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Eco

hntsc/s/wse.vaarelist

i:uh

9November2026|9:03AMHKT

ASIAECONOMICSANALYST

China’sTighterTaxEnforcement:AStructuralTrend,butInsufficienttoResolveGovernmentFundingShortfalls

LishengWang

+852-3966-4004|

lisheng.wang@

GoldmanSachs(Asia)L.L.C.

YutingYang

+852-2978-7283|

yuting.y.yang@

GoldmanSachs(Asia)L.L.C.

FiscaltighteningmaybethesinglelargestdragonChina’sGDPgrowththisyearbyourestimates,andstrengthenedtaxenforcementisakeydriver.InthisAsiaEconomicsAnalyst,weexaminehowtightercollectionworksandwhyithas

intensifiedthisyear,quantifyitsrevenueimpactrelativetootherfundingchallenges,andassessitsmacroimplicationsandlikelytrajectoryahead.

China’stightertaxenforcementthisyearreflectsbothmountingfiscalpressuresandimproveddigitalmonitoring.Fallinglandsalesrevenueandelevated

governmentdebthaveincreasedtheneedfornewrevenueinrecentyears.Meanwhile,technologicalandinstitutionalupgradesnowenablesystematicenforcement,replacingdiscretionaryflexibilitytocurbrevenueleakage.

DespiteslowerrealGDPgrowth,taxrevenuegrowthroseto+6.1%yoyinQ1-Q32026from+0.8%in2025.WeestimatearoundRMB300bnoftheincreasethis

yearisunexplainedbyrealGDPgrowthandinflation,potentiallyreflecting

tightercollectioninpart.Iftaxenforcementexplainsthefullresidual,itaccountsfor0.2ppoftheprojected1.4ppofGDPnarrowinginChina’sAugmentedFiscalDeficit(AFD)from2025to2026.Beyonditsfiscalimpact,tighterenforcementhasalsoweakenedprivatesectorconfidenceandmarketsentimenttosome

degree.

Combiningoursectoranalysts’bottom-upestimateswithourtop-downanalysis,weestimatetighterenforcementmayhaveaddedaroundRMB500bnto

governmentfundingthisyearrelativeto2021(whenlocalgovernmentfinanceswererelativelyhealthy,beforetheprolongedpropertydownturnandanotherroundofstringentCovidlockdowns):RMB300bnintaxesandRMB200bnin

socialsecuritycontributions.Onanannualbasis,thisgaincouldreacharoundRMB1tntoward2030ifcoverageexpandsfurther.

However,thisyear’sRMB500bnrevenuegainfromenforcementtightening

relativeto2021cannotoffsettheRMB2.8tnshortfallfromlowerlandsales

revenue,highergovernmentdebt-servicingcostsandincreasedsocialsecurityfundsubsidies.Relativeto2021,theremainingfundinggapisRMB2.3tnthisyearbyourestimates,andweexpectittowidenbyanotherRMB1.8tntoward2030(toRMB4.1tn).

Webelievetaxrevenueincreasesarethereforelikelytoremainastructuraltrendoverthecomingyearsanddecades.Althoughwedonotexpectsignificant,

Investorsshouldconsiderthisreportasonlyasinglefactorinmakingtheirinvestmentdecision.ForRegACcertificationandotherimportantdisclosures,seetheDisclosureAppendix,orgoto

/research/hedge.html.

GoldmanSachsAsi

aho:/iwA.nalyst

broad-basedtaxratehikes,tightertaxenforcementshouldpersistratherthanproveaone-off.Highertaxrevenueandsustainedoff-budgetfundingpressurescouldendChina’sdecadeofAFDpersistentlyhoveringabove10%ofGDP,inourview.

9November20262

9November20263

China’sTighterTaxEnforcement:AStructuralTrend,butInsufficienttoResolveGovernmentFundingShortfalls

FiscaltighteningmaybethesinglelargestdragonChina’sGDPgrowththisyearbyourestimates,exertingamoresevereincrementaldragthanthepropertydownturn.

Alongsideweakincentivesforlocalofficialstolaunchlargeprojectsamidintensified

anti-corruptioneffortsandlocalleadershipreshuffles,strengthenedtaxenforcementisakeydriver,raisedinalmosteveryinvestormeetingwehadinrecentmonths.InthisAsiaEconomicsAnalyst,weexaminehowtightercollectionworksandwhyithasintensified

thisyear,quantifyitsrevenueimpactrelativetootherfundingchallenges,andassessitsmacroimplicationsandlikelytrajectoryahead.

Tightertaxenforcementaplannedpolicyshift

China’stightertaxenforcementthisyearreflectsbothmountingfiscalpressuresand

improveddigitalmonitoring.Fallinglandsalesrevenueandrisinggovernmentdebthaveincreasedtheneedfornewrevenueinrecentyears.Meanwhile,technologicaland

institutionalupgradesnowenablesystematicenforcementoffullstatutorycompliance,replacingdiscretionaryflexibilitytocurbrevenueleakage.

CentraltoChina’staxsystemupgradeistheGoldenTaxPhaseIV(金税四期)program,

pilotedinlate2021,officiallylaunchedin2023andexpandedin2024-25(seeExhibit14intheAppendixforanoverviewofChina’sfiscalsystem).Itreplacedinvoice-based

controlswithdigitalized,cross-agencymonitoringthatautomaticallyreconciles

contracts,invoices,andfundflowsusingbanking,customs,corporateregistrationande-invoicedata.In2024-25,directintegrationofinternationalCommonReporting

Standard(CRS;共同申报准则)dataintotheStateTaxationAdministration’s(STA)centralizeddatamonitoringreducedoffshoreopacitybyautomaticallymatchingoverseasdividends,capitalgains,depositsandtrustdistributionstodomestictaxresidents.

TheSTA’s“Foundation-StrengtheningProjectforTaxCollectionandManagement”(税费征管强基工程),formallyannouncedinApril2025,sthesetools.Its2026phaseeffectivelyshiftsenforcementfrompost-auditreviewtoreal-timepre-filing

validation,targetsregional“tax-refundhavens”andclosescompliancegapsinwealthmanagement,platformbusinessesandshareholdertransactions.TheSTA’supdatedmeasuresagainsttaxarrears,effectiveMarch2026,increasepenaltiesfordelinquenttaxpayersthroughdirectlinkstosocialcreditassessmentsandmorefrequentpublicdisclosure.

Taxrevenuehasincreasedmeaningfullythisyear

DespiteslowerrealGDPgrowththisyear(4.6%yoyinQ1-Q32026,vs.5.0%in2025),

governmentrevenuegrowthreboundednotablyto+1.4%yoyinQ1-Q32026from

-2.8%yoyin2025,asfastertaxrevenuegrowthmorethanoffsetdeeperlandsales

revenuecontraction(Exhibit1).Specifically,taxrevenuegrowthjumpedto+6.1%yoyinQ1-Q32026from+0.8%yoyin2025(Exhibit2),beatingtheMinistryofFinance’s(MOF)projectionofa2.9%gainforthisyearandledbyhigherrevenuefromindividualincometax,corporateincometaxandvalue-addedtax(VAT).

9November20264

Exhibit1:Thestrongreboundingovernmentrevenue

growthsofarthisyearhasbeenmainlydrivenbystrongertaxrevenue

20

15

10

5

0

-5

-10

Percent,yoyPercent,yoy

GovernmentRevenueGrowthandItsBreakdown

Othergovt-managedfundrevenue

Landsalesrevenue

Non-taxrevenue

Taxrevenue

Totalgovtrevenue

1314151617181920212223242526

YTD

20

15

10

5

0

-5

-10

Governmentrevenueincludesrevenuefromboththegeneralpublicbudgetandgovernment-managedfundbudget.26YTDprintsrefertoQ1-Q32026,thelatestdataavailable.

Source:Wind,CEIC,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Exhibit2:TaxrevenuegrowthsofarthisyearhasmeaningfullyexceededtheMOF’sprojectioninthebudgetreport

%yoy%yoy

20

15

10

5

0

-5

Annualtaxrevenuegrowth:budgetprojectionvs.outturnBudgetprojection

Outturn

Q1-Q3

2026

20

15

10

5

0

-5

1617181920212223242526

The2026printfor“Outturn”referstoQ1-Q32026,thelatestdataavailable.

Source:MOF,Wind,DatacompiledbyGoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Decomposingtaxrevenuegrowth

Giventhattherevenueimpactoftightertaxenforcementisdifficulttoisolate,weuseanindirectapproach:regressingtaxrevenuegrowthonrealGDPgrowthandGDPdeflatorandexaminingtheresiduals.1Intermittenttaxcutsanddeferrals,aswellasrelatedbaseeffects,significantlydistortedrevenuegrowthin2020-24.Thisyear,however,withno

majordistortions,weestimatethataroundRMB300bnoftaxrevenueincreaseis

unexplainedbyrealGDPgrowthandinflation(proxiedbyGDPdeflator),potentially

reflectingtightertaxcollection(Exhibit3).Iftheenforcementexplainsthefullresidual,itwouldaccountfor0.2ppoftheprojected1.4ppofGDPnarrowinginChina’s

AugmentedFiscalDeficit(AFD)from2025to2026,basedonourestimates.Beyonditsfiscalimpact,tighterenforcementhasalsoweakenedprivatesectorconfidenceand

marketsentimenttosomedegree.

1WealsotestedalternativemodelspecificationsusingCPIinflationandPPIinflationasprice-relatedexplanatoryvariables,butourbenchmarkregressionusingtheGDPdeflatorprovidedthebestfit.

9November20265

Exhibit3:WeestimatearoundRMB300bnincreaseintax

revenuethisyearunabletobeexplainedbyrealGDPgrowthandinflation

%/ppyoy%/ppyoy

15

10

5

0

-5

-10

Taxrevenuebreakdownbymajordriver

Residual

GDPdeflator

RealGDPgrowth

Taxrevenue

15

10

5

0

-5

-10

151617181920212223242526

Taxrevenuegrowthbreakdownbymajordrivers,includingrealGDPgrowthandGDPdeflator,isbasedonourregressionusingasamplebetween2015-2026YTD.

Source:NBS,Wind,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Moreevidenceonrecenttighteningintaxenforcement

AlthoughauditsandinspectionsrepresentonlypartofChina’staxenforcement,tax

authoritiesnationwiderecoveredRMB181bnintaxrevenuethroughthesemeasuresinH12026,up21%yoy,accordingtoSTAdata(Exhibit4).Individualincometaxrevenuegrowthalsoacceleratedin2025-26despitesubduedhouseholddisposableincome

growth(Exhibit5),partlyreflectingtightertaxenforcement.Mediareportsalsosuggestcasesoftightenedtaxenforcementleadingtosalesofcompanyequitysharesbysomelisted-companyfoundersandseniorexecutives(e.g.,Haidilao).

Exhibit4:Taxrevenuerecoveredfromnationwideauditsandinspectionsgained21%yoyin1H2026

RMBbnRMBbn

250

200

150

100

50

0

Revenuerecoveredfromnationwidetaxauditsandinspections

+21%

yoy

250

200

150

100

50

0

16171819202122231H251H26

STAdidnotofficiallyreleasetheannualrevenuerecoveredfromnationwidetaxauditsandinspectionsfor2024and2025.

Source:StateTaxationAdministrationAnnualReport,Governmentwebsites,DatacompiledbyGoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Exhibit5:Growthinindividualincometaxrevenuecontinuedtoacceleratein2025-26despiteslowinghouseholddisposableincomegrowth

%yoy%yoy

40

30

20

10

0

-10

-20

-30

-40

Individualincometaxrevenuegrowthvs.disposableincomegrowth

Individualincometaxrevenue

Disposableincomepercapita(RHS)

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

-2

1314151617181920212223242526

YTD

26YTDprintsrefertoQ1-Q32026,thelatestdataavailable.

Source:Wind,DatacompiledbyGoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Mountinggovernmentfundingpressures

Governmentfundingfacestwomainchallenges.First,landsalesrevenuehasfallen

around70%fromitsmid-2021peak.Basedondevelopercashflows,ourproperty

researchteamprojectsresidentiallandsalesvolumetodeclinemorethan90%between

GoldmanSachsAsiaEconomicsAnaiyst

2025and2035,suggestinglocalgovernmentfinancingpressureswilllikelypersist.

Second,risinggovernmentdebtandanagingpopulationrequiremorefundingfordebtservicingandmaintainingpensionbalances.

Governmentdebtinterestpaymentmaymaintainitsuptrend

Basedonourestimates,China'sAugmentedGovernmentDebt(AGD)-aGSproprietarymetrictocapturealldebtraisedbythebroadChinesegovernmentsector(includingitsagents)-continuedtoriseinrecentyearsandregisteredRMB199tnin2025(equivalentto142%ofGDP;Exhibit6).Thismarksanaround80%gainfromRMB111tnin2019

(beforetheCovidpandemic)andasixteen-foldincreasefromRMB12tnin2007(beforetheGFC).TheamountofAGDinterestpaymentwouldbearoundRMB6.2tnin2026

(equivalentto4.2%ofGDP)andmayrisefurtherincomingyears(Exhibit7),as

continuedgovernmentdebtexpansionshouldmorethanoffsetlowerweightedaveragefinancingcosts.²

Exhibit6:AdiagramofChina'sAugmentedGovernmentDebt(AGD)basedon2025data

Augmentedgovt198.6tn(100%)

impicit

102.9tn(518%)

Localgovt

371tn(187%)65.8tn(33.1%)

LGFVonshore65

LGGB

4tn(87%)

Policybankbond

28.2tn(14.2%)

liabilities

CGGB

35.6tn(17.9%)

CGSB

5.2tn(2.6%)

CRconstructionnon-bond

liabiities4.6tn(2.3%)

LGFVnon-bond

liabilities

50.6tn(25.5%)

debt957tn(482%)

Localgovt

54.7tn(27.5%)

CRconstructionbonds

Policybank*

31.0tn(156%)

Centralgovt

41.0tn(20.7%)

ChinaRailway

2tn(3

Onshore

406%)

Onshore

30.9tn(15.5%)

LGFVbonds15.0tn(7.6%)

Onshore

54.7tn(27.5%)

LGSB

373tn(188%)

Offshore

0.1tn(01%)

Offshore

02tn(01%)

LGFVoffshore

1.6tn(0.8%)

CGGB,CGSB,LGGB,LGSB,LGFVandCRrefertocentralgovernmentgeneralbond,centralgovernmentspecialbond,localgovernmentgeneralbond,local

govermentspecialbond,localgovernmentfinancingvehicle,andChinaRailway,respectivel.Numbersoutsideandinsidethebracketrefertotheoutstandingamountofdebt(inRMBvaluetermsanditsproportioninAGD,respectively,foreachcategoryasofend-2025.*Weadjustforthedoublecountingissuesbyexcludingsomedebtsfrompolicybanks(deductedfrom“otherlabilities”).

Source:GoldmanSachsGloballnvestmentResearch,MOF,Wind,Bloomberg,CEIC

Pension-relatedgovernmentspendingisalsogrowing

FiscaltransfersfromthegeneralpublicbudgettoChina'ssocialinsurancefunds

(primarilythebasicpensionsystem)haverisensharplyoverthepasttwodecades,fromRMB60bnin2005tomorethanRMB3tnin2026,onthebackofanagingpopulation

withtheworking-ageproportionshrinking(Exhibit8).Specifically,theChinese

2WeleveragehistoricalfinancingcostsandtheaveragetenorsofAGDviamajorchannelstoestimatetherepricingpathofAFDfinancingcostsovertime.

9November20266

GoldmanSachsAsi

aho:/iwA.nalyst

9November20267

populationaged65andabovereached211millionin2025(15%ofthetotal),andis

projectedtoexceed370million(28%)by2045,basedontheUnitedNations(UN)data.Bycontrast,theworking-agepopulation(aged15-64)isprojectedtofallfrom987

million(70%ofthetotal)in2025to807million(62%)by2045.Aspensionrecipientsgrowinnumberrelativetocontributors,contributionrevenuesfaceincreasingpressuretokeeppacewithbenefitpayments,makingfiscalsupportarisingstructural

commitment.

Exhibit7:AGDannualinterestpaymentmayreboundslightlyin2026

7

7

RMBtnRMBtn

6

6

5

5

4

4

3

3

2

2

1

1

0

0

Governmentdebtinterestpaymentanditsbreakdown

Officalgovtdebtinterestpayment

Implicitgovtdebtinterestpayment

08091011121314151617181920212223242526

Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch,MOF,Wind,Bloomberg,CEIC

Exhibit8:Fiscalsubsidiesforsocialsecurityfundtrendedupoverthepastdecades

RMBtnMillionpersons

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

400

350

300

250

200

150

100

Chinafiscalsubsidiesforsocialsecurityfundvs.elderlypopulationFiscalsubsidies

Populationaged65orabove(RHS)

UN

projection

051015202530354045

Databefore2026arefromthefinalreviewofannualfiscalbudgets(outturns),whilethe2026printreferstothe2026budgetplan.

Source:UnitedNations,Wind,HaverAnalytics,DatacompiledbyGoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Policymakershavealsostrengthenedsocialsecuritycontributioncollection

China’ssocialinsurancefundsfacenotonlydemographicpressuresbutalsoastructuralshortfallincontributionsfromemployersandworkers.Whilestatutorycontributionsarebenchmarkedagainstemployees’wages,someemployersfailtoenrollalleligible

workersordeclareanartificiallylowwageforsocialsecuritycontributionpurposes,therebydampeningoverallrevenuecollection.The2025ChinaEnterpriseSocial

InsuranceWhitePaperfoundthatonly34.1%ofthe6,689surveyedemployersfullycompliedwithregulationsbyusingactualwagelevelstocalculatecontributions.

Policymakersareactivelyseekingtoclosethisgapbyexpandingcoveragetomoreworkersandensuringtheconsistencybetweenthereportedwageandactualwage.

TheSupremePeople’sCourt’sjudicialinterpretation,effectiveSeptember2025,

prohibitsagreementsbetweenemployersandemployeestoforgosocialinsurance.It

alsoupholdseligibleworkers’claimsforstatutoryseverancewhenterminating

employmentoveranemployer’sfailuretocontribute.Coupledwiththeselegal

developments,socialsecuritycontributionenforcementhasvisiblytightened.Whilethisshouldexpandsocialinsurancefundreceipts,italsoimposeshigherfinancialcostson

currentlyunder-contributingfirms.Channelcheckswithindustryandpolicycontacts

suggestthatreportedwageswilllikelybealignedwithactualwagesgradually,balancingthegoalofraisingrevenueagainsttheneedtoavoidoverburdeningbusinessestoo

quickly.Byourestimates,liftingtheeffectivewagebasefromRMB70toRMB75per

RMB100earnedcouldgenerateanincrementalRMB240bnannually,anadjustmentwe

9November20268

expecttomaterializelargelyby2027.3

Recentenforcementtighteningisfarfrombeingsufficienttofillthegovernmentfundingvoid

Recentenforcementtighteningincludesclosertaxscrutinyofonshoreindividualsand

companies,newtaxrulesonoffshoretrustsandincomefromoffshoreinsurance

products,4andstrictercollectionofsocialsecuritycontributions.Thesemeasures

coincidedwithsometaxpolicychanges,suchasthecurtailmentandphasedwithdrawalofVATrebatesforsolar,batteryandelectricvehicle(EV)exports,andthereinstatementofVAToninterestincomefromnewlyissuedChinacentralandlocalgovernmentbonds(CGBsandLGBs;withexistingbondsgrandfathereduntilmaturity).Tighterenforcementboostsgovernmentrevenue,butoverlyaggressiveimplementationandsignificant

delaysinspendingtheproceedscouldweighongrowth.Fiscaldepositswere14%higheryoyasofSeptember,andourproprietary“fiscalspend-through”ratiofellnotablyin

Q2-Q3,bothindicatingslowerspendingofpreviouslyraisedfunds.

Combiningoursectoranalysts’bottom-upestimateswithourtop-downanalysis,we

estimatethatstricterenforcementmayhaveboostedgovernmentfundingthisyearbyaroundRMB500bnrelativeto2021,whenlocalgovernmentfinanceswererelatively

healthy,beforetheprolongedpropertydownturnandanotherroundofstringentCovidlockdowns.ThisincludesRMB300bnfromtaxesandRMB200bnfromsocialsecurity

contributions(Exhibit9).Onanannualbasis,thisgaincouldreacharoundRMB1tn

toward2030ifcoveragecontinuestoexpand,thoughtheincrementaleffectsofsomemeasuresmayfadeovertime.

However,tighteningenforcementfallswellshortofclosingthegovernmentfundinggap.Thelonger-termdeclineinlandsalesrevenueimpliesafundingshortfallofaround

RMB1.3tnin2026relativeto2021forthegovernmentsector,afteradjustingforthe

sharespentonlandacquisitionandredevelopment.Wealsoestimatethathigher

governmentdebt-servicingcostsandsocialsecurityfundsubsidiesrequireanadditionalRMB1.5tninspendingthisyearcomparedwith2021.

Thus,thisyear’sRMB500bnrevenuegainfromtighterenforcementrelativeto2021isinsufficienttooffsettheRMB2.8tnfundingshortfallfromfallinglandsalesrevenue,

highergovernmentdebt-servicingcostsandincreasedsocialsecurityfundsubsidies

(=RMB1.3tn+RMB1.5tn).Relativeto2021,theremainingfundinggapisRMB2.3tnthisyearbyourestimates,andweexpectittowidenbyanotherRMB1.8tntoward2030(toRMB4.1tn).

3Policymakershavesteppedupenforcementofsocialsecuritycontributionssince2021,andthetrendlookssettolast,ascollectionshiftedentirelytotaxauthorities,whosestatutoryenforcementpowerandvisibilityintofirms’accountsandpayrollshaveimprovedcompliance.

4Accordingtomediareportsandindustryexperts,thenewtaxrulesonoffshoretrust—particularlyretroactiveauditsofpastassetcontributions—mayhaveraisedmorerevenuethantaxesonincomefromoffshoreinsuranceproducts.

9November20269

Exhibit9:Recenttighteningenforcementfallswellshortofclosingthegovernmentfundinggap

Estimatedamountoffundingandspending(RMBtn)

Past

2021

Current

2026

Future

2030

Isthe

incrementalimpactone-

off?

Differencesbetweenyears

2026vs.

2021

2030vs.

2026

2030vs.

2021

Lessfundingcollected(a)

Netrevenuefromlandsales(=30%*grossrevenue)

2.5

1.2

0.3

No

-1.3-1.0-2.3

Morefundingneeded(b)

Augmentedgovtdebt(AGD)debtservices

-5.5

-6.2

-6.6

No

-0.7-0.4-1.1

Fiscalsubsidiesforsocialsecurityfund

-2.3

-3.1

-4.0

No

-0.8-0.9-1.7

Sub-total

-7.8

-9.3

-10.6

-1.5-1.3-2.8

Revenuegainfromrecenttighteningenforcement(c)

Tightertaxscrutinyofonshoreindividualsandcompanies

0.0

0.2

0.3

No

0.20.10.3

Newtaxrulesonoffshoretrustsandincomefromoffshoreinsuranceproducts

0.0

0.1

0.1

Yes

0.10.00.1

Strictercollectionofsocialsecuritycontributions

0.0

0.2

0.6

No

0.20.40.6

Sub-total

0.0

0.5

1.0

0.50.51.0

Fundinggapamongtheabove-mentionedchannels(a+b+c)

-2.3-1.8-4.1

Whenestimating“lessfundingcollected”,weassumethenetrevenueaccountsfor30%ofgrosslandsalesproceeds,withtheremainderdedicatedtolandacquisitionandredevelopment.

Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch,MOF,Wind,Bloomberg

China’smacrotaxburdenremainsbelowmajorDMeconomies

IMFdatasuggestChina’smacrotaxburden—measuredasgovernmentrevenue-to-GDPratio—hasheldbroadlysteadyat26%inrecentyears,belowmanyDMeconomies

(Exhibit10).WhileChina’sprogressivepersonalincometaxsystemhasastatutoryrateforhighearnersbroadlycomparabletothoseinmanyDMeconomies,onlyaround5%ofitspopulation,or9%ofemployedpeople,payspersonalincometax,comparedto45%oftheUSpopulation.TaxesonpropertyarealsolowerthaninmostDMeconomies,

reflectingChina’snarrowpropertyandwealthtaxbase—mostnotablytheabsenceofbothanationwiderecurrentresidentialpropertytaxandaninheritancetax(Exhibit11).

9November202610

Exhibit10:China’smacrotaxburdenshavedeclinedinrecentyears,belowmanyDMeconomies…

50

40

30

20

10

0

50

40

30

20

10

0

%ofGDP%ofGDP

GovernmentrevenuetoGDPratioacrosscountries

ChinaIndia

KoreaUK

JapanUS

909294

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