2026年1月全球贸易动态报告

JANUARY2026

Globaltradeupdate

PolicyInsights

Toptrendsredefiningglobaltradein2026

KEYTRENDS

1Globaleconomicandtradegrowthslows

–developingcountrieswillfaceheadwinds.

2Updatingtherules–WTOreformatacrossroadsforglobaltradein2026.

3Tariffsontherise–increasedprotectionismmaytriggergreaterpolicyuncertainty.

4Valuechainscontinuetoreconfigure–

geopoliticsredrawstradeandinvestmentmaps.

5Servicificationoftrade–exportsofservicescontinuetogrowfasterthangoods.

6South–Southtradesurge–developingcountriesdriveglobalexportgrowth.

7Sustainabletrade–environmentwillcontinuetobepartofglobaltradeinitiatives.

8Criticalminerals-oversupplyandgeopoliticsmaydestabilizetradeandglobalvaluechains.

9Feedingthefuture–agriculturaltradewillremainfundamentaltofoodsecurity.

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10Traderegulationstighten–nationalpoliciesreshapeglobalcommerce.

JANUARY2026

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Globaltradein2026isatacriticaljuncture.Geopolitical

considerations,economicheadwinds,shiftingsupplychains,

digitalbreakthroughs,andsustainabilityimperativesare

redefininghowcountriesengageincommerce–withespeciallyprofoundimplicationsfordevelopingnations.Policymakers

faceanurgentchallengetonavigatethiscomplexlandscapewhileensuringtradecontinuestodriveinclusiveand

sustainablegrowth.Thisreportexaminestenkeytrendstofollowin2026.

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TREND1

Globaleconomicandtradegrowthslows–developingcountrieswillfaceheadwinds

Globalgrowthremainssluggish.Globaleconomicgrowthin2026willmoderatetradeprospects,investmentflows,andpolicychoices.UNCTADestimatesglobalgrowthwillremainsubduedat2.6percentin2025and2026,despitepotentialgainsfromtechnologiessuchasartificialintelligence.1Growthindevelopingeconomies(excludingChina)isexpectedtoeaseslightlyto4.2percentin2026,downfrom4.3percentin2025,pointingtoavolatileexternalenvironment.2

Majoreconomieswillalsolosemomentum.TheUnitedStatesgrowthisprojectedat1.5percentin2026,downfrom1.8percentin2025,whileChina—anessentialtradeandinvestmentpartnerformanydevelopingcountries—isexpectedtoexpandby4.6percentin2026,downfrom5percentin2025.InEurope,fiscalstimulusincountrieslikeGermanymayofferlimitedsupport,butoveralldemandwillremainmodest.3

1UNCTAD,TradeandDevelopmentReport2025,pp.4–5.

2UNCTAD,TradeandDevelopmentReport2025,p.2..

3UNCTAD,TradeandDevelopmentReport2025,pp.4–5.

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Slowergrowthaffectstradethroughweakerexportdemand,tighterfinancialconditions,andgreaterexposuretoshocks.Commodity-dependenteconomiesmayfaceheightenedpricevolatility,whileaccesstoexternalfinancecouldbecomemoreconstrained.Globally,policyvolatilitymayfurtherdampenlong-terminvestment,complicatinginfrastructureandindustrialfinancingfordevelopingcountries.

Theimpactondevelopingcountrieswillbesignificant.Subduedglobalgrowthraisesthestakesindevelopingcountriesbylimitinginvestmentandaccesstofinanceforinfrastructureandindustrialization(figure1).Policymakerswillneedtoadaptstrategies—suchasstrengtheningregionalintegrationordigitaltrade—tocounterglobalheadwindsandbuildresilientdevelopmentplanstoward2026.

Figure1

Adeterioratingpolicyenvironmentinhibitsgrowthacrosstheglobe.

Realgrossdomesticproduct(GDP)growth,worldandselectedeconomies,percentage,2004–2026

World

UnitedStates

15%

10

5

0

-5

20042026

China

15%

10

5

0

-5

20042026

EuropeanUnion

20042026

GlobalSouth(excludingChina)

20042026

Source:UNCTAD.TDR2025.p.5.

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TREND2

Updatingtherules–WTOreformatacrossroadsforglobaltradein2026

The14thWTOMinisterialConference(MC14)willtakeplaceinYaoundé,Cameroon,againstabackdropofgeopoliticaltensionsandtradeuncertaintiesdrivenbyunilateraltariffs,bilateraldeals,andeconomicsecurityconcerns.

Fordevelopingcountries,addressingsystemicchallengesremainsapriority,particularlyreformingthedisputesettlementmechanismandrestoringafully-functioningAppellateBody.Thesereformsareessentialtosafeguardmarketaccessandensuredevelopingmemberscaneffectivelyupholdtheirrightswithinthemultilateraltradingsystem.

PreservingpolicyspaceandreinforcingSpecialandDifferentialTreatment(SDT)willalsobecentralconcerns.SDTprovisionsarecriticalforindustrialization,valueaddition,andstructuraltransformation,enablingdevelopingcountriestomaximizethebenefitsofglobaltrade.

Developingcountries’interestsspanseveralareas.Theseinterestsincludeagricultureandfisheries,withanemphasisonfoodsecurityandrurallivelihoods;electroniccommerce,coveringregulatoryapproachesthatsupportdigitaldevelopmentstrategies,cross-borderdataflows,emergingservicestrademodels,andthefutureofthee-commercemoratorium;andthepotentialintegrationoftheplurilateralInvestmentFacilitationforDevelopmentAgreement(IFDA)intotheWTOlegalframework,aimedatpromotingforeigndirectinvestmentandfacilitatingintegrationintoglobalvaluechains.

Theintersectionoftradeandclimatepolicywillremainrelevant.Discussionsonsubsidiesforsustainableindustrializationandeco-labellingmeasurescouldaffectdevelopingcountries’tradecompetitivenessandarelikelytofeatureinthelonger-termWTOreformagenda.

DeliverablesatMC14willshapethetrajectoryofWTOreformandglobaltradegovernance.Fordevelopingcountries,thisisapivotalmomenttoinfluencereformsthataddresscontemporaryeconomicchallengesandopportunitieswhilealsofosteringinclusivegrowth.

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TREND3

Tariffsontherise-increasedprotectionismmaytriggergreaterpolicyuncertainty

Tariffproliferationcreatesuncertainty.In2026,governmentsareexpectedtocontinueusingtariffsasprotectionistandstrategictools.Theirroleinregulatingmarketaccessexpandedmarkedlyin2025,ledbytheUnitedStates’tariffincreasestiedtoindustrial,geoeconomic,andgeopoliticalobjectives.Asaresult,averageglobaltariffsrose,withuneveneffectsacrosssectorsandtradingpartners(figure2a,b).Uncertaintyislikelytopersistin2026asgovernmentspursueavarietyofdomesticpolicyobjectivesusingtariffsandothertradepolicyinstruments,includingindustrysupport,intensifyingindustrialpolicies,addressingtradeimbalances,andadjustmentstosupply-chainreorganizationandtechnologicalchangewithinexistingandnewtradeagreements.

Tariffsshapetradeflowsbyincreasingimportcosts,andevensmallincreasescanrippleacrossmarketsbyweakeningdemand,shiftingsourcing,andreroutingtrade.Frequentpolicychangesamplifyuncertainty,discouraginginvestmentandcomplicatingplanning.Tradevolumesmayfallnotonlyaftertariffsrise,butalsoasfirmsadjustpreemptivelytoexpectedpolicyshifts.Avolatiletariffenvironment,therefore,risksunderminingglobaltradegrowthandefficiency.

Smaller,lessdiversifiedeconomiesareparticularlyexposedtorisingtariffsandpolicyvolatility.Limitedcapacitytoredirectexportsorabsorbhighercostscanleadtorevenuelosses,fiscalstrain,andslowerdevelopment.Tariffhikesoncommoditiesmayalsothreatenlivelihoodsandfoodsecurity.

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Figure2

a.Tariffsincreaseonglobaltradehasbeensubstantialin2025,especiallyinmanufacturing.

Trade-weightedaverageappliedtariffonglobaltrade

Tariffin2024Tariffin2025

6.7%

5.7%

4.7%1.9%

0.8%0.8%

AgricultureNaturalResourcesManufacturing

b.Tariffincreasesinglobaltradeinselectedmanufacturingsubsectors

0%246810

AutomotiveandTransport

Chemicalproducts

ElectricalMachinery

IronandSteel

Machinery

Otherbasemetals

Othermanufacturing

PlasticsandRubber

Precisioninstruments

TextilesandApparel

Source:UNTradeandDevelopment(UNCTAD).

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TREND4

Valuechainscontinueto

reconfigure–geopoliticsredrawstradeandinvestmentmaps

Globalvaluechainsareshifting.Recentshocksarereshapingproductionnetworksastradetensionsandthepandemicpushedfirmsbeyondcost-drivenoffshoringandtowardsrisk-awarestrategies.Thisreconfigurationisexpectedtocontinuein2026,drivenbygeopoliticalstrains,newindustrialandclimatepolicies,andtechnologicalchange.Firmsarediversifyingsuppliers,“near-shoring”productionclosertoconsumers,andverticallyintegratingtosecurekeyinputs.Advancesinautomationandartificialintelligencearealsoreducinglabour-costadvantages,encouragingproductionrelocation.

Structuralshiftsarealteringtradepatterns.Nearlytwo-thirdsofglobaltradeoccurswithinglobalvaluechains,andchangesintheirconfigurationarecreatingnewhubsandroutes.Somehubcountries-keylocationswherevaluechainactivitiesareconcentrated-androutesthroughwhichgoodsandservicesmove-areexpandingfasterthanaverage,whileothersdecline(figure3).Althoughsupplierdiversificationcanstrengthenresilienceandthusstabilizetrade,itmayalsointroduceinefficienciesandweighontradegrowth.

Developingeconomiesfacebothopportunitiesandrisks.Countrieswithstronginfrastructure,skilledlabour,andstablelong-termpoliciesarebetterpositionedtoattractinvestmentasfirmsseeknewlocations.Bycontrast,peripheraleconomies—especiallythosereliantonlow-costlabourexports—riskmarginalizationifproductionconcentratesinafewhubs.Proactivemeasures,includingimprovedlogistics,workforceupgrading,andastrongerinvestmentclimate,areessentialtoremainintegratedintoglobalvaluechains.

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Figure3

Uneventradegrowthinglobalvaluechain-relatedbilateralflows

Annualgrowthratesofselectedbilateralflows(relativetotheglobalaverageintheperiod)

2018–20242024–2025

UnitedStates<>VietNam

China<>Mexico

China<>VietNam

EuropeanUnion<>UnitedStates

Mexico<>UnitedStates

EuropeanUnion<>VietNam

China<>EuropeanUnion

Canada<>UnitedStates

China<>UnitedStates

EuropeanUnion<>UnitedKingdom

-20%-10%0%10%20%

Source:UNCTADcalculationbasedonUNCTADSTATandnationalstatistics.

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TREND5

Servicificationoftrade–exportsofservicescontinuetogrowfasterthangoods

Servicesarepoweringglobaltradegrowth.Overthepastdecade,worldservicesexportsexpandedbyabout5.3percentannually—morethantwicethepaceofgoodstrade—andnowaccountfor27percentofglobaltrade.In2025,servicesexportgrowthisexpectedtoreach9percent,withmomentumlikelytocontinuein2026.Thisreflectsgrowingservicification,asservicesincreasinglyunderpinproductionacrosssectors.By2022,servicesmadeup71percentofglobalintermediateinputs,includingsizeablesharesinprimaryindustries(about18percent)andmanufacturing(about31percent).4Accesstoefficientservicessuchasfinance,logistics,andinformationtechnology,oftenthroughimports,hasbecomeessentialforcompetitiveness.

Digitalizationacceleratesservicification.Advancesindigitaltechnologyhavemademanyservicestradableatscale.Digitallydeliverableservicesnowrepresent56percentofglobalservicesexports,havinggrownatanaverageannualrateof7.1percentoverthepastdecade.However,apronounceddigitaldivideremains:indevelopedeconomies,about61percentofservicesexportsaredelivereddigitally,comparedwithjust16percentinleastdevelopedcountries(LDCs).5Atthesametime,newbarriersareemerging,withtheglobaldigitalservicestraderestrictivenessindexrisingfrom0.168in2014to0.182in2024.6Figures4and5illustrateboththerapidexpansionofdigitalservicestradeandthelimitedparticipationofLDCs.

Digitalservicesincreasinglyfeatureprominentlyinbilateralandregionaltradeagreements,suchasforexample,theAfCFTADigitalTradeProtocolwithits9Annexes(adoptedin2025,goingforratificationbyAfricancountriesin2026),recentbilateraldealsbetweentheUnitedStatesandsomeAsiancountries,andongoingnegotiationstowardtheASEANDigitalEconomyFrameworkAgreement(DEFA).Lookingahead,ministerialdecisionsonelectroniccommerceanddigitaltransactionsattheWTOMC14maycarrysignificantimplicationsforglobalstrategiesaimedatadvancingservicificationandintegratingvaluechains,aswellasforthecapacityofdevelopingcountriestoeffectivelyparticipateintheseactivities.

4Intermediateinputsdatafrom

OECDTIVAdatabase

.AccessedNovember2025.

5Exportdatafrom

UNCTADstat

.AccessedNovember2025.

6TheDigitalServicesTradeRestrictivenessIndexdatafromthe

OECDdigitalSTRIdatabase

.AccessedNovember2025.

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Figure4

Digitallydeliverableservicesareafast-growingsegmentofglobaltrade

Averageannualgrowthofexports,percentage,2015–2024

Digitally-deliverableservicesOthertypesofservicesGoods

10

8.4

6.7

7.16.0

5.2

5

4.4

3.8

4.2

3.7

3.3

3.62.9

Developedeconomies

Developingeconomies

Leastdevelopedcountries

World

Source:UNTradeandDevelopment(UNCTAD)estimatesbasedonUNCTADstatstatistics.

Note:Growthrateisthecompoundannualgrowthrate.Digitallydeliverableproductsinclude:insuranceandfinancialservices,telecommunications,computerandinformationservices,intellectualpropertycharges,

research-and-developmentservices,trade-related,technical,managerial,consultancy,engineering,scientificandarchitecturalservices,audiovisualservices,aswellashealthandeducationpersonalservices,andculturalheritageandrecreationalservices.

10

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Figure5

Digitallydeliverableservicesaccountforonlyasmallshareofservicesexportsinleastdevelopedcountries

Exportofdigitallydeliverableservicesasashareoftotalexportofservices,percentage,2010–2024

WorldDevelopingeconomiesDevelopedeconomiesLeastdevelopedcountries(LDCs)

80%

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

20102012201420162018202020222024

Source:UNTradeandDevelopment(UNCTAD)basedonUNCTADstat.

Note:Digitallydeliverableproductsinclude:insuranceandfinancialservices,telecommunications,computerandinformationservices,intellectualpropertycharges,research-and-developmentservices,trade-related,technical,managerial,consultancy,engineering,scientificandarchitecturalservices,audiovisualservices,aswellashealthandeducationpersonalservices,andculturalheritageandrecreationalservices.

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12

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TREND6

South–Southtradesurge–

developingcountriesdriveglobalexportgrowth

South–Southtradeisemergingasamajorengineofglobaltrade.Between1995and2025,South–Southmerchandiseexportsareestimatedtohavesoaredfromabout$0.5trillionto$6.8trillion,faroutpacingbothSouth–Northtradeandoverallworldtradegrowth(figure6).Today,57percentofdevelopingcountryexportsgotootherdevelopingmarkets,upfrom38percentin1995.

ThissurgehasbeenfueledlargelybyAsia’sregionalvaluechains–especiallyinEastandSoutheastAsia–wherehigh-andmedium-techmanufacturingaccountsforroughlyhalfof

South–Southtrade.7

7UNCTADcalculationsbasedonUNCTADStatdata.

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Figure6

South-SouthtradeoutpaceddevelopingcountriesIexportstoNorthandworldtradegrowth

World,SouthtoSouth,andSouthtoNorthmerchandiseexportflows(1995=100)

WorldSouthtoSouthSouthtoNorth

1400

1200

1000

800

600

400

200

0

1995200020052010201520202025

Source:UNCTADcalculationsbasedonUNCTADstatandUNCTADestimates.

Note:Merchandiseexports.Donotincludeservices.

South–Southtradeacrossregionsisontherise.MorethanhalfofAfrica’sexportsnowgotootherdevelopingcountries(figure7),reflectingdeeperregionalintegrationandthegrowingroleoflargeemergingeconomiesasimportmarkets.Geopoliticalfragmentationcouldfurtheracceleratethistrend,asdevelopingcountriesincreasinglyrelyoneachothertooffsetweakerdemandinadvancedeconomies.

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Figure7

Southernmarketsbecameaprominentexportdestinationfordevelopingcountries

Shareofdevelopingcountriesinmerchandiseexportsbyregion(percent)19952024

60%

58.742.5

53.2

40

20

37.3

55.638.3

27.4

24.5

AfricaLatinAmericaAsiaandOceania

Developingeconomies

Shareofdevelopingcountries(excludingChina)inmerchandiseexportsbyregion(percent)

60%

40

43.534.0

40.2

39.531.5

26.324.4

20

23.3

Developingeconomies

AfricaLatinAmericaAsiaandOceania

Source:UNCTADcalculationsbasedonUNCTADstat.

Note:Chinaisalsoexcludedasreportingcountry(exporter)

Developingcountriescanharnessopportunities.InterregionaltradeoutsideAsia,particularlybetweenAfricaandLatinAmerica,remainssignificantlyunderdevelopeddespitestrongcomplementarities.StrengtheningSouth–Southlinkagescouldbecomeakeydriverofresiliencewithinglobaltradenetworks.8

8See

/news/unctad16-stronger-south-south-cooperation-trade-and-investment-key-shared-

prosperity

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TREND7

Sustainabletrade–environmentwillcontinuetobepartofglobaltradeinitiatives

Environmentalagendasaremovingintoimplementation.In2026,internationalagreementsonoceans,biodiversity,fisheriessubsidies,andwaterresourcesaretakingeffect,withimplicationsforembeddingenvironmentalgovernanceintotradeandeconomicplanning.Asof9November2025,enhancedclimatepledgesby113countriescouldcutglobalemissionsby12%by2035incomparisonto2029levels,signalingadecisiveshifttowardlow-carbongrowth.

The2026UnitedNationsClimateChangeConference(COP31)willtakeplacefrom9to20NovemberinAntalya,Türkiye.Trade-relateddiscussionsareexpectedtofocusonacceleratingtheenergytransition,includingfinancingrenewableenergy,haltingdeforestation,andadvancingajustandequitableshiftawayfromfossilfuels.Ascarbon-relatedregulationsandindustrialpoliciesreshapemarketaccessandcompetitiveness,thegreeneconomyisredefiningtradeflows—drivenbycleanenergytechnologies,carbonpricingmechanisms,andgrowingdemandforenvironmentalgoodsandservices

Thegreeneconomyisreshapingtrade.In2026,theEuropeanUnionCarbonBorderAdjustmentMechanismwillbecomefullyoperational,imposingacarbonpriceonselectedimportsand,from2028,onspecificsteelandaluminium-intensivedownstreamgoods.Applyingtoimportswithoutequivalentcarbonpricing,includingthosefromLDCs,mayaffectmarketaccess,whilesimilarmeasureselsewherecouldfurtherinfluencetradeandinvestmentflows.

Carbon-relatedregulationsandindustrialpoliciesarealsoredirectingtrade.CleanenergytechnologymarketscouldreachUS$640billionannuallyby2030.9Tradeincleanandclimate-adaptationtechnologieswilldriveenvironmentalgoodsgrowththrough2030.Environmentalsustainabilityisincreasinglycentraltocompetitiveness,requiringinclusiveaccesstogreentechnologiesandfinance,lowerbarriersforenvironmentalgoods,andtargetedtechnicalassistancetobuildresilientproductivecapacity.

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/reports/the-state-of-clean-technology-manufacturing/analysis

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TREND8

Criticalminerals–Oversupplyandgeopoliticsmaydestabilizetrade

andglobalvaluechains

Criticalmineralmarketsenter2026afterasharppricecorrectionfromtheir2021–2022highs.Bylate2025,pricesofkeymineralsessentialforcleanenergytechnologieswere18–39percentbelowpeaklevels,despitenotableshort-termvolatility(figure11).Whilecobaltpricesreboundedstronglyin2025,thisincreasewaslargelydrivenbytemporarysupplydisruptionsandexportrestrictionsintheDemocraticRepublicofCongo,amplifiedbylowinventoriesandprecautionaryrestocking,ratherthanbysustainedrecoveryinunderlyingdemand.

Overall,thepricedeclinesince2022reflectsrapidsupplyexpansion,slower-than-expectedbatterydemand,andtechnologicalshiftsthatreducemineralintensity.10Thesetrendsareexpectedtocontinuein2026.

Lowerpriceshaveeasedcostpressuresforelectricvehiclesandrenewableenergyproducers,butalsoriskdiscouragingnewminingprojectsin2026.In2024,investmentspendinggrewbyonly5percentcomparedto14percentin2023and30percentin2022.11Entering2026,critical-mineralsinvestmentremainsconstrained,withpolicy-drivenfundingintheEuropeanUnion12andtheUnitedStates13partiallyoffsettingweakmarketincentives.Financingisexpectedtorecoveronlymodestlyandremainfocusedonnear-mineprojectsratherthannewgreenfielddevelopment.14

10InternationalEnergyAgency,2024a,Trendsinelectricvehiclebatteries,availableat

/reports/

global-ev-outlook-2024/trends-in-electric-vehicle-batteries

11InternationalEnergyAgency,2025,GlobalcriticalMineralsOutlook,availableat

/reports/global-

critical-minerals-outlook-2025

12EuropeanCommission(2025),RESourceEUActionPlan,COM(2025)945final,Brussels.3December2025.

https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/01c448d6-dc93-40d7-9afe-4c2af448d00c_en

13UnitedStatesDepartmentoftheInterior(2025),Final2025ListofCriticalMineralspressrelease,7Nov.

https:///pressreleases/interior-department-releases-final-2025-list-critical-minerals

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/news/diversification-is-the-cornerstone-of-energy-security-yet-critical-minerals-are-moving-in-

the-opposite-direction

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Figure8

Criticalmineralpricesdeclinefrom2021highs

LithiumCarbonateCobaltNickel,dollarspermetricton90000

80000

70000

60000

50000

40000

30000

20000

10000

0

202020212022202320242025

Source:UNCTADbasedonThomsonReutersandWorldBankdata

Note:LithiumCarbonatevaluerefersto99.2%IndustrialGrade,cobaltvaluereferstoLondonMetalExchange.

Despitelowerprices,supplyriskspersist.Exportcontrolsandlicensingregimeshaveintensified,includingtheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo’scobaltexportbaninFebruary2025(followedbytheintroductionofexportquotas)15andChina’scontrolsonsevenheavyrareearthsandhigh-performancepermanentmagnets.16Suchmeasurescantightensupplyabruptly,eveninalow-priceenvironment.Thecobaltepisodealsosignalsthatsomeresource-richcountriesmayincreasinglyuseexportrestrictionsin2026tomanagemarketconditions,thoughadoptionislikelytobeselectiveandmineral-specificgivenfiscalandinvestmenttrade-offs.Import-dependentcountriesarerespondingthroughstockpilingandbilateralagreementstosecureaccesstoupstreamandprocessingcapacity,potentiallyincreasingsupply-chainfragmentationandreducingefficiencyin2026.

Resourcesecuritywillremainastrategictradeissue,asgovernmentsintervenetoprotectcriticalmineralsupplychains.Despitemoderatingprices,competitionovercriticalmineralsuppliesisintensifyingandisexpectedtocontinuein2026.

15

/policies/28969-temporary-suspension-of-cobalt-export-from-the-democratic-republic-of-congo

16

/zwgk/zcfb/art/2025/art_9c2108ccaf754f22a34abab2fedaa944.html

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TREND9

Feedingthefuture–agriculturaltradewillremainfundamentaltofoodsecurity

Agriculturaltradewillcontinuetounderpinfoodsecurity.Foodandagriculturalproductsrepresentaroundone-thirdofcommodityexports,withfoodproductsmakingupnearly87percent.17Manydevelopingcountriesdependonfoodimportstomeetbasicneeds,makingopenandpredictabletradeessential.Atthesametime,agriculturalexportssupportlivelihoodsandincomesformillionsoffarmersandruralworkers.

Agriculturalmarketsremainhighlyvulnerabletoshocks.Inrecentyears,conflicts,traderestrictions,andextremeweatherhavedisruptedfoodandfertilizersupplies.Droughts,floods,andstormsarebecomingmorefrequent,reducingyieldsandtriggeringlocalshortages.Theseshockskeepfoodpricesvolatile.Fertilizermarketshavebeenespeciallyvolatile,withpricesofnitrogenatedandphosphatefertilizerssurgingin2025andremaininghigh(figure9),raisingproductioncostsforfarmersaroundtheworld.18Developingcountriesareparticularlyexposed,asmanylackthefiscalandpolicybufferstoabsorbpricespikes.

Keepingglobalfoodtradeopenisalifelineforvulnerableeconomies.Whendomesticharvestsfallshort,importscanpreventsevereshortages.Atthesametime,strengtheningdomesticagricultureiscriticaltoreduceexcessiverelianceonimports.Thisrequiresbetteraccesstoinputssuchasseeds,fertilizer,andmachinery;improvedruralinfrast