2025生育率悖论教育是关键研究报告（英文）-

Thefertilityrate

paradox:Educationis

key10September2025AllianzResearchContent4ExecutiveSummary10Moneycan’tbuymorechildren21Lowfertilityratesareheretostay27Theworldpopulationmightpeakearlier

andageevenfasterthanexpected30Capital-fundedpensionprovisionand

flexibleretirementsolutionsgaininimportance33Educationiskeyforincreasingproductivity38AppendixAllianzResearch2Moneycan’tbuymorechildren.AmongOECDcountries,taxbreaks,cashbenefitsandservicesgrantedforfamiliesandchildrencorrespondedto1.8%ofGDP.IntheEU-27,theaverageshareofgovernmentexpendituresspendonfamilyandchildrenhasincreasedfrom1.6%in2001to1.9%ofGDPin2023,rangingfrom0.8%inMaltato4.0%inDenmark.However,inmanyindustrialized

countriestodayfamilyandchildrenpolicyisnotonlyconsideredanimportantelementinpreventingchildhoodpovertyandsmoothingconsumption,butalso

asmoreorlesssubtleincentivetoincreasethefertilityrate.Theunprecedented

declineinfertilityratesinmanycountries,callsthetargetsoftoday’sfamilypolicyintoquestion,suggestingthat

justspendingmoremoneydoesnotnecessarilyleadtohigherfertilityrates.Thisinturnraisesthequestionofwhetheritwouldnotbemoreimportanttofocusfamilypoliciesonguaranteeingthateverychildhasthesamechancesirrespectiveoftheparents’incomeandtopushaheadwiththenecessarymeasurestoadaptlabormarketsandpensionsystemstotherealityofagingsocieties.Evenmoreso,iftoday’scriticsoftheUNpopulationprojectionsturnouttoberightandtheworldpopulationagesmuchstrongerthanexpectedinthelongterm.Fertilityrateskeepdeclining,anditishardtotellwhy.Theunprecedenteddeclineinfertilityratesisaglobalphenomenon.InGermany,forexampleithasfallentoanaverage1.35childrenperwoman,in

Japanitdroppedto1.15childrenandtheUSreportedarecordlow1.6childrenperwomanin2024.However,noonecanpinpointtheonesinglereason,thatcouldexplainthisdevelopment,sincefertilitybehaviordependsonamultitudeoffactors,includingwomen’seducationattainmentlevels,theavailabilityandaffordabilityofhousingandchildcarefacilities,thelabormarketsituation,work-lifebalance

andsocietalnorms.Inthiscontext,effortstoraisethelaborforceparticipationrateofwomentodampentheimpactofdemographicchangeon

thelabormarket,theincreasingcostofliving,still-limitedchildcarefacilitiesandunaffordablehousing,especiallyinbigcities,andanincreasingshareofyoungpeoplewhointendtoremainchildless,arelikelytokeepglobalfertilityrateslow

fortheforeseeable

future.Withoutareversalofcurrentfertilitytrends,theglobalpopulationissetto

peakearlierthanexpectedandagemuchmorethanexpected,whichmakes

capital-fundedpensionprovisionallthemoreurgent.IntheUN’slow-fertility

scenario,theold-agedependencyratioinhigh-incomecountrieswouldincrease

toalmost80%inthelongrun.Thiswouldmeanahugestrainontax-orpay-as-you-gofinancedpensionsystems,whichwillnotbesustainableorprovideanadequatestandardoflivinginoldageinthelongrun.Hence,pensionsystemswillneedtoadapttotheneedsofanagingpopulation,andcapital-fundedpensionprovisionwillbecritical.10

September2025ExecutiveSummaryMichaelaGrimmSeniorEconomist,Demography&SocialProtectionmichaela.grimm@allianArneHolzhausenHeadofInsurance,Wealth&ESGResearcharne.holzhausen@al34Labormarketsandcompaniesalsoneedtobeadaptedtotheneedsofanagingworkforcepopulation.Thedeclineofthepopulationinworkingagecouldbecushionedbyanincreaseofthelaborforceparticipationinhigherages.IfEU-27membercountriessucceededingraduallyincreasingthelaborforceparticipationratesinhigheragestolevelsalreadyseenin

Japantoday,the

numberofpeopleavailableonthelabormarketwouldincreasefrom221.7mntodayto228.2mnin2041–eveninthelowfertilityscenario–beforedeclining

to

192.1mnin2060,with43%ofthembeing50andolderbythen.Therefore,labor

marketsandcompaniesneedtobeadaptedtotheneedsofanagingworkforce

population,notleastinordertoincentivizeolderworkerstopostponeretirement.Educationisalsokey.Whilehighereducationalattainmentdoescontributetoalowerfertilityrate,itisalsoanimportantmeanstocushiontheimpactofdemographicchangeonlabormarketsandeconomicgrowth,sincetheeducationalattainmentleveloftheworkforcepopulationispositivelycorrelatedwithproductivity.Therefore,thedeclineinthenumberofchildreninthefutureshouldnottriggeracutinpublicspendingoneducation.Instead,itshouldbeatleastkeptstableinordertoincreasepercapitainvestmentsinhumancapital.AllianzResearchwhileRomaniatopsthelistintermsofbenefits,grantingpaymentscorrespondingto89weeksofa

full-rateequivalent(i.e.thenumberofweeksitwouldhavetaken

themothertoearnthesameamountifshehadearned100%ofherpreviousearnings¹).TheleastgenerouscountryintheserespectsistheUS,where12weeksofjob-protectedunpaidleaveareonlygrantedtopublicemployeesandemployeesofprivatecompaniesthathave

atleast50employees,undertheFamilyandMedicalLeaveAct(FMLA)(seeFigure1).Today,mosthigh-incomeandmanymiddle-incomecountrieshaveimplementedfamilyandchildrenpolicies,includinginstrumentssuchascashbenefitsandtaxcredits.Furthermore,manyofthemnotonlygrantpre-andpost-birthmaternityleavetoprotectthehealthofmothers–ranginginOECDcountriesfromin

totaltwoweeksin

Australiato56weeksinGreece

–butalsoextendedpaidleavetobothparents.

Among

OECDcountries,Slovakiaisthemostgenerousintermsofduration(upto164weeksofmaternityleave)Moneycan’tbuymorechildren¹InRomania,forexample,ayoungmotherisonaverageentitledto85%ofherpreviousincomeforaperiodof104.3weeks.Shewouldhaveneeded89weekstoearnthesameamountifshehadearned100%ofherpreviousincome.SeeableOECD(2025).TablePF2.1.A.,Summaryofpaidleaveentitlementsavailabletomothers.10

September20255Source:OECD.Financialsupportforfamilies,likecashtransfers,childtaxcreditsorreducedsocialsecuritycontributions,isinmostOECDcountriesgrantedatleastuntilthechild

turns18.Insomecountries,itlastsevenbeyondthatage,lastingaslongasthechildisineducation.Hence,

therearemarkeddifferencesinthetaxtreatmentofsingleswithnochildrenandfamilieswithchildren.InBelgium,forexample,incometaxandemployees’social

securitycontributionsminuscashbenefitsforamarriedcouplewithone-earnerandtwochildrenaddup

to19.9%ofthegrosswage,while

forasinglepersonwith

nochild,incometaxplussocialsecuritycontributions

amountto39.7%oftheaveragegrosswage.²However,thedifferencesinthetaxtreatmentof

singles

withnochildrenandfamiliesvarymarkedly.Thehighestdifferencewithrespecttothetaxandsocial

contribution

burdenbetweensingleswithoutchildrenandmarriedcoupleswithone-earnerandtwochildrenwasreported

inSlovakia,wheretheincomeoffamilieswith

thesecharacteristicswasonaverage107%ofthegrosswage,

whilethetaxesandsocialsecuritycontributionsadded

upto24.1%forasingleperson.InGreece,thisdifference

wasmerely2.4%,whileinTürkiye,MexicoandCostaRicatherewasnodifferencebetweenasinglewithno

childandfamiliesinthisrespect(seeFigure2).²TheOECDtaxwedgeisnetofcashbenefitswhichincludethoseuniversallypaidtoworkerswithdependentchildrenagedfromsixtoelevenand

in-workbenefitspaidtoworkersingeneral,seeOECD(2025):Taxingwages2025,p.32.Figure1:Totalpaidweeksofmaternityleaveavailabletomothersandfull-rateequivalent(inweeks)

weeks(lhs)full-rateequivalent(weeks,rhs)1801601401201008060402009080706050403020100LuxembourgSouthKoreaCzechiaLithuaniaSloveniaHungaryBulgariaSlovakiaPolandNorwayFinlandColombiaCostaRicaAustriaCroatiaNewZealandNetherlandsIcelandSwitzerlandIrelandGermanyItalyPortugalBelgiumAllianzResearchDenmarkAustraliaIsraelTürkiyeRomaniaCyprusCanadaSwedenJapanEstoniaMexicoSpainGreeceFranceLatviaMaltaChileUSAUK6.1child。2children▲

3childreno

4childrenSource:OECD.³Theaveragefull-timewagereferstotheaveragegrosswageearningspaidtofull-time,full-yearworkers,beforedeductionsofanykind,seeOECD

(2025),tablePF1.3.C.

Valueoffamilybenefitsbynumberofchildren.4.5%ofanaveragewage³inSouthKoreato47%ofanaveragewageinEstoniain2023.Forarespectivecouplewithonlyonechild,theyrangedbetween0.9%inIcelandto

8.1%ofanaveragewageinItaly.ExceptionswereTürkiye

andtheUS,whichofferednocomparablefamilybenefits

(seeFigure3).Furthermore,inmostOECDcountries,benefitsforfamiliesincreasewiththenumberofchildren.

According

toOECDstatistics,benefitsforatwo-parentfamily,inwhichoneparentworkedfull-timeandonepart-time,withbothonwagesatthemedianofthe

full-timeearningsdistribution,withfourchildren,rangedfrom

singlenochildmarriedone-earnercouple,twochildrenSource:OECD.Figure2:Incometaxplusemployeecontributionslesscashbenefits(in%ofgrosswageearnings),2024Figure3:Amountoffamilybenefits,bynumberofchildren(inpercentofaveragewage)BelgiumLithuaniaGermanyDenmarkSloveniaHungary403020100-106050403020100(in%ofgrosswageearnings)CanadaAustraliaPortugalSwitzerlandSouthKoreaFinlandTürkiyeNorwayGermanyCzechiaSlovakia10

September2025SlovakiaSwedenFranceIrelandIcelandNorwayHungaryPortugalBulgariaAustraliaBelgiumSloveniaSouth

KoreaIrelandFinlandSpainJapanCroatiaSwedenLuxembourgOECDaverageNewZealandCyprusFranceJapanSpainLuxembourgNetherlandsChileIsraelIcelandNewZealandCostaRicaNetherlandsSwitzerlandIsraelCzechiaLithuaniaDenmarkTürkiyeEstoniaRomaniaPolandMexicoItalyAustriaGreeceCanadaLatviaEstoniaPolandAustriaItalyGreeceChileLatviaMaltaUSAUSAUK7UKSource:Eurostat.OnOECDaverage,taxbreaks,cashbenefitsandservicesgrantedforfamiliesandchildrencorrespondedto1.8%ofGDP⁴,withmarkeddifferencesinthetotalshareandcompositionoffamilybenefits.TotalpublicspendingforfamilysupportinOECDcountriesranged

from0.5%ofGDPinTürkiyeto3.8%inIceland,withcash

benefitsbeingthemajorinstrumentinmostcountries,IntheEU27,theaverageshareofgovernmentexpendituresspentonfamilyandchildrenamountedto1.9%ofGDPin2023.GovernmentsofalmosteveryEUmembercountryspendahighershareofGDPonfamiliesandchildrentodaythanin2001,with

the

shares

rangingfrom0.8%inMaltaand4.0%inDenmarkin2023.Bothcountrieswerebeingamongthosewheretheincreaseofgovernmentspendingonfamilieswasaccountingformorethan70%ofthebenefitsinCanadaandGreece.However,thelevelsofgovernmentspendingforfamiliesandchildrenarenotreflectedinfertilityrates.In

fact,despiterelativelylowlevelsofsupportforfamiliesand

children,IrelandandtheUScontinuetohavesomeofthehighestbirthratesamongOECDcountries(seeFigure5).lowerthanGDPgrowth.BesidesDenmark,Finland,FranceandSwedenwerealsoamongthecountriesthatspentthemostforfamilyandchildren,whileItaly,Spain,

GreeceandIrelandwereatthelowerendofthisscale

(seeFigure4).Figure4:Generalgovernmentexpendituresonfamilyandchildren(in%ofGDP)GermanyLithuaniaPortugalSloveniaRomaniaHungary

2001

2013

2023generalgovermentexpenditures,family

and5.55.04.54.03.53.02.52.01.51.00.50.0FinlandSlovakiaNorwaychi

ldren

(in%ofGDP)EstoniaPolandFrance⁴Datarefersto2021.SwedenBelgiumGreeceIrelandLuxembourgNetherlandsSwitzerlandBulgariaAllianzResearchDenmarkCyprusCzechiaCroatiaItalyAustriaSpainLatviaMalta8Figure5:Publicspendingforfamilysupport(in%ofGDP)andfertilityrates4.03.53.02.52.01.51.00.50.0Thispicturedoesnotchangewhenalsotakingparentalleaveandrelatedbenefitsintoaccount:Measuringthe

familypolicygenerositybysimplyrankingcountriesbythelengthofandbenefitlevelsgrantedinparental

leaveandthecorrespondingshareofpublicspendingofGDP,andweighingtheresultsinthethreesub-categoriesequally,putsEstoniaatthetopoftheranking,

whilepublicpolicyintheUSistheleastgenerous(seeFigure6). Cash(in%GDP) Services(in%GDP)

Taxbreaksforfamilies(in%GDP)

Fertilityrate2023Sources:OECD,UNPopulationDivision(2024).Figure6:Familypolicygenerosityandfertilityrates40

Sources:OECD,UNPopulationDivision(2024),

AllianzResearch.3.02.52.01.51.00.50.0

FPG(lhs)fertilityrate(rhs)35302520151050EstoniaFinlandAustriaNorwayCzechiaSweden10

September2025SwedenBelgiumBelgiumItalyCanadaPortugalIcelandPolandMexicoTürkiyeHungarySlovakiaTürkiyeMexicoPolandAustriaIsraelSpainLuxembourgLuxembourgNewZealandNewZealandNetherlandsNetherlandsJapanIcelandSwitzerlandIrelandSwitzerlandIrelandGermanyGermanyPortugalCostaRicaCostaRicaHungaryColombiaColombiaNorwayLithuaniaLithuaniaDenmarkDenmarkAustraliaAustraliaIsraelSlovakiaSloveniaSloveniaCanadaCzechiaFinlandJapanEstoniaItalySpainGreeceGreeceFranceFranceLatviaLatviaKoreaKoreaChileChileUSAUSAUKUK9Onthecontrary,accordingtothelatestavailablefigures,

thedeclineinfertilityratesinmajorEU27membercountries–includingtheformerNordicmodelcountries

Denmark,FinlandandSweden–continuedin2024.InGermany,wherethefertilityratedeclinedto1.35childrenperwoman,theslowdownofthedeclineinthenumberofbirthswasalreadyconsideredapositive

development.IntheUS,aslightincreaseinthenumberofbirthscouldnotpreventthefertilityratefromfallingbelow1.6childrenperwoman.In

Japan,thefertilityratedeclinedfurtherto1.15,withthenumberofbirthsfalling

below700,000forthefirst

time.However,there

werealsosomemajor

Asianeconomieswherefertilityrates

developedcontrarytothegeneraltrend:ChinareportedFigure7:Fertilityrates,selectedcountriesanincreaseofthenumberofbirthsforthefirst

timeafter

seven

yearsfollowingtheintroductionofawholerange

ofbirth-friendlypolicies.SouthKoreaalsoregisteredanincreaseinthenumberofbirthsandthefirstincreaseof

thefertilityratesince2015,from0.72to0.75.

Thelatest

dataforTaiwanshowaslightincreaseof

thebirthrate

from0.87to0.89,andpreliminaryfiguresforHongKongalsoindicateaslightincreaseofthenumberofbirths.However,itistooearlyto

judgewhetherthisisonlyatemporaryupwardbliporareversalofthetrend.InSingapore,thefertilityratedidnotdeclinefurtherbutremainedstableatanaverage0.97childrenperwoman

(seeFigure7).

Austria

Canada

China

Denmark

England&Wales

Finland

France

Germany

Italy

Japan

Portugal

Singapore

SouthKorea

Spain

Sweden

Switzerland

Taiwan

USASources:HumanFertilityDatabase;BundesamtfürStatistikDeutschland;BFSSwitzerland;DepartmentofStatisticsSingapore;Departmentof

HouseholdRegistrationM.O.ITaiwan;INSEE;ISTAT;Martin,Joyce

A.,BradyE.

Hamilton,and

MichelleJ.K.Osterman(2025);OfficeforNational

StatisticsUK;Statistik

Austria;StatisticsFinland;StatisticsKorea;StatisticsSweden;UNPopulationDivision(2024).1979

1984

1989

1994

1999200420092014201920243.02.52.01.51.00.5本报告来源于三个皮匠报告站（）,由用户Id:659839下载,文档Id:911809,下载日期:2026-02-15total

ferti

l

ity

rateAllianzResearch10Theselatestdevelopmentsreflectthefactthatthereisnot“the”onesinglefactorthatexplains

the

fertility

behaviorinasociety.Thedecisionwhethertohavechildren,andhowmanyandwhen,isratherinfluenced

byacombinationoffactors,suchasthe

educationallevelofwomen,theaffordabilityofhousing,theoverall

leveloflivingexpenses,expectedexpendituresforachild’seducation,costsandavailabilityofchildcarefacilities,thelabormarketsituationorthechanceofbalancingworklifeandfamily.Therelativeimportance

ofasinglefactormayshiftovertimeandinline

withthedevelopmentstageofaneconomyorchangingattitudesandsocietalnorms.Whichexplainswhyinthepastpro-natalpolicieshaveledonlytoalimitedandoftentemporaryincreaseinfertilityrates.Accordingto

theGBD2021FertilityandForecastingCollaborators,

empiricalevidencesuggeststhatthesepoliciesledto

anincreaseofthetotalfertilityrateofnomorethan0.2

birthsperwoman.⁵MoreeducatedwomenhavefewerchildrenProbablythemostimportantfactorsaretheeducationalattainmentlevelandthebargainingpowerofwomen.

Thehigherthelevelofeducationandtheshareofawoman’scontributiontohouseholdincome,i.e.thebettercareeropportunitiesforwomenareand

thehighertheirownincome,thelowerthefertilityrateingeneral.Inlow-incomecountries,even

justfinishingprimaryschoolmakesadifference,reducingthefertility

rate(seeFigure8).Lowfertilityratesareheretostay⁵SeeGBD2021FertilityandForecastingCollaborators(2024),p.2088.10

September202511degreehasalmostdoubledfrom25.3%in2002to49.8%in

2024,withthesharesrangingbetween26.3%inRomania

and69.6%inIreland.Thismarkedincreasewasobserved

inallcountries,withtheexceptionofFinland,where

thissharewashighestin2000(seeFigure9).Inthegeneration

ofthe45-to54-year-olds,only36.6%of

the

womenin

the

EU-27heldatertiarydegree,andofthoseagedbetween

55and64merely25.4%in2024.Inmiddle-andespeciallyhigh-incomecountries,theincreasingshareofwomenwitha

tertiaryeducationalattainmentlevelhascontributedtothefurtherdeclineoffertilityratesastheageofentryintothelabormarket

andstartingone’sownhouseholdisdelayedbyalonger

timespentineducation.Intoday’sEU-27membercountries,forexample,theaverageshareof

youngwomenagedbetween25and34whoholdatertiary

200020102024Source:Eurostat.*atleastcompletedprimary,femalepopulation25+

years(%),(cumulative)

Sources:WorldBank,UNPopulationDivision(2024).0

20

40

60

80100Figure9:Femalepopulationwithtertiaryeducationalattainmentlevel,agegroup25-34(in%)atleastcompletedprimarylevel,female25+(in%)Figure8:Educationalattainmentlevel*andtotalfertilityratesfemales,25-34,tertiaryeducationlevel(in%)7560453015076543210PolandEstoniaGreeceSlovakiaGermanytotal

ferti

l

ity

rateLatviaMaltaLuxembourgNetherlandsIrelandPortugalBulgariaBelgiumAllianzResearchLithuaniaDenmarkRomaniaSloveniaSwedenCzechiaFinlandItalyAustriaSpainFrance12Theoverallshareoffemaleswith

tertiaryeducationagedbetween25and64intheEU-27hasmorethandoubledfrom18.3%in2002to39.0%in2024,withthesharesrangingfrom21.4%inRomaniato60.8%inIreland.

However,theaverageshareisstillmarkedlybelowthelevelintheUS,whereaccordingtothelatestavailableWorldBankfigures51%ofallwomenaged25andolderhadatleastcompletedshort-term-cycletertiaryeducation⁶.InSouthKorea,⁷oneofthecountrieswiththelowestfertilityratesworld-wide,theshareofwomenaged15andolderwhograduatedeitherfromcollegeoruniversityhasincreasedfrom14.6%to39.5%since2000.Asaconsequenceoflongerperiodsofeducation,inOECDcountries,theaverageageofmothersatfirstbirth

increasedfrom26.4yearsin2000to29.5

yearsin2022.Withanaverageageof32.9,SouthKoreahadtheoldestfirst-timemothersofallOECDcountries,followedbyItaly,wheremothersareonaverageaged31.8atfirstbirth.Bulgariahadthe

youngestfirst-timemotherswithinthe

EU27,withanaverageageof26.9years.IntheUS,thisagewas27.5⁸,withtheageincreasealsoreflectingthe

successinreducingthenumberofteenagepregnancies

(seeFigure

10).Thedelayinchildbearingisreflectedintheincreaseinfertilityratesintheagegroups30andolder.However,theolderwomenareatthetime

ofbecominga

first-time

mother,thelowerthechancetheygivebirthtoasecondorthirdchild,sincethelikelihoodofafurther(natural)pregnancydecreaseswithage,whiletheassociatedhealthrisksforthemotherandtheunbornchildincrease.

Hence,manywomenandcoupleswhopostponedtheir

wishforeitherfoundingafamily

orhavinga

furtherchildduetotheCovid-19pandemicin2021aremorelikelytonotbeabletohavethenumberofchildrenthey

intended.Thefertilityrateofwomenwithalowereducationalattainmentlevelisingeneralhighersincetheyoftenhavetheirfirstchildearlier.InGermany,forexample,the

shareofwomenwiththreeandmorethan

four

children

ismorethantwiceashighamongwomenwithaloweducationalattainmentlevelcomparedtothosewithahighormediumeducationalattainmentlevel(seeFigure

11)acrossallagecohorts.Source:OECD,Brown,AndreaD.(2025),table1.6

WorldBankDevelopment(2025)WorldDevelopmentindicators.InallcountriesbesidesGermanyandSouthKorea,theshareofwomenwithterti-aryeducationwashigherthanthatofmenintheagegroup

25

to

64.⁷SeeStatisticsKorea(2025).⁸SeeBrown,

AndreaD.etal(2025),table1.Figure10:

Averageageofmothersatfirstbirth(inyears)333231302928272625meanageatfirstbirth(inyears)SlovakiaRomaniaBulgariaSloveniaCzechiaHungaryLuxembourgSwitzerlandFinlandAustriaCyprusPortugalDenmark10

September2025NorwaySwedenCroatiaFranceTaiwanGreeceSerbiaLatviaLiechtensteinNetherlandsItalyIrelandGermanyBelgiumLithuaniaCanadaJapanEstoniaPolandSpainMaltaKorea13USAAtthesametime,the

shareof

women

whoremain

childlesshasbeenmarkedlyhigheramongthosewithatertiarydegreethaningroups

withalowereducationaldegree.InGermany,thissharewasingeneralaround10ppshigherthanamongwomenwitha

loweducationalattainmentleveland5ppshigherthan

thatamongwomenwithamediumone.Ofthehighlyeducatedwomenbornbetween1978and1987,29%werechildlesscomparedto16%ofthosewithaloweducational

level(seeFigure12).However,thetotalshareofwomenwho

remainchildlesshasincreased:Ofthewomenbornin1941

merely11%remainedchildlesscomparedto21%ofthosebornin1977.1998-20071988-19971978-19871968-19771958-19671947-1957

low

medium

highSource:BundesamtfürStatistik,Germany.

high

medium

lowSource:BundesamtfürStatistik,Germany.1998-20071988-19971978-19871968-

19771958-19671947-1957Figure11:

Fertilityrates,byeducationalattainmentlevelandagegroup,Germany100806040200Figure12:Shareofwomenremainingchildless,byagecohort,Germany2.52.01.51.00.50.0childlessness(in%ofagecohort)total

ferti

l

ity

rateAllianzResearch14Sources:OECD,BundesamtfürStatistik.9

However,despitehavingthehighestshareofwomenwhoremainedchildless,thetotalfertilityratein

JapanisstillhigherthaninSouthKorea,dueI

h

ht

,i

hSi

hp

i

tei

oS

vi

,

retr

nc-

.a

g

t

s2

,

.B1

f.ujouan,

Eva

and

CarolineBerghammer(2021),pp.526und528.11

SeeStatisticsKorea(2025).epS4ie20ounECDcOneiekSpilalyandGsecondoneaaphgdwasKoregusotnUSantningonEuropeanJapanmorewomfohaytdtuctaae0o1tTheopportunitycostsofhavingchildrenarestillborn

by

womenThefactthatfertilityratesandthe

share

of

childlesswomencorrespondtotheeducationalattainmentlevelofwomenreflectsthatopportunitycostsplayamajor

roleinthedecisionsofifandwhentohavechildrenasthelaborforceparticipationrateofwomen,andwithittheireconomicindependenceandtheirbargainingpower,increasewiththeireducationalattainmentlevel.OnEUaverage,forexample,ofthewomenaged

between15and64withalowersecondaryeducational

attainmentlevel,merely43.0%wereactiveonthelabormarket,comparedto71.4%ofthosewith

anuppersecondaryorpost-secondarydegreeand87.9%ofthe

womenwithtertiarydegree(Figure14).

AndtheEUis

notanexception.Thesamestructurecanalsobefound

inotherindustrializedcountries,likeinSouthKorea,wherethecorrespondinglaborforceparticipationratesintheagegroup15andolderwere32.7%,50.9%and71.2%.11Theincreaseintheshareofwomenwhoremainchildlessisaglobalphenomenonandexplainsapartofthedeclineinfertilityrates:Thehighestshareofwomen

who