零售商过度自信的库存决策研究

1、分类编号学号M201171961学校代码1 0 4 8 7密级硕士学位论文零售商过度自信库存决策研究学位申请人：孟楚国科学主修：系统工程地图教师：谢永副教授答复日期：2014年二月十七日a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirementsfor the degree of master of engineeringresearch on inventory decision-making with theOverconfident RetailerCandidate:四方(消歧义)马焦尔:Systems Engineerin

2、gAssociate Prof. Xie YongSupervisor:华中大学科学与技术学院。Wuhan 430074 Hubei，P.R.ChinaFeb，2014年华中科技大学硕士学位论文摘要传统的供应链库存决策基于“李晟经济人”假说，但随着产业链的加快，推进后，供应链管理领域发生了新的变化，实证研究表明，在不确定的条件下，人们的实际决断力已经暴露出来。政策系统地摆脱了“合理的经济人”的假设。为了解决牙齿问题，决策者本身从行为和心理认识的角度研究他们的决策，才能更好地指导实践。实证研究结果库存决策者往往是不理性的订单倾向，过度自信，典型的非理性行为生活的各个领域都普遍存在，很多决策者没有

3、意识到自己有过度自信的倾向是的，决策者对已经确保的信息的认识往往会受到过度自信的影响，进行决策会。影响自己和供应链其他成员的利益。牙齿文章论述了现有的过度自信相关理论和供给。连锁库存决策相结合，重点关注零售商过度自信非理性行为下的库存决策问题。牙齿文章首先以经典的报童模式为基础，考虑报童的过度自信行为，建立了过度自信的新闻男孩决策模型解决了新闻男孩过度自信时的最佳订货量和合理性。讨论了订货量之间的关系，以及他的库存决定偏差的变化规律，并得出了证据。报童过度自信时的信念期望利润是他理性时最好的利润函数，总是比报童不可理喻。城市的最佳利润较低，理论上是基于报童对自己需求的理解，当他们过于自信的时候

4、。决定订单的原因。然后从过度自信的新闻男孩模型扩展到了两个零售商的生产竞争模型。过度自信水平对每个零售商最佳订购数量和预期利润的影响的分析结果在Stackelberg产量竞争中，有理性零售商主导或过度自信的零售商。在主导地位上，过度自信的零售商都倾向于多下订单，获得比理性时更多的利润。因此，在竞争中占据优势与过度自信报童模型相比，说明过度自信本身不一定会带来负面效果，研究发现过度自信不会影响Stackelberg Borg。游戏竞争中决策者的先驱优势。关键词：过度自信、库存决策、产量竞争、煽动优势、行动供应链I华中科技大学硕士学位论文Abstracttraditional supply cha

5、in inventory decision-making is based on the neo-classicaleconomics rational economic man hypothesis，but supply chain there have been somenew changes with the rapid advance of industrial chain，empirical studies have showedthat humans decision-making systematical ly deviates from the actual decision-

6、makingwhich based on rational economic man hypothesis with the uncertain environment . inOrder to solve this problem，only through studying the decision-makers cognitive behaviorand psychology can we better guide the practice . empirical studies also have found thatinventory managers often have an ir

7、rational tendency to place an order，over confidence asa typical irrational behavior gradually attracts much attention in all walks of life recently，and many managers even can t recognize their own over confidence，over confidenceaffects decision-makers information cognition and gives decision-makers

8、and othermembers of the supply chain positive or negative impact . this article combines theover confidence and traditional supply chain inventory decision theory to focus oninventory decision problem with the over confident retailer。In this article，I establish an over confident news vendor model vi

9、a considering thenews vendor over confidence on the basis of classical news vendor model firstly，derive theanalytic relationship between the optimal order quantity of the over confident news vendorand that of the benchmark news vendor and demonstrate how order bias changes with theLevel of over conf

10、idence，then I proved that belief expected profit always larger than theoptimal expected profit of the benchmark news vendor，which explains theoretically thatwhy over confident news vendor makes his order decision according to his belief about theTruedemand.secondly，I extend the over confident news v

11、endor model to the productioncompetition model and analyze how the over confidence level affects the retailers optimalorder quantity and the expected profits . I find that the over confident retailer prefers toorder more and gain much more profit than the rational retailer，no matter the rationalreta

12、iler is the leader or the over confident retailer is the leader in the Stackelberg game。Therefore，over confidence not always leads to negative effect . at the same time，weconfirm that over confidence doesn t affect first-Mover advantage in the StackelbergGame。Keywords : over confidence，inventory decision-making，production competition，First-mover advantage，behavioral supply chain爱奇华中科技大学硕士学位论文目录摘