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再生能源趸购电价与竞标机制的整合1SelectedIndicatorsUnit200820092010Globalnewinvestmentinrenewableenergy(annual)billionUSD130160211Renewablepowercapacity(existing,notincludinghydro)GW200250312Renewablepowercapacity(existing,includinghydro)GW115012301320Hydropowercapacity(existing)GW9509801010Windpowercapacity(existing)GW121159198SolarPVcapacity(existing)GW162340SolarPVcellcapacity(capacity)GW6.91124Solarhotwatercapacity(existing)GWth130160185Ethanolproduction(annual)billionliters677686Biodieselproduction(annual)billionliters121719Countrieswithpolicytargets#798996States/provinces/countrieswithfeed-inpolicies*#718287States/provinces/countrieswithRPS/quotapolicies#606163States/provinces/countrieswithbiofuelsmandates#555760我省再生能源电能趸购费率项目型态级距(kW)2011费率(元/度)2010费率(元/度)变动(%)太阳光电系统屋顶型≧1~<1010.318511.1883*(相当于无设备补助14.6030)-29.34≧10~<1009.179912.9722-29.23≧100~<5008.8241-31.98≧5007.970111.1190-28.32地上型无区分7.3297-34.08风力陆上≧1~<107.35627.27141.17≧10**2.61382.38349.67离岸无区分5.56264.198232.5川流式水力发电--无区分2.18212.06155.85地热能--无区分4.80395.1838-7.33生质能--无区分2.18212.06155.85废弃物衍生燃料--无区分2.68752.087928.72其他--无区分2.18212.06155.85注*:1kW以上未达10kW太阳光电99年公告再生能源趸购费率另提供5万元/Kw设备补助,100年则不另提供5万元/Kw设备补助。注**:依规定须加装LVRT者,则费率为2.6574元/度。Source:经济部能源局3FIT与竞标制度(1/2)对IPP来说,大型发电技术应适用FIT:AC(边际成本+合理利润)=P小型:不同厂商间,每KW平均成本(AC)有差异,因总装置容量<10KW,整体差异不大。大型:总装置容量、每KW平均成本差异大,收购期间长,整体差异很大,不符技术效率和公平原则下,经长时间累积(20年),潜在利润高。(竞租→泡沫化)4FIT与竞标制度(2/2)制度可能影响小型分散式发电技术推广,影响装设意愿及连带产业效益,从而无法发挥”聚沙成塔”效果。交易成本价格搜寻成本。议价成本。契约成本。行政单位监管成本。5RAM

(RenewableAuctionMechanism)TheCaliforniaPublicUtilitiesCommission(CPUC)votedunanimouslyinDecember,2010CaliforniaRenewableAuctionMechanism(RAM),whichisanewmechanismtorequireIOUstopurchaseelectricityfromvariousrenewabletechnologieswithcapacitysmallerthan20MW.ThreelargestIOUsinCalifornia(SCE,PG&EandSDG&E)wouldparticipateinapilotprogramtoholdtwoauctionsbiannuallyandthebidwillbeawardedstartingfromthelowestcostandviableprogramsuntilcapacityperauctionwasfilledwithtotalprogramcapacity761MWin2years.Thefirstauctionwillbeholdinthefourthquarter2011.

6IOUsTotalProgramCapacity(MW)perauction(MW)SCE259.465PG&E420.9105.2SDG&E80.720.2Total761190.25RAMProgramOverview7StateCaliforniaEligibleRenewable/OtherTechnologiesSolarThermalElectric,Photovoltaics,LandfillGas,Wind,Biomass,GeothermalElectric,MunicipalSolidWaste,AnaerobicDigestion,SmallHydroelectric,TidalEnergy,WaveEnergy,OceanThermal,Biodiesel,FuelCellsusingRenewableFuelsApplicableSectorsCommercial,IndustrialAuthority1:

DateEnacted:

CPUCDecision10-12-048

12/16/2010

Authority2:

DateEnacted:

CPUCResolution4414

8/18/2011

RAMKeyProgramElements(1/2)8KeyElementsStandardContract1.Flexibillityincontractlanguage:Simple,non-negotiablecontractapprovedbyCPUC.2.IOUwouldsigncontractwithwinnerbidders.3.Minimumcontractsize(1MW)andmaximumcontractsize(20MW):projectsgreaterorequalto500kWcanaggregatetomeettheminimumcriteriaaslongastheyinterconnecttothesamep-nodeandcontractingsizenotgreaterthan5MW.4.ContractLength:10,15,or20years.5.LengthofTimetoCOD:Projectmustbeonlinewithin18monthsofCPUCapprovalwithone6-monthextensionforregulatorydelays.Sellerscanrequestacontractextensionwitha60-daynoticeinadvancetoguaranteedcommercialoperationdate(COD).ProductFirm(baseload):geothermalandbiomassNon-firmpeaking(peakingas-available):solarNon-firmnon-peaking(non-peakingas-available)electricity:solar+windProjectViabilityMinimumrequirementforparticipatingintheauction:1.Sitecontrol:biddersmustshow100%sitecontrolthroughdirectownership,leasingorandoptiontoleaseorpurchaseuponawardofRAMcontracts.2.CommercializedTechnology.3.DevelopmentExperience:Atleastonememberhascompletedorbegunatleastoneprojectwithsimilarcapacityandtechnology.4.InterconnectionApplication:proofhavingfiledinterconnectionapplicationandcompletedaSystem-ImpactStudy,etc.Source:SummarizedfromCPUCResolution4414(2011);G&Eadviseletters,SDG&Eadviseletters(2011),SCEadviseletters(2011)RAMKeyProgramElements(2/2)9KeyProgramElementsBidsSelection1.Market-BasedPricing:Bidswillbeselectedstartingwiththelowestcostuntilcapacityperauctionisfilled.2.IOUscoulduseapprovemethodsdescribinginitsadviselettersimplementingRAMtonormalize(adjust)bidstoplacethemonanequivalentbasis;estimatedtransmissionnetworkupgradecostsshouldbeaccountedinrankingbids.StreamlinedProcurement1.ContractmusthaveCPUCstaffapprovalbeforeexecuting.2.Price,termsandconditionsarenon-negotiable.Transparency1.Annualprogramforumstocollectfeedbacks.2.Projectdevelopmentmilestonesandannualprogressreportfromtheutility,biannualprogressreportfromthedevelopers.3.ProgramdataisPubliclyavailable.Source:CPUCResolution4414,PG&Eadviseletters,SDG&Eadviseletters,SCEadviselettersIntentionsofRAMReducedTransactionCostsPurchasepriceisdeterminedbyauctionandisnon-negotiableprice.Developerswouldbidatapriceclosetoorslightlyhigherthancost.StrengthenPolicyClarityDeveloperswhowereawardedbidswillsignlong-terncontractswithIOUsandelectricitygeneratedwillbepurchasedwithbidpriceoverafixedperiod.TakeMarket,Utility,RegulatorsandRatepayersintoConsiderationAvoidadministrationcostsofregularlyadjustingpricesandrelateddisputes.HelpCaliforniatoachieveitsRPStargetmorequickly.Encouragedeveloperstooffermoreefficientgeneratingtechnologies.Rateismoremarket-orientedandreflectinggeneratingcosts.Avoidadministrationcostsforregularlyadjustingpricesandpossibledisputes.IndependentEvaluatorsarehiredtoascertaincost-competitivenessandprojectintegrity,theircommentsarerequiredforCPUC’sapprovalofbids.PerformanceDepositsandDevelopmentDepositsarerequired10DifferencesbetweenRAMandFITUnderRAM,electricitygeneratedfromthesametechnologycouldreceivedifferentpriceswhileunderFIT,theywouldbepurchasedwiththesameprice.ThreeIOUsparticipatinginthispilotprogram(SCE,PG&E,SDG&E)couldrejectuncompetitivepriceorbidssusceptibleofmarketmanipulation。Unsubscribedorsubscribedamountdroppedoutoftheprogramwouldbeleftforthenextauction.Source:AdviselettersfromPG&E,P3.11SimilaritiesbetweenRAMandFIT

PurchasepricecouldbeadjustedbyTOD(TimeofDelivery)underRAM:sellerswillbepaidthecontractpricemultipliedbyapplicableTODfactorineachhour.12PG&E:TODFactorsforEachTODPeriodPeriod1.Super-Peak2.Shoulder3.NightA.June-September2.204901.122370.68988B.Oct-Dec,Jan&Feb1.057830.934770.76384C.Mar-May1.145880.846340.64235Source:AdviselettersfromPG&E.交易成本:FIT与RAM比较FIT行政、监督管制成本高小用户价格搜寻成本高技术进步快,无适当参考价格一般用户难分析回收期限RAM议价成本高行政监督管制成本低13FIT和RAM相异处RAMcouldachieve"competitivemarket”And”reducedtransactioncosts”ProtectionMechanism:publicinterestsfirst。FIT、RPS并行国家考量交易成本和规模经济,小型发电技术适用FIT制度,大型技术适用RPS14FIT,RPS和RAM制度比较项目FIT制度RPS制度RAM再生能源费率决定政府主导集合产学界意见决定合理趸购费率价格取决市场供需且需建立电能或REC凭证交易平台Bidapriceclosetoorslightlyhigherthancost再生能源投资风险业者可掌握每期现金流量,降低营运风险投资风险受电力市场价格波动影响。IOUspurchaseelectricitywiththebidpriceforafixedperiodandbidderswouldsignalong-termcontractwiththeIOUs.电业义务电业具强制趸购再生能源义务电业具强制配比再生能源义务CertaincapacitywasrequiredtobepurchasedthroughRAM.电力市场适用性无特殊限制适用电业自由竞争市场Competitivegeneratingmarket电价反应方式增加成本完全反映至用电户电费增加成本依市场机制,由电业与电力消费吸收Costswouldbereflectedonbundledconsumers.制度特性1.按再生能源发电成本订定费率。2.固定费率使业者可掌握每期现金流量,降低业者营运风险。3.利用能量费率及成本标竿,鼓励再生能源资源较优区域及经营效率较佳业者优先进入市场,并给予业者提高发电量之诱因,以提升再生能源经济效益。4.趸购费率定期检讨,据递减倾向,引导技术进步以降低成本。1.电力市场供需机制决定收购价格。2.订定未达义务罚则。3.市场竞争引导技术进步以降低成本。4.市场偏好较具经济效益之再生能源。1.Market-basedandnon-negotiableprice(contract).2.Avoidadministrationcostsforregularlyadjustingpricesandpossibledisputes.3.PerformanceandDevelopmentDepositswasrequiredtoprotectratepayersandutilities.4.Flexibilityinconstructingitsowncontractswithsomerequiredstandardterms.5.IndependentEvaluatorsarehiredtoascertaincost-competitivenessandprojectintegrit

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