevinRennert,KristinHayes,BillyPizer,RayKopp,AnnieMcDarris,DonniePeterson,Caroline

Hamilton,SaraKangas,andKristinaGawrgy.

FundingforthissurveywasprovidedbyStanfordUniversity(theWoodsInstitutefortheEnvironment,thePrecourtInstituteforEnergy,andtheDoerrSchoolof

Sustainability),RFF,andReconMR.

SharingOurWork

OurworkisavailableforsharingandadaptationunderanAttribution-

NonCommercial-NoDerivatives4.0International(CCBY-NC-ND4.0)license.Youcancopyandredistributeourmaterialinanymediumorformat;youmustgive

appropriatecredit,providealinktothelicense,andindicateifchangesweremade,andyoumaynotapplyadditionalrestrictions.Youmaydosoinanyreasonable

manner,butnotinanywaythatsuggeststhelicensorendorsesyouoryouruse.

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StanfordUniversityandResourcesfortheFuture

Youmaynotusethematerialforcommercialpurposes.Ifyouremix,transform,orbuilduponthematerial,youmaynotdistributethemodifiedmaterial.Formoreinformation,visit

https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

.

Useofanymaterialinthispublicationshouldbecreditedtothefollowing:Krosnick,JonA.,andBoMacInnis.2024.ClimateInsights2024:AmericanClimatePolicy

Opinions.Washington,DC:ResourcesfortheFuture.

Thedataincludedinthisreportcomesfromsourceswithvaryingsharingpolicies.

Pleasecheckthereferencesformoreinformation,andemail

krosnick@

withanyquestions.

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ClimateInsights2024|AmericanClimatePolicyOpinions

Contents

Introduction1

MostPopularPolicies3

ModeratelyPopularPolicies7

LeastPopularPolicies9

EconomicEffectsofMitigationPolicies10

Votinginthe2024Election12

Conclusion14

References15

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StanfordUniversityandResourcesfortheFuture

Introduction

InClimateInsights2024:AmericanUnderstandingofClimateChange,weshowedthathugemajoritiesofAmericansbelievethattheearthhasbeenwarming,thatthewarminghasbeencausedbyhumanactivity,thatwarmingposesasignificantthreattothenationandtheworld—especiallytofuturegenerations—andthatgovernments,businesses,andindividualsshouldbetakingstepstoaddressit.

Inthisreport,weturntospecificfederalgovernmentopportunitiestoreducefuturegreenhousegasemissions,oftenreferredtoasclimatechangemitigation.Policiestoaccomplishthisgoalfallintoseveralcategories,including:

1.Consumerincentivesthatrewardpeoplefortakingstepsthatreducetheiruseoffossilfuelsand,byextension,reducetheircarbonfootprint

2.Carbonpricingpoliciesthatrequireemitterstopayfortheircarbonemissions,suchasacarbontax(whichwouldrequirecarbonemitterstopayataxforeachtonofcarbontheyemit),oracap-and-tradeprogram(whichwouldrequirebusinessestohaveapermitforeachtonofcarbontheyemit)

3.Regulationsthatrequiremanufacturerstoincreaseenergyefficiencyoftheirproducts

4.Taxincentivesthatencouragemanufacturerstoincreasetheenergyefficiencyoftheirproducts

This2024surveyaskedAmericansabouttheiropinionsonawidearrayofsuchpolicies,whichallowsusnotonlytoassesscurrentopinions,buttotrackchangesinthoseopinionsoverthepasttwodecadesthroughcomparisonswithresponsestocomparablequestionsaskedinearliernationalsurveys.

Overallemissionsreductionstrategies

In2024,weaskedforthefirsttimewhether

Americanspreferusing“carrots”toreduceemissionsor“sticks.”Theformerentailsofferingincentivestorewardcompaniesforachievingdesiredoutcomes,andthelatterinvolvespenalizingcompaniesthat

failtoreachdesiredgoals.59percentofAmericanspreferacarrotapproachinwhichgovernment

lowerstaxesforcompaniesthatreduceemissions,and35percentpreferastickapproachsuchthatgovernmentraisestaxesoncompaniesthatdonotreduceemissions(seeFigure1).

Figure1.GeneralclimatepolicypreferencesofAmericans

6%

35%

59%

Prefersusing“carrots”toreduceemissionsPrefersusing“sticks”toreduceemissions

Nopreference

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ClimateInsights2024|AmericanClimatePolicyOpinions

Overallemissionsreductionprinciples

Overthepastdecades,aconsistentlylargemajorityofAmericanshaswantedthe

governmenttoreducegreenhousegasemissionsbyUSbusinesses.In2024,74

percentofAmericansendorsethismitigationpolicyprinciple(seeFigure2).This

numberisnotsignificantlydifferentfromthe77percentseenin2020andisaboutthesameasithasbeensince1997whenthisseriesofsurveyswaslaunched.

Figure2.PercentofAmericanswhothinkthegovernmentshouldlimitgreenhousegasemissionsbyUSbusinesses

100%

90%

80%·.'·74%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

2000200420082012201620202024

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StanfordUniversityandResourcesfortheFuture

MostPopularPolicies(>60percentapproval)

Taxingimportedemissions

In2024,weaskedaboutimporttaxestiedtoemissions;respondentswereaskedwhethertheywouldfavor

taxingforeigncompaniesforimportingproductsthatputoutmoregreenhousegasesthanacomparableUSproduct.AhugemajorityofAmericans,84percent,

favorthespecialtax(seeFigure3).

Assistingwithjobtransitions

In2024,weaskedwhetherthefederalgovernment

shouldspendmoneytohelppeoplewholosejobsduetoatransitionfromfossil-basedelectricitygenerationtoelectricitygeneratedfromrenewables.78percentofAmericansfavorthegovernmentpayingthosepeopletolearntodootherkindsofwork(seeFigure4).

Fillingabandonedoilwells

In2024,weaskedwhetherthefederalgovernment

shouldspendmoneytocloseoffabandonedoilwellsthatemitgreenhousegases;76percentofAmericansfavorthegovernmentspendingmoneytofilltheseoldwells(seeFigure5).

Shiftingenergygenerationtorenewablepower

HugenumbersofAmericansfavorgovernmentefforttoshiftelectricitygenerationawayfromfossilfuelsandtowardrenewableenergysources.

In2024,72percentofAmericansbelievethatthe

USgovernmentshouldoffertaxbreakstoutilitiesin

Figure3.Americanpublic

opiniononwhetherthe

governmentshouldtax

foreigncompaniesforimportsthatputoutmoregreenhousegasesthanUSproducts

14%

2%

84%

Thegovernmentshouldtaxhigher-emittingforeigngoods

Thegovernmentshouldnottaxhigher-emittingforeigngoods

Don’tknow

Figure4.Americanpublic

opiniononwhetherthe

governmentshouldpayfor

jobtrainingforthosewholosejobsduetoatransitionawayfromfossilfuels

21%1%

78%

Thegovernmentshouldpayforjobtraining

Thegovernmentshouldnotpayforjobtraining

Don’tknow

Figure5.Americanpublicopiniononwhetherthe

governmentshouldspendmoneytofillabandonedoilwells

3%21%

76%

Thegovernmentshouldfillabandonedoilwells

Thegovernmentshouldnotfillabandonedoilwells

Don’tknow

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ClimateInsights2024|AmericanClimatePolicyOpinions

Figure6.PercentageofAmericanswhothinkthattheUSgovernmentshouldgiveutilitiestaxbreakstoproduceelectricityfromwater,wind,andsolarpower

100%

90%..

80%72%

70%60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10%

0%

200820102012201420162018202020222024

exchangeformakingmoreelectricityfromwater,

wind,andsolarsources.However,thisisastatisticallysignificantdeclinefromthe85percentseenin2020,andarecordlowsince2006(seeFigure6).

Slightchangestothequestionwordingyielded

similarresults:76percentofAmericansin2024favoreithermandatesortaxbreaksforutilitiestoreducegreenhousegasemissionsfrompowerplants.Thisnumberisnotsignificantlydifferentfromthe82

percentseenin2020andisaboutthesameasithasbeensince2009.Before2009,thisproportionwasslightlyhigher:86percentand88percentin2006and2007,respectively(seeFigure7).

13

percentagepointsfewer

AmericansbelievethattheUSgovernmentshouldoffertaxbreakstoutilitiesinexchangeformakingmoreelectricity

fromrenewablesourcesin2024than2020.

Figure7.PercentageofAmericanswhothinkthattheUSgovernmentshould

eitherrequireorgivetaxbreakstolowergreenhousegasemissionsfrompowerplants

100%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

200820102012201420162018202020222024

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StanfordUniversityandResourcesfortheFuture

Increasingtheenergyefficiencyofproducts

Abouttwo-thirdsofAmericansfavorgovernmenteffortsthroughtaxbreaksormandatestoimprovetheenergyefficiencyofvariousconsumerproducts(seeFigure8).

Specifically,62percentofAmericansin2024favor

increasingthefuelefficiencyofautomobiles,a

statisticallysignificantdropfromthe72percentseenin2020.

68percentfavorincreasingtheenergyefficiencyofappliances,similartothe71percentobservedin2020.

69percentfavorincreasingtheenergyefficiencyofnewbuildings,astatisticallysignificantdeclinefromthe76percentin2020.

Sequesteringcarbon

In2024,63percentofAmericansfavorreducing

emissionsbysequestering(i.e.,capturingandstoring)carbonreleasedbyburningcoal.Thislevelofsupporthasbeensteadyoverthepast15years(seeFigure9).

Figure9.PercentageofAmericanswho

favortheUSgovernmentgivingtaxbreakstocompaniestoreduceairpollutionfromburningcoal

63%

100% 90% 80% 70%

●

60%

50%40%30%20%10%

0%

20082012201620202024

Figure8.PercentageofAmericanswho

thinktheUSgovernmentshouldeither

requireorgivetaxbreakstoconstruct

moreenergy-efficientcars,appliances,andbuildings

Energy-efficientcars

100%90%

80%70%60%

62%

50% 40% 30% 20% 10%

0%

20082012201620202024

Energy-efficientappliances

100%90%

68%

80%

70%···· 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10%

0%

20082012201620202024

Energy-efficientbuildings

100%90%

69%

80%70%

60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10%

0%

200820102012201420162018202020222024

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ClimateInsights2024|AmericanClimatePolicyOpinions

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aStanfordUniversity,ResourcesfortheFuture,andReconMR

emissions,makingitthe

surveyed.

mostpopularpolicywe

84%ofrespondents

favorimporttaxestiedto

ClimateInsights2024|AmericanUnderstandingofClimateChange

DRAFTVERSION—DONOTDISTRIBUTE

ModeratelyPopularPolicies(50–60percentapproval)

Reducingsubsidiesforfossilfuels

In2024,weaskedforthefirsttimewhetherthefederalgovernmentshouldcontinueitslong-standingpracticeofofferingsubsidiestooilandnaturalgascompaniesbyreducingtheirtaxes.

61percentofAmericansfavorendinggovernmentreductionofoilcompanies’taxes,and37percentbelievethesesubsidiesshouldcontinue.

42percentofAmericansfavorendinggovernmentreductionofnaturalgascompanies’taxes,and56percentbelievethatthesesubsidiesshouldcontinue.

Taxinggreenhousegases

Whenaskedwhethercompaniesshouldbechargedataxforeverytonofgreenhousegasestheyemit,54percentofrespondentswereinfavorin2024,astatistically

significantdeclinefromthe66percentobservedin2020(figure10).

Creatingacap-and-tradeprogram

Althougheconomistsgenerallyassertthatacarbontaxincentivizescompanies

toreduceemissions(BaumolandOates,1971;ClimateLeadershipCouncil,2019;

MarronandToder,2014;Montgomery,1972;WorldBank,2017),acarbontaxdoesnotguaranteethatsuchemissionsreductionswillhappen.

Figure10.PercentageofAmericanswhofavortaxinggreenhousegases

100%

80%

60%

54%

●

40%

20%

0%

201420162018202020222024

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ClimateInsights2024|AmericanClimatePolicyOpinions

Figure11.PercentageofAmericanswhofavoracap-and-dividendpolicy

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

●

52%

201420162018202020222024

Acap-and-tradeorcap-and-dividendpolicy,on

theotherhand,arealternativepoliciesinwhich

agovernmentsetsalimit,or‘cap,’onemissions.

Thecapisimposedbygovernment-issuedpermits

thatlimitemissions.Thegovernmentgives,sells,

orauctionsthepermitstocompanies,creatingan

opportunitytogeneraterevenue.Acap-and-dividendprogramwouldreturnthisrevenuetoconsumers

througharebate.

ThelogicinaskingthisquestionaboutcapandtradeistoassesswhethermoreAmericanswouldfavoragreenhousegastaxifassuredthatitwouldresultinemissionsreductions.However,weshowcap-and-

tradeandcap-and-dividendpoliciesarenotnotablymorepopularthanstraightforwardtaxes.

In2024,52percentofAmericansfavoracap-and-

dividendpolicy,astatisticallysignificantdeclinefromthe63percentobservedin2020(seeFIgure11).

Subsidizingsolarpanels

In2024,weaskedrespondentswhetherthefederalgovernmentshouldspendmoneytohelppeople

installsolarpanelsonhousesandapartment

buildings.Respondentswererandomlyassignedtobeaskedoneoffourversionsofthequestion.Twoversionsaskedaboutthegovernmentpayingalloftheinstallationcosts,andtheothertwoversionsaskedaboutthegovernmentpayingsomeofthecosts.

Forhalfofeachgroup(chosenrandomly),thequestionwasprecededbythisintroduction:

“Solarpanelscangenerateelectricitywhenthesunisshining,andthatelectricitycanbestoredinbatteriestobeusedwhenthesunisnotout.However,

companiesthatmakeelectricitycannotinstall

enoughsolarpanelstomakealloftheelectricity

neededinthecountry.Peoplecanputsolarpanels

ontheroofsofmanyhousesandapartmentbuildingssomuchmoreofAmerica’selectricitycanbemadefromthesun.Butitisexpensivetodothis,andmostpeoplecannotaffordtopaythatamountofmoney.”

Amongpeoplewhodidnotheartheintroduction,51percentfavorthegovernmentpayingsomeofthe

cost,and42percentfavorthegovernmentpayingallofthecosts.

Amongpeoplewhodidheartheintroduction,77

percentfavorthegovernmentpayingsomeofthe

cost,and74percentfavorthegovernmentpayingallofthecosts.

Permittingreform

In2024,weaskedwhetherthefederalgovernment

shouldexpeditetheprocessofgrantingpermitsto

buildnewpowerplantsthatmakeelectricityfrom

sourcesotherthancoalandpetroleum.52percentofAmericansfavorexpeditingthisprocess.

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StanfordUniversityandResourcesfortheFuture

LeastPopularPolicies(<50percentapproval)

Nuclearpowertaxbreaks

Althoughnuclearpowerdoesnotdirectlyemit

greenhousegases,taxbreaksfortheconstructionofnewnuclearpowerplantsareamongtheleastpopularpoliciesaskedaboutin2024.47percentofAmericansfavorthispolicy;however,itisnotablethatthisisa

statisticallysignificantincreasefromthe37percentobservedin2020(seeFIgure12).

All-electricvehicletaxbreaks

In2024,46percentofAmericans—arecordlow—thinkthegovernmentshouldrequireorgivetaxbreaksto

companiestobuildall-electricvehicles,astatisticallysignificantdeclinefromthe60percentobservedin

2015whenthisquestionwaslastasked(seeFigure13).

Taxesonconsumers

Theleastpopularpoliciesimposenewtaxeson

consumerstoincentivizethemtoconsumelessfossilfuel.FewAmericansfavorincreasingtaxesonretailgasolineandelectricitypurchasesforthispurpose.15percentapproveincreasingtaxesonelectricity,astatisticallysignificantdeclinefromthe28percent

observedin2020.Likewise,28percentapprove

increasingtaxesongasoline,astatisticallysignificantdeclinefromthe41percentobservedin2020(see

Figure14).

Figure12.PercentageofAmericanswhofavortheUSgovernmentgivingtaxbreakstocompaniestobuildnuclearpowerplants

100%

80%

60%47%

40%

20%

0%

20082012201620202024

Figure13.PercentageofAmericanswho

thinkthattheUSgovernmentshouldeitherrequireorgivetaxbreakstocompaniestoconstructall-electricvehicles

100%

80%

60%46%

●

●

40%

20%

0%

200820122016202