做空EquipmentShare公司报告 2026

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THISRESEARCHREPORTEXPRESSESSOLELYOUROPINIONS.Weareshortsellers.Wearebiased.Soarelonginvestors.SoisEquipmentShare.SoarethebanksthatraisedmoneyfortheCompany.Ifyouareinvested(eitherlongorshort)inEquipmentShare,soareyou.Justbecausewearebiaseddoesnotmeanthatwearewrong.UseBOCTexas,LLC’sresearchopinionsatyourownrisk.Thisreportanditscontentsarenotintendedtobeanddonotconstituteorcontainanyfinancialproductadvice.Investorsshouldseektheirownfinancial,legalandtaxadviceinrespectofanydecisionregardinganysecuritiesdiscussedherein.Youshoulddoyourownresearchandduediligencebeforemakinganyinvestmentdecisions,includingwithrespecttothesecuritiesdiscussedherein.WehaveashortinterestinEquipmentShare’ssecuritiesandthereforestandtorealizesignificantgainsintheeventthatthepriceofsuchsecuritiesdeclinesandwewilllikelybegincoveringsomeorallofourshortpositionuponpublicationofthisreport.Pleasereferto

ourfulldisclaimerlocatedonthelastpageofthisreport.

COMPANY:

EquipmentS

Inc.│NASDAQ:EQPT

Weareshort

EquipmentS

Inc.(NASDAQ:EQPT)(“EquipmentShare”orthe“Company”)becausewebelievethatundisclosedpromisestobackstopitsequipmentinvestmentprogramcreatebillionsofdollarsinhiddenliabilitiesthatcouldeasilyimpairitsbalancesheetandbonds.

EquipmentShareIPO’dinJanuary‘26atapremiumtopeersbecauseinvestorsbelievethatits asset-litemodelfuelsgrowthwithoutthecapitalrequirementsthatgenerallyburdencompetitors intheequipmentrentalindustry.TheCompanytellsinvestorsthatitsOWNProgramrepresents apurportedlynovelfinancingarrangementinwhichEquipmentShareleveragesthebalancesheetofthird-partyinvestorslikelocaldentiststofundtheexpansionofitsrentalfleet.

INDUSTRY:EquipmentRental

PRICE(ASOFCLOSE9/23/2026)

USD18.08MARKETCAP

USD4.6BN

Inpractice,webelievethatresellers/capitalfunnelscloselyconnectedtotheCompany’sco-foundersJabbokandWilliamSchlacks(i.e.,EZEquipmentZone,LLC&ArmadaFleetManagement,LLC1)enticeinvestorstoparticipateintheOWNProgrambypromisingthatEquipmentSharewillbackstoptheequipmentinvestmentwithafirst-lossguaranteeandamurkypromisethatEquipmentSharewillrepurchasetheequipmentattheendoftheinvestmentterm.Webelievethatthesepromisescreatemassivehiddenliabilitiesthatcouldeasilyimpairtheinterestsofnotonlyshareholdersbutalsobondholders.

WealsoquestionhowmuchoftheOWNProgramisarms-length,third-partycapital.OnitsQ2’26earningscall,EquipmentSharetoldinvestorsthatitsco-foundersenrolledlessthan$1millionofequipmentintheOWNProgram.YetwefoundanentitywhichusedtobecalledSchlacksRentals(nowcalledthePremiereGroup)whichrecentlyboastedonitswebsitethatitownedover$440millionofequipment.AformerCompanyexecutivetoldusthatthisequipmentislikelyenrolledintheOWNProgram.2Tous,thisnotonlymakesamockeryofSECdisclosurerulesbutalsoraisesthequestionastowhetherthereporteddemandfromoutsideinvestorsfortheOWNProgramisreal.Lamentingtheself-dealingofthefounders,aformerEquipmentShareexecutiveweintervieweddescribeditbestwhenhesaidEquipmentShare“isabeautifulfinancialecosystemthatfurtherstheirenrichment.”

Criticallyforinvestors,wethinkEquipmentShareinappropriatelyinflatesthereportedEquipmentRentalSegmentAdj.EBITDA(“ERSAdj.EBITDA”)andassociatedmarginsbyexcludingOWNProgramdistributionstotheinvestorswhopurchasedtheequipment.Inshort,wethinkEquipmentShareisfarlessprofitablethaninvestorsandbondholdersareledtobelieve.

StartinginAugust‘26,theCompany’sbiggestthird-partyinvestor,RomulusCapital,isnowunlockedandhasalreadystartedselling.ThissameinvestorsuedEquipmentSharein2025,allegingrottenconnected-partydealings,anunusuallyaggressiveactionforamajorshareholderbeforeanIPO.WesurmisethatashareholderangryenoughtosuetheCompanywilllikelyaggressivelydumpshareswhengiventheopportunity.Thisalreadyappearstobehappening,asRomulushasstartedselling.Consideringtheco-founders’massivesharepledge,webelievethatanywidespreadsellingfrompre-IPOinvestorscoulddevastatetheCompany’sstock.

1Referredtosubsequentlyas“EZEquipmentZone”and“Armada”respectively.

2Premieresubsequentlyremovedtheclaimfromitswebsite.

EquipmentSInc.│NASDAQ:EQPT

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1)HiddenOff-BalanceSheetLiabilitiesCreateRiskofMassiveLosseswhileEnrichingCloselyConnectedEntities.EquipmentSharetradesatapremiumbecauseinvestorsmistakenlybelievetheOWNProgramwillfuelrapidgrowthwithoutencumberingtheCompany’sbalancesheet.Onpaper,theOWNProgramappearstobefundedbyindependentinvestors(thinkhigh-net-worthindividualslikelocaldentists)whobuyconstructionequipmentandthenleasetheequipmentbacktoEquipmentShare,which,inturn,makesitavailableforrentthroughitsplatform.

Whywouldadentistbuyconstructionequipment?Wefoundevidencethattheyarepromisedoutlandishreturnssuchas“minimum16%annualreturnoninvestmentwithguaranteedrentals,”aswellasaccelerateddepreciationtaxbenefitswhich,asanothershortsellerrecentlypointedout,couldeasilyfailtopassIRSscrutiny.Butsofar,wethinkothercriticshavemissedthekeypromisesandwhytheymattertoinvestorsandbondholders.

Inpractice,webelievethatresellers/capitalfunnelscloselyconnectedtotheCompany’sco-founders(i.e.,EZEquipmentZone&Armada)enticeinvestorstoparticipateintheOWNProgrambypromisingboththatEquipmentSharewillprovideafirst-lossguaranteeandwillrepurchasetheequipmentattheendofthelease.

Weestimatethatfromjustthe10%first-lossguarantees,EquipmentShare’spromisestoOWNPrograminvestorscreatehalfabilliondollarsinundisclosedoff-balancesheetliabilities,whichalonewouldwipeoutallofthetangiblebookequityattributabletotheCompany’scommonshareholders.

Yetinourview,thescaleoftheliabilityislikelyfargreater,ascapitalfunnelsfortheOWNProgramalsogiveamurkypromisethatEquipmentSharewillrepurchasetheequipmentattheendofthelease.WhileEquipmentSharewillnodoubtretortthattherepurchasepromisesarenotlegallybinding,wehavefirsthandaccountsfromthemarketingfirmsthatfunnelmoneyintotheOWNProgramtellinginvestorstoexpectEquipmentSharetobuybacktheequipment.WebelievethatinvestorswhoparticipateintheOWNProgramlikelyrelyonthepromisethatEquipmentSharewillbuybacktheirequipmentattheendoftheterm,meaningthatanyinvestorsleftholdingunwantedequipmentattheendofthetermlikelyhaveacolorablelegalclaimoffraud.Ifthingsgobadly,therewilllikelybeanentireclassofsuchclaims.WesuspecttheCompany’struebuybackliabilitycouldapproachalargeportionofthe~$5.5billioninoutstandingoriginalequipmentcostenrolledintheOWNProgram,afigurethat,evenifonlypartiallyrealized,couldresultinsubstantialimpairmentsforbothequityinvestorsandbondholdersalike.

2)HowRealisInvestorDemandfortheOWNProgram?UndisclosedRelatedPartyAppearstoOwnHundredsofMillionsofDollars’WorthofEquipmentintheOWNProgram.Onitslatestquarterlyearningscall,theCompanyclaimedthatitsco-foundersheldlessthan$1millionofequipmentenrolledinitsOWNProgramandthatEquipmentSharewasreducingtheparticipationofrelatedpartiesintheOWNProgramfollowingtheIPO.

Wedoubtthisistrue.OurdiligencesuggeststhatanentityformerlyknownasSchlacksRentals(nowcalledthePremiereGroup)likelyenrollshundredsofmillionsofdollars’worthofequipmentintotheOWNProgram.MissouricorporaterecordsshowthatJabbokandWilliamSchlacksweremembersofthePremiereGroupandalonesignedits2023and2024annualreports.Theco-founderswerethesolesignatoriesoftheSchlacksRentalsannualreportsin2023and2024,suggestinginouropinionthattheylikelymaintainownership,controlof,oradirectorindirectinterestintheentity.

Thisissignificantbecause,ratherthanowninglessthan$1millionofequipment,thePremiereGroup’swebsiteclaimedthatitmanagedover$440millioninheavyequipment.

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AformerEquipmentShareexecutive,UCCfilings,andascrapeofthe“forsale”inventoryonthePremiereGroup’swebsitecorroboratethisclaim,indicatingthatanentityformerlyknownasSchlacksRentalsenrollshundredsofmillionsofdollarsofequipmentintheOWNProgram–farmorethanthe<$1milliondisclosed.Theformeremployeemadeclearthattheco-founderscouldhaveonpaperatleast,disposedortransferredtheirinteresttoafamilymemberorcloseconnection–butneverthelessallegedthatwhateverthearrangement,theco-foundersstilleffectivelycontrolledorhadadirect/indirectinterestintheentity.

3Premieresubsequentlyremovedtheclaimfromitswebsite.

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NotonlydowethinkthisisclearlyanotherexampleofEquipmentSharemisleadinginvestors,butifrelatedpartiesrepresentamateriallylargerportionoftheOWNProgramthantheCompanydiscloses,wequestionwhetherindependentinvestordemandfortheseprogramsisasrobustasmanagementprojects.TheOWNProgramunderpinsEquipmentShare’sgrowthforecasts–butifrelatedpartiesaresecretlyadrivingforcebehindthisdemand–wedoubtthatEquipmentSharecanachieveanywherenearitstargetgrowthnorjustifyitscurrentvaluation.

3)CloselyConnectedPartiesAllegedlyFunnelingCapitalinSupposedlyAsset-liteRentalProgram.TheOWNProgramanditsopaquestructurehavealreadydrawnsubstantialcriticismfrominvestors.AnothershortsellerrecentlyreleasedadetailedreportallegingthattheOWNProgramreliesoncapitalfunneledthroughatleasttwopartiescloselyconnectedtoEquipmentShare’sco-founders(EZEquipmentZoneandArmada),secretlyenrichinginsidersand/ortheircompatriotsoninvestmentsfunneledintotheOWNProgramviathesetwoentities.

ThereportalsopresentedevidencethatEquipmentSharesteerscustomerswhopurchaseequipmentfromEquipmentShareand/orparticipateintheOWNProgramtofinancethepurchasesthroughanotherSchlack-controlledentity:BevelFinancial.Despiteitscriticalandlucrativeroleinfinancinginvestorequipment,BevelFinancialdoesnotappeartobeaconsolidatedsubsidiaryofEquipmentShare–nortoourknowledge,isitevermentionedintheCompany’sSECfilings(includingtheprospectus).

Toourknowledge,EquipmentSharehasyettoresponddirectlytothereport’sallegations.Inouropinion,theevidencepresentediscredibleandoverwhelming,suggestingthatEquipmentShare’sundiscloseddealingssecretlyenrichinsidersand/ortheircompatriots.

4)Co-Founders’MarginLoanandStockPledgesCreateSignificantRisk.AccordingtotheCompany'sprospectus,JabbokandWilliamSchlackseachown~35millionshares,representing~28%oftotalsharesoutstandingandcommanding81%oftheCompany’svotingpower.ButUCCfilingsshowthatEquipmentShare’sco-founderscombinedpledged~27.2millionsharesonthedayoftheCompany’sinitialoffering.Worse,EquipmentShare’sprospectusdisclosesthatthemarginloans,collateralizedbyCompanystock,containaloan-to-valuecovenantwithout,toourknowledge,disclosingthepricetermsofthiscovenant.InvestorsareinthedarkastothestockpriceatwhichEquipmentShare’sfounderswouldgetamargincall,despitethechancethatsuchamargincallcoulddevastateEquipmentShare’sstock.

5)EquipmentShareMisleadsInvestorsonProfitabilityofCoreRentalBusiness.EquipmentShareclaimsthatitsrentalsegmentgenerates40%+ERSAdj.EBITDAmargin.ThisKPIpurportedlyhelpsjustifytheCompany’sexorbitantvaluationcomparedtoitspeergroup.Inouropinion,EquipmentShareinappropriatelyinflatesthereportedERSAdj.EBITDAandassociatedmarginsbyexcludingOWNProgramdistributionstotheinvestorswhopurchasedtheequipment.

Third-partyinvestorslikedoctorsandlawyerspurchasetheequipment,andafterasale-leaseback-esquetransaction,areentitledtoaportionoftherentearnedfromrentingtheequipmentthroughtheOWNProgram.Inexplicably,EquipmentSharecalculatestheprofitabilityoftheOWNProgrambyexcludingtheportionoftherentalpaymentspaidbacktotheinvestors.Wethinkthislaughableadjustmentishugelymisleading,asitexcludespaymentstotheveryinvestorsthatfinancedtheequipmentandwhoareentitledtoaportionoftherentalrevenues.

Byourcalculation,oncethepaymentstoinvestorsareproperlyaccountedfor,EquipmentShareearnsapedestrian~14%Adj.EBITDAmarginonitsrentalbusiness,ratherthanthemisleading40%+marginreportedtoinvestors.Ultimately,anyreasonableaccountingforpaymentstothefinancierswhopurchasedtheequipmentrevealsthatEquipmentShare’sprimaryrentalbusinessisfarlessprofitablethaninvestorsareledtobelieve.

DespiterotatthecoreofitsbusinessanddisclosuressomisleadingwequestionwhetheranythingtheCompanysayscanbetrusted,EquipmentSharetradesatasubstantialpremiumtopeers.OnanEV/LTMEBITbasis,theCompanytradesat~28x,a43%premiumtocompetitors.

EquipmentSInc.│NASDAQ:EQPT

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Source:CapIQ

Inourview,EquipmentShare’spremiumappearsevenmoreegregiousgiventheCompany’sabysmaloperatingandfreecashflowcomparedtopeers.

Source:BOCCalculations,CapIQ

Equipmentrentalbusinessestradingatahealthyvaluationshouldconsistentlyproducehealthycashflows.Evengrowingones.ButnotEquipmentShare.Thisraisesthequestion:isEquipmentShare’scorebusinessevenprofitable?

BuriedinoneofthelastpagesofitsQ2’26investorpresentation,theCompanyfeaturedatableshowingthattheOWNProgramlost$12millionpre-taxoverthelasttwelvemonths.Putsimply,EquipmentShare’smarqueeOWNProgram,whichwebelieveexposesbothequityinvestorsandbondholderstoseveralopaquerisks,doesnotgeneratemeaningfulprofitsoncetheactualcostsofdoingbusinessarefactoredin.

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Source:EquipmentShareQ2’26InvestorPresentation

Andbigshareholdersarestartingtosell.InvestorsshouldnotethatRomulusCapitalManagement,EquipmentShare’slargestshareholder,filedalawsuitinOctober’25allegingmisconductbytheCompanyanditsco-founders.EquipmentShareIPO’dinJanuary‘26withan180-daylock-upperiod.FollowingthequarterlyearningsonAugust12,2026,wewouldexpect(givenhislawsuit)thattheCompany’slargestshareholderwillsellsome,ifnotall,ofitssharesrepresenting26%ofEquipmentShare’stotalsharesoutstanding.

EQPTTop5ShareholdersHolderName

MarketValue

($,mm)

%Out

Position

Source

RomulusCapitalManagementVarious56,091,50426.0%1,040

AnchorageCapitalGroup

13F

17,770,560

8.2%

330

EQSHeritageHoldings

Form4

14,306,548

6.6%

265

InsightHoldingsGroup

13F

13,526,731

6.3%

251

BDTCapitalPartners13F10,548,9374.9%196

Total112,244,28052%2,082

Source:Bloomberg

Indeed,Romulushasalreadystartedselling.SinceEquipmentSharereportedearningsonAugust12,2026,Romulusfiledtwoform4’sstatingthatitsold2.2millionsharesworth~$45million.Underliningthepaceofitstransactions,Romulussoldshareson8/18representing~84%oftheaverageonedaytradingvolumeovertheprevious15days.

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42.19mm(sharessoldon8/18)/2.6mm(15dayADVended8/18)–datasourcedfromBloomberg

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Source:(Top)SEC–Form4,(Bottom)SEC–Form4

WethinkthepromisesmadetoinvestorsintheOWNProgramofafirst-lossguaranteeandanequipmentbuybackpotentiallycreatemassiveundisclosedliabilitiesthat,ifevenpartiallyrealized,woulddevastatetheCompany’sbalancesheetandcouldimpairitscredit.TogetherwithEquipmentShare’sgrowingleverage,stockpledges,andquestionabledisclosures,wefailtoseehowEquipmentSharecouldbeinvestable.

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1)HiddenOff-BalanceSheetLiabilitiesCreateRiskofMassiveLosseswhileEnrichingCloselyConnectedParties

EquipmentSharetradesatapremiumbecauseinvestorsmistakenlybelievetheOWNProgramwillfuelrapidgrowthwithoutcreatinganyliabilitiesontheCompany’sbalancesheet.

Inpractice,wesuspectthatresellers/capitalfunnelscloselyconnectedtotheCompany’sco-founders(i.e.,EZEquipmentZone&Armada)enticedinvestorstoparticipateintheOWNProgrambypromisingnotonlythatEquipmentSharewillprovideafirst-lossguarantee,butalsothatitwillrepurchasetheequipmentattheendofthelease.

Fromthe10%first-lossguaranteesalone,webelievethatEquipmentShareunder-disclosesitsliabilitiesbyhalfabilliondollars,whichalonewouldwipeoutallofthetangiblebookequityvalueattributabletotheCompany’scommonshareholders.

Yet,inourview,thescaleofEquipmentShare’sliabilityislikelyfargreaterinlightofmurkyequipmentbuy-backpromisesmadetoinvestors.TheCompanywillnodoubtretortthattherepurchaserepresentationsaremerelyteasedbutnotlegallybinding.But,inouropinion,thislikelydoesnotabsolveEquipmentShareofresponsibilitybecauseinvestorswhoparticipateintheOWNProgramlikelyrelyonthepromisethatEquipmentSharewillbuybacktheirequipmentattheendoftheterm,meaningthatanyinvestorsleftholdingunwantedequipmentwilllikelyhaveacolorablelegalclaimoffraud.

Inshort,wesuspectEquipmentShare’struebuybackliabilitycouldapproachamaterialportionofthe~$5.5billioninoutstandingoriginalequipmentcostenrolledintheOWNProgram,afigurethat,evenifonlypartiallyrealized,wouldresultinsubstantialimpairmentsforbothequityinvestorsandcreditorsalike.

.IndependentOWNProgramInvestorsSupposedlyUnderpinAsset-LiteGrowthStory

EquipmentShare’sstocktradesatapremiumtocompsbecauseinvestorsbelievethattheCompanyemploysauniquefinancingstructurethatreliesonoff-balancesheetarrangementsprovidedbythird-partyinvestorstofundtheexpansionofitsrentalfleet.Thispurportedlyrepresentsanadvantagebecausetheequipmentrentalindustryisacapital-intensivebusiness,meaningthatsourcesandcostsofcapitaloftenrepresentalimitingfactorongrowth.

ThroughwhattheCompanycallsthe“OWNProgram,”EquipmentSharepurchasesequipmentfromOEMsandsellsittothird-partyinvestors.Theseinvestors(i.e.,dentists,lawyers,andRIAs)leasethepurchasedequipmentbacktotheCompany,whichthenrentsittoendusersoftheequipment.EquipmentSharefurtherdistributesaportionoftherentalincometothesethird-partyinvestors.

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5AsofQ2’26,theOWNProgramrepresented$5.5billionor56%oftheCompany’sfleet.

Source:(Top)EquipmentShare–AnnualReport(FY2025),(Bottom)EquipmentShareDisclosures,BOCAnalysis

AnalystscredittheOWNProgramforEquipmentShare’spremiumvaluationrelativetootherequipmentrentalcompanies.Forexample,GoldmanSachsstatesthattheCompany’suniqueasset-litemodelenablesittomaintainanindustryleadinggrowthprofilebecauseitsOWNProgramreducestheassociatedcapitalrequirement.

Source:GoldmanSachs–InitiatingCoverage(February2026)6

Onpaper,thissoundsincredible.EquipmentShareclaimsitwillcapturemarketshareinafragmentedandtraditionallycapital-intensiveindustryusingthebalancesheetsofthird-partyinvestorslikedentists,lawyers,andRIAs,whoareenticedintoatax-advantagedequipmentinvestmentscheme.Intheory,thiscouldallowtheCompanytooutgrowpeerswithouttakingonasubstantialdebtburden.Butinouropinion,thisnarrativeislargelyasham.

.EntitiesConnectedtoEquipmentShare’sCo-foundersAllegedlyConstitutetheMajorityoftheOWNProgram

Whywouldadentistbuyconstructionequipment?Wefoundevidencethattheyarepromisedoutlandishreturnssuchas“minimum16%annualreturnoninvestmentwithguaranteedrentals,”aswellasaccelerateddepreciationtaxbenefitswhich,asanothershortsellerrecentlypointedout,couldeasilyfailtopassIRSscrutiny.7

Tounderstandtheproblem,itisnecessarytounderstandwherethemoneycomesfrom.TheOWNProgramreliesonseveralresellersorcapitalfunnelstoattractparticipants,whichadvertisetheOWNProgramthroughsocialmediaplatformslikeLinkedInandInstagram.

6Pagebreakremovedforspace.

7“AggressiveSolicitations&QuestionableTaxBenefits:OWNGrowthRestsonMarketingThatMayInviteRegulatoryScrutinyfromtheSEC&IRS”–UmibozuResearch(June2026)

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Thesemarketerspromisethingslike“Minimum16%annualreturnoninvestmentwithguaranteedrentals”andtheabilityforinvestorstoreduceoreliminatefederalandstatetaxes.

Source:(Left)LinkedIn–TravisMcMinn,(Right)Instagram–CochranCapital

AnothershortsellerallegedinaJune’26reportthat,unbeknownsttoEquipmentShare’sinvestors,twoofthesecapitalfunnels,EZEquipmentZoneandArmada,whichassembledthemajorityofthecapitalcurrentlyenrolledintheOWNProgram,arecloselyconnectedtoEquipmentShareanditsco-founders.Tounderscorescale,theshortsellerfurtherallegedthatEZEquipmentZonebyitselflikelyaccountsformorethan50%ofEquipmentShare’sOWNProgram,while$100-200millioninequipmentforsaleintotheOWNProgramflowedthroughArmadaduringJune'26alone.

Toourknowledge,theCompanyneverrespondedtotheevidencepresentedbytheshortreport.Inourview,theevidencecitedinthereportthatEZEquipmentZoneandArmadaarecloselyconnectedtothefoundersandtheCompanyisoverwhelmingandcredible.Yetalthoughthepreviousshortreportidentifiedtheconnection,itdidnotexplainwhyitmattered.

.PromisesMadebyCloselyConnectedOWNProgramResellersLikelyCreateExistentialRiskforEquipmentShareInvestorsandCreditors

Inourduediligence,weaskedEquipmentShare’sinvestorrelationsteamabouttheaccountingtreatmentoftheOWNProgram.ArepresentativeconfirmedthattheOWNProgramdoesnotincreasetheliabilitiesenumeratedonEquipmentShare’sbalancesheet.

BOC:Therearen’tanyassetsorliabilitiesassociatedwiththeOWNProgramatall?

EQPTIR:That’sright.

Nowthereare,thereare,therearefuturefeesthatwehavetojustinthewaythatit’saccountingandthat’llflowthroughprepaids.There’ssomeprepaidthatwehavetoputontherebecauseit’soverthelifeofthelease.

…

BOC:Whatarethesefees?

EQPTIR:Revshare.

-EQPTInvestorRelations

EquipmentSInc.│NASDAQ:EQPT

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OnitsQ2'26earningscall,EquipmentSharestressedtheimportanceofthispoint,repeatingmultipletimesthattheCompanydoesnotmakeminimumutilizationorresidualvalueguaranteestoOWNPrograminvestors,nordoesithaveanyobligationtorepurchaseequipmentattheendoftheinvestmentterm.

“Attheendoftheleaseterm,whichisgenerally6to7years,EquipmentSharehasnoobligationtorepurchasetheequipment.ThereisnoputrighttoEquipmentShareandnoguaranteedresidualvalue.…”

“So,toreiterate,OWNhasnominimumleasepayments,noutilizationguarantees,noresidualvalueguaranteesandnoobligationforEquipmentSharetorepurchasetheequipment.…”

“Tobeclear,OWNdoesnotcreateafixedpaymentobligationorafinancingliability.…”

“EquipmentSharehasnoobligationtorepurchasetheequipmentattheendoftheagreement.Theestimatedresidualvalueisincludedsolelytocalculatetheimpliedeconomicsofthetransaction,notbecauseitrepresentsafutureobligation.

”

…

“OntheOWNProgramdynamicsspecifically,wearenotatrecourseinanymacroenvironmentfortheequipment.…”

-EquipmentShareQ2’26EarningsCall

Wesuspect,however,that,unbeknownsttoinvestors,theOWNProgramwillmateriallyencumberEquipmentShare’sbalancesheetwithhiddenliabilitiescurrentlynotreportedontheCompany’sfinancialstatements.

a)CapitalFunnelsPromisethatEquipmentShareProvides10%First-LossGuaranteetoOWNProgramParticipants

Inourduediligence,wecontactedEZEquipmentZoneandCochranCapital

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toinquireabouttheinvestmentprogramstheyoffer.BothcapitalfunnelsrepresentthatEquipmentShareprovidesafirst-lossguaranteeof~10%ofthecostoftheequipmenttothird-partyparticipantsintheOWNProgram.

Forexample,anEZEquipmentZonerepresentativeclearlystatedthatEquipmentShareprovidesaLimitedLossGuaranteeof10%oftheoriginalequipmentcost.

BOC:Likeisthisjustahandshaketypedeal?OrIsawtherewasalikepropernounLimitedLossGuaranteeinthe--

EZEquipmentZone:Limitedlossbasicallyisanadditionalprotectionwe’venegotiatedandfactoredinforourclients.

Sobasicallyit’ssayingit’skindofholdingtheEquipmentShare’shandtothefire.So,eitheryou[EquipmentShare]buyitbackorifthisclientgoesandsellsit,you’restillgoingtohavetopayatleast10%ofanylossincurred.

Okay,sohypotheticallyspeaking,theyvalueyourequipmentat$560,000attheendof72ndmonth,okay?Iftheydon’tbuyitback,there’sagraceperiodofayeartherewherethey’regoingtopayyoutheearnedrent,whateveritis,it’swhatever,youboughtamillion,it’s$11,050monthlyforthatyearastheyattempttosellitortrytobuyitback,okay?

Soagain,normallyIbuybackatthe72ndmonth,butasyouasked,youknow,itkindofgetsusintheweedswiththishypothetical,butthat’swhythelimitedlossisthere.So,ifyoudecidedtosellitinwhatevertimeafterEquipmentSharedecidednottobuybackafterthe72ndmonth,then,andyoutookalossofwhatever,$100,000,okay,thenthey’regoingtogiveyouthat$100,000.It’srough.It’s99,999.It’sactually9.99%becauseitc