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i:uh
9November2026|9:03AMHKT
ASIAECONOMICSANALYST
China’sTighterTaxEnforcement:AStructuralTrend,butInsufficienttoResolveGovernmentFundingShortfalls
LishengWang
+852-3966-4004|
lisheng.wang@
GoldmanSachs(Asia)L.L.C.
YutingYang
+852-2978-7283|
yuting.y.yang@
GoldmanSachs(Asia)L.L.C.
FiscaltighteningmaybethesinglelargestdragonChina’sGDPgrowththisyearbyourestimates,andstrengthenedtaxenforcementisakeydriver.InthisAsiaEconomicsAnalyst,weexaminehowtightercollectionworksandwhyithas
intensifiedthisyear,quantifyitsrevenueimpactrelativetootherfundingchallenges,andassessitsmacroimplicationsandlikelytrajectoryahead.
China’stightertaxenforcementthisyearreflectsbothmountingfiscalpressuresandimproveddigitalmonitoring.Fallinglandsalesrevenueandelevated
governmentdebthaveincreasedtheneedfornewrevenueinrecentyears.Meanwhile,technologicalandinstitutionalupgradesnowenablesystematicenforcement,replacingdiscretionaryflexibilitytocurbrevenueleakage.
DespiteslowerrealGDPgrowth,taxrevenuegrowthroseto+6.1%yoyinQ1-Q32026from+0.8%in2025.WeestimatearoundRMB300bnoftheincreasethis
yearisunexplainedbyrealGDPgrowthandinflation,potentiallyreflecting
tightercollectioninpart.Iftaxenforcementexplainsthefullresidual,itaccountsfor0.2ppoftheprojected1.4ppofGDPnarrowinginChina’sAugmentedFiscalDeficit(AFD)from2025to2026.Beyonditsfiscalimpact,tighterenforcementhasalsoweakenedprivatesectorconfidenceandmarketsentimenttosome
degree.
Combiningoursectoranalysts’bottom-upestimateswithourtop-downanalysis,weestimatetighterenforcementmayhaveaddedaroundRMB500bnto
governmentfundingthisyearrelativeto2021(whenlocalgovernmentfinanceswererelativelyhealthy,beforetheprolongedpropertydownturnandanotherroundofstringentCovidlockdowns):RMB300bnintaxesandRMB200bnin
socialsecuritycontributions.Onanannualbasis,thisgaincouldreacharoundRMB1tntoward2030ifcoverageexpandsfurther.
However,thisyear’sRMB500bnrevenuegainfromenforcementtightening
relativeto2021cannotoffsettheRMB2.8tnshortfallfromlowerlandsales
revenue,highergovernmentdebt-servicingcostsandincreasedsocialsecurityfundsubsidies.Relativeto2021,theremainingfundinggapisRMB2.3tnthisyearbyourestimates,andweexpectittowidenbyanotherRMB1.8tntoward2030(toRMB4.1tn).
Webelievetaxrevenueincreasesarethereforelikelytoremainastructuraltrendoverthecomingyearsanddecades.Althoughwedonotexpectsignificant,
Investorsshouldconsiderthisreportasonlyasinglefactorinmakingtheirinvestmentdecision.ForRegACcertificationandotherimportantdisclosures,seetheDisclosureAppendix,orgoto
/research/hedge.html.
GoldmanSachsAsi
aho:/iwA.nalyst
broad-basedtaxratehikes,tightertaxenforcementshouldpersistratherthanproveaone-off.Highertaxrevenueandsustainedoff-budgetfundingpressurescouldendChina’sdecadeofAFDpersistentlyhoveringabove10%ofGDP,inourview.
9November20262
9November20263
China’sTighterTaxEnforcement:AStructuralTrend,butInsufficienttoResolveGovernmentFundingShortfalls
FiscaltighteningmaybethesinglelargestdragonChina’sGDPgrowththisyearbyourestimates,exertingamoresevereincrementaldragthanthepropertydownturn.
Alongsideweakincentivesforlocalofficialstolaunchlargeprojectsamidintensified
anti-corruptioneffortsandlocalleadershipreshuffles,strengthenedtaxenforcementisakeydriver,raisedinalmosteveryinvestormeetingwehadinrecentmonths.InthisAsiaEconomicsAnalyst,weexaminehowtightercollectionworksandwhyithasintensified
thisyear,quantifyitsrevenueimpactrelativetootherfundingchallenges,andassessitsmacroimplicationsandlikelytrajectoryahead.
Tightertaxenforcementaplannedpolicyshift
China’stightertaxenforcementthisyearreflectsbothmountingfiscalpressuresand
improveddigitalmonitoring.Fallinglandsalesrevenueandrisinggovernmentdebthaveincreasedtheneedfornewrevenueinrecentyears.Meanwhile,technologicaland
institutionalupgradesnowenablesystematicenforcementoffullstatutorycompliance,replacingdiscretionaryflexibilitytocurbrevenueleakage.
CentraltoChina’staxsystemupgradeistheGoldenTaxPhaseIV(金税四期)program,
pilotedinlate2021,officiallylaunchedin2023andexpandedin2024-25(seeExhibit14intheAppendixforanoverviewofChina’sfiscalsystem).Itreplacedinvoice-based
controlswithdigitalized,cross-agencymonitoringthatautomaticallyreconciles
contracts,invoices,andfundflowsusingbanking,customs,corporateregistrationande-invoicedata.In2024-25,directintegrationofinternationalCommonReporting
Standard(CRS;共同申报准则)dataintotheStateTaxationAdministration’s(STA)centralizeddatamonitoringreducedoffshoreopacitybyautomaticallymatchingoverseasdividends,capitalgains,depositsandtrustdistributionstodomestictaxresidents.
TheSTA’s“Foundation-StrengtheningProjectforTaxCollectionandManagement”(税费征管强基工程),formallyannouncedinApril2025,sthesetools.Its2026phaseeffectivelyshiftsenforcementfrompost-auditreviewtoreal-timepre-filing
validation,targetsregional“tax-refundhavens”andclosescompliancegapsinwealthmanagement,platformbusinessesandshareholdertransactions.TheSTA’supdatedmeasuresagainsttaxarrears,effectiveMarch2026,increasepenaltiesfordelinquenttaxpayersthroughdirectlinkstosocialcreditassessmentsandmorefrequentpublicdisclosure.
Taxrevenuehasincreasedmeaningfullythisyear
DespiteslowerrealGDPgrowththisyear(4.6%yoyinQ1-Q32026,vs.5.0%in2025),
governmentrevenuegrowthreboundednotablyto+1.4%yoyinQ1-Q32026from
-2.8%yoyin2025,asfastertaxrevenuegrowthmorethanoffsetdeeperlandsales
revenuecontraction(Exhibit1).Specifically,taxrevenuegrowthjumpedto+6.1%yoyinQ1-Q32026from+0.8%yoyin2025(Exhibit2),beatingtheMinistryofFinance’s(MOF)projectionofa2.9%gainforthisyearandledbyhigherrevenuefromindividualincometax,corporateincometaxandvalue-addedtax(VAT).
9November20264
Exhibit1:Thestrongreboundingovernmentrevenue
growthsofarthisyearhasbeenmainlydrivenbystrongertaxrevenue
20
15
10
5
0
-5
-10
Percent,yoyPercent,yoy
GovernmentRevenueGrowthandItsBreakdown
Othergovt-managedfundrevenue
Landsalesrevenue
Non-taxrevenue
Taxrevenue
Totalgovtrevenue
1314151617181920212223242526
YTD
20
15
10
5
0
-5
-10
Governmentrevenueincludesrevenuefromboththegeneralpublicbudgetandgovernment-managedfundbudget.26YTDprintsrefertoQ1-Q32026,thelatestdataavailable.
Source:Wind,CEIC,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch
Exhibit2:TaxrevenuegrowthsofarthisyearhasmeaningfullyexceededtheMOF’sprojectioninthebudgetreport
%yoy%yoy
20
15
10
5
0
-5
Annualtaxrevenuegrowth:budgetprojectionvs.outturnBudgetprojection
Outturn
Q1-Q3
2026
20
15
10
5
0
-5
1617181920212223242526
The2026printfor“Outturn”referstoQ1-Q32026,thelatestdataavailable.
Source:MOF,Wind,DatacompiledbyGoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch
Decomposingtaxrevenuegrowth
Giventhattherevenueimpactoftightertaxenforcementisdifficulttoisolate,weuseanindirectapproach:regressingtaxrevenuegrowthonrealGDPgrowthandGDPdeflatorandexaminingtheresiduals.1Intermittenttaxcutsanddeferrals,aswellasrelatedbaseeffects,significantlydistortedrevenuegrowthin2020-24.Thisyear,however,withno
majordistortions,weestimatethataroundRMB300bnoftaxrevenueincreaseis
unexplainedbyrealGDPgrowthandinflation(proxiedbyGDPdeflator),potentially
reflectingtightertaxcollection(Exhibit3).Iftheenforcementexplainsthefullresidual,itwouldaccountfor0.2ppoftheprojected1.4ppofGDPnarrowinginChina’s
AugmentedFiscalDeficit(AFD)from2025to2026,basedonourestimates.Beyonditsfiscalimpact,tighterenforcementhasalsoweakenedprivatesectorconfidenceand
marketsentimenttosomedegree.
1WealsotestedalternativemodelspecificationsusingCPIinflationandPPIinflationasprice-relatedexplanatoryvariables,butourbenchmarkregressionusingtheGDPdeflatorprovidedthebestfit.
9November20265
Exhibit3:WeestimatearoundRMB300bnincreaseintax
revenuethisyearunabletobeexplainedbyrealGDPgrowthandinflation
%/ppyoy%/ppyoy
15
10
5
0
-5
-10
Taxrevenuebreakdownbymajordriver
Residual
GDPdeflator
RealGDPgrowth
Taxrevenue
15
10
5
0
-5
-10
151617181920212223242526
Taxrevenuegrowthbreakdownbymajordrivers,includingrealGDPgrowthandGDPdeflator,isbasedonourregressionusingasamplebetween2015-2026YTD.
Source:NBS,Wind,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch
Moreevidenceonrecenttighteningintaxenforcement
AlthoughauditsandinspectionsrepresentonlypartofChina’staxenforcement,tax
authoritiesnationwiderecoveredRMB181bnintaxrevenuethroughthesemeasuresinH12026,up21%yoy,accordingtoSTAdata(Exhibit4).Individualincometaxrevenuegrowthalsoacceleratedin2025-26despitesubduedhouseholddisposableincome
growth(Exhibit5),partlyreflectingtightertaxenforcement.Mediareportsalsosuggestcasesoftightenedtaxenforcementleadingtosalesofcompanyequitysharesbysomelisted-companyfoundersandseniorexecutives(e.g.,Haidilao).
Exhibit4:Taxrevenuerecoveredfromnationwideauditsandinspectionsgained21%yoyin1H2026
RMBbnRMBbn
250
200
150
100
50
0
Revenuerecoveredfromnationwidetaxauditsandinspections
+21%
yoy
250
200
150
100
50
0
16171819202122231H251H26
STAdidnotofficiallyreleasetheannualrevenuerecoveredfromnationwidetaxauditsandinspectionsfor2024and2025.
Source:StateTaxationAdministrationAnnualReport,Governmentwebsites,DatacompiledbyGoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch
Exhibit5:Growthinindividualincometaxrevenuecontinuedtoacceleratein2025-26despiteslowinghouseholddisposableincomegrowth
%yoy%yoy
40
30
20
10
0
-10
-20
-30
-40
Individualincometaxrevenuegrowthvs.disposableincomegrowth
Individualincometaxrevenue
Disposableincomepercapita(RHS)
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
1314151617181920212223242526
YTD
26YTDprintsrefertoQ1-Q32026,thelatestdataavailable.
Source:Wind,DatacompiledbyGoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch
Mountinggovernmentfundingpressures
Governmentfundingfacestwomainchallenges.First,landsalesrevenuehasfallen
around70%fromitsmid-2021peak.Basedondevelopercashflows,ourproperty
researchteamprojectsresidentiallandsalesvolumetodeclinemorethan90%between
GoldmanSachsAsiaEconomicsAnaiyst
2025and2035,suggestinglocalgovernmentfinancingpressureswilllikelypersist.
Second,risinggovernmentdebtandanagingpopulationrequiremorefundingfordebtservicingandmaintainingpensionbalances.
Governmentdebtinterestpaymentmaymaintainitsuptrend
Basedonourestimates,China'sAugmentedGovernmentDebt(AGD)-aGSproprietarymetrictocapturealldebtraisedbythebroadChinesegovernmentsector(includingitsagents)-continuedtoriseinrecentyearsandregisteredRMB199tnin2025(equivalentto142%ofGDP;Exhibit6).Thismarksanaround80%gainfromRMB111tnin2019
(beforetheCovidpandemic)andasixteen-foldincreasefromRMB12tnin2007(beforetheGFC).TheamountofAGDinterestpaymentwouldbearoundRMB6.2tnin2026
(equivalentto4.2%ofGDP)andmayrisefurtherincomingyears(Exhibit7),as
continuedgovernmentdebtexpansionshouldmorethanoffsetlowerweightedaveragefinancingcosts.²
Exhibit6:AdiagramofChina'sAugmentedGovernmentDebt(AGD)basedon2025data
Augmentedgovt198.6tn(100%)
impicit
102.9tn(518%)
Localgovt
371tn(187%)65.8tn(33.1%)
LGFVonshore65
LGGB
4tn(87%)
Policybankbond
28.2tn(14.2%)
liabilities
CGGB
35.6tn(17.9%)
CGSB
5.2tn(2.6%)
CRconstructionnon-bond
liabiities4.6tn(2.3%)
LGFVnon-bond
liabilities
50.6tn(25.5%)
debt957tn(482%)
Localgovt
54.7tn(27.5%)
CRconstructionbonds
Policybank*
31.0tn(156%)
Centralgovt
41.0tn(20.7%)
ChinaRailway
2tn(3
Onshore
406%)
Onshore
30.9tn(15.5%)
LGFVbonds15.0tn(7.6%)
Onshore
54.7tn(27.5%)
LGSB
373tn(188%)
Offshore
0.1tn(01%)
Offshore
02tn(01%)
LGFVoffshore
1.6tn(0.8%)
CGGB,CGSB,LGGB,LGSB,LGFVandCRrefertocentralgovernmentgeneralbond,centralgovernmentspecialbond,localgovernmentgeneralbond,local
govermentspecialbond,localgovernmentfinancingvehicle,andChinaRailway,respectivel.Numbersoutsideandinsidethebracketrefertotheoutstandingamountofdebt(inRMBvaluetermsanditsproportioninAGD,respectively,foreachcategoryasofend-2025.*Weadjustforthedoublecountingissuesbyexcludingsomedebtsfrompolicybanks(deductedfrom“otherlabilities”).
Source:GoldmanSachsGloballnvestmentResearch,MOF,Wind,Bloomberg,CEIC
Pension-relatedgovernmentspendingisalsogrowing
FiscaltransfersfromthegeneralpublicbudgettoChina'ssocialinsurancefunds
(primarilythebasicpensionsystem)haverisensharplyoverthepasttwodecades,fromRMB60bnin2005tomorethanRMB3tnin2026,onthebackofanagingpopulation
withtheworking-ageproportionshrinking(Exhibit8).Specifically,theChinese
2WeleveragehistoricalfinancingcostsandtheaveragetenorsofAGDviamajorchannelstoestimatetherepricingpathofAFDfinancingcostsovertime.
9November20266
GoldmanSachsAsi
aho:/iwA.nalyst
9November20267
populationaged65andabovereached211millionin2025(15%ofthetotal),andis
projectedtoexceed370million(28%)by2045,basedontheUnitedNations(UN)data.Bycontrast,theworking-agepopulation(aged15-64)isprojectedtofallfrom987
million(70%ofthetotal)in2025to807million(62%)by2045.Aspensionrecipientsgrowinnumberrelativetocontributors,contributionrevenuesfaceincreasingpressuretokeeppacewithbenefitpayments,makingfiscalsupportarisingstructural
commitment.
Exhibit7:AGDannualinterestpaymentmayreboundslightlyin2026
7
7
RMBtnRMBtn
6
6
5
5
4
4
3
3
2
2
1
1
0
0
Governmentdebtinterestpaymentanditsbreakdown
Officalgovtdebtinterestpayment
Implicitgovtdebtinterestpayment
08091011121314151617181920212223242526
Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch,MOF,Wind,Bloomberg,CEIC
Exhibit8:Fiscalsubsidiesforsocialsecurityfundtrendedupoverthepastdecades
RMBtnMillionpersons
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
Chinafiscalsubsidiesforsocialsecurityfundvs.elderlypopulationFiscalsubsidies
Populationaged65orabove(RHS)
UN
projection
051015202530354045
Databefore2026arefromthefinalreviewofannualfiscalbudgets(outturns),whilethe2026printreferstothe2026budgetplan.
Source:UnitedNations,Wind,HaverAnalytics,DatacompiledbyGoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch
Policymakershavealsostrengthenedsocialsecuritycontributioncollection
China’ssocialinsurancefundsfacenotonlydemographicpressuresbutalsoastructuralshortfallincontributionsfromemployersandworkers.Whilestatutorycontributionsarebenchmarkedagainstemployees’wages,someemployersfailtoenrollalleligible
workersordeclareanartificiallylowwageforsocialsecuritycontributionpurposes,therebydampeningoverallrevenuecollection.The2025ChinaEnterpriseSocial
InsuranceWhitePaperfoundthatonly34.1%ofthe6,689surveyedemployersfullycompliedwithregulationsbyusingactualwagelevelstocalculatecontributions.
Policymakersareactivelyseekingtoclosethisgapbyexpandingcoveragetomoreworkersandensuringtheconsistencybetweenthereportedwageandactualwage.
TheSupremePeople’sCourt’sjudicialinterpretation,effectiveSeptember2025,
prohibitsagreementsbetweenemployersandemployeestoforgosocialinsurance.It
alsoupholdseligibleworkers’claimsforstatutoryseverancewhenterminating
employmentoveranemployer’sfailuretocontribute.Coupledwiththeselegal
developments,socialsecuritycontributionenforcementhasvisiblytightened.Whilethisshouldexpandsocialinsurancefundreceipts,italsoimposeshigherfinancialcostson
currentlyunder-contributingfirms.Channelcheckswithindustryandpolicycontacts
suggestthatreportedwageswilllikelybealignedwithactualwagesgradually,balancingthegoalofraisingrevenueagainsttheneedtoavoidoverburdeningbusinessestoo
quickly.Byourestimates,liftingtheeffectivewagebasefromRMB70toRMB75per
RMB100earnedcouldgenerateanincrementalRMB240bnannually,anadjustmentwe
9November20268
expecttomaterializelargelyby2027.3
Recentenforcementtighteningisfarfrombeingsufficienttofillthegovernmentfundingvoid
Recentenforcementtighteningincludesclosertaxscrutinyofonshoreindividualsand
companies,newtaxrulesonoffshoretrustsandincomefromoffshoreinsurance
products,4andstrictercollectionofsocialsecuritycontributions.Thesemeasures
coincidedwithsometaxpolicychanges,suchasthecurtailmentandphasedwithdrawalofVATrebatesforsolar,batteryandelectricvehicle(EV)exports,andthereinstatementofVAToninterestincomefromnewlyissuedChinacentralandlocalgovernmentbonds(CGBsandLGBs;withexistingbondsgrandfathereduntilmaturity).Tighterenforcementboostsgovernmentrevenue,butoverlyaggressiveimplementationandsignificant
delaysinspendingtheproceedscouldweighongrowth.Fiscaldepositswere14%higheryoyasofSeptember,andourproprietary“fiscalspend-through”ratiofellnotablyin
Q2-Q3,bothindicatingslowerspendingofpreviouslyraisedfunds.
Combiningoursectoranalysts’bottom-upestimateswithourtop-downanalysis,we
estimatethatstricterenforcementmayhaveboostedgovernmentfundingthisyearbyaroundRMB500bnrelativeto2021,whenlocalgovernmentfinanceswererelatively
healthy,beforetheprolongedpropertydownturnandanotherroundofstringentCovidlockdowns.ThisincludesRMB300bnfromtaxesandRMB200bnfromsocialsecurity
contributions(Exhibit9).Onanannualbasis,thisgaincouldreacharoundRMB1tn
toward2030ifcoveragecontinuestoexpand,thoughtheincrementaleffectsofsomemeasuresmayfadeovertime.
However,tighteningenforcementfallswellshortofclosingthegovernmentfundinggap.Thelonger-termdeclineinlandsalesrevenueimpliesafundingshortfallofaround
RMB1.3tnin2026relativeto2021forthegovernmentsector,afteradjustingforthe
sharespentonlandacquisitionandredevelopment.Wealsoestimatethathigher
governmentdebt-servicingcostsandsocialsecurityfundsubsidiesrequireanadditionalRMB1.5tninspendingthisyearcomparedwith2021.
Thus,thisyear’sRMB500bnrevenuegainfromtighterenforcementrelativeto2021isinsufficienttooffsettheRMB2.8tnfundingshortfallfromfallinglandsalesrevenue,
highergovernmentdebt-servicingcostsandincreasedsocialsecurityfundsubsidies
(=RMB1.3tn+RMB1.5tn).Relativeto2021,theremainingfundinggapisRMB2.3tnthisyearbyourestimates,andweexpectittowidenbyanotherRMB1.8tntoward2030(toRMB4.1tn).
3Policymakershavesteppedupenforcementofsocialsecuritycontributionssince2021,andthetrendlookssettolast,ascollectionshiftedentirelytotaxauthorities,whosestatutoryenforcementpowerandvisibilityintofirms’accountsandpayrollshaveimprovedcompliance.
4Accordingtomediareportsandindustryexperts,thenewtaxrulesonoffshoretrust—particularlyretroactiveauditsofpastassetcontributions—mayhaveraisedmorerevenuethantaxesonincomefromoffshoreinsuranceproducts.
9November20269
Exhibit9:Recenttighteningenforcementfallswellshortofclosingthegovernmentfundinggap
Estimatedamountoffundingandspending(RMBtn)
Past
2021
Current
2026
Future
2030
Isthe
incrementalimpactone-
off?
Differencesbetweenyears
2026vs.
2021
2030vs.
2026
2030vs.
2021
Lessfundingcollected(a)
Netrevenuefromlandsales(=30%*grossrevenue)
2.5
1.2
0.3
No
-1.3-1.0-2.3
Morefundingneeded(b)
Augmentedgovtdebt(AGD)debtservices
-5.5
-6.2
-6.6
No
-0.7-0.4-1.1
Fiscalsubsidiesforsocialsecurityfund
-2.3
-3.1
-4.0
No
-0.8-0.9-1.7
Sub-total
-7.8
-9.3
-10.6
-1.5-1.3-2.8
Revenuegainfromrecenttighteningenforcement(c)
Tightertaxscrutinyofonshoreindividualsandcompanies
0.0
0.2
0.3
No
0.20.10.3
Newtaxrulesonoffshoretrustsandincomefromoffshoreinsuranceproducts
0.0
0.1
0.1
Yes
0.10.00.1
Strictercollectionofsocialsecuritycontributions
0.0
0.2
0.6
No
0.20.40.6
Sub-total
0.0
0.5
1.0
0.50.51.0
Fundinggapamongtheabove-mentionedchannels(a+b+c)
-2.3-1.8-4.1
Whenestimating“lessfundingcollected”,weassumethenetrevenueaccountsfor30%ofgrosslandsalesproceeds,withtheremainderdedicatedtolandacquisitionandredevelopment.
Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch,MOF,Wind,Bloomberg
China’smacrotaxburdenremainsbelowmajorDMeconomies
IMFdatasuggestChina’smacrotaxburden—measuredasgovernmentrevenue-to-GDPratio—hasheldbroadlysteadyat26%inrecentyears,belowmanyDMeconomies
(Exhibit10).WhileChina’sprogressivepersonalincometaxsystemhasastatutoryrateforhighearnersbroadlycomparabletothoseinmanyDMeconomies,onlyaround5%ofitspopulation,or9%ofemployedpeople,payspersonalincometax,comparedto45%oftheUSpopulation.TaxesonpropertyarealsolowerthaninmostDMeconomies,
reflectingChina’snarrowpropertyandwealthtaxbase—mostnotablytheabsenceofbothanationwiderecurrentresidentialpropertytaxandaninheritancetax(Exhibit11).
9November202610
Exhibit10:China’smacrotaxburdenshavedeclinedinrecentyears,belowmanyDMeconomies…
50
40
30
20
10
0
50
40
30
20
10
0
%ofGDP%ofGDP
GovernmentrevenuetoGDPratioacrosscountries
ChinaIndia
KoreaUK
JapanUS
909294
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