2026年全球经济展望报告-

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ECONOMICS

17March2026

Quarterly

GlobalEconomicOutlook

Throughthevalleyofuncertainty

ImagegeneratedbyAIfromauser-provideddescription

WeiYao

+85221664983

wei.yao@

AnatoliAnnenkov

+442076767625

anatoli.annenkov@

KunalKundu

+918067318266

kunal.kundu@

MichelMartinez

+33156373429

michel.martinez@

FabienBossy

+33158982873

fabien.bossy@

DevAshish

+918067314381

dev.ashish@

JohannesGroen

+12122784228

johannes.groen@

SamCartwright

+442077624506

sam.cartwright@

MichelleLam

+85221665721

michelle.lam@

JinKenzaki

+818021623727

jin.kenzaki@

Researchcontributionsfrom

JaferJiang

LucasPuttrePerezLlorca

GlobalEconomicOutlook

17March20262

Pageleftblankintentionally

GlobalEconomicOutlook

17March20263

TABLEOFCONTENTS

Keycalls 4

Keyforecastsvsconsensus 5

Warshock-Keepcalmandstayvigilant 7

Box

1NiGEMmodel

Howanoilshockworksthroughamacroeconomicmodel 12

AItomakeorbreakit 13

Box

2AIandglobaltrade

WinnersoftheAIcapexboom 17

UnitedStates-Real-economyresilience,stickyinflation 18

Euroarea-(Still)poisedforaprolongedcyclicalrecovery 21

Box3

Germany

Spilloversfromfiscalstimuluslargerthantradeimpact 25

Box

4Euroareahousing

Thedownturnisending 27

Box

5

UKpoliticsPoliticsriskspersist 28

China-Endofdeflation,butlittlerebalancing 29

Japan-Targetedfiscaleasing,BoJtighteningstillontrack 31

EMex-China-Structuralmomentumintact 33

Box6

SouthKorea,sreformsLayingthegroundforre-rating 39

Box7

FiscaldominanceinIndiaBewaryoftheemergingsigns 40

Box8

LatAmelectoralcycle

Ideologiesshapefiscaloutcomes 41

Box9

CEEresilience

Structuralshifts,strongservices,andtheAIboom 42

Forecasttables 43

Growthandinflationoutlook 43

Monetarypolicyoutlook–Keyrates 44

Ten-yeargovernmentbondoutlook 45

FXoutlook 46

ElectionsCalendar 47

EventCalendar 48

GlobalEconomicOutlook

17March20264

Keycalls

Globaleconomy:AIcapexboomtosurvivethewarshock

nTheMiddleEastwarshockis,fornow,moreinflationarythanrecessionary,withtheeffectspushingbackoncentralbankeasing.Globalgrowthappearsresilient,butnotimmune.Thelongerthewarlasts,themorethestoryislikelytoshiftfromdemandresiliencetosupplyconstraints.

nAIisstillsettobethemainsourceofsupportforglobalgrowthin2026,boostinginvestmentandtradeacrossmajoreconomies,eveniftheproductivitypay-offremainsuncertain.Wethinkfearsofrapid,large-scaleAI-drivenlabourdisplacementareoverstated,whereasthereturnonsoaringAIcapexisamoregenuinesourceofconcerninthemediumterm.

US:resilientgrowth,stickyinflation,higher-for-longerrates

nGrowthstillappearsresilientinthenearterm,cushionedbyfiscalimpulsesandAIcapex.Labour-marketconditionsareeasingonlygraduallyratherthandeterioratingsharply.

nInflationpersistenceisreinforcedbytheoilshock.Weexpectunderlyingpricepressures,especiallyinservices,toremainsticky,whiletherecentoilshockaddsanotherlayerofupsideriskanduncertainty.

nFed.Wenowexpectaprolongedholdthisyear,withanyeasingpushedintonextyearandlikelytobemoderate,conditionalonclearerevidenceofsofterinflationandgrowth.

Euroarea:(still)poisedforaprolongedcyclicalrecovery

nTherecoveryisbroadening,supportedbyGermanfiscaleasing,firmconsumption,AIinvestment,housingandNGEUspillovers.

nTheenergyshockisacomplication,notabreak.Inflationshouldrisetemporarily,butthegrowthhitwillprobablyremainmodest.

nECB:noimmediateneedtomove,butthemedium-termbiasstillpointstotightening,noteasing.

China:endofdeflation,butlittlerebalancing

nThegrowthmixremainsunbalanced.Exportssupportedbystrongerglobaldemand,AItailwindsandlowerUStariffs.Housing,labourmarketsandconsumptionarestilltooweakforaconvincingdomesticrecovery.

nPolicyremainsmeasured.Limitedeasing,moderateinvestmentsupport,andonlyaslowpathoutofdisinflation.

Japan:targetedfiscaleasing;BoJtighteningstillontrack

nAmildstagflationaryshock:higheroilpricesraiseinflationandtrimgrowth.

nAtargetedfiscalresponseismorelikelytocomeintheformofsubsidiesforfuelandutilities,thanofbroadtaxrelief.

nBoJtighteningisstilloncards,asyenweaknessfeedsmoredirectlyintounderlyinginflation.

EMex-China:structuralmomentumintact

nSolidstructuralbackingfromsupply-chainrelocation,AIdemand,industrialpolicyandstrongermacrocredibility.

nThewinnersarediverse:Asiainhardware,Indiainservices,andLatAmincommoditiesandselectivemanufacturing.

nTherisksarefamiliarbutmanageable:geopolitics,energy,policyslippageandaweakerAIcapexcycle.

17March20265

Keyforecastsvsconsensus

SGgrowthoutlookvsconsensus(realGDPgrowth)

Notesonthecolour:comparedwithBloombergmedianforecasts,darkred=morethan0.4pplower;lightred=0.2-0.4pplower;lightgrey=0.2-0.4higher;anddarkgrey=morethan0.4pphigher.*P=Previous(Jan2026);ForIndia,thenumbersareaveragedoverthefiscalyearendinginMarch.Source:SGCrossAssetResearch/Economics,Bloomberg,IMF

SGinflationoutlookvsconsensus(headlineCPI)

Notesonthecolour:comparedwithBloombergmedianforecasts,darkred=morethan0.4pplower;lightred=0.2-0.4pplower;lightgrey=0.2-0.4higher;anddarkgrey=morethan0.4pphigher.*P=Previous(Jan2026);ForIndia,thenumbersareaveragedoverthefiscalyearendinginMarch.Source:SGCrossAssetResearch/Economics,Bloomberg,IMF

17March20266

SGmonetarypolicyrateoutlookvsconsensus(year-end)

Notesonthecolour:comparedwithBloombergmedianforecasts,darkred=morethan0.4pplower;lightred=0.2-0.4pplower;lightgrey=0.2-0.4higher;anddarkgrey=morethan0.4pphigher.*P=Previous(Jan2026);forChina,PBoC7-dayreporate.Source:SGCrossAssetResearch/Economics,Bloomberg

GlobalEconomicOutlook

17March20267

GlobalChiefEconomistHeadofAPACResearchWeiYao

+85221664983

wei.yao@

Warshock-Keepcalmandstayvigilant

Waristragicandhumbling.Atthetimeofwriting,ourbaselineassumptionisthattheconflictcouldendinaroundearly-to-midApril,butthereisstillconsiderableuncertainty.

Fortheglobaleconomy,thedurationoftheshockmattersmorethanthesizeofthespike(ifitlastsforjustdays),astemporaryoilshocksmostlyre-shapethenear-terminflationpath,whereaspersistentlyhigherenergypricescanleadtosecond-roundeffectsandgrowthtrade-offs.Moreseriouslystill,iftheStraitofHormuzremainseffectivelyblockedformonths,disruptionstosupplychainsbeyondenergy–fromfoodtosemiconductors–willbecomesocriticalthattheriskofascenarioakintotheCOVIDplusRussia-Ukraineshockwouldbehardtoruleout.

Inourcentralscenario,oilpricesare12%higherthisyearthanin2025,whichwouldmeanlittleimpactongrowthbutsomejumpsininflation.Consequently,weexpectanumberofcentralbankstocutbackordelayeasing,notablytheFed(withnofurthercutsthisyear).Indeed,weexpectcentralbankstoremainvigilantgiventhecurrentstartingconditionsofdecentgrowthmomentumand/orstickyinflationarypressure.Thepolicylessonsfrom2020-2023areworthremembering:1)‘lookingthrough’isnotafreeoptionforcentralbankswhenthereisarisktoinflationexpectations;and2)targetedfiscalreliefispreferabletobroad-basedstimulus.A1970s-stylestagflation,however,isarisk,inourview,albeitaremoteone.

Lessonsfromthehistoryofwar

FromthewritingsofSunTzu,ThucydidesandClausewitztomodernmilitaryhistory,afairlystablesetoflessonskeepsrecurring.Threeareespeciallyrelevantnow.

1)Warispoliticalbeforeitismilitary.Thekeyquestionisnotwhichsidecandestroymoretargets,itiswhichhasahigherpoliticalpainthreshold.ItisdifficulttojudgehowunstabletheIranianregimereallyis,butdevelopmentssofarseemtoshowahighpaintolerance.Meanwhile,Trumpmayneedtoconsiderdomesticoilpricesandthemid-termelections,whichhaveafixedtimeline.

2)Winningbattles≠winningthewar.TheUSandIsraelhavedestroyedmostofIran’sairdefenceandnavalcapabilities,butTehranstillretainsdronesanddispersedcapabilitytokeeptheGulfunderpressureandtheStraitofHormuzunsafe.TheUS,incontrast,needseithertovirtuallyobliterateIran’smilitarycapacityortoprovide(near-)perfectnavalprotectionandre-insurancecovertonormaliseflows.

3)Logisticsandsupplychainsarewaritself.Interceptingcheapdronesisvastlymoreexpensivethanlaunchingthem,whiletheGulfstateshavefarmorefixedassetstoprotect.Theseassetsarecriticalforglobalsupplychains,asfossilfuelsandpetrochemicalfeedstocksrunthroughthedeepplumbingofthemoderneconomy,fromammoniaforfertilizer,ethyleneandpropyleneforplasticsandsyntheticfibres,toessentialchemicalsforindustrialprocesses,pharmaceuticalandsemiconductorsupplychains.

Thestakesofthisconflictareenormousfortheglobaleconomy,whichmightjustbethecatalystforworldleaderstobringhostilitiestoanendsoonerratherthanlater.However,aseachdaypasses,theconflictmovesfurtherbeyondarisk-premiumshocktowardasustainedphysicalsupplyshock.

GlobalEconomicOutlook

17March20268

Upstreamshut-inscontinuetorise,andnowconsiderablyexceed6mb/d.Eachadditionaldayofshut-inworsenswellboreconditions,surfaceconstraintsandlogistics.Afteraboutamonthoffline,only80-95%ofcapacitytypicallyreturns,andcorrosionandscalecancreatemulti-monthoutages.Thelongerthiscontinues,theharderandslowernormalisationbecomes.

Centralscenario:amanageableimpact,lessmonetaryeasing

Inourcentralscenario,thedisruptiontoGulfenergyflowslaststhroughoutMarchandthengraduallyeasesfromApril,withonlylimitedlastingdamagetoregionalproductioncapacity.Policysupport,includingreleasesfromemergencyreserves,helpstostabilisesupply,whileChineseprecautionarybuyingpausestemporarilyaspricessettle.Inthisscenario,oilpricesrisesharplyinMarch,butthenfallbackrelativelyquicklyoverthefollowingmonthsassupplyconditionsimproveandglobalstocklevelsrecover.Bytheendof2026,pricesreturntoaround$70/bblandthefull-yearpriceaveragesat$76/bbl,or16%higherthanin2025.

110

CentralscenarioModeratedisruptions

Prolongedshut-inPre-war

1Q26

2Q26

3Q26

4Q26

2026

2025

26vs25

90

70

50

1Q2Q3Q4Q

Ourscenariosforoilpricesin2026(Brent,$bbl)

Central

Moderate

disruption

Prolonged

shut-in

Pre-war

86.5

86.5

95.0

65.0

77.5

80.0

90.0

65.0

71.0

75.0

85.0

62.5

68.0

75.0

80.0

57.0

75.8

79.1

87.5

63.6

67.5

16%

22%

34%

-4%

Source:SGCrossAssetResearch/CommoditiesStrategySeeCommoditiesOutlook:Wildcardrealised

Fortheglobaleconomy,ashockofthismagnitudeanddurationshouldbemanageable,inourview.Whileitmaynotbeenoughtodampenthestronggrowthmomentumseensincethestartoftheyear,butitwilladdtonear-terminflation,albeitnottotheextentthatcentralbankshavetorespondwithtightening.

-Limitedgrowthimpact.AIcapexanditsrelateddemandisacommonfactorbehindtheresilientgrowthinseveralcountries.TheUSandeuroareaarealsosupportedbyfiscalstimulus(theOneBigBeautifulBillActintheUSandGermany’sstimuluspackage),andChinaiscushionedbystrategicreserves.KoreaandTaiwanarelikelytoseemorenotablebutstillmanageabledrags,duetotheirhighdependencyonenergyimportsandrelativelylowstrategicreserves.

-Morevisiblejumpsininflationtriggeringtargetedfiscalmitigation.Theeuroareaislikelytoseethemostnotablejump,butthatwouldstillprobablybeamuchlesssignificantinflationshockthanin2022-23(see

theEuroareasection

).ChinaandIndiashouldseeverylittleimpactgivendomesticpricecontrolsandfiscalsubsidies.Chinaalsohasstrategicreserves,whileIndiaismorevulnerableonenergysecurityandanymeasurestomitigatetheinflationfalloutshouldbeevidentinadeteriorationincurrentaccountandfiscaldeficits.LatAminflationshouldalsobemitigatedbycurrencyappreciationandpricecontrols(BrazilandColombia)ortaxadjustments(Mexico).

17March20269

-Lessandlatereasingfromcentralbanks.Eventhoughweweremorehawkish(orlessdovish)thanconsensustobeginwith,westillexpectlesseasingnow.Mostnotably,wenolongerexpectanyeasingfromtheFedthisyear.Thisisnotallbecauseoftheoilpriceshock,butthisfactordoespresentanadditionalsourceofinflationuncertaintylayeredontopofalreadystickycoreinflation.Asinflationalreadylooksuncomfortableunderarelativelycontainedoilscenario,thenanyworseenergyoutcomewouldmaketheFed’sjobevenharder,inourview(see

theUSsection

).

Impactofourupdatedoilpricescenarioonour2026forecasts,factoringinfiscalresponses

Growth(pp)HeadlineCPI(pp)Centralbankpolicy

US

0

+0.2[core0]

From-25bptonomove(butnotallduetotheoilshock)

Euroarea

-0.2

+1.1[core+0.2]

Unchanged,one25bphikeinDecember

China

0

+0.2

From-20bpto-10bp

Japan

-0.05

+0.05

Unchanged,two25bphikesinApril/Sept.

India

-0.2

+0.2

From-25bptonomove

UK

0

+0.4

From-75bpto-50bp

Taiwan

-0.3

+0.1

Unchanged,nomove

Korea

-0.2

+0.1

Unchanged,nomove

Indonesia

-0.1

+0.1

From-50bpto-25bp

Brazil

+0.1

+0.1

Unchanged,-275bp

Mexico

0

+0.2

From-50bpto-25bp

Chile

-0.2

+0.4

From-50bptonomore

Colombia

+0.2

+0.1

Unchanged,+175bp

Note:Thistablereflectsonlytheimpactofhigheroilprices(inourcentralscenario),offsetbyexpectedfiscalresponses.Theforecastchanges

indicatedon6alsoreflectotherfactors.Source:SGCrossAssetResearch/Economics

Riskscenarios:harderpolicytrade-off,notstagflation,watchsupplychains

AmoreseverecaseanalysedbyourcommoditiesstrategistsassumesdisruptiontoGulfshippinglastingfortwomonthsandalarge,persistentlossofIranianexportcapacitythereafter.Inthisscenario,evenwithoffsettingsupplymeasuresandemergencystockreleases,theglobalenergyshortfallremainssignificantformuchoftheyear.Pricesjumpmuchmoresharplytoperhaps$150/bblandremainhighforlonger,averagingcloseto$120/bblforthreemonthsbeforeeasingonlygraduallyassupplypartlyrecovers.Byend-2026,oilpricesstillstandataround$80/bblandthefull-yearpriceaveragesat$87/bblor34%higherthan2025.SeeCommoditiesOutlook:Wildcardrealisedformoredetails.

Fortheglobaleconomy,wehaverunthetwofollowingriskscenariosthroughtheNiGEMmodel.

#1:A$20hikelastingforthreequarters,similartothefalloutfromtheRussia-Ukrainewar.

#2:A$60hikelastingforonequarter,matchingourworst-casescenarioforoilprices.SeeBox1fortechnicaldetailsonthesimulations.

AftercombiningtheresultsofthesesimulationsandthelessonsfromtheRussia-Ukrainewar,wehighlightthefollowingobservations.

-Forgrowth,shocksofanysizestarttomatterafterafewmonths,butsmallmultiple-quartershocksaremoreimpactfulthanbigone-quartershocks.Notsurprisingly,thedamagetogrowthfromaone-quarter$60shockismuchmorepronouncedattheonsetoftheshockandpushesupthefirst-yearimpactnotably.Butitfallsoffquicklytobelowthat

17March202610

fromafour-quarter$10shock.Thepersistenceoftheshockiswhatleadstosecond-roundeffectsandgrowthtrade-offsforpolicymakers.Acrossthesimulations,longershocksresultinmorecentralbanktightening;andthelongerashocklasts,themoretimecentralbankstaketonormalisethetightening.Also,consistentwiththeirhighdependencyonenergyimports,Asiancountriesareamongthemostvulnerabletooilshocks.

Deviationfrombaselineaftershocks:worldGDPlevel…

0

-0.05

-0.1

-0.15

-0.2

-0.25

+$10for4Q

+$20for3Q

+$60for1Q

0123456

Source:SGCrossAssetResearch/Economics,NiGEM

…andworldinflationyoyrate

2

1.5

1

0.5

0

-0.5

-1

-1.5

$10for4Q

$20for3Q

$60for1Q

0123456

-Theinflationproblemistrickier,andcentralbanksneedtostayvigilant.Inexistingmodels,theinflationjumpsalwaysfadeafterfourquarters,andcentralbanks’responsesarealwaystimelyandproportional;however,inreality,thisisneverthecase.Thecurrentstartingpointismorechallengingthantheset-upinmodels:fiveyearsaftertheCOVIDstimulusandfouryearsintotheRussia-Ukrainewar,returningtoa2%targetisstillprovingdifficultforafewmajoreconomies,notablytheUSandJapan.Intheeuroarea,thelabourmarketremainstighterthanpre-COVID.Ifthereisonelessonfrom2022-2023thatcanbedrawnbyallglobalcentralbanks,itisthat‘lookingthrough’isnotafreeoptionwheninflationexpectationsareatrisk.Andinflationexpectationsarehighlysensitivetooilprices.Asforthefiscalpolicy,targetedreliefispreferabletobroaddemandstimulus.

First-yeargrowthimpactfromoilshocks(ppdeviationfrombaselines)

0.0

+$10for4Q+$20for3Q+$60for1Q

-0.1-0.2-0.3-0.4-0.5-0.6

-0.7

Source:SGCrossAssetResearch/Economics,NiGEM

-Weareveryfarfromastagflationscenario.Wehadtorunan$80oilpriceshockforseveralyearstogettoastagflationprofile:globalgrowthhalvingfrom3%to1.5%andglobal

17March202611

inflationrisingtoabove5%.Theglobaleconomyhasbecomelessreliantonoilandgasasenergysources,andmoreefficientinenergyconsumption,eventhoughoilremainsessential.Theshareofoilintotalenergyconsumptionhasfallenbynearly20ppsincethe1970s,whiletheshareofgasisup7pp.Globalenergyintensity(energytooutput)hasdroppedby40%sincethen.

AsiaandEuropevulnerabletooilpriceshocks

6%Netoilexportsas%ofGDP(2024)

4%

2%

0%

-2%

-4%

-6%

-8%

Source:SGCrossAssetResearch/Economics,UNComtrade,IMF

Inflationexpectationssensitivetooilprices

3.5

3

2.5

2

1.5

USDInflationSwapForward5Y5YWTIprice(rhs)

160

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

20052010201520202025

Source:SGCrossAssetResearch/Economics,Bloomberg

-Thatsaid,disruptionstoglobalsupplychainswillbeaserioussourceofconcern.Theglobaleconomywasonastrongfootingbeforethecurrentconflict,asgrowthinmostmajoreconomieswasresilientandacceleratingheadinginto2026,thanksinnosmallparttotheAIcapexboom.IftheIranconflictdragsoutmuchbeyondamonth,thereisariskthattheAIcapexboomcouldrunintoahardsupply-and-costsqueeze,asKoreanofficialshavealreadywarneditcould.Chipmakerssaynear-termoperationsareresilient,butthedefactoHormuzblockaderaisestheprobabilityofshortagesincriticalinputs,suchashelium(notablyfromQatar).Atthesametime,reroutingshippingaddstoleadtimesandfuelsurcharges,whileelevatednaturalgaspricesraisefabelectricitycosts.Theresultcouldbedelayedwaferoutput,tighterGPU/memoryavailability,andpostponeddata-centrebuildouts.

Globalenergyconsumptionbysource

60

%oftotalenergyconsumptionOil

NaturalGas

Coal

50

Nuclear

RenewableEnergy

40

30

20

10

0

196519701975198019851990199520002005201020152020

Source:SGCrossAssetResearch/Economics,StatisticalReviewofworldEnergy

Energyintensityoftheglobaleconomy

3.3

3.1

2.9

2.7

2.5

2.3

2.1

1.9

1.7

1.5

GlobalEnergyConsumptioninTWh

--(perbillionUSDGlobalRealGDP)

一、

196519701975198019851990199520002005201020152020

GlobalEconomicOutlook

17March202612

Box1NiGEMmodelHowanoilshockworksthroughamacroeconomicmodel

Keyassumptions

UnderNiGEM’sdefaultsettings,centralbankstargetconsumerinflationandtheGDPdeflator.Policyratesrespondtobringbothmeasuresbacktotheirrespectivetargets,withthemodelfocusingoninflationonequarterahead.Exchangeratesmoveinresponsetointerestratedifferentials.Forsimplicity,whenapplyinga$10/bblincreasetotheoilprice,wealsoapplieda$10/bblincreasetogasinoil-equivalentterms.Lastly,toreplicatethelimitedpass-throughfromtheStraitofHormuzdisruption,wepreventedGDPinMiddleEasterneconomies,whichaccountforroughly7ppofglobalGDP,fromrising.Inreality,thegrowthdamagetotheseeconomiesisprobablymuchlarger.

Energyintensityofoutput(MnToe/GDP(ppp))

GasOil

5.0

4.5

4.0

3.5

3.0

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0

Source:NiGEM

Howdoesanenergyshockaffectgrowth?

Energyintensityofoutput.Oilandgasareinputsintheproductionfunction;higherpricesreducetheeffectivequantityoftheseinputs,loweringoutput.Countriesthatrelymoreheavilyonoilandgasasproductioninputsarethereforemoreexposed.Amongthecountrieswecover,theUS,Mexico,andSouthKoreastandout.However,giventheshort-livednatureoftheshock,thiseffectmaybelimited.

Termsoftrade.Theshareofcommoditiesinacountry’simportsandexportsisanotherkeychannel.Ariseinoilandgaspricesworsensthetermsoftradefornetimporters,loweringpurchasingpower.Conversely,netexportersinitiallybenefitfromstrongerexportrevenuesfromhigherprices.

Second-roundeffects.Countrieswithalargershareofoilandgasimportsmayfacehigherinflation,promptingastronger

centralbankresponse.RatedifferentialsarealsoakeydriverofFXmovesandthereforetermsoftrade.

Lowerrealincomesfromhigherinflationweighonconsumption.Astheshockfades,wagebargaininghelpstorecoverlostrealearningsandtheeffectdiminishes.

Howdoesanenergyshockaffectinflation?

Countries’importbasket.Higherimportpricesfeeddirectlyintoconsumerprices.Energypriceshocksalsospillovertoothergloballytradedcommodities,especiallyfoodandmetals.Non-netenergyexporters,energy-intensiveindustrialeconomies(China),andAsianeconomiesappearmostexposed.

Outputgap.Higherenergypricesreduceproductivecapacity,raisecapitalutilisation,andpushupprices.Giventheshort-termnatureoftheshock,thiseffectmaybelimited.

Second-roundeffects.Workersseekhigherwagestooffsetthedeclineinrealincomes.Thedegreeofwageinertiavariesacrosscountries:itishighintheUK,China,andJapan,andlowintheUS,Germany,andFrance.NiGEMassumesthatthelong-runinflationaryeffectofwagegrowthisneutral.

Limitations

Supply-chaindisruptions.NiGEMisamacromodellinkingcountriesviatradeandfinance;itdoesnotcaptureshippinglanes,inventories,refineryconfigurations,orcompany-levelsubstitutionconstraints,potentiallyunderestimatingsectoralconcentrationofpainandover-smoothingthetimeline.

Financialmarketriskpremiumwasnotincorporated.Higherglobaluncertaintycouldraiseborrowingcostsandweighoneconomicgrowth.IntypicalIMFsimulations,thischannelisoftencalibratedtodoubletheimpact.

Behaviouralassumptions.Centralbanksandhouseholdsmaybemorebackward-lookingthanthe