中国制造：全球供应链与美国脱钩的局限性（英）

黔PIIE

PETERSONINSTITUTEFOR

INTERNATIONALECONOMICS

POLICYBRIEF

26-12MadewithChina:Global

SupplyChainsandtheLimitsofUSDecoupling

MaryE.LovelyandChristineY.Wan

August2026

Note:TheauthorsthankGregAuclair,RichardBaldwin,ChadBown,

KimberlyClausing,MichaelClemens,andRobertZ.Lawrenceforinsightfulcomments.WearegratefultoGregAuclairandAriyasurenBaldansenge

forimplementingPIIE’sdataqualityassuranceproceduresandtoNellHendersonforeditorialguidance.

INTRODUCTION

USpolicymakershavefailedtosignificantlyreduceAmerica’s

MaryE.Lovely

isthe

dependenceonChinese-madegoodsandservicesdespite

AnthonyM.SolomonSeniorFellowatthe

yearsoftrying.

PetersonInstitute

ThesteeptariffsemployedduringthefirstTrump

forInternationalEconomics.She

administrationandtheBidenadministrationsignificantlyshrankdirect,bilateralimportsfromChinaasashareoftotalUSimports:

servedasthe2022

CarnegieChairinUS-ChinaRelationswith

Theydroppedbyabout7percentagepoints,to11percent,from

theKlugeCenter

2017through2024.1Someobservershailthisasprogressin

decouplingtheworld’stwolargesteconomiesandasjustification

attheLibraryofCongress.

ChristineY.Wan

is

forthehightariffsonChinatoday.

researchanalystat

Butthisviewmissesthelessrosypicturegleanedbyincluding

thePetersonInstituteforInternational

indirectChineseimports—Chinese-madeproducts,parts,and

Economics.

1China’sshareofUSgoodsimportsalonewas22percentin2017,fallingto9percentbytheendof2025.SeeBown(2026)for

details.

1750MassachusettsAvenue,NW|Washington,DC20036-1903USA+1.202.328.9000|

PB26-12|AUGUST20262

othercontentembeddedintheUnitedStates’importsfromother

countries.ImagineacomputerimportedtotheUnitedStatesfromVietnamthatcontainsChinesecomponents.OuranalysisfindsthatthecombinedvalueofUSdirectandindirectimportsfromChina

felljust2percentagepointsasashareofthecomparableUSimporttotalinthesameperiod.

OurbroadermeasureimpliesthatthehighUStariffsofthe

periodwerelargelyineffectiveinreducingUSimportsofChinesecontent.ThemeasuresfailedtoachievesignificantUSdecouplingfromChinaduringthisperiod,leavingAmericavulnerableto

interruptionsofkeysuppliesoriginatinginChinawhiletaxingpurchasesofnonsensitivegoods.

ThesefindingssuggestthesecondTrumpadministration’s

currentbroadtariffpolicieswillalsolikelyfailtocurbAmerica’srelianceonChineseimports,someofwhichareessential

inputstoimportantindustries.Indeed,UStariffsonChinawillbecounterproductiveiftheireffectsobscurerealityandlullpolicymakersintounderestimatingriskstoUSsecurity.

ThisPolicyBriefreviewshowtariffsrearrangedUSsupply

chains,detailshowwecalculateChinesevalueaddedinallUSimports,quantifieshowmuchChinesecontentiscomingfromthirdcountries,describesthepolicyimplicationsofthesetradedevelopments,andoffersourpolicyrecommendations.

PresidentDonaldTrump’s2018–19tradewarwithChina

dramaticallyalteredbilateralgoodstradeflowsbetweenthetwo

economies.TheOfficeoftheUSTradeRepresentative(USTR),in

its2024reviewoftheeffectsofthetradewar,toutedthedeclineinbilateralimports,saying,“tariffshavedecreasedChina’smarketshareofUSimports,”andthatdiversiontoalternativesuppliersis“potentiallysupportingmorediverseandresilientsupplychainsforAmericanproducersandconsumers”(USTR2024,52).ThesetradetrendsacceleratedlastyearasUSimportsfromChinafellbymorethanaquarterin2025fromtheyearbefore.2

2SeeCongressionalResearchService,USLibraryofCongress,2026,

US-ChinaTradeRelations

.

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Forsomeobservers,thedeclineinChina’sbilateralexportsis

evidenceofUS-Chinadecoupling.3Ratherthanactualdelinking,

however,wearguethatobservedshiftsinbilateralflowslargely

reflecttherearrangementofglobalsupplychainsbyfirmsseekingtoavoidhighUStariffs.Facinghightaxesontheirdirectexports,

Chinesefirmshavelargelygonearoundthembyincreasingsales

toso-called“connectorcountries,”whichinturnincreasedtheir

exportstotheUnitedStates.NomaturestrategytoreduceUS

supplychainvulnerabilitieswouldfailtoaccountfordependenciesinherentintheseindirectimports.Chinese-madecontentcoming

intotheUnitedStatesthroughthesethirdcountrieshasthesame

benefitsandrisksasdirectimports:TheyallowtheUnitedStatestoaccesslow-costpartsandcomponents,someofwhichareavailableonlyorlargelyfromChina,whileexposingtheUnitedStatesto

potentialChinesechokepoints.

ThegrowthinChineseexportstoconnectorcountrieshasbeen

widelynoted,butaquantitativemeasureoftheextentofsuch

flowshaslaggedrecentUStariffchanges.4ThisPolicyBrieffillsthegapbyusingpubliclyavailabledatatotraceChinesevalue

addedasitweavesthroughglobalproductionnetworksinto

USimports,providinganaggregatemeasureofUSrelianceon

Chinesesuppliers.Thesevalue-addedtrademeasuresalsoallowustoapportiontheshareofChinesecontentthatcomesthroughalternativetradepartners.

Asimpleexampleillustrateswhythisdistinctionbetween

bilateraltradeflowsandvalue-addedflowsmatterswhenthinking

3Forexample,intheiranalysisoftheshort-runimpactofthe2025

tariffsontheUSeconomy,FajgelbaumandKhandelwal(2026)

concludethat“tariffshavebeensuccessfulatraisingfederalrevenueanddecouplingtradewithChina,”whilefindingotherpromised

outcomeswerelargelyunrealized.

4AsreportedbyAlfaroandChor(2026),estimatesavailablefromtheOECDshowthat“theshareofChinesevalueaddedembodiedinUSgrossimportsfellfrom15.7%to15.3%between2017–2022,reversingwhathadbeenasteadyriseformostofthe2010s….”Ouranalysis

usesadifferentdatasource(seethe

appendix

,availableonthe

PIIEwebsite,forcomparisonswiththeOECDtradeinvalue-addeddatabase)andcarriestheestimatesforwardto2024.

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abouttradedependencies.(

Table1

providesaguidetoterminologyusedinthisbrief.)SupposetheUnitedStatesimportsa$1,000

laptopfromVietnam.ConventionalcustomsaccountingrecordsthisasabilateralVietnameseexporttotheUnitedStatesof

$1,000.However,supposethat60percentofthattotalfinalvaluecamefrompartsthatoriginatedinChina.Tradeinvalue-added

accountingmethodsuseinformationontradeflowsandinput-outputrelationshipstotracetheoriginofvaluethroughglobalproductionnetworks.Thesemethodswouldrecordthelaptop’sUSvalue-addedimportsfromVietnamas$400andUSvalue-addedimportsfromChinaas$600.BecauseChinaproduces

moresophisticatedelectroniccomponentsthanVietnam,a

relativenewcomertothesesupplychains,theChinesecontentoftheVietnameselaptopshouldberecognizedinsupplychainsecurityassessments.

Ouranalysisshiftsthedecouplingnarrativebyfocusingontheultimatesourceofimportedcontentratherthanthelastborder

crossedbeforearrivingintheUnitedStates.Usingrecently

availabledatafromtheAsianDevelopmentBank(ADB),weapplywell-establishedtradeinvalue-addedmethodstouncoverthe

originofthegoodsandservicesusedtoproduceUSimports.Webeginbyreviewingwhatanalysisofstandardcustomsbilateral

tradedatarevealsabouttheeffectoftariffchangesonUSbilateralimportsfromChinaandfromalternativesourcecountries.5Nextweexplainhowvalue-addedmeasuresprovideabroaderperspectiveonsupplychainreorganization.Wethendeploythesevalue-addedmeasurestoidentifyChinesecontentintheexportsofthose

countriesmakingthelargestgainsintheUSmarket,revealingitsgrowthovertimeandbybroadindustrialsector.

5Weusetheterm“bilateraltrade”assynonymouswiththe“gross

trade”measuredbynationalcustomsadministrations.Itisthevalueofgoodsandservicestradedbetweentwopartnersbilaterally,

regardlessoftheultimatesourceofthecontentofthosegoodsandservices.

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Table1

Termsdescribingalternativeimportmeasures

a.ThisPolicyBrieffollowsthestandardICIO/MRIOaccounting,which

attributesvalueaddedtotheeconomywhereproductiontakesplace,nottofirmownership.Asaresult,valuecreatedbyChinese-ownedaffiliatesinthirdcountriesisgenerallyrecordedasvalueaddedofthehost

economyratherthanChina,evenifsomereturnsmayultimatelyaccruetoChineseinvestors.ForanFDI-augmentedframeworkthattracesvalueaddedinthepresenceofforeign-investedenterprises,seeWangetal.

(2021).

WeshowthatassessmentsusingbilateralimportdataoverstatetheextentofUS-Chinadecoupling.WhilethebilateraldataappeartoshowaprecipitousdeclineinUSdependenceonChina,China’sshareofUSvalue-addedimportsdeclinedbyjust2percentage

pointsby2024fromitspre-trade-warlevel.Interestingly,wefindthatonlyUSsupplychainsadaptedtotariffincreasesbydivertingChinesepartsandcomponentsthroughfactoriesinthirdcountries;wedonotfindsimilartrendsinthevalue-addedtradeflowsof

otherG7countries.

ThepolicyimplicationsofthesefindingsreflectthelimitsofusingblankettariffstostrategicallyrestructureUSsupplychains.

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WesummarizehowouranalysisexposesthefailureofcurrenttradepolicytopromotedecouplingfromChina.Wearguethatamore

effectiveapproachwouldincludetargetedtariffs,butthatthey

mustbecomplementedbypoliciesthathelpbuildtheproduction,infrastructure,andlegalcapacityofpartnerswiththepotentialtobecomenewUSsuppliers.Drawingoninsightsintohowdevelopingcountriesbuilddomesticcapacity,wearguethatcertaincurrent

Trumpadministrationtradepoliciesarecounterproductiveto

securingUSsupplychains.TheseincludeUStariffsunderSection301(b)oftheTradeActof1974tocombatforcedlaboraswellasmechanismswithinthenewlysignedArticlesofReciprocalTrade.

Lastly,wehighlightdifferencesemergingbetweenthetrade

patternsoftheUnitedStatesandthoseofotherG7partnersandsuggestthatcooperation,ratherthantradeaggression,isneededtodevelopmorereliableandsecuresupplies.

USTARIFFSREDUCEDBILATERALIMPORTSFROMCHINA

USimportsfromChinadeclinedsubstantiallyafter2017,consistentwithatariff-inducedbreakinearliertrends.Asillustratedby

figure1

,whichpresentsrealimportvaluesrelativetotheJune

2018level,USimportsfromChinabegantofallinearly2019,inthewakeofthefirstthreeroundsoftheUS-Chinatradewar,andtheyremainedlowduringtheCOVID-19pandemic.6Althoughdemand

forChinesegoodsroseastheUSeconomyrecoveredfromits

pandemiccollapse,realimportsfromChinapeakedinlate2022

andthenresumedtheirdecline.Bown(2026)findsthatafterthe

secondTrumpadministration’smultipletariffrounds,theaverage

USweightedtariffonChinareachedabove50percent,before

fallingbackfollowingbilateralnegotiationsinOctober.Bytheendof2025,realUSimportsfromChinahaddropped40percentbelowthepre-tradewarlevelsetinJune2018.Bown(2026)statesthat

“thedirectionoftravelisclear:Tradebetweenthetwocountriesisunwindingfasterthanever.”

6Lovely(2023)examinespoliciesofthefirstTrumpadministration

andtheBidenadministrationdesignedtoreorderUSsupplychainsthroughreshoringmanufacturing,“friendshoring”supplychains,anddecouplingfromChina.

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CarefulempiricalstudieshaveestablishedthatUStariffsleviedduringthetradewarwereasignificantcauseofthedeclineinUS

importsfromChina.Examiningmonth-to-monthchangesinimportvalues,Fajgelbaumetal.(2020)estimatethattheaveragefallin

importvalueforChineseproductshitwithtrade-wartariffswas

31.7percent.Lookingoveralongerperiod,Amiti,Redding,and

Weinstein(2020)findthatimportelasticitiesincreaseinmagnitudeovertime,suggestingthatshort-rundeclinesinUSimports

resultingfromtariffswouldaccelerateoncesupplychainshadtimetoreorganize.TheirresultsareconsistentwiththerapiddeclineinimportsfromChinaafter2023,despitefewchangestotrade-wartariffratesundertheBidenadministration.

Asalsoseenin

figure1

,therealvalueofUSimportsfromtherestoftheworldfollowedadifferenttrend,decliningduringthepandemicbutreboundingthereafter,endingin202540percenthigherthaninJune2018.Takenatfacevalue,thedivergence

betweenUSimportsfromChinaandfromtherestoftheworld

suggestsarapiddecouplingbetweentheUnitedStatesand

China,withtheUnitedStatesdecreasingitsrelianceonacountrythatitdeemsbothasecuritythreatandanunfaircompetitor.

Thisinterpretation,however,suggeststhatvulnerabilitiesfrom

overdependenceandpotentialsupplychainchokepointscome

mainlyfrombilateralimports,ignoringtheultimatesourceof

specificpartsandcomponentsinsidethefinalgoodsthatreach

Americanshores.Assupplychainsarereorganizedgeographically,ChineseintermediatescontinuetoreachtheUSmarketembeddedinexportsfromthirdcountries.7

7RecentexportcontrolsimplementedbyboththeUnitedStates

andChinaseektolimitaccesstorestrictedproductsastheytravelthroughsupplychains,explicitlysignalingthatdependenciesexistthroughoutthevaluechainandnotjustthroughbilateraltrade.

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Figure1

USrealmonthlyimportvalues,2017–25(index,June2018=100)

Note:IndexedvalueofUSrealmonthlygoodsimports,12-monthtrailingsums;datadrawnfromUSCensus.

Source:ChadP.Bown,

TheTrump-ChinaTradeWars:FiveTakeawaysfrom

USImportsin2025

,PIIERealTimeEconomicsblog,March16,2026.

USTARIFFSONCHINAREARRANGEDUSIMPORTSOURCING

USimportsourcingreconfiguredaroundthetrade-wartariffs,

shiftingawayfrombilateraltradewithChinaandtoward

greaterpurchasesfromtherestoftheworld.Analyzinghighly

disaggregatedtradedata,Lovely,Xu,andZhang(2021)findthatnewlytaxedUSimportsfromChinawerepartiallyreplacedby

purchasesfromothersuppliers.Exportersthatheldlargerpre-trade-warmarketshareexperiencedthebiggestincreaseinUSsalesinnewlytariffedsectors.8

8Fajgelbaumetal.(2024)findthat,inresponsetobilateraltariff

increasesfromboththeUnitedStatesandChinaduringthe2018-19tradewar,so-calledbystanders(countriesotherthantheUnited

StatesandChina)increasedtheirexportstotheUnitedStates,

barelychangedtheirexportstoChina,andincreasedtheirexportstotherestoftheworldinproductswithhigherUS-Chinatariffs.

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Examiningalongertimehorizon,Freundetal.(2024)document

substantialUSimportdiversionby2022.Whileconfirmingthattrade-wartariffsdepressedimportsourcingfromChina,theyfindnosignificanteffectoftariffsontotalUSimportgrowth

intheproductswhereChina’ssharedeclinedmostrapidly.

Instead,Chineseimportswerereplacedbygoodsfromother

developingcountrieswithrevealedcomparativeadvantageinthesameproducts.9

AlfaroandChor(2023)alsodocumenttheshiftinUSpurchasingawayfromChinaandtowardalternativesourcesby2022.10Dubbingthesesupplychainmovementsthe“GreatReallocation,”theynotethatthefullimpactoftheUS-Chinatradewarwouldberevealed

onlyovertime.TheseinitialassessmentsarerevisitedinAlfaroandChor(2026),whichconfirmsthattheemergingreallocationofUSimportpatternsobservedin2022continuedthrough2025,with

importmarketshareslostbyChinafilledalmostentirelybytheUnitedStates’largestincumbentpartners.AlfaroandChoralsodocumentalaggedAmericanshiftawayfromChinafor“sticky”

products:relativelyskill-intensiveimportsand,startingin2021,forgoodswhoseproductionreliesonspecializedinputsorlong-livedbuyer-supplierrelationships.

9Revealedcomparativeadvantageisanindexusedtoinfera

country’scompetitiveexportstrength.Itiscalculatedastheshareofthecountry’sexportscomprisedbyaspecificproductrelativetoitsshareofworldexports.IncontrasttoFreundetal.(2024),whoidentifyrevealedcomparativeadvantageasafactordetermining

gainsinUSmarketshare,Fajgelbaumetal.(2024)estimateonlyasmallroleforpre-warspecializationasapredictorofoverallexportexpansionsbythirdcountries.Instead,theyfindthatcountry-

specificfactorsexplainthebulkofthecross-countryvariationinexportgrowthintargetedproducts.

10AlfaroandChor(2023)uncoveracorrelationattheproduct(HS4)levelbetweendecreasesinChina’sshareofUSimportsoverthe

period2017–22andgainsintheimportsharesofCanada,Mexico,andmajorEastandSoutheastAsianpartners.

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EXPORTERSGAININGUSMARKETSHAREINCREASEDTHEIRIMPORTSFROMCHINA

OnlyahandfuloftradepartnersincreasedtheirshareofaggregateUSgoodsimportsbymorethan1percentagepointafterthetradewar.ThetopgainersinUSmarketsharebetween2017and2025areTaiwan(4.1percentagepoints),Vietnam(3.7points),andMexico

(2.3points),asseeninfigure2.ThesurgeinUSimportsfrom

TaiwanisconcentratedintheelectronicssectorandcloselylinkedtoincreasedUSdemandforsemiconductorsandothercomponentsofAI-relatedinvestments.Thenexttwogainers,Vietnam

andMexico,aremiddle-incomecountriesthathavegradually

increasedtheirshareofglobalmanufacturedexportsoverthepastdecade,andwhoseexpandingpresenceinUSmarketsextends

beyondelectronics.

Figure2

ChangeinUSgoodsimportmarketsharefrom2017to2025,selectedcountries

Source:Authors’calculationsbasedonUSgoodsimportdatafromthe

USCensusBureau.Importsharesaredefinedaspartnerimportvalue

dividedbytotalUSimportsin2017and2025.Changesinmarketshare

arecalculatedasthedifferencebetween2025and2017shares.Countrieswithincreasesgreaterthan1percentagepointareshown.

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Tradedataprovideprimafacieevidencethatsomepartners

gainingUSmarketsharehavebecomeconnectorcountrieslinkingChinesegoodstoUSmarkets.11

Figure3

showsthatallsixgainingcountriesincreasedtheshareoftheirimportssourcedfrom

China,butthepatternvariesconsiderablyacrossthem.Taiwan

isthemostdistinctivecase.Taiwanesefirmsoperateextensive

productionnetworksthatspanChinaandcombineChineseand

non-Chinesevalueadded,whilethesurgeinAIdemand,especiallyforsemiconductorsproducedbyTSMC,hasaddedapowerfulforceshapingtradepatterns.TheresultisacomplexTaiwanstorythat

goeswellbeyondthescopeofthispieceanddeservesseparate

treatment.Forpresentpurposes,thekeypointisthatTaiwanese

firmsoperatingsuchChina-linkedproductionnetworksnowhaveastrongincentivetoshiftthefinalstageofassemblyoutsideChinatoavoidUStariffs.Mostrelevantforouranalysis,China’sshare

ofimportsrosebyabout10percentagepointsinVietnamandbyabout3percentagepointsinMexico.12

Previousresearchersclaimacausalrelationshipbetween

connectorcountrygainsintheUSmarketandintensified

importflowsfromChina.Utar,Zurita,andTorres(2025)provideeconometricevidencethatUStariffhikesonChinaincreased

MexicanexportstotheUnitedStatesandincreasedMexican

importsfromAsia.SimilarlyforVietnam,Wu(2025)findsthat

VietnameseexportstotheUnitedStatesincreasedsignificantlyinfinalgoodssubjecttotheUSimporttariffsonChineseexports

11ConnectorcountriesarethoseexperiencingsimultaneousincreasesinimportsfromChinaandincreasesinexportstotheUnitedStates,theEuropeanUnion,orothermarkets.Thetermappearstohave

beenpopularizedbyBloomberg,whichusedittodescribeaset

ofcountriesbenefittingfromthesupplychainreshufflingresultingfromtheUS-Chinatradewar.Bloomberg,

TheseFiveCountriesAre

KeyEconomic“Connectors”inaFragmentingWorld

,November2,2023.

12TheBidenadministrationlaunchedtheIndo-PacificEconomic

FrameworkforProsperity(IPEF)in2022tostrengthensupply

chainsbetweentheUnitedStatesandtheregionand—notleast—reduceitsmembers’economicrelianceonChina.Dahlmanand

Lovely(2023)findthatasof2021,ChinawasthetopsourceofmanufacturedgoodsforallIPEFcountries.

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andthatVietnameseimportsfromChinaincreasedsignificantlyinintermediatesandcapitalgoodssubjecttothesamesetoftariffs.

Figure3

ChangeinshareofgoodsimportsfromChinafrom2017to2024,selectedcountries

Source:Authors’calculationsbasedongoodsimportdatafromITCTradeMap;thechangereflectspercentagepointincrease.

FindingthatUSsuppliersareincreasingtheirrelianceon

ChineseimportsdoesnotprovethattheirexportstotheUnited

StatescontainmoreChinesecontent.Withgrowingeconomiesoftheirown,thesecountriesmaybeabsorbingnewChinesecontentthroughdomesticconsumption.Nevertheless,previousanalyses

suggestthatAmerica’snewsuppliersindeedmayberaisingthe

Chinesecontentoftheirexports.HoangandLewis(2024)show

thatformanycountriesandregionstheimportsharefromChina

andtheshareofChinesevalue-addedintheirexportsfollowsimilartrendsoverthe2012–20period.

ThereareseveralroutesbywhichChinesecontentendsupin

connectorcountryexportstotheUnitedStates.First,someChinesefirmshavemadeoutwardforeigndirectinvestments(FDI)tiedto

export-orientedmanufacturingfromconnectorcountries.ForeignaffiliatesofChinesefirmsimportpartsandcomponentsfrom

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themainland,furtherprocesstheminsidethehostcountry,and

sellaportiontooverseasmarkets.Second,higherUStariffsandmoribundgrowthathomehavepromptedChina-basedproducerstointensifytheirexportsofintermediategoodstoconnector

countries,andsomeofthesemaybeembeddedintoexportstotheUnitedStates.

Theco-movementoftradeandFDIflowsisevidentinthe

data.Gopinathetal.(2024)establishastrongpositivecorrelationbetweenacountry’sgaininUSimportmarketshareanditsreceiptofChineseoutwardFDI.AlfaroandChor(2023,29)examine

bothChineserecordsofthedestinationofitsoutwardFDIand

VietnameseandMexicanrecordsoftheirinwardFDIsources,

concludingthatChinesefirmshavebeen“increasinglyactiveasasourceofFDIintobothVietnamandMexico,withthetimingofthisrisecoincidingwiththeUSimpositionofdiscretionarytariffson

directimportsfromChina.”13

GarredandYuan(2025)examinechangesintheroleof

connectorcountriesthroughaChineselens.Drawingupon

informationfromannualreportsofChineselistedcompanies,theyfindthatChinesefirmswithagivenproductmixopenedmorenewmanufacturingaffiliatesincountriesthatraisedtheirUSimport

shareforthatproductmix,ascomparedtocountrieswithno

gain.Secondly,observingtradeinintermediatepartsalone,theyfindthattheshareofChina’spartsexportssenttothirdcountriesispositivelycorrelatedwiththatcountry’sincreaseinitsshare

oftheUSmarketforthedownstreamgoodsusingthoseparts.

Whiletheseexercisesdonotcapturetheinput-outputrelationshipspecifically,theyprovidenovelevidencethatChinesefirmshave

respondedtoUStariffsbybothdirectinvestmentinconnectorcountriesandbysellingthesecountriesmoreintermediate

goodsupstreamtotheproductionofgoodstheyexporttotheUnitedStates.

13LopezandVázquez(2023)examinesurveysofindustrialpark

operatorstofindthatsincethestartoftheUS-Chinatradewar

in2018andtheendof2022,830newforeignfirmslocatedin

Mexico.Lookingahead,theseoperatorsexpect20percentoffirmsprojectedtolocateintheirindustrialparkstobeChineseinorigin.

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Inadditiontothereallocationofsupplychains,another

mechanismmaybedrivingChineseexportstotheUnitedStates

throughthirdcountries.Transshipment(alsoknownasrerouting)

happenswhengoodsfromChinapassthroughathirdcountry

andundergoonlyminimalprocessingbeforeenteringtheUnited

Statesunderadifferentorigin.Itisameansoftariffevasionor

circumventionbutisnotareorganizationofproduction.Measuringtheextentofthisillegalactivityischallengingduetoitsclandestinenature.However,Iyohaetal.(2024)shedconsiderablelighton

itsextentthroughdetailedinvestigationoftheimportandexportrecordsofVietnamesefirmsinthewakeofthe2018–19US-