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ElectricityMarketVisions

TOSUPPORTARELIABLEANDAFFORDABLEELECTRICGRIDUNDERELECTRICITYDECARBONIZATION

March2025ES

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ELECTRICITYMARKETVISIONSENERGYSYSTEMSINTEGRATIONGROUPii

ELECTRICITYMARKETVISIONSENERGYSYSTEMSINTEGRATIONGROUPiii

ElectricityMarketVisionstoSupportaReliableandAffordableElectricGridUnderElectricityDecarbonization

AReportbytheEnergySystemsIntegrationGroup’s

ElectricityMarketsUnder100%CleanElectricityTaskForce

WritingTeam

ErikEla,EnergySystemsIntegrationGroup,EPRI

RobinHytowitz,TaskForceChairRyanSchoppe,EPRI

RobGramlich,GridStrategies

KelliJoseph,UniversityofPennsylvaniaJacobMays,CornellUniversity

DebraLew,EnergySystemsIntegrationGroup

TaskForceMembers

ManojKumarAgrawal,

GridControllerofIndiaLimitedMohitAgrawal,NextEraEnergy

FarhadBillimoria,AuroraEnergyResearch

FrankBerring,SMAAmerica

AaronBurdick,Energyand

EnvironmentalEconomics(E3)

ScottBurger,FormEnergy

ConleighByers,HarvardUniversity

JuanPabloCarvallo,Lawrence

BerkeleyNationalLaboratory

YonghongChen,NationalRenewableEnergyLaboratory

PatrickDanner,NewYorkPowerAuthority

WilliamD’haeseleer,KULeuvenResearchandDevelopment

JoshuaDillon,PineGateRenewables

MarkDrummond,IndependentElectricitySystemOperator

PengweiDu,ElectricReliabilityCouncilofTexas

WillFrazier,encoord

BethanyFrew,NationalRenewableEnergyLaboratory

MichaelGoggin,GridStrategies

JimGonzalez,SouthwestPowerPool

JessicaGreenberg,EnelGreenPower

KarlHausker,WorldResourcesInstitute

ELECTRICITYMARKETVISIONSENERGYSYSTEMSINTEGRATIONGROUPiv

SamanthaHoffman,TransAltaHanneleHolttinen,RecognisOyJonJensen,WesternElectricityCoordinatingCouncil

VijithaKandamkumarath,GridControllerofIndiaLimited

LynnKiesling,NorthwesternUniversityBheshajKrishnappa,SolarEnergy

IndustriesAssociation

DanieleLerede,OpenEnergyTransitionToddLevin,ArgonneNationalLaboratoryEliMassey,MidcontinentIndependent

SystemOperator

JacobMays,CornellUniversity

MarianoMezzatesta,BonnevillePowerAdministration

MichaelMilligan,MilliganGridSolutions,Inc.

DavidMindham,EDPRenewables

ZacharyMing,EnergyandEnvironmentalEconomics(E3)

FranciscoMuñoz,GeneradorasdeChilePramilaNirbhavane,NewYork

IndependentSystemOperator

KazuhikoOgimoto,UniversityofTokyoArneOlson,EnergyandEnvironmentalEconomics(E3)

GlendaOskar,U.S.DepartmentofEnergyKarenPalmer,ResourcesfortheFuture

MichelePastor,Enernex

CodyPhillips,ConnectGen

KevinPorter,ExeterAssociatesPramodKumarPrajapati,

GridControllerofIndiaLimited

MollyRobertson,ResourcesfortheFutureHammadSaleem,IndependentElectricitySystemOperator

MichaelSchowalter,FreshEnergyBrianSergi,NationalRenewable

EnergyLaboratory

PaulSotkiewicz,E-CubedPolicyAssociates

SylvieSpewak,CaliforniaIndependentSystemOperator

ElinaSpyrou,ImperialCollegeLondonGordStephen,NationalRenewable

EnergyLaboratory

MuthuSubramanian,Independent

SystemOperatorforNewEngland

MichaelTita,FederalEnergyRegulatoryCommission

KarinWadsack,NationalRenewableEnergyLaboratory

ThisreportwasdevelopedbaseduponfundingfromtheAllianceforSustainableEnergy,LLC,ManagingandOperatingContractorfortheNationalRenewableEnergyLaboratoryforthe

U.S.DepartmentofEnergy.

SuggestedCitation

EnergySystemsIntegrationGroup.2025.ElectricityMarketVisionstoSupportaReliableand

AffordableElectricGridUnderElectricityDecarbonization.Reston,VA.

https://www.esig.energy/

market-evolution-report

/.

Disclaimer

Thisreportwasproducedbyataskforcemadeupofdiversememberswithdiverseviewpoints

andlevelsofparticipation.Specificstatementsmaynotnecessarilyrepresentaconsensusamongallparticipantsortheviewsofparticipants’employers.

ELECTRICITYMARKETVISIONSENERGYSYSTEMSINTEGRATIONGROUPv

Contents

viiExecutiveSummary

1

Introduction

2

ElectricityMarketsUnderDeepDecarbonization:

LiteratureReviewandTaskForceWorkshops

2

FourKeyPrinciplesforElectricityMarkets’Objectives,Today

andintheFuture

3

ASharedViewofaBeneficialDesignofFutureElectricityMarkets

5

AssumptionsAboutandCharacteristicsof100%CleanElectricitySystems

andTheirImplications

5

TheResourceMix:PathwaystoMeet100%CleanElectricity

10

TransmissionandOtherInfrastructure

12

ReliabilityonaSystemwithHighLevelsofWeather-Dependent,

Variable,Uncertain,andInverter-BasedResources

13

WholesaleEnergyPricesandPriceFormationwith

Zero-Fuel-CostResources

14

IncorporatingCleanEnergyPoliciesasanExternalityWithin

theWholesaleMarkets

15

AVisionforMarketDesignandMarketStructureinFutureSystems

with100%CleanElectricity

15

TheVision

17

TheContinuationofPresentMarketStructures

20

TheContinuationofShort-TermEnergyandGridServices

SpotMarkets

29

HybridMarketApproachestoEnsuringResourceAdequacy,

RiskMitigation,andInvestmentCertainty

33

MarketsShouldNotSubsidizeCleanElectricityResources

butCanFacilitateOutsidePolicyInstrumentsThatProvide

IncentivesandSubsidiestoCleanElectricityResources

34

SummaryofPossibleFutureMarketDesignsIncluding

AlternativeProposals

ELECTRICITYMARKETVISIONSENERGYSYSTEMSINTEGRATIONGROUPvi

35

PossibleNextStepsforRealizationoftheMarketDesignVision

35

PotentialActions

36

IdentifyingMetricstoEvaluateFutureMarketDesigns

38

LookingForward

38

SummaryoftheMarketDesignVision

40

Evolution,NotRevolution

40

ANeedforGlobalCollaboration

41

References

PHOTOS

Cover:©iStockphoto/GaleanuMihai

p.vii:©iStockphoto/NigelHarris

p.x:©iStockphoto/zhengzaishuru

p.1:©iStockphoto/UniqueMotionGraphics

p.2:©iStockphoto/Vadim_Key

p.4:©iStockphoto/KEZHUANG

p.5:©iStockphoto/AntonioCorread’Almeida

p.6:©iStockphoto/KEZHUANG

p.8:©iStockphoto/Stilo_studio

p.10:©iStockphoto/Urban78

p.12:©iStockphoto/vovashevchuk

p.13:©iStockphoto/LaurenceDutton

p.15:©iStockphoto/KEZHUANG

p.17:©iStockphoto/GaleanuMihai

p.20:©iStockphoto/ThalesAntonio

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p.30:©iStockphoto/gremlin

p.32:©iStockphoto/MonaMakela

p.35:©iStockphoto/damircudic

p.37:©iStockphoto/NicoElNino

ELECTRICITYMARKETVISIONSENERGYSYSTEMSINTEGRATIONGROUPvii

ExecutiveSummary

A

stheelectricitygridcontinuestoevolveand

themixofelectricitysuppliersmovestowardone wherethereareclean,emissions-freesuppliers,opportunitiesandchallengesarise.Withthesechanges,organizedelectricitymarketscanplayakeyroleinthefutureinachievingasystemthatmaintainsthegoalsofaffordabilityandreliabilityandfostersfurtherinnova-tion.TheEnergySystemsIntegrationGroupconvenedtheElectricityMarketsUnder100%CleanElectricityTaskForcetoevaluatethepotentialdesignofelectricity

Organizedelectricitymarketscanplaya

keyroleinthefutureinachievingasystemthatmaintainsthegoalsofaffordabilityandreliabilityandfostersfurtherinnovation.

marketsunderasysteminwhichallelectricityis

suppliedfromclean,zero-emittingsupplyresources.

Taskforceparticipantsincludedexpertsfrominde-

pendentsystemoperatorsandregionaltransmission

organizations,expertpractitioners,developers,and

otherkeystakeholdergroups.Theprimarygoalwas

todeterminewhatkindofdesignwillbebeneficial

tosocietywhilealsoconsideringfuturestructures,

institutions,andpolicies.Itwasacollaborativeeffort

todescribeacoherentvisionofhowafutureelectricitymarketcanprovideefficientsignalssuchthatmeetingelectricitydemandwithallzero-emittingcleanenergyresourcesleadstoareliableandaffordablesystemthatisfairandequitable.Thisreportpresentsacollective

visionregardingparticulargoalsandcorefundamentalsaswellashighlightsareasstillunderactivedebate.

FigureES-1(p.viii)showssixkeycategoriesthat

needconsiderationforfuturemarkets.

Theelectricitymarketcanachievemanygoals,but

itcannotdoeverything.Insomecasestheincentives

thatarebuiltintothemarketdesigncanbechangedbydesignersorregulatorsbasedonwhatthechallengesareandwheresolutionsareneeded.Wefocusonfourkey

principlesforwhatamarketneedstodotodayandin

thefuture(FigureES-2,p.ix):(1)toenableinnovationsuchthatmarketdesignsarenotfixedtothecurrent

setoftechnologiesbutrathershowtherightsignals

toimproveupontheexistingtechnologywhencost-

effective,(2)toincentivizeinvestmentdecisions(entryandexit)whentheyareneededtomeetreliabilityneedsandmaximizeefficiency,(3)toallowforhedgingfrom

suppliersandconsumersalikewhenuncertaintyorvari-abilitycanincreaserisk,and(4)toprovideanincentivefortheexistingparticipantsinthemarkettooperateinawaytomaximizeefficiencyandtocontributetoreliability.

ELECTRICITYMARKETVISIONSENERGYSYSTEMSINTEGRATIONGROUPviii

FIGUREES-1

CategoriesofChangeforFutureMarketDesignVision

Transmission

andother

infrastructure

Incentivesand

policiestoachieve

thenecessary

cost-effective

infrastructure

Electricity

Market

Components

services

Resource

adequacyand

investment

Efficiententryandexit

thatleadstoanadequate

supplysystem

Operationalreliabilityservices

Incentivesforresources

toprovidetheshort-term

operationalgrid

Price

formation

Intheshortterm,

howpricesareformed

andalignwith

operational

decisions

Demand

participation

Promoting

demand-sidesupport

throughpricesand

gridsignals

Cleanenergyincentives

Howtoincentivize

theefficienttransition

tocleanenergy

resources

Severalcategorieswerediscussedaspartoftheworkshopsandtaskforcediscussionthatneed

considerationwhensharingthefuturemarketdesignvision.Theseincludedpriceformation,cleanenergyincentives,resourceadequacyandinvestment,operationalreliabilityservices,demand

participation,andtransmissionandotherinfrastructure.

Source:EnergySystemsIntegrationGroup.

Allfourprincipleswerekeptinmindfor

anyfuturemarketdesignproposalandwereleveragedthroughoutthereport.

Keepingallfourprinciplesinmindforanyfuture

marketdesignproposaliskeyandleveragedthroughoutthereport.

Todevelopthefuturemarketdesignvision,several

assumptionsweremadeaboutthepowersystemanditsassociatedcharacteristics.Notimeframeorspecificmixwaslaidout,asregionswillvaryinthisregard.Butit

wasassumedthatthisfuturesystemwouldcontain

substantialamountsofvariablerenewableenergysuch

aswindandsolar,withasubstantialamountofenergy

storageresources.Itmaybelikelythatthesetechnologiesarebuiltprimarilyatthetransmissionscale,wherelarge-scaletransmissionexpansionandinnovativetransmissiontechnologiesallowfordeliveryoftheirenergytoload

centers.Butthetechnologiescouldalsohaveagreater

presenceonthedistributionnetworkasdistributed

energyresources,therebypotentiallylesseningthe

transmissionneed.Itwasalsoassumedthatareasonableamountofcapacitythatiszero-emittingbutalsowithfirmandlong-durationavailabilitywouldbepresent

tomaintainreliabilityduringcriticaltimeperiods.The

ELECTRICITYMARKETVISIONSENERGYSYSTEMSINTEGRATIONGROUPix

FIGUREES-2

FourKeyPrinciplesThatMarketsAimtoAccomplish

InnovateInvestHedgeOperate

Isthereameans

fornewtechnologiesto

enterandcompete?

Ifanewresourceor

capitalprojectisefficient

andcompetitive,is

thereanincentiveforan

investortoinstall?

Ifefficiencycauses

uncertainty,can

participantshedge

againstit?

Isthereincentive

tooperatethefacility

inthemostefficient

andreliablemanner

possible?

Successfulmarketsmustincentivizeinnovation,investmentincapital,hedgingagainstrisk,andbehaviortooperateinwaysthatleadtoreliableandeconomicallyefficientoutcomes.

Source:EnergySystemsIntegrationGroup.

amountofthistypeofresourcewilldependinpartonhowmuchofthedemandisresponsivetopricesandgridneeds.

Certainchallengesexistintoday’ssystemsbutare

amplifiedonasystemwiththismake-upofresources.

Thissystemleadstochallengestoreliabilityandresourceadequacy,andaffectsthedistributionoftheresulting

wholesaleprices.Dependingonthesystem’smake-up,

therecouldbeadditionalchallengesofbuildingsufficientinfrastructureormeetingthecontrolandvisibility

necessaryforreliability.Itisalsoconfrontedwiththe

lackofdirectcompetitivecleanenergyincentiveswithinthemarkettonaturallybringcleanenergyresources

tothemix.

Giventheseassumptionsandchallenges,thetaskforce

lookedatmarketdesignsthatcouldenableanaffordableandreliablesystemassocietytransitionstothatfuture.Thereportsharesdetailsoffutureelectricitymarketsdis-cussedbythetaskforce.Itconsidersthemanyproposalsandreviewsintheliteratureandprovidesashared—butnotconsensus—visionoffuturemarketswithafocusonthesixcomponentsinFigureES-1.Thefundamentalsofthefuturemarketvisiondescribedinthereportgenerallywereagreedonbymanytaskforceparticipants,althoughalternativepathswerealsoproposedandsupportedby

thegroup.Forexample,someparticipantsrecommended

substantialcoordinationbetweenpolicymakersandgridplannersasawaytoachieveresourceadequacywith

afeasibleresourcemixandinfrastructureinvestmentsinplace.

ElementsoftheMarketDesignVision

Whilemarketstructure—themake-upofthe

marketandtheresponsibilitiesofdifferententities—

isimportant,thetaskforceprimarilyfocusedonthe

marketdesignforitsvision.Thefollowingeleven

designelementsencapsulatethefuturemarketdesign

vision.Somearemoreconcreteandwithbroaderagree-mentamongtaskforceparticipants,whileforothers

onlythegeneralobjectivewasagreeduponandimple-mentationproposalsvaried.Someareona“businessasusual”path,whileothers,thoughnotnecessarily

suggestingmajorredesigns,doshowsubstantialchangesfromthestatusquo.

PriceFormation—IncentivizetoOperate

Amajorityofthetaskforceagreedthattheexisting

largeregionalenergymarketswithbid-basedeconomicdispatchandnodalmarginalcostpricingwithsufficientlocationalandtemporalgranularitywouldremainlargelyinplaceasawaytoincentivizeoperationalbehaviorandprovidesignalsthatcanhelpinvestmentdecisionmaking.

ELECTRICITYMARKETVISIONSENERGYSYSTEMSINTEGRATIONGROUPx

PriceFormation—IncentivizetoOperateandtoInvest

Taskforceparticipantsagreedthatshortageorscarcitypricingwouldbeusedthatdrivespriceshighwhencon-ditionswarrant.Extendedreservedemandcurvescouldbeusedthatwouldallowforlessvolatileshortagepricesbeforetheactualscarcityconditionbecomesapparent,whileprovidingbeneficialoperationalincentives.

PriceFormation—IncentivizetoOperate

Whileparticipantsbelievedthatexistingenergymarketdesignshouldlargelycontinue,theyalsothoughtthat

someincrementalchangescouldcontinuetobeconsid-eredsuchasimprovedsectorcoordination,regional

seamsmanagementandefficiencyimprovements,marketpowermitigationprocedures,andexplorationofwhethertheunitcommitmenttoolformarketclearingisstill

necessaryandwhatmightreplaceit.Stakeholdersandresearchersshouldcontinuetoexplorethefeasibilityoffurthergranularityofpricing,suchasdistributionnetworkpricing,todeterminewhetheritispracticalandwhetheritprovidesbenefitsthatoutweighthe

complexityandadministrativecosts.

PriceFormation—IncentivizetoInnovateandtoOperate

Toincentivizeinnovationinenergyandgridservice

supplytechnologies,thetaskforcefavoredparticipation

modelsthatarepreemptiveandprioritizedforreliability,butthatdonotpreventorstallnewtechnologiesthatarecompetitivefromparticipatingintheelectricitymarket.Participantsbelievedthatmarketdesignshouldstrive

fortechnologyneutralitybutnotattributeneutrality.

DemandParticipation—IncentivizetoOperateandtoInnovate

Thetaskforcebelievedthatmechanismsshouldbe

exploredtoenablemoredemandresourcestosupportgridreliabilitythantheydotoday,includinggiving

accesstosystemcostsandpricesonasgranularabasisaspossibleforthesubsetofthosedemandresources

thatchoosetoparticipate,whileprotectingcertaincustomerclassesfromfinancialharmandkeepingequityobjectivesinmind.

OperationalReliability—IncentivizetoOperateandtoInnovate

Taskforceparticipantsagreedthatcontinualevaluationisneededofwhethernewoperationalreliabilityproductsarenecessaryandwhethercompetitivemarketsforthoseproductswouldprovideadditionalbenefitsthatoutweightheircostsandadministrativeburden.Anyresource,

regardlessofitstechnology,thatdemonstratesadequateattributesandperformanceshouldbequalifiedto

participateinthatservice.

ELECTRICITYMARKETVISIONSENERGYSYSTEMSINTEGRATIONGROUPxi

OperationalReliability—IncentivizetoOperateandtoInvest

Therewasashortdiscussionaroundwhetherthe

opportunitycostdesignforancillaryservicemarketsissufficientbyitselfwithextendedoperatingreservedemandcurves,andwhetherforwardcontractsforgridservicesmaybenecessaryforcertainservices.

ResourceAdequacy—IncentivizetoInvestandtoHedge

Thetaskforcelargelyagreedthatenergymarketsandrelatedmarketmechanismsbythemselvesmaynot

accomplishallthefunctionstoensureinvestmentofanadequateandefficientsupplyportfoliothatmeetsthecleanenergycriteria.Interventionsmaybeneededforresourceadequacyandforcertainreliabilityattributesaswellasforinfrastructure.Thetaskforcedifferedontheemphasisandtheextentoftheintervention,anditconsideredseveraldifferentdesignapproachestothissuchasexistingcapacitymarkets,strongcoordinated

generationandinfrastructureplanning,mandatorycontractsforhedging,andothers.

TransmissionandOtherInfrastructure—IncentivizetoInvestandtoInnovate

Mostofthetaskforcethoughtthatsubstantialtrans-missionexpansionandotheradditionalinfrastructure,currentlydecideduponlargelyoutsideofthewholesalemarkets,mayneedfurtherconsiderationtoenablethecleanenergytransition.Workablepolicythatcould

incentivizeinnovationandefficientinvestmentininfrastructureshouldbeexploredfurther.

CleanEnergyIncentives—IncentivizetoInvestandtoInnovate

Manyinthetaskforcebelievedthatcleanenergyincen-tiveshavesoundeconomicprinciplesanddesignsthat

focusonreducingemissions.Theythoughtthatmarketdesignerscanplayaroletofacilitateregional/state

policiesandaccommodateefficienttradingofenergy

withpoliciesbuiltinasconstraintsinthemarketdesign.

CleanEnergyIncentives—IncentivizetoOperateandtoHedge

Ashortdiscussionexploredwhetherloadscouldor

shouldinputtheirwillingnesstopurchasecleanenergy

withintheelectricitymarketsandwhetherthemarketsshouldprovidetransparencytothepremiumthatmaybepaidforthatcleanenergy.

AsseeninFigureES-3(C)(p.xii),ingeneral,price

formationandthemodificationstodesignoftheenergymarketwererelativelyminoraspartofthisvisionand

remainontheircurrenttrajectory.Largerchangeswereenvisionedbythetaskforceacrossthecategoriesof

demand-sideparticipationandresourceadequacy,

investment,andhedging.Theserelatetotheexpansion

ofdemand-sideresourcesbeingabletosupportthegridthroughmoregranularpricingorotherwise,andthe

needformandatorycontractsand/orlarge-scalecoor-

dinationtomeettheinvestmentneedsandresource

adequacyofafuture100%cleanelectricitysystem.

Whilesolutionsaroundinfrastructurewerenotdiscussedextensively,thetaskforcediddiscusstheneedtoexpandtransmissionandotherinfrastructuresuchasdistributionandfueldeliveryinfrastructure,whichmaybedonethroughpolicymechanisms.Thesamediscussionoccurredregard-ingcleanenergyincentives.Substantialchangeswere

notdiscussedatlengthregardingoperationalreliabilityneeds,butthevisionnoteshowneworincreasedneedsforgridservicesshouldbecontinuallystudiedand

discusseswhethertheycontinuetoincentivizeoperation,investment,hedging,andinnovation.

Recommendations

Thetaskforceprovidedafewrecommendations.Forthepartsofthevisionwherebroadagreementwasreached,stakeholderscanworktogethertodeterminewhether

anyadditionalresearchorimplementationdetailsare

neededforfurtherimplementation.Italsomightbeworthconsideringwhetherpolicyandrulechangesareneces-sarygiventheamountoftimethatsomeofthesemay

taketomovefromideatoapprovaltoimplementation.

Forthosepartsofthevisionwhereseveraldifferingim-plementationsstillexistedamongtaskforceparticipants,suchashowefficientinvestmentandhedgingcouldbeattainedunderthecleansupplyscenario,furtherwork

mayberequiredtoevaluatethepotentialoutcomesto

seewhichoptionsmayworkbestinwhichsituations.

Metricsareneededthatcanevaluatemarketdesignpro-posals,andconsensusonwhichmetricstofocusonand

ELECTRICITYMARKETVISIONSENERGYSYSTEMSINTEGRATIONGROUPxii

FIGUREES-3

ViewingtheScaleofChangeofMarketDesignFuturesbyCategory

Demand

participation

Transmission

andother

infrastructure

Transmission

andother

infrastructure

(B)

Major

Redesign

Resource

adequacyand

investment

Operationalreliabilityservices

Cleanenergyincentives

Demand

participation

Price

formation

(A)

Operationalreliabilityservices

Price

formation

Resource

adequacyand

investment

Cleanenergyincentives

BAU

Demand

participation

Transmission

andother

infrastructure

(C)MarketDesignVision

Price

formation

Operationalreliabilityservices

Resource

Cleanenergyincentives

adequacyand

investment

Themarketdesignvisioncanbeexpressedusingarosechartacrossthesixcategoriesshownhere.Theupperleft-handside(A)illustratesbusinessasusualwhiletheupperright-handside(B)illustrateswhatacompletemajorredesignwouldlooklike.Thebottomimage(C)expressesthemarketdesignvisioninthispaperintheseterms.

Source:EnergySystemsIntegrationGroup.

Metricsareneededthatcanevaluatemarketdesignproposals,andconsensusonwhich

metricstofocusonandhowtheycanbecombinediscritical.

howtheycanbecombinediscritical.Insomecases,

marketdesignpilotscanbeintroducedtobegingather-inginformationonpromisingdesignproposalsthatarepromisingbutuntested.Further,determiningwhether

theremaybeconsensusfromtechnicalexpertsbeyondthistaskforceisimportant.Thatconsensuscanbeveryhelpfulfordecisionmakersandpolicymakers.

Lastly,thetaskforcerecognizesthatglobalcollaborationiskey.Differentregionsmayseeacleanelectricityfutureatdifferenttimesandthusmayintroducemarketdesignandpolicyatdifferentpoints.Globalcollaborationwill

becriticalforunderstandingimpacts,includingsharingbothfailuresandsuccesses,andexploringfutureconceptsandideasthatcansupporttheevolutiontoward100%

cleanelectricity.

ELECTRICITYMARKETVISIONSENERGYSYSTEMSINTEGRATIONGROUP1

Introduction

transformation.Theresourcemixischanging,bothwithincreasedvariablerenewableenergysources

E

lectricpowersystemsareundergoingmajor

(VRES)andenergy-limitedresources,includingelectricstorageresources.Climatepoliciescontinuetoarisein

manystateswithintheUnitedStatesandworldwide.

Demand-sideresources,includingthoseconnecting

atdistributionsystemsandthosebehindthecustomer

meter,arealsoincreasi