野村-人工智能如何掩盖美国不断上升的风险溢价-How AI masks America's rising risk premium-20260903

NOAURA

SpecialReport

【价值目录】网整

https://www.val

GlobalMarketsResearch

3September2026

HowAlmasksAmerica'srisingriskpremium

Weshowhowtherestoftheworld'sconcentrationinUSDassetshas

becomesoextremethatanAlsetbackwouldlikelycauseUSDdepreciation.

USDassets.Weattempttodebunktheassumedrobustnessof

·ConventionalwisdomsaysTINA-thereisnoalternative-to

TINA,giventheAlboomhasmaskedarisingUSriskpremium,

andasforeigninvestorshavebuiltsuchalargeexposurein

USDassets.

·Strikingly,theratioofUSnetinternationalinvestmentposition

hassurgedto80%-avividmeasureofhowconcentratedthe

ROW'ssavingshavebeenfunnelledintoUSDinvestments.

·Itistruethat,duringtheGFCandpandemic,USNIIPliabilities

increasedandUSDappreciated.Werunasimulationtoshow

whyitisnowmoreplausibleforUSNIIPliabilitiestodecrease:

USIIPportfolioliabilitieshavebecomesolargethatmoderate

percentagedeclinescouldnowoutstripdeclinesinUSIIPportfolio

assets,shrinkingUSNIIPliabilitiesanddepreciatingtheUSD.

(NIIP)liabilitiestothesumofallnetcreditornations'NIIPassets

ResearchAnalysts

GlobalEconomics

RobSubbaraman-NSL

rob.subbaraman@+6564336548

YiruChen-NSL

yiru.chen1@+6564336405

ProductionComplete:2026-09-0307:23UTC

SeeAppendixA-1foranalystcertification,importantdisclosuresandthestatusofnon-USanalysts.

2

Nomura|SpecialReport【价值目录Sp整teb：er2026

Contents

Executivesummary3

Introduction 4

Fiscalstress5

TheROW’sextremeconcentrationriskinUSDassets6

ThetighteninglinkbetweenUStwindeficits8

TheAIboomconcealsarisingUSriskpremium9

So,whathappensifthereisanAIsetback?10

Creating ameasureofUSalliesandfoes11

Simulating aforeigninvestorretreatfromUSDassets12

Conclusion 14

RecentSpecialReports15

AppendixA-116

Nomura|SpecialReport【价值目录Sp整teb：er2026

3

Executive

summary

TheFedhasnotachieveditsinflationtargetforfiveyearsrunning,anditsfiscaland

currentaccountdeficitshaveswollenpublicdebtandthenetinternationalinvestment

position(NIIP)ofliabilities,assharesofGDP,toat,ornear,historichighs.InternationaltrustinUSfiscal,tradeandforeignpoliciesand,somewouldargue,Fedindependence,haseroded.Allofwhichraisesthequestion:iftrustinUSpolicyiscompromised,whyaretherenoclearsignsofde-riskingfromUSDassets?WebelievetheanswerisAI.TheUSsitsattheheartoftheAIrevolution,nowheremoresothanincapitalmarkets.USNIIP

liabilities(i.e.,theROW’sholdingsofUSDassets)haveballoonedbecauseofnetcapitalinflowsandextraordinarycapitalgainsfromtheAI-drivenUSequityboom.

ExtremeconcentrationinUSDassets

Strikingly,wecalculatethattheratioofUSNIIPliabilitiestothesumofallROWnet

creditornations’NIIPassetshassurgedto80%,avividsignoftheconcentrationofthe

world'ssavingsthathavebeenfunneledintoUSDinvestments.However,theUSD21.3trnpileofUSNIIPliabilitiesisfinallystartingtoexactapenalty.Aftermorethantwodecadesinsurplus,netprimaryincome–netprofits,dividendsandinterest–hasflippedtodeficitsoverthelasttwoyears.Justasnetgovernmentinterestpaymentshaveswelledbeyondhalfthefiscaldeficit,thesamedynamicmaynowbestartingtoplayoutinthecurrent

account,shouldNIIPliabilitiesandUSTyieldskeepclimbing.ThestandardrebuttalisthatAmerica’ssuperpowerstatusgrantsitthe“exorbitantprivilege”torunlargedeficitsand

pileupdebtindefinitely.However,thesymbiosisofrisingUSTyieldsfeedingthefiscaldeficitandnowthecurrentaccountdeficithintsthatthisprivilegehaslimits.

DebunkingtheassumedrobustnessofTINA

AnintriguingquestioniswhatforeignholdersofUSassetswoulddointheeventofanAIsetback.Conventionalwisdomsays“TINA”–thereisnoalternative–toUSDassets.WeattempttodebunktheassumedrobustnessofTINA,givenAIhasconcealedarisingUSriskpremium,andasforeigninvestorshavebuiltsuchalargeconcentrationinUSD

assets.Itistruethat,duringtheGFCandpandemic,USNIIPliabilitiesincreasedand

USDappreciated,butthemaindriverwasnottheROWincreasinginvestmentintothe

US;rather,USresidentsrepatriatedtheirforeignholdingsmoreaggressivelythanthe

ROWrepatriateditsUSholdings(thedecreaseinUSIIPliabilitieswasdwarfedbythe

decreaseinUSIIPassets).Thatbehavior–thesheerscaleofUSresidentrepatriationinacrisis–ispoorlyunderstood,inourview,yetitisanimportantreasonwhythe

conventionalwisdomofTINAtotheUSDhasbecomesoingrained.

Simulationandfindings

WerunasimulationtoshowwhyitisnowmoreplausibleforUSNIIPliabilitiestodecrease:USIIPportfolioliabilitieshavebecomesolargethatmoderatepercentagedeclinescannowoutstripdeclinesinUSIIPportfolioassets,shrinkingUSNIIPliabilitiesanddepreciating

USD.USportfolioassetswouldneedtofallbyover30%–aGFC-scalerepatriation–to

fullyoffsetthedecreaseinUSIIPportfolioliabilities.Aspartofthesimulationexercise,wealsocreatedameasureofUSalliesandfoes.Basedonover5,000resolutionsattheUnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyoverthe1965-2025period,weanalyzehowfrequently190-oddcountriesvotedwithoragainsttheUS.WefindthatthesharevotingwiththeUShas

declinednoticeably,echoingtheerosionoftrustinUSpolicies.MappingourUSalliesandfoescountrydecompositiontoTICdataonforeignholdingsofUSportfolioassetsby

country,wefind,unsurprisingly,thatthefoes’grouphasgrownfarmoreslowlythantheallies’group:64%versus264%from2012to2026.

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Introduction

DeterminedtoprolongtheUS'shegemonyinthefaceofagreatpowerrivalrywithChina,theTrumpadministrationhasmadesweepingchangestotheworldorderthattheUS

oncebuilt,leaningonitseconomicandmilitarymighttoimposetariffs,financialsanctionsandotherformsofcoercion,anddeployingitsarmedforcesmoreassertively.TheresultisaUnitedStatesthatevenitsalliesnowfindunpredictableandunreliable.Meanwhile,athome,somethingdosertoaruptureisunderway:theadministrationismoreaggressively

challengingsomeoftheinstitutionalchecksonpresidentialpower,whilethepoliticizationofeconomicdecision-makingchipsawayatfiscalprudenceand,quitepossibly,Fed

independence.

Yet,theUSremainsheavilydependentonforeigncapitalinflowstofinanceitspersistentlylargefiscalandcurrentaccountdeficits,whichforthisyearweexpecttoreach6.4%and3.4%ofGDP,respectively.Twindeficitsofthatsizecannotcontinueindefinitely.Decadesofaccumulation(fiscalsince2002,currentaccountsince1992)haveswollenUSpublicdebttoUSD30.2trnandnetinternationalinvestmentliabilitiestoUSD21.9trnin2025,

whichassharesofGDPstandat,ornear,recordlevels(Figure1).Theserisingdebtloadsaretickingtimebombs,andpressurepointsarebuilding.

Fig.1:USpublicdebtandnetinternationalinvestmentposition

%ofGDP

150

100

50

-50

-100

1940195619721988200420202036

Source:CBO,CEICandNomuraGlobalEconomics.

CBO

projections

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Fiscalstress

USfiscalconsolidationfacesanuphillbattle.Cuttingbackspendingondefense,healthcareandsocialwelfareispoliticallytoxic,atatimewhenoutlaysonnetinterestpaymentshaveballoonedtonearly19%oftotalrevenues,morethanhalfofthefiscaldeficitand

eclipsingevenAmerica'svastdefenseoutlays.

ThestandardrebuttalisthatAmerica'ssuperpowerstatusgrantsitthe“exorbitant

privilege”torunlargedeficitsandpileupdebtindefinitely.However,theclimbinUST

yieldshintsthatthisprivilegehaslimits.Thereareseveralpressurepoints.TheFedhasnotachieveditsinflationtargetforfiveyearsrunning.UShyperscalersarerampingup

high-gradedebtissuance-ourcreditresearchteamestimatesUSD250-275bnthisyearandUSD350-400bnin2027-crowdingoutbuyersofTreasurys,andthecompositionofthatbuyerbaseisshiftingawayfromtheFedandforeigncentralbankstowardsmore

price-sensitiveprivateinvestors(Figure2).Fickleglobalhedgefundsalonehave

increasedtheirsharefrom4.0%in2023to8.5%in2025.TheTreasury'srecentresponsetorisingUSTyields-apledgetoatleastdoubleitsbuybackprogramforlong-duration

bonds-isactivism,notasustainablesolution,inourview,andwilllikelyrequireincreasedshort-temdebtissuance,heighteningrolloverrisks.

Fig.2:ForeignholdingofUSlong-termtreasurybonds

USDtrn

5.0

4.0

3.0

2.0

1.0

Dec-11May-14Oct-16Mar-19Aug-21Jan-24Jun-26

Source:CEICandNomuraGlobalEconomics.

Nomura|SpecialReport3Septenber2026

TheROW'sextremeconcentrationriskin

USDassets

LargeUSfiscaldeficitshavenotbeenoffsetbyprivatesectornetsavings.Theresultisnationalnetdissaving,andthisiswhytheUSrunscurrentaccountdeficits,whichhavenotbeenexcessive(theyhaverangedbetween3-4%ofGDPsincethepandemic)buttheyhavebeenpersistent:thelastsurpluswasin1991.ThecontinuousfinancingbytheROWhasswelledtheUSnetinternationalinvestmentposition(NIIP)ofliabilitiesto

USD21.9trnin2025,or71%ofGDP.

Thescalebecomesclearerwithasimpleexercise.Foreachyear,weidentifiedevery

countrywithavailabledataintheROWholdingNIIPassets.Strikingly,theratioofUS

NIIPliabilitiestothesumofallROWnetcreditornations'NIIPassetshassurgedto80%

-avividmeasureoftheconcentrationoftheworld'ssavingsthathavebeenfunnelledintoUSDinvestments(Figure3).Morestrikingstill:in2010,USNIIPliabilitiesmatchedthe

NIIPassetholdingsoftheworld'stopnetcreditornation,Japan.By2025,ittookthetop10netcreditornationscombinedtomatchUSNIIPliabilities(Figure4).

Fig.3:RatioofUSNIIPliabilitiestothesumofROW'snetcreditornations'NIIPassets

%

100

40

20

200720102013201620192022

Note:WeuseIMFdataformosteconomies,whereavailable,andusethecountrysourcedataaccessedfromCEICandtheexternalwealthofnationsdatabasetosupplementforthoseunavailable.Overall,oursamplecovers88netcreditornations.Weomittedsome(mostlyverysmall)netcreditornationsfromthecalculationduetolackofconsistentdatafrom2007to2025.However,thoseomittednetcreditorsonlycompriseanestimated1-2%ofthesumofallnetcreditornations'NIIPassetsthatweincluded.

Source:IMF,Theexternalweathofnationsdatabase,CEICandNomuraGlobalEconomics.

Fig.4:Top15netcreditornations’NIIPassets,USDbn

2025

UnitedStatesGermany

China

Japan

HongKong

Norway

Taiwan

Canada

SwitzerlandRussia

Singapore

SouthKoreaSaudiArabiaNetherlandsDenmark

Sweden

2015

2020

7,590894

-11,

-21,874

4,321

4,071

3,594

2,506

2,099

1,350

1,219

1,205

1,097

1,082

886

721

656

498

425

RankUnitedStates

-UnitedStates2,715Japan

1,699Germany

1,14China

1,089HongKongTaiwan

805Norway

705Singapore

647Switzerland

493Canada

339Netherlands

323SaudiArabia

209Russia

205SouthKorea

204Belgium

124Denmark

3,474

2,729

2,287

2,122

1,388

1,138

1,074

892

884

884

701

517

487

275

230

-2,511UnitedStates3,142Japan

1,478China

744Germany

721Taiwan

665HongKong

636SaudiArabia

565Norway

512Singapore

387Switzerland

273Russia

130Canada

124Netherlands

99Belgium

41SouthKorea

39Algeria

2010

1Japan

2China

3Switzerland

1,003

4Germany

5HongKong

6Taiwan

7SaudiArabia

8Singapore

9Norway

10Belgium

11Mauritius

12Venezuela

13Kuwait

14Denmark

15Finland

Note:WeuseIMFdataformosteconomies,whereavailable,andusethecountrysourcedataaccessedfromCEICandtheexternalwealthofnationsdatabasetosupplementforthoseunavailable.WeboldthetopnetcreditornationswherethesumoftheirNIPassetsexceedsthesizeofUSNIIPliabilities.

Source:IMF,Theexternalwealthofnationsdatabase,CEICandNomuraGlobalEconomics.

Nomura|SpecialReport3Septenber2026

7

Allofwhichraisethequestion:iftrustinUSpolicyhaserodedsovisibly,whyaretherenoclearsignsofde-riskingfromUSDassets,beyondtheshrinkingforeignofficialshareofUSTbonds?WebelievetheanswerisAl.

TheUSsitsattheheartoftheAlrevolution,nowheremoresothanincapitalmarkets.

Alongsidetheaccumulationofcurrentaccountdeficits(theflipsideofwhichisnetcapitalinflows),USNIIPliabilitieshaveballooned,largelybecauseofcapitalgainsfromtheAl-drivenUSequityboom.ThelargestandmostliquidcomponentofUSIIPliabilitiesis

portfolioliabilities(equityanddebtsecurities),whichhavequadrupledtoUSD37.4trnin

March2026fromapre-GFClowofUSD9.2trninMarch2009.Withinthat,thetrajectoryofUSportfolioequityliabilitieslookslikeastructuralbreaksincethepandemic,breaking

wellaboveitslong-runtrend(Figure5).

Fig.5:USIIPportfolioequityliabilities

USDtrn25

20

15

10

5

0

Mar-06Mar-11Mar-16

Extrapolated

basedondatafrom2006-2020

Mar-21Mar-26

Source:CEICandNomuraGlobalEconomics.

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ThetighteninglinkbetweenUStwindeficits

TheUSD21.3trnpileofUSNIIPliabilities,asofMarch2026,isfinallystartingtoexactaprice.Formorethantwodecades,theUShaspulledoffaremarkablefeat:despitebeinganetdebtor,itconsistentlyearnedanetprimaryincomesurplus-netprofits,dividendsandinterest-withoutwhichthecurrentaccountdeficitwouldhavebeenwiderstill.Thattrickfailedin2024and2025,asnetprimaryincomeflippedintodeficit(Figure6).

Fig.6:USnetprimaryincome

USDbn

300

250

200

150

100

50

-50

-100

196019731986199920122025

Source:CEICandNomuraGlobalEconomics.

Howdidthesurplusdefygravityforsolong?BecausetheUSearnedfarhigherreturnsonitsFDIandportfolioequityinvestmentsabroadthantheROWearnedonthose

investmentsintheUS.Inrecentyears,however,risingUSTyields-compoundedby

America'sstatusastheworld'slargestnetinternationaldebtor-havedrivenasurgeinnetinterestpaymentsthatnowdwarfsUSearningsonnetprofitsanddividends.Justasnetgovernmentinterestpaymentshaveswelledbeyondhalfthefiscaldeficit,thesamedynamicmaynowbestartingtoplayoutinthecurrentaccount,shouldNIIPliabilitiesandUSTyieldskeepclimbing.StaffattheNewYorkFedestimatethateveryonepercentagepointriseinUSandforeigninterestratessubtractsUSD150bnfromUSnetprimary

income.Thesymbiosisisemerginginplainsight:risingUSTyieldsfeedthefiscaldeficitandthecurrentaccountdeficit(seeHoney,WhoShrunktheUSIncomeSurplus,LibertyStreetEconomics,May2026).

Nomura|SpecialReport3Septenber2026

TheAlboomconcealsarisingUSrisk

premium

TheUSequitymarket'sphenomenalrally-achievedintheteethoflargetwindeficitsandrisinginterestrates-restsonagenuinefoundation:extraordinaryAl-ledprofitgrowththatisexpectedtosustainforyears(Figure7).

Fig.7:USS&P500,10yUSTbondyieldandtwindeficits

7,500

Budgetdeficit,%ofGDP,Ihs

Currentaccountdeficit,%ofGDP,Ihs

6,000

4,500

3,000

1,500

1990199920082017

一10yUSTbondyield,%(avg.),IhsS&P500,Index(avg.),rhs

15

10

2026

1981

20

0

Note:For2026,weuseNomura'sforecastsforthetwindeficitsandyear-to-dateaverageforS&P500indexand10yUSTbondyield.

Source:Bloomberg,CEICandNomuraGlobalEconomics.

ThereisnodoubtthatAIwillrevolutionizehoweveryonelivesandworks,andithasthepotentialtoraiseproductivitysubstantiallyoverthecomingdecade.However,rapid

technologicaltransformationcarriesitsownrisks.AstheBISwarnedinits2026AnnualEconomicReport,"thecanalmaniaofthe1830s,theBritishrailwaymaniainthe1840s,theelectrificationexuberanceofthelate1920s(roaring20s)andthedotcomboomofthelate90sallsharedonecommontrait:agenuinetechnologicalbreakthroughthatattractedcapitalinexcessofwhatcommercialreturnscouldultimatelyjustify.Theseepisodes

endedwithaneventualreversalininvestment,inducingeconomy-widerecessions.”

Likeeveryonce-in-a-generationinnovation,theAlrevolutioncomeswrappedin

uncertainty.DebateragesoverwhethertheextraordinarilyhighreturnsonAlinvestmentcanhod,ananswerthathingesonthespeedandscaleofadoptionandonwhether

marginssurvivemountingcompetitionfromChina'scheaperLLMmodels.OtherobstaclescrowdtheAlbuildouttoo:globalscarcityofcomputememoryandelectricity,cybersecurityvulnerabilities,regulationplayingcatch-up,jobdisplacementandthepotentialforsocialbacklash(seeTheturbulentAleraishere.Thechoiceswemakenowarecritical,Bill

Gates,26August2026).

ThereisgoodreasontobelieveAlwillultimatelydeliverstrongproductivitygains.Giventherisks,though,thepaththereisunlikelytobeastraightlineup.ThemassiveAl

buildouthasbecomeamajorengineofUSGDPgrowth,yetitisalsostrainingthe

economyalongseveralseams:acceleratingchipandelectricitypricesarefeedingCPIinflation;surgingimportsofchipsandtechequipmentarewideningthetradedeficit;

massivedebtissuancebyhyperscalersispushingUSTyieldshigher;andhiringofyoungworkersisshowingnascentsignsofslowing(seeTheAlBuildoutandtheEconomy:

PubliclyAvailableDatatoAssessAI'sImpact,FedsNotes,July2026).

Nomura|SpecialReport【价值目录Sp整teb：er2026

10

So,whathappensifthereisanAIsetback?

ToborrowfromWarrenBuffet,“onlywhenthetidegoesoutdoyoudiscoverwho’sbeenswimmingnaked”;wesuspectthat,withrichUSequityvaluationsandweakereconomicfundamentals,anAIsetbackwouldtriggeralargeUSequitycorrection.AmplifiedbytheextremeforeigninvestorexposuretoUSequities,leverageandcircularfinancinginsidetheAIecosystem,thatcorrectioncouldmorphintoaglobalrisk-offevent.

WewouldexpecttheFedtopivotswiftlyfrominflationtorecessionriskandslashrates;thoughundernewleadership,thehurdleforreturningtoQElookshigherthaninthepast.USinvestors,whoheld82%ofUSequitiesoutstandingin2025andcarryanaturalhomebias,wouldlikelyrotatefromequitiesintoTreasurys,andthatdominantflowwoulddragUSTyieldsdown.

ThemostintriguingquestioniswhatforeignholdersofUSassetswoulddo.ConventionalwisdomsaysTINA–thereisnoalternative–toUSDassets,giventhesizeoftheUS

economy,thedepthandliquidityofitscapitalmarketsandthedollar’sglobalreserve

status.Historyappearstoagree:inmajorglobalrisk-offeventsthebroadUSDindex

strengthens,evenduringthe2008GFCthatbeganinAmericaitself.Butasnoted,otherpillarsofAmericanexceptionalismhavebeenerodingastheadministrationleverages–or,somewouldsay,abuses–itsexorbitantprivilegethroughpoliciesofcoercion(seeTheCostofGeoeconomicCoercion,IMFF&DMagazine,June2026).TrustinUSfiscalandtradepolicy,intheUSsecurityumbrellaand,somewouldargue,inFed

independencehaseroded.

Therearehintsthetidemayalreadybeturning.Afterthesweeping“LiberationDay”tariffannouncementinApril2025,USmarketsdeliveredanunusualtrifecta:equities,bonds

andUSDallfelltogether.Theerosionoftrusthasonlydeepenedsince.AsCanada's

primeministerputitinhisnow-famousDavosspeechinJanuary2026:“Hegemons

cannotcontinuallymonetizetheirrelationships.Allieswilldiversifytohedgeagainst

uncertainty.They’llbuyinsurance,increaseoptionsinordertorebuildsovereignty,

sovereigntythatwasoncegroundedinrulesbutwillincreasinglybeanchoredintheabilitytowithstandpressure.”

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11

CreatingameasureofUSalliesandfoes

WehaveframedanAlsetbackasthetriggerthatunmasksAmerica'srisingriskpremium,butothercandidatesexist(e.g.,moreextremeTreasurypolicyactivismtosuppressUSTyields,whetherthroughfinancialrepressionorpressureontheFedtorestartQE).Our

objectiveistodebunktheassumedrobustnessofTINAtotheUSD,giventhesurgeinUSNIPliabilitiesandtheconcentrationofROWNIIPassetsintheUS.Putsimply:theROWhasbuiltsuchalargeconcentrationinUSDassets,amoderatede-riskingbyforeign

investorsmaybeallthatisneededtodriveadepreciationofUSD.

AlargeUSDdepreciationwouldrequirecurrentUSNIIPliabilitiesofUSD21.3trn(asofMarch2026)tofallsharply.Oursimulationdemonstrateswhythatoutcomehasbecomemoreplausible.First,though,wesorteveryforeigncountryholdingUSDassetsintoUSalliesorfoes.Todoso,wedrawonUnitedNationsGeneralAssembly(UNGA)voting

datacoveringover5,000resolutionsacrossregular,specialandemergencyspecial

sessionsfrom1965-2025forsome190-oddcountries.Foreachcountryineachyear,wecalculatetheshareofUNGAresolutionswhereitvotedinlinewiththeUS(asopposedtovotingagainst,abstainingornotvoting)outoftotalresolutions.Inaggregate,theshareofcountriesvotingwiththeUShasdeclinednoticeably,echoingtheerosionoftrustinUSpolicies.(Figure8).

Onasmoothed3-yearmovingaveragebasis,weclassifythebottom30%byshareofvotesinlinewiththeUS(i.e.,thosemostfrequentlyvotingagainst)asUSfoes,andtheremaining70%asUSallies.ForsomecountriesabsentfromtheUNGAdata,weusedMapdisglobalrelationsanddiplomacymapdistanceasasupplementarysource.WethenapplyourUSallies-foesclassificationtotheUSTreasuryInternationalCapital(TIC)Systemdataon

foreignholdingsofUSportfolioassetsbycountry,givingabreakdownofthoseliabilities

overtimeintoholdingsbyUSalliesandfoes.Foroffshorefinancialcentersmissingfrom

boththeUNGAandMapdisdatasets,wesplitholdingsevenlybetweenalliesandfoes.

Unsurprisingly,thefoes'grouphasgrownitsUSDportfolioholdingsfarmoreslowlythantheallies'group:64%versus264%from2012to2026(Figure9).

Fig.8:AggregatedshareofcountriesvotinginlinewiththeUS

%

50

40

30

20

10

0

196519751985199520152025

Note:BasedonUNGAvotingdatacoveringover5,000resolutionsacrossregular,

specialandemergencyspecialsessionsduringthetimeperiodshownforsome190-oddcountries.Foreachcountryineachyear,wecalculatetheshareofUNGAresolutions

whereitvotedinlinewiththeUSoutoftotaresolutions.Wethentaketheaverageacrossallcountriesineachyeartogettheaggregatedshare.

Source:UNGAandNomuraGlobalEconomics.

Fig.9:USportfolioliabilitiesbyUSalliesversusfoes

USDtrn

40

30

20

10

0

Feb-12Sep-15Apr-19Nov-22Jun-26

Note:ForUStotalportfolioliabilities,wesumupportfolioliabilitiesoflong-termdebtandequitysecurities,negotiableCDsand