2025能源转型新篇章研究报告（英文）-BCG

TheEnergyTransition’sNextChapter

September2025

ByMauriceBerns,BasSudmeijer,RichLesser,

PattabiSeshadri,AndersPorsborg-Smith,PatrickHerhold,CorneliusPieper,AsheeshSastry,ZsofiaBeck,RebeccaFitz,TomBrijs,StevenGoovaerts,andAlexanderOhm

BCG

BostonConsultingGroup

BostonConsultingGrouppartnerswithleadersinbusinessandsocietytotackletheirmostimportantchallengesandcapturetheirgreatestopportunities.BCGwasthepioneerinbusinessstrategywhenitwasfoundedin1963.Today,

weworkcloselywithclientstoembraceatransformationalapproachaimedatbenefitingallstakeholders—empoweringorganizationstogrow,buildsustainablecompetitive

advantage,anddrivepositivesocietalimpact.

Ourdiverse,globalteamsbringdeepindustryandfunctionalexpertiseandarangeofperspectivesthatquestionthe

statusquoandsparkchange.BCGdeliverssolutions

throughleading-edgemanagementconsulting,technologyanddesign,andcorporateanddigitalventures.Weworkinauniquelycollaborativemodelacrossthefirmand

throughoutalllevelsoftheclientorganization,fueledbythegoalofhelpingourclientsthriveandenablingthemtomaketheworldabetterplace.

TheCenterforEnergyImpact

TheCenterforEnergyImpact(CEI)shineslightonthe

energytransition,focusingontheactionsrequiredto

achieveglobaltransformation.CEIappliesaholistic

perspectivetounderstandingandshapingboldresponsestooneofthemostcriticalandcomplexchallengesofourtime.

Ourdeepexpertisespansmarketsandeconomics,carbon

andtechnology,capitalandinvestors,themacrodynamicsofgeopoliticsandresilience,andthemicrodynamicsofpoliticsandspecificpolicies.Weoffernuanced,constructiveideas

andsolutionscoveringthefutureavailability,economics,

andsustainabilityoftheworld’senergysources—andtheimplicationsforenergycompanies,industries,investors,

consumers,andgovernments.TheCEIteamiscommittedtofacilitatinginformed,innovativediscussionstomakeourworldsustainable.

Preface

Theenergytransitionhas

enteredanewphase.Over

thepast36months,theglobalenergylandscapehasevolvedsignificantly.

Amongthemostnotabledevelopmentsistheincreasing

emphasisonenergysecurityandaffordability.Thisreflectsthefactthataccesstoenergyunderpinseconomic

vitalityandhumanprosperity.Yettheincreasedcarbon

emissionsassociatedwithmeetingtheworld’senergyneedsriskunderminingthoseverygains.Failingtopriceinthe

externalitiesofCO2emissionsdoesn’tmakethemdisappear.

Thatsaid,theenergytransitionremainsafundamental

secularshift.Itis,however,unlikelytobealinearone—withtheroadaheadmarkedbyunevenprogressandoccasionalsetbacks.Itisalsoimportanttonotethatthereisnosingletransition,butmultiplecountryandregionaltransitions

unfoldingwithdifferencesinpaceandtechnologychoices.Still,theevolvingandcomplexenvironmentweobserve

todaydoesnotsignalaretreatfromtheenergytransition

overall:inmanycases,energysecurityandaffordabilitycanbealignedwithdecarbonizationgoals.

Thequestionnowisnotwhetherthesetransitions

willcontinue,buthowandatwhatpace.Accelerating

progressremainsessential.Theworldisontracktoreachalevelofwarmingthatsignificantlyexceeds2°Cabove

preindustriallevels,andmomentumonclimateaction

isweakeninginsomecountries.Multilateralalignmentisprovingharder,evenasstrongbusinesscasesfor

actionpersist.Movingforwardatpacethereforerequiresthreereinforcingefforts:accelerateddeploymentof

commerciallyviabledecarbonizationtechnologies

(whichcanaddressapproximately65%ofenergy-related

emissions),encouragementofcollectivepolicyandpublicsupport,andpreparationforawarmerworldthrough

smarteradaptation.

Thispublication,developedbyBCG’sCenterforEnergy

Impactasafollow-upto

our2023report

,isintendedtohelpstakeholdersmakesenseoftheprofoundshifts

underwayintheglobalenergysystemandnavigateits

ongoingtransition.Inanenvironmentfilledwithconflictingsignalsandinformation,ourfact-basedanalysisseeksto

bringgreaterclaritytothepathforward.

Ourreportisstructuredinthreeparts.Thefirstsection

takesstockofwherewestandbyexploringsevenshifts

thatarereshapingthetransition.Someofthesechanges

createheadwindsforthetransition,whileothersproducetailwinds.Ourassessmentisbasednotonsubjective

judgments,butonobservationsofcurrenttrajectories.Thesecondsectionexploresfourmajorimplicationsofthese

shifts.Thethirdsectionofferstargetedrecommendationsfordifferentstakeholdergroups.

Thisreportaimstocutthroughthenoisewithrealism—

providingaclear-eyedviewofthepathaheadbasedonfactandaction.

RICHLESSER

GlobalChair,BCG

MAURICEBERNS

Chair,CenterforEnergyImpact

THEENERGYTRANSITION’SNEXTCHAPTER3

Energyaccessisessentialforsocietalprosperity

50

40

30

20

10

0

LowMediumHighVeryhigh

Japan

China

SouthAfricaSwitzerland

Uruguay

MozambiqueIndia

Bangladesh

0.30.40.50.60.70.80.91.0HUMANDEVELOPMENTINDEXSCORE

201920232019–2023evolution

·HighHumanDevelopmentIndexcountriestypicallyhavehigh

primaryenergyusepercapita

·Somecountries(e.g.,UK,

Sweden,Germany,Switzerland)

havesuccessfullydecoupled

energyusefromeconomicgrowth

·~700millionpeople,mostlyin

AsiaandAfrica,stilllackelectricityaccess;billionsofothersface

supplyconstraintsandwillrequiremoreenergyinthedecadesahead

·Thecarbonintensityassociatedwithmeetingthatadditional

demandrisksunderminingdevelopmentgains

Sources:UNDP;EIA;WHO;WorldBank;BCGanalysis.

Note:TheHumanDevelopmentIndex(HDI)measuresacountryIsperformanceintermsoflifeexpectancyatbirth,averageyearsofschooling,andgross

nationalincome.Thetrendlineisbasedoncorrelationmeasureduntil0.88HDIand40MWhprimaryenergypercapitaandisshownforillustrative

purposes.Countries/regionswithenergyconsumptionabove60MWhpercapitaand0.8HDI(MiddleEast,US,Nordics,Benelux,Australia,Canada)arenotshownonthegraph.MWh=megawatt-hour.

Currentwarmingisonapathtowardroughly3°C;acceleratingprovensolutionsandadaptationisessential

GLOBALNETANTHROPOGENICGREENHOUSEGASEMISSIONS(GtCO2ePERYEAR)Movingforwardrequiresthreereinforcingefforts:

75

60

3.2°Cpath1

Withimplementedpolicies

45

2.0°Cpath2

30

15

1.5°Cpath2

Withnoorlimitedovershoot

0

197019801990200020102020203020402050

1

2

3

Deployproventechnologies.Withsufficientpolicysupport,commerciallyviableand

soon-to-beviabletechnologiescanaddress~65%ofemissions.

Encouragecollectivepolicyandpublicsupport.Collaborationamongcountriesandinstitutions

canhelpaddressemissionsinharder-to-abate

sectorsandscalenascentsolutions;suchactioncanbefocusedinareassuchascarbonpricing,climatefinance,technologytransfers,and

alignmentofregulation.

Investinadaptationandresilience.Asextremeweatherbecomesmorefrequent,investmentsinresilience(e.g.,infrastructureandcoastal

protection,foodsecurity)growinimportance.

Primaryenergypercapitain2023—andin2019forselectedcountries—andHumanDevelopmentIndexscore,bycountry

PRIMARYENERGYPERCAPITA(MWh)

Sources:WorldBank;IMF;IPCC;EDGAR;WEF;BCGanalysis.

Note:GtCO2e=gigatonsofcarbondioxideequivalent.

1IPCCAR6WGIII(April2022)medianprojection,5thto95thpercentilerange:2.2–3.5°Cby2100,mediumconfidence.2IPCCmedianprojection.

4BOSTONCONSULTINGGROUP|CENTERFORENERGYIMPACT

Contents

06SevenShiftsReshapingtheEnergyTransition

•Energysecurityhasemergedasthedrivingforceglobally

•Publicsupportfortheenergytransitionisbeingchallenged,driveninpartbyhighenergyprices

•Electricitydemandhasenteredastructuralsupercycle

•Naturalgasandnuclearpowerarebackintheplans,strongly

•Wehavemovedfrom“sweattheassets”to“buildtheassets”intheenergysystem

•Demandtrajectoryforoilandgasishigherthanexpected,butalsoincreasinglyuncertain

•Technologycosttrajectoriesarediverging—somefallingfast,othersprovingpersistentlymoreexpensive

22ImplicationsoftheSevenShifts

•Weneedtoreducetheoverallcostandacceleratethebuild-outofenablinginfrastructure

•Wecanaccelerateprogressbydoublingdownonproventechnologiesandplacingstrategicbets

•Energyaffordabilityandcustomeragencyareessentialtosustainpublicsupportforthetransition

•Thetransitionwillvaryacrosscountriesandregions—andstrategiesmustfollowsuit

33Recommendations

•Recommendationsforgridownersandoperators

•Recommendationsforlargeconsumers

•Recommendationsforenergyproducersandsuppliers

•Optionsforpolicymakersastheynavigatethetransition

6BOSTONCONSULTINGGROUP|CENTERFORENERGYIMPACT

SevenShiftsReshapingthe

EnergyTransition

Multipleforceshavealteredthepathofthetransition:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Energysecurityhasemergedasthedrivingforceglobally

Publicsupportfortheenergytransitionisbeingchallenged,driveninpartbyhighenergyprices

Electricitydemandhasenteredastructuralsupercycle

Naturalgasandnuclearpowerarebackintheplans,strongly

Wehavemovedfrom“sweattheassets”to“buildtheassets”intheenergysystem

Demandtrajectoryforoilandgasishigherthanexpected,butalsoincreasinglyuncertain

Technologycosttrajectoriesarediverging—some

fallingfast,othersprovingpersistentlymoreexpensive

SHIFT1

Energysecurityhasemergedasthedrivingforceglobally

Energysecurity,energyaffordability,andeconomic

resilienceandcompetitivenessaretightlylinked.Asthe

geopoliticallandscapebecomesmorefragmented,alteringtheeconomicdynamicsinmanycountries,energysecurityhastakenonevengreaterurgency.Thisdevelopmenthasprofoundimplicationsfortheenergytransition.

Increasingly,countriesarefocusingonexpandingtheshareoftheirenergythatcomesfromindigenoussources.

Forexample,theUSisincentivizingdevelopmentof

domesticoilandgasresourceswhilealsosupporting

alternativeenergysourcessuchasnuclear,geothermal,

andhydro.Chinahasemergedasadominantforcein

globallow-carbonenergy,bothindeploymentandacrossmanufacturingandtechnologyvaluechains,leveragingitssubstantialcoalreserveswhilerapidlyscalingupitssolar

andwindcapacity.TheEU,meanwhile,hasexplicitlytieddecarbonizationtoenergysecurity,reducingitsrelianceonRussiangas.

Manycountriesarealsoseekingtobuildlocalizedvalue

chainsforcriticallow-carbontechnologies,oftenthroughtradeprotectionsandindustrialpolicy.Fornow,though,

manycleanenergyvaluechainsremainglobal.Asan

example,mostofthevaluechainforbatteriesusedintheUSislocatedoutsidethecountry.However,therenewedcommitmenttodomesticenergydevelopmentdoesn’t

necessarilysignalaslowdowninthetransition.History

showsthathighenergypricesandafocusonenergy

securitycanbeatailwindforthetransition,particularlyincountrieswithrenewablespotential.

Chinainvestsheavilyinenergysecurity;itsrenewablescapacityand

coalcapacityarelargerthanthoseofthenextninecountriescombined

2024INSTALLEDGENERATIONCAPACITYINCHINAANDINOTHERTOP

10COUNTRIESGLOBALLYFORTHESPECIFIEDENERGYSOURCE(GW)1

Coal

China

India

US

Japan

Indonesia

SouthAfrica

SouthKorea

Russia

Germany

Poland

196

55

1,147

240

1.6x

52

726

Total

44

41

38

32

28

Solarandwind

China1,409

US329

Germany163

1.4x

1,040

Total

India145Japan97Brazil86Spain68Australia54Italy49

UK49

CHINA’SANNUALNETENERGYIMPORTSANDTOTALENERGYCONSUMPTION(EJ)

120

Nevertheless,Chinaisstilltheworld’s

biggest

importerofenergy2

100

+16%

peryear

80

60

40

+5%

peryear

30%oftotalconsumption

20

0

20002005201020152020

NetenergyimportsTotalenergyconsumption

Sources:IRENA;GlobalEnergyMonitor;IEA;BCGanalysis.

Note:EJ=exajoule;GW=gigawatt.

1Basedonend-of-year2024figures.

2In2023,China’soil,naturalgas,andcoalimportsrepresented,respectively,32%,26%,and33%ofglobaltradeforthesecommodities.

THEENERGYTRANSITION’SNEXTCHAPTER7

8BOSTONCONSULTINGGROUP|CENTERFORENERGYIMPACT

Evenbefore2025tariffs,tradebarriersongreentechwereincreasingmorethanthoseonoilproducts;somearenowreachingsimilarlevels

GLOBALTRADERESTRICTIONSBYSECTOR(NUMBER)1

Lithiumbatteries

~25x

51

20152024

>70%

SolarPVEVsWindturbines

~14x

~31x

51

47

~11x

16

201520242015202420152024

2024EXPORTSHAREOFGLOBALMARKET,BASED

>60%>30%>5%

HeatpumpsElectrolyzers

~16x

32

~15x

15

2015202420152024ONSELECTEDCOMPONENTS2

>50%>20%

Oilproducts

~2x

49

20152024

>85%

Sources:UNComtrade;IEA;BloombergNEF;BCGanalysis.

Note:Excludesdatafrom2025tariffchanges.EVs=electricvehicles;PV=photovoltaics.

1Thetradepoliciesconsideredasbarriersincludechangesinimportorexporttariffs,anti-dumpingdutiesandcountervailingmeasures,importorexport

controlandbans,andothernontariffmeasuressuchasimportorexportlicensingandquotas.

2Exportsharesreflecttheshareofinternationaltrade(byvalue,2024)basedonHarmonizedSystemcodesrepresentingthefollowingselectedcomponents:lithiumbatteries,PVmodules,passengerEVs,wind-poweredelectricitygeneratingsets,heatpumps,electrolyzers,andcrudeoilproducts.

Manycleantechnologiesarehighlyexposedtoglobalsupplychains

RELATIVEDOLLARVALUECONTRIBUTIONOFGOODSTOUSBATTERYSUPPLYCHAIN(%)1

Criticalmaterials2

(e.g.,lithium,graphite)

Components

(e.g.,cathodes,anodes)

Finishedproducts

(e.g.,LFPbatteries)

~60

Local~15

Imported~85

~90

~25

~50

HalfofthebatteriesinstalledintheUSareimportedfromChina

US

China

CanadaEU

Mexico

Restof

theworld

Sources:UNCOMTRADE;BCGSWITCH-GT;BCGanalysis.

Note:Excludes2025tariffimpact.LFP=lithiumironphosphate.1Averagesacrosscleantechnologies.

2Metalsforanodes,cathodes,andelectrolytes.

THEENERGYTRANSITION’SNEXTCHAPTER9

Highenergypricesandsecurityconcernscandrivedecarbonization,sometimesfasterthanclimatepolicies

France’sresponsetooilcrisis

Thefirstandsecondoilshocksinthe1970sand1980striggeredstate-ledenergy

planninginFranceandrapidexpansionofnationalnuclearpower

CHANGEINCO2EMISSIONSINTENSITY(%)1

+10

Years51015

0

–10

Climate

–20

transition

–30

(2010–2022)

–40

–50

Firstandsecondoilshocks

(1973–1985)

UK’sswitchfromcoaltogas

Inthe1990s,decliningcoalreservesandtheavailabilityofcheapnaturalgasfromdepositsbeneaththeNorthSeadroveaswitchfromcoaltogasintheUK

CHANGEINCO2EMISSIONSINTENSITY(%)1

China’spushforenergysecurity

Facingenergyshortagesandgeopoliticalrisks,Chinainvestedheavilyinrenewablesandstoragestartingin2010toboost

energysecurity

CHANGEINCO2EMISSIONSINTENSITY(%)1

Years15

+10

0

–10

+10

10

10

5

5

Years15

0

–10

–20

–30

–40

–50

–20

–30

–40

–50

Coal-to-gasswitch

(1990–2002)

Energy

security

(2010–2022)

Climate

transition

(2010–2022)

Sources:EDGAR;WorldBank;EnergyInstitute;BCGanalysis.

Note:Eachcharttrackschangesincethestartdateofthespecifiedevent.1PercentagechangeinCO₂emittedperunitofenergyconsumed.

10BOSTONCONSULTINGGROUP|CENTERFORENERGYIMPACT

SHIFT2

Publicsupportfortheenergytransitionisbeingchallenged,driveninpartbyhighenergyprices

Energyaffordability,especiallyforthepooresthouseholds,hasdeterioratedoverthepast25years,especiallyin

recentyears.InFranceandGermany,forexample,

industrialandresidentialuserspayroughly2.5timesas

muchforpowerasusersinmorecompetitiveregionssuchastheUS,China,andIndiado.

Therepercussionsaretwofold.Forconsumers,concerns

aboutenergyaffordabilitycanerodepublicsupportforthetransition:since2020,publicprioritizationofsustainabilityhasdeclinedacrosstheEU,andconcernaboutclimate

mitigationhasweakened.Forbusinessusers,higherpricesinonemarketthaninanothercanlimitgrowthandtriggeraflightofcapitalandjobs.

Already,growthininvestmentsinenergy-intensive

industriesincountriessuchastheUSandChinaoutstriptheincreasesincountriessuchasGermany,whereenduserspaymoreforenergy.Thatsaid,highenergypricescanalsofuelinnovationthatdrivesenergyefficiencyorotheracceleratingimprovements.

ElectricityismoreexpensiveinEuropethaninotherregions

YEARLYAVERAGEINDUSTRIALEND-USEPRICES($/MWh)1YEARLYAVERAGERESIDENTIALEND-USEPRICES($/MWh)1

~2x一3x

~2x一5x

~2x一2.5x

~1.5x

254

264

190

162

150

154

111

93

86

77

78

55

2015

2024

2024

2015

US(midcontinent)US(NewEngland)China

-----Average

India

FranceGermany

Sources:OECD;USEnergyInformationAdministration;IEA;Eurostat;Statista;BCGanalysis.

Note:USelectricitypricesvaryconsiderablybyregion;midcontinentandNewEnglandpricesareshowntoreflecttherangeofpricesnationally.MWh=megawatt-hour.

1Allpricesareexpressedinconstant2015dollars.

THEENERGYTRANSITION’SNEXTCHAPTER11

ChinaandtheUSareoutpacingEuropeininvestmentsinenergy-intensiveindustries

INVESTMENTSINENERGY-INTENSIVEINDUSTRIES($BILLIONS)1

China

+275%

657

508

474

337

175

20042009201420192024

US

+60%

398

429430

309

268

20042009201420192024

Germany

+20%

3033333636

20042009201420192024

ENERGYCOSTASAPERCENTAGEOFGROSSOUTPUT(%)

3

4

5

5

6

4

7

7

8

11

10

14

13

12

2

Sources:BureauofEconomicAnalysis;ChinaNationalBureauofStatistics;WorldBank;FederalStatisticsOfficeGermany;HaverAnalytics;IEA;OxfordEconomics;BCGanalysis.

Note:Energy-intensiveindustriesincludechemicalsandpharmaceuticals,metalsandminerals,cokeandrefinedpetroleumproducts,mining,andpaper

andprinting.“Grossoutput”referstothetotalvalueofsalesbydomesticindustries.Beyondenergycost,otherimportantdriversincludelaborproductivity,carbonmarkets,andbroadergovernmentandfiscalpolicies.

1Allpricesareexpressedinconstant2015dollars.

SupportfortheenergytransitionintheEUisdecreasingbutremainsstrong

Sustainabilityisdecliningasapoliticalpriority

EURESPONDENTSWHORANKEDTHETOPICASATOP3PRIORITYFORTHEREGIONIN2024(%)

EconomySecurity

46%

in2020(–7pp)

Sustainability

survey

Immigration

Socialequality

Democracy

Education

Innovation

0102030405060

Publicfocusisshiftingfrommitigationtoadaptation

EURESPONDENTSWHOCHOSEMITIGATIONVS.ADAPTATION(%)1

Italy

Germany

France

78

67

71

66

56

57

44

43

34

33

29

22

20202024

2020

2024

20202024

MitigationAdaptation

Sources:Bruegel;EuropeanCommission;BCGanalysis.

Note:ResultsbasedonStandardEurobarometerSurveyof7,819peopleconductedinApril2024inGermany,France,Italy,Poland,andSweden.

1Respondentswereaskedtochoosebetween“doeverythingwecantostopclimatechange”and“shouldadapttoclimatechange,sothatwecanlivewellwithachangedclimate.”

SHIFT3

Electricitydemandhasenteredastructuralsupercycle

12BOSTONCONSULTINGGROUP|CENTERFORENERGYIMPACT

Therapidbuild-outofdatacenters(fueledinpartby

theAIboom),risingdemandforcooling,andgrowing

electrificationoftransport,buildings,andindustryhavepushedelectricitydemandintoastructuralsupercycle.

TheGlobalSouthisleadingthisshift.ChinaandIndiaaloneareexpectedtodrive30%to50%growthinnational

consumptionby2030,withmanyASEANandAfrican

economiesonsimilartrajectories.Thisreflectsstrong

economicexpansion,expandingpopulations(withthe

exceptionofChina),andrisingaccesstomodernenergy.

Advancedeconomies,meanwhile,areexperiencingamorestructuralinflection.

Afterdecadesofstagnantelectricitydemand,newusesaredrivingasurgeingeneration.Theswitchfromfossilfuelstoelectricityhasbeenslowerthananticipatedbutisnow

gainingmomentum.Pairedwithnewsourcesofdemand,

suchasdatacenters,thistrendmarksanotableshiftafter

manyyearsduringwhichefficiencygainsoffsetconsumptiongrowth.IntheUSalone,demandisprojectedtoriseby

roughly800TWhfrom2024to2030—theequivalentof1.5timesGermany’scurrentpowerconsumption—representing4%growthannually,drivenbystronguptakefromdata

centers.Europeisonasimilarpath.Aroundtheworld,theprojectedstructuralincreaseinelectricitydemandislikelytorequiresignificantadditionalsupply,intheabsenceofwhichpricesarelikelytoseeupwardpressure.

Powergenerationissettorisetomeetsurgingdemand

ELECTRICITYGENERATIONCAGRPER10-YEARPERIOD(%)

6

66

5

4

4

4

3

3

3

3

2

2

2

2

2

0

0

India

China

MiddleEast

US

Europe

SouthAmerica

2024BASELINEELECTRICITYDEMAND(PWh)

9.8

4.5

2.1

1.5

1.5

3.8

2010–20192020–20292030–2039

55

4

ASEAN1

1.2

4

3

2

Africa

0.9

Totalabsoluteincrease

inglobalpowergenerationbydecade

2010–2019

+5.3PWh

2020–2029

+7.1PWh

2030–2039

+7.4PWh

Sources:EnergyInstitute;Enerdata;EIA;IEA;BCGanalysis.

Note:BasedonEnerfutureBaseCasescenario,EIAReferenceCase,IEAStatedPolicies(STEPS).AlldecadeintervalsrunfromJanuary1ofthestartyearthroughDecember31oftheendyear.CAGR=compoundannualgrowthrate;PWh=petawatt-hour.

1IncludesdatafromIndonesia,Malaysia,Philippines,Singapore,Thailand,andVietnam.

THEENERGYTRANSITION’SNEXTCHAPTER13

Structuraldemanddriversfuelelectricitygrowthacrossmajoreconomies

PROJECTEDANNUALELECTRICITYGROWTHBYDRIVER,2025–2030(TWh)1

225

70

40

30

30

China

(+350–450TWh)

Datacenters

(+110–170TWh)

50

30

15155

India

(+90–120TWh)

80

20

101010

US

(+100–130TWh)

25

20

1

105

EU

(+50–70TWh)

Transport

(+120–140TWh)

Buildings

(+240–300TWh)

Industry

(+300–600TWh)

Cooling

(+80–120TWh)

·InChinaandIndia,

industryandcoolingdrivemostoftheincrease,

underscoringthestructuralnatureofdemandgrowth

·AI-drivendatacenterloadisprojectedtobeakey

driverofdemand,

accountingforabout60%ofUSgrowth

Sources:EnergyPolicySimulator;EnergyInstitute;EIA;IEA;TSEResearch;Vasudha(2024);BCGanalysis.

Note:SectoralglobalsplitfollowstheIEAandBCGdatacentermodel.TWh=terawatt-hours.1DataisfortheEPSBAUandIEASTEPSscenario.

SHIFT4

Naturalgasandnuclearpowerarebackintheplans,strongly

14BOSTONCONSULTINGGROUP|CENTERFORENERGYIMPACT

Asrenewablesexpand,theneedwillpersistforfirm,

dispatchablepower—electricitygenerationthatcanbe

dialedupordowntobalancesupplyanddemand.The

growthofenergy-hungrydatacentersisamplifyingthe

demandforreliablefirmpowersources.Naturalgas,awell-establishedandflexibleenergysource,isseeingrenewed

energyinvestmentglobally.(Ofcourse,risingsupplychain

costs,suchasthoserecentlyseeninnewbuildsofcombined-cyclegasturbines,coulddampenthatmomentum.)

Meanwhile,nuclearpower,azero-carbonfirmsupply

option,isexperiencingastrongrevival,withprojectionsof2040capacityrisingsharplyinrecentyears.Bothlarge-

scalereactorsandsmallmodularreactors(SMRs)are

gainingtraction.SMRsareespeciallyattractivebecauseoftheirpotentialtolowertheriskofcostoverrunsandavoidbet-the-companydecisions.Ultimately,thepaceandscaleofthenuclearresurgencewilldependonfactorssuchas

thespeedofpermitting,accesstoaskilledworkforce,theevolutionofpublicsupport,and,aboveall,theindustry’sabilitytodeliveron-costandon-budgetandavoidthe

high-profileoverrunswitnessedinrecentyears.

Otherfirmsupplyoptionsaregainingmomentumaswell:geothermalisreceivingrenewedinterest,andinvestmentinlong-durationenergystorageisaccelerating.These

technologieswillplayacriticalrolealongsidegasandnuclearinshapingfutureenergysystems.

Globalgasgenerationcapacityisexpectedtoincreasebyroughly40%through2040asdemandincreases

2023total

China

US

Egypt

SaudiArabia

Japan

Brazil

Thailand

Indonesia

Germany

Philippines

SouthKorea

Other

2040total

ADDITIONALGAS-FIREDPOWERGENERATIONCAPACITYBYCOUNTRYUNTIL2040(GW)

+40%

~2,000

+~15+~15+~15+~15

(1.5x)(1.5x)(5x)(1.3x)

+~15

(1.5x)

+~20

(2x)

+~25

(1.3x)

+~25

(1.5x)

+~35

(1.5x)

+~40

(1.1x)

+~200

(2.5x)

~1,400

·Demandfornaturalgashasrisen

sharply.Onedriverisitsroleasa

flexible,lower-carbonalternativetocoalforpowergeneration

·Naturalgascanalsoserveasa

dispatchable,flexiblepowersourceforhyperscalersandindustrialusers

seekingadegreeofreliabilitythatrenewablesalonecan’tguarantee

·However,formanycountries,includingthosethatrelyoncoaltoday,importedLNGcarriesacostdisadvantage,

limitingbroadadoption

·Intheshortterm,gaspoweris

constrainedbysupplychaindelaysandrisingcosts(e.g.,leadtimesnowexceedfiveyearsincertaingeographies)

Sources:Enerdata;EMBER;Bloomberg;GlobalData;Reuters;GEVernova;BCGanalysis.

Note:GW=gigawatts;LNG=liquefiednaturalgas.

THEENERGYTRANSITION’SNEXTCHAPTER15

Anuclearrenaissanceisunderwayinkeymarkets

+18%

NUCLEARINSTALLEDCAPACITYANDOUTLOOK(GW)A