【未来能源研究所】资源收入共享协议-2025.11

ResourceRevenue-Sharing

Agreements

AbenaBoafoaDarkwah,LucijaMuehlenbachs,andLaurelWheeler

WorkingPaper25-29November2025

AbouttheAuthors

AbenaBoafoaDarkwahisaPhDcandidateineconomicsattheUniversityofCalgary.

LucijaMuehlenbachsisaprofessorofeconomicsattheUniversityofCalgaryandauniversityfellowatResourcesfortheFuture(RFF).Shehaspublishedextensivelyontheoilandgasindustry,coveringtopicssuchaswellreactivation,methaneleaks,propertyvalueimpacts,shale-relatedtraficaccidents,wastewatercomposition,andeffectsonwaterquality.

LaurelWheelerisanassistantprofessorattheUniversityofAlbertawithresearch

interestsindevelopmentandlaboreconomics.WheelerholdsaPhDandanMAin

economicsfromDukeUniversityandanMScineconomicsfordevelopmentfromtheUniversityofOxford.HerresearchinterestscenterIndigenouseconomicdevelopmentandlabormarketsinlow-incomecountries.

Acknowledgements

WethankRiccardoFicarellaforresearchassistance.WearegratefultoKayliAvveduti,JoshBurger,TaniadeSilva,BillyPizer,BeiaSpillerandTrevorTombeforfeedback.Thisprojectreceivedin-kindsupportfromtheConfederacyofTreaty6FirstNationsandfundingfromaSSHRCPartnershpEngageGrant.

AboutRFF

ResourcesfortheFuture(RFF)isanindependent,nonprofitresearchinstitutioninWashington,DC.Itsmissionistoimproveenvironmental,energy,andnaturalresourcedecisionsthroughimpartialeconomicresearchandpolicyengagement.RFFis

committedtobeingthemostwidelytrustedsourceofresearchinsightsandpolicysolutionsleadingtoahealthyenvironmentandathrivingeconomy.

Workingpapersareresearchmaterialscirculatedbytheirauthorsforpurposesof

informationanddiscussion.Theyhavenotnecessarilyundergoneformalpeerreview.TheviewsexpressedherearethoseoftheindividualauthorsandmaydiferfromthoseofotherRFFexperts,itsofficers,oritsdirectors.

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ResourceRevenue-SharingAgreements

AbenaBoafoaDarkwah,LucijaMuehlenbachs,andLaurelWheeler*

November14,2025

Abstract

AgrowingnumberofFirstNationsacrossCanadaareenteringintoagreementswithprovincialgovernmentstosharerevenuesfromnaturalresourceextractionwithintheirtraditionalterritories.Yet,littleguidanceexistsonthedesignoftheseResourceRevenue-SharingAgreements(RRSAs).Inthispaper,weexaminepubliclyavailableRRSAstosummarizetheircommoncomponents.Weoutlinethedecisionpointsin-volvedinstructuringanRRSAanddiscusspotentialbenefitsanddrawbacksforFirstNationsconsideringentry.

JEL-Classification:Q28,Q32,J15

Keywords:NaturalResources;RevenueSharing;FirstNations

*Darkwah:UniversityofCalgary,Muehlenbachs:UniversityofCalgaryandResourcesfortheFuture,Wheeler:UniversityofAlberta.WethankRiccardoFicarellaforresearchassistance.WearegratefultoKayliAvveduti,JoshBurger,TaniadeSilva,BillyPizer,BeiaSpillerandTrevorTombeforfeedback.Thisprojectreceivedin-kindsupportfromtheConfederacyofTreaty6FirstNationsandfundingfromaSSHRCPartnershipEngageGrant.

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1Introduction

Themajorityofroyaltiesfromnaturalresourceextractionhashistoricallyflowedtoprovin-cialgovernmentsinCanada.Inrecentdecades,however,FirstNationshaveactivelypursuedashareoftheserevenues,assertingtheirrightstobenefitfromdevelopmentontheirtradi-tionalterritories.Inresponse,someprovinceshaveenteredintoResourceRevenue-SharingAgreements(RRSAs)withFirstNations,allocatingashareofprovincialgovernmentrev-enuesfromresourceprojectstothem.Intheagreementsweexamined,thepercentagessharedvarywidely,from9to45percent.

Canadahasmorethan600FirstNationscommunities,andasof2024,fourprovinceshavenegotiatedRRSAs,includingmorethan200separateonesinBritishColumbia(BC).Despitetheirgrowingprevalenceandpotentialeconomicimportance,nostandardizedframeworkor“manual”existsfordesigningorimplementingRRSAs.Asaresult,provincesandFirstNationsoftennavigatethemcasebycase,drawingfromlimitedprecedentandafragmentedsetofexamples.WeconductaframeworkanalysisofexistingRRSAs,focusingonthosethatoperateindependentlyofmodernlandclaimsettlements.1WeconcentrateonstandaloneRRSAswithprovinces.TheseexistinOntario,BC,Manitoba,andNewBrunswick,butonlythoseinOntarioandBCaremadepublic.Ouranalysisentailscategorizingthestructureofpubliclyavailableagreements,supplementedbyinformalinterviewswithstakeholdersandpolicymakers.Thoughweanalyzethedataimpartially,weincludesectionsthatoutlinethepotentialcostsandbenefitsofRRSAstoFirstNationsspecifically.WealsohighlightimportantexistingandemergingbestpracticesforFirstNationsinRRSAdevelopment.2

TheliteratureonresourcerevenuesharinginCanadahasprimarilyfocusedonImpactBenefitAgreements(IBAs),whicharebetweenFirstNationsandprivatecompanies.Al-

1Somerevenue-sharingarrangementsareembeddedwithinlandclaimagreements,suchasthoseinYukon,Quebec,andtheNorthwestTerritories.Theseareoutsideofthescopeofourwork.

2OurfocusisonagreementsbetweenprovincialgovernmentsandFirstNations.OtherIndigenouspeo-ples/communitiesoutsideofthescopeofourstudymayalsohaveaninterestinformingsimilaragreements.Forexample,theunincorporatedMountainCreecommunitiesaroundGrandCache,RockyMountainHouse,andSmallboyCamphavelobbiedtobeincludedindecisionsaboutcoalminesintheirareas.

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thoughfundamentallydifferentfromRRSAs,whichinvolveprovincialgovernmentsinstead,IBAsshareakeyfeature:allocatingresourcerevenues.MuchoftheliteratureonIBAstakesasimilarapproachtoours,surveyingexistingIBAstocategorizetheirstructuresandas-sesstheirimplications(Rodon,Lemus-LauzonandSchott,2018;AdebayoandWerker,2021;Bairdetal.,2024)andhighlightingbestpractices(GuntonandMarkey,2021;Cascadden,GuntonandRutherford,2021;Dale,2020;Batson,2020).3ManyoftherecommendationsfromtheIBAliteraturewouldberelevantandapplicabletopartiesenteringintoRRSAs(forexample,opencommunicationorprovidingfundingforagreementimplementation(Cascad-den,GuntonandRutherford,2021)).

IncontrasttotherelativelyextensiveliteratureonIBAs,tothebestofourknowledge,noacademicresearchhassystematicallysurveyedtheexistingRRSAsinCanada.Althoughafewnonacademicreportsprovidevaluablesummariesofindividualagreements,theyarelimitedinscopeandnotuptodatewithrecentdevelopments.4Themostrecentreportweidentified,from2018,summarizestheinformationaboutRRSAsforBCandOntario(AboucharandMckay,2018).Ourpapergoesbeyondsummariestoprovidinganin-depthanalysisofRRSAstructures,examininghowtheyaredesignedandgoverned—includinghowFirstNationsengagewithprovincialgovernments,thescopeoftheagreements(sectorwideversusprojectspecific),andhowrevenuesareshared.OurapproachprovidespracticalinsightsintothestructureandfunctionalityofRRSAs.

OurworkistheproductofacollaborationwiththeConfederacyofTreaty6FirstNations(CT6),whichsoughtresearchonhowRRSAsareusedacrossCanada,withparticularatten-

3Forexample,Rodon,Lemus-LauzonandSchott(2018)reviewdifferentmodelsofrevenuedistributionandinvestment,evaluatingtheirpositiveandnegativeimpactsonIndigenouscommunitiesandtheirsus-tainability.Additionally,frominterviewswithFirstNations,government,andindustryleaders,Bairdetal.(2024)presentqualitativefindingsthatexplorewhatmakesanIBAsuccessfulandfromwhoseperspective.

4Forexample,Prospectors&DevelopersAssociationofCanada(2014)releasedarelevantreportonRRSAsin2014.Since2014,bothOntarioandManitobahaveenteredintoRRSAs,andseveralupdatestoRRSAstructureshavebeenmade.BCrestructureditsforestryrevenue-sharingmodel,leadingtoareported$63millionincreaseinrevenuesfromtheForestConsultationandRevenue-SharingAgreements(FCRSAs)in2022–2023(GovernmentofBritishColumbia,2022).

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tiontovariationsindesign.5AlthoughinitiatedthroughourworkwithCT6inAlberta,ourfindingsarereadilygeneralizabletobroaderRRSAdiscussionsacrossCanadaandelsewhere.Thesectionsofthepaperareorganizedasfollows.Section2discussesourmethodology.

Section3reviewsexistingagreements,examiningtheirstructuresanddesign.Section4outlinesthebenefitsofanRRSA,andSection5outlinesthepotentialcosts.WehighlightexistingandemergingbestpracticesinSection6.Section7concludesthepaper.

2Methodology

In2024-2025,weconductedareviewofmorethan50RRSAsfromBCandOntario,thetwoprovinceswithpubliclyavailableRSAsontheirwebsites(MinistryofIndigenousRelationsandReconciliation,BC,2024;GovernmentofOntario,2020).ForOntario,wesupplementedtherawdatafromtheagreementswithinformationgatheredthroughinformalinterviews.6Wethenusedtheframeworkanalysismethod(e.g.,RitchieandSpencer,1994)toreducethedimensionalityofandprocessthedata.Weconductedthisapproachmanually(withoutsoftware)anddeductively(withpreselectedthemes).Onekeyadvantageofthisapproachisthatitdoesnotinvolvemajortransformationsofthedata,allowingforeasycategorizationofraw,qualitativedata(Klingberg,StalmeijerandVarpio,2024).Wecategorizedthetextoftheagreementsbasedonwhetheritrelatedtothefollowingthemes:participationtype,agreementscope,applicablegeographicarea,revenuebase,revenueformulas,anduseofrevenue.BecausetheRRSAsemergedfromclosed-doornegotiations,wetreatthedecision-makingprocessthatledtothefinaldesignasablackboxthatislikelyinfluencedbypolitics,preferences,andbargainingpower.Section3reportsourfindings.

Ourmethodologicalapproachisgroundedinprinciplesofmutualbenefits,meaningthatwearecommittedtopursuingresearchthatproducesoutcomesthatFirstNationsperceive

5TheCT6wasestablishedin1993torepresentthecollectiveinterestsofFirstNationssignatoriesofTreaty6.Atthetimeofwriting,CT6represents16memberNations.

6P.GambleandH.Sidky,personalcommunication,July21,2024;P.Gamble,personalcommunication,November28,2024andMarch26,2025.

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tobevaluable(Tri-CouncilPolicyStatement,2018).Asnon-Indigenousresearchers,weacknowledgethatwecannotindependentlydefinewhatconstitutesresearchofvalueandanyattempttodosowouldbeharmful(Kovach,2010).ThroughacollaborationwithCT6,weidentifiedacentralresearchquestion:HowareexistingRRSAsstructured?ThisoffersinsightsthatcouldbenefitthedesignofsimilarframeworksinAlbertaandotherjurisdictions.

3StructureofRRSAs

ThissectionpresentsthecomponentsthatarecommonacrossRRSAsinOntarioandBC,thetwoprovinceswiththemostaccessibleandextensivesetsofpubliclyavailableRRSAdocuments(seeAppendixA.1).AsdescribedinSection2,wedevelopedasetofcate-goriesthroughadeductiveprocessoforganizingrecurringcomponents.Thecategoriesthatemerged—agreementscope,participationtype,applicablegeographicarea,revenuebase,revenueformulas,andrevenueuse—comprisemanyofthemostimportantdecisionsfacingthepartiesdevelopinganRRSA.

3.1AgreementScope

RRSAscanbeimplementedeitherbysectororbyproject.

3.1.1SectorBased

Asector-basedapproachmeansthatagreementsarenegotiatedatthelevelofthesector(i.e.,forestry,mining,orcleanenergy)ratherthanprojectbyproject.ThismodelissimilartotheapproachusedinOntario,whereFirstNationsreceiveafixedpercentageofrevenuesfromentiresectors,suchas45percentofforestryrevenues(timbersales)and40percentofminingrevenues(taxesandroyalties)generatedwithintheirtraditionalterritories.

TheprovinceagreestoshareapercentageofallrevenueitcollectsfromaparticularsectorwithinthegeographicareacoveredbytheFirstNation(s).Forinstance,forFirst

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Nationswithasector-basedagreement,anyforestryorminingprojectthatfallswithintheirtraditionalterritorywouldbecoveredunderthebroadersector-specificagreement.Termsdonotneedtoberenegotiatedforeachindividualprojectwithinthatsector.

Thekeyadvantageofthismodelisitsefficiency.ItavoidstheneedtocreatemultipleRRSAs.Instead,theRRSAcanbebasedonterritorialboundaries:anyprojectwithinthatareaandsectorisautomaticallyincluded.Thissimplifiesadministrationandallowsforsteadyandpredictablerevenueflows.Italsoreducestheneedtorenegotiatetermsforeachindividualdevelopment,whichcansavetimeandadministrativecosts.

However,thesector-basedmodelfaceslimitationsbynotallowingforproject-specificformulas,whichwouldbenecessaryiftheenvironmentalorsocialimpactsofindividualprojectsvary.Asaresult,FirstNationsmayreceiverevenuesthatdonotfullyreflectthetruescaleofbenefitsandburdensassociatedwithaspecificproject.

3.1.2ProjectBased

Incontrast,aproject-basedRRSAinvolvesnegotiatingagreementsindividuallyforeachresourceproject,regardlessofthesector.FirstNationsenterintoaseparateagreementforeveryminingoperation,forestryzone,hydropowerproject,orotherdevelopmentthatfallswithintheircollectiveterritory.ThismodelisusedinBC.

Themainadvantageofproject-basedRRSAsistheirflexibilityandprecision.Becauseeachagreementistailoredtoaspecificproject,itallowsFirstNationsandtheprovincetonegotiatetermsbasedonitsuniquecharacteristicsandprojectedrevenue.ThiscanleadtohigherreturnsforFirstNations,especiallyifaprojectisexpectedtogeneratesubstantialgovernmentrevenuethroughtaxesorroyalties.ItalsogivesFirstNationsmoreopportunitiestoraiseproject-specificconcernsorprioritiesduringnegotiations.

However,project-specificRRSAscomewithchallenges.NegotiatinganRRSAforeveryprojectcanbeonerousforallparties.Itrequiresrepeatedconsultationprocesses,legalreview,andongoingmanagementofmultipleagreements.ForFirstNationsorrepresentative

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councilsalreadyoperatingwithlimitedadministrativecapacity,thisapproachmaynotbepractical.Itcouldalsodelayimplementingrevenueflows,especiallyinregionswithdozensofactiveorplannedprojects.

3.2ParticipationType

RRSAscanbeeitherpooledacrossmanyNations(Section3.2.1)orNation-specific(Section3.2.2)agreements.Eachparticipationtypeisassociatedwithbenefitsanddrawbacks.

3.2.1PooledRRSA

InapooledRRSA,acollectivebodyofFirstNations,typicallyaProvincialTreatyOrgani-zation(PTO),servesastherepresentativesignatoryonbehalfofallmembers.RatherthannegotiatingseparateagreementswitheachNation,theprovinceentersintoasingleonewiththePTO.ThisstructurehasbeenusedinOntario,wherethreeFirstNationsPTOs—GrandCouncilTreaty3,WabunTribalCouncil,andMushkegowukCouncil—signedagreements.

OnekeyadvantageofapooledRRSAisthatitcanbemoreinclusive.SomeFirstNationsmaynothavethecapacity,whetheradministrative,financial,orlegal,toengageinone-on-onenegotiationswiththeprovince,andapooledapproachallowsparticipation.Thiscanresultinalargerrevenuebase,asitinvolvesabroadergeographicareaandmoreFirstNations,andmakenegotiationseasierfortheprovincebyreducingtheseparateRRSAstonegotiateandadminister.

Thepooledmodelcouldallowforneed-baseddistributionofrevenuesacrossNations.Ratherthanallocatingrevenuestrictlybasedonterritoryorpopulation,fundscanbedi-rectedtocommunitiesthataremostinneed,whetherforhousing,infrastructure,health,oreducation.Furthermore,pooledRRSAsprovideanopportunityforbandcouncilsacrosstheprovincetocollaborate,potentiallyleadingtoanagreementthatbenefitsawidernumberofNationsandbuildsoninter-Nationrelationships.

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However,oneconcernisequalityinrevenuedistribution.SomeNationsmaybemoredirectlyaffectedbytheresourceproject,whetherduetoproximityordegreeofenvironmen-tal,cultural,oreconomicimpacts.WhenrevenueisdistributedbyaPTOthatrepresentsmanyNations,asinOntario’smodel,disagreementscanariseoverhowfundsareallocated.Nationsthatbelievetheycouldhavesuccessfullynegotiatedtheirownagreementmayalsobedissatisfiedwithbeinggroupedintoacollectiveprocesswheretheyhavelesscontrol.

GovernancecapacityisnecessaryforthepooledRRSAtobesuccessful.ThePTOmustbewellequippedtomanageconsultationprocesses,overseelargefinancialtransfers,andensureaccountabilityinhowfundsareusedandreported.

AllocationacrossFirstNationswithinthePool:TheOntarioRRSAsassignspecificallocationstoeachparticipatingFirstNation.Forinstance,withintheforestrysector,FirstNationscollectivelyreceive45percent(whichisthesharingpercentage)ofCrownrevenuesgeneratedfromaForestManagementUnit(FMU)thatisdesignatedaspartoftheagreement.However,thisisfurtherdividedamongtheparticipantsbasedonpredeterminedallocations.Theagreementdoesnotclarifyhowthesepredeterminedallocationsweremade.

InOntario,ifaFirstNationdecidestooptoutoftheagreement,itsassignedportionoftherevenuewillnolongerbeincludedintheoverallcalculationforFirstNations,startingfromthefiscalyearinwhichtheopt-outtakeseffect.Conversely,ifaFirstNationchoosestooptinforthefirsttime,itsallocatedsharewillbeincorporatedintotherevenuedistributionmovingforward.WhenaFirstNationoptsout,itsshareisnotredistributedamongtheremainingparticipants.7Instead,thatunclaimedportionremainswiththeOntariogovernment.ThiscouldcreateanincentiveforNationstosignagreements.

7IndiscussionwithOntariorepresentatives,areasonforoptingoutisinadequatecapacitytospendthefundsand/orreportthefundexpenditures.AnotherreasonmentionedisthatNationsthatareinlitigationwiththeCrownpostponesigninganyagreementsuntilthatisfinished.

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3.2.2Nation-SpecificRRSA

ANation-specificRRSAisoneinwhicheachFirstNationnegotiatesandsignsitsownagreementdirectlywiththeprovince,ratherthanbeingrepresentedthroughacollectivecouncil,suchasaPTO.ManyagreementsinBCaresignedthisway.IfthismodelwereappliedinAlberta,forexample,eachFirstNationwouldberesponsibleforindependentlynegotiatingitsownagreementwiththeprovince.

Onemajorstrengthofthismodelisthatitprovidesgreaterautonomyandcontrol.FirstNationswithwell-developedgovernancestructuresandadministrativecapacityoruniquepri-oritiesmayprefertomanagetheirownnegotiations,finances,andimplementationprocesses.AnotherkeyadvantageisthatFirstNationsthataredirectlyandsignificantlyimpactedbyspecificprojectsorsectors,suchasduetoproximityorenvironmentalandculturaleffects,cannegotiaterevenuesharesthatmoreaccuratelyreflectthatlevelofimpact.

However,themodelalsopresentschallenges,particularlyforFirstNationsthatmaylacktheinternalcapacityorresourcestonegotiatecomplexagreementswiththeprovince.ThiscouldleadtoNationsthatareaffectedbydevelopmentbutlackadministrativesupportbeingleftoutofrevenue-sharingopportunities,furtherwideninginequalities.

TheassumptionnecessaryfortheNation-specificstructuretobesuccessfulisthatallFirstNationshavethecapacityandreadinesstoengagedirectlywiththeprovince.Itpresumesthateachisequippedwiththelegal,technical,andfinancialresourcesrequiredtohandlenegotiations,consultations,financialmanagement,andcompliancereportingindependently.Inreality,theircapacityvarieswidely.

3.3ApplicableGeographicArea

ThesizeofthegeographicareacoveredbytheRRSAwillinfluencetherevenueshared.InBC,foraFirstNationtobeeligibleforanRRSA,theprojectareamustoverlapwiththeirtraditionalterritoryorbesubjecttotheirassertionsofAboriginalInterest.

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InOntario,tobeeligibleforashareofminingrevenues,theFirstNationhastobein“proximity”toapplicablemines.Forforestry,theymustbe“associatedwith”theAgreementFMU.Howproximityandassociationaredeterminedisnotdefined.8

3.4RevenueBase

RRSAscouldapplytodifferentgovernmentrevenuesources,suchastaxes,royalties,penal-ties,permits,licenses,orotherfees.Amongthese,royaltiesandtaxrevenuesarethemostcommon.Forexample,fundingforRRSAsrelatedtominingcomesfrombothtaxrevenuesandroyaltiesinOntariobutprimarilyfromtaxrevenuesinBC.Inaddition,otherexcep-tionalsourcesofrevenueexist.Forexample,inBC,therevenueforforestry-relatedRRSAsmainlycomesfromtimbersales.

3.5RevenueFormulas

Anothercomponenttoconsideristheformulausedtocalculatetheamountofrevenueshared,determininghowmuchmoneywillflowtoFirstNations.RRSAsshowthreemainapproaches:lumpsumpayments(Section3.5.1),percentage-basedformulas(Section3.5.2),andtiered-percentagemodels(Section3.5.2).Eachhasitsownstrengthsandweaknesses.

3.5.1LumpSum

ThelumpsuminvolvespayingafixedamountofmoneytoaFirstNation,regardlessoftheactualresourcerevenuegenerated.Thispaymentispredetermined,oftennegotiatedinadvance,andtypicallydeliveredinoneormoreinstallmentstiedtoprojectmilestones(e.g.,constructionstart,completion,oroperationalphases).Forexample,forthePrinceRupert

8AlthoughRRSAsare,inprinciple,jointlyauthored,publicdocumentsdonotindicatewhichparty(ies)tooktheleadondefiningtermssuchasthese.Authorshipcouldhavesomebearingonwhetherthesedefinitionsarepoliticallyneutral.

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GasTransmissionProject,GitxsanFirstNationreceived§5.81millioninprojectpaymentsand§1.16millioninadditionalpayments.9

Lumpsumsareparticularlyusefulwhenresourcerevenuesarehighlyvolatileoruncertain.Byfixingtheamount,boththeprovinceandFirstNationcanplanmorepredictably.Thiscanavoiddisputesoverfluctuatingpricesorproductionlevelsandisadministrativelysimplertomanage.Adisadvantageisthatalumpsumpaymentdoesnotscalewithchangesinrevenue.Ifaprojectbecomesmuchmoreprofitablethaninitiallyexpected,theNationwillnotreceiveadditionalfundswithoutrenegotiation.ThismaybeperceivedaslessfairwhenFirstNationsaresignificantlyimpactedbylarge-scale,high-valuedevelopments.

3.5.2Percentage

Apercentage-basedformulaassignsafixedshareofthegovernment’srevenuefromaspecificprojectorsectortotheFirstNation.Forexample,?EsdilaghFirstNationinBCreceives11.55percentofallannualtaxrevenuesfromtheGibraltarmine.

Usingapercentagemodel,therevenuewouldberesponsivetochangesinprojectperfor-mance.Astheprovince’srevenuefromtheprojectincreases,sodoestheamountreceived.Thisprovidesaclear,transparentlinkbetweenprojectsuccessandcommunitybenefit,whichcanhelpaligninterests.However,apercentagemodelisvulnerabletorevenuevolatility.Ifcommoditypricesdroporproductionslows,theFirstNation’ssharewillalsodecrease.Thiscancreatefinancialuncertaintyforcommunitiestryingtobudgetforthelongterm,especiallywithresourceindustriespronetoboomandbustcycles.

3.5.3TieredPercentage

Atiered-percentageformulaincorporatesthetwoapproaches,havingaguaranteedbasepercentage,followedbyadditionalpaymentsoncerevenuesurpassesacertainthreshold.For

9GitxanFirstNationalsoreceivessomeshareofongoingbenefits,buttheirmainpaymentshavebeenthelumpsums.

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example,KtunaxaFirstNationinBCreceivesfromtheElkValleyMine37.5percentofthefirst§23millionfromtaxrevenuesandthen5percentonanythingabovethatamount.

Withahigherpercentageinthefirsttier,tieredmodelsofferthestabilityofahigherbasepaymentwhilealsoallowingFirstNationstobenefitfromhigher-revenueperiods,albeitatalowerpercentage.Thisstructurecanbemoreequitablewhenthelong-termrevenuepotentialofaprojectisuncertainbutpotentiallylarge.However,theseagreementsrequiredecisionsonbothpercentagesandthresholds,potentiallycreatingdisagreementaboutwherethresholdsshouldbesetandwhethertheadditionalpercentagesarefair.

3.6ReceiptofRevenue

MoneyfromRRSAscangodirectlytoaFirstNation,enablingrightsholderstoreceiveandmanagetheirownrevenues,asinBC.Moneycouldalsogotoarepresentativecouncilorcollectiveorganization,asinOntario,wheretheRRSAsdirectfundstoGrandCouncilTreaty#3,MushkegowukCouncil,andWabunTribalCouncil.Theseorganizationsoverseethedistributionofthefundstothesignatories,followingapredeterminedplan.UnlikestipulationsintheIndianAct,whichrequiretransferstoberoutedthroughtheConsolidatedRevenueFund,givingcontroltobureaucratsratherthanFirstNations(YellowheadInstitute,2021),RRSAscanenablemoredirectaccesstoandcontrolov