外商直接投资能否带来溢出效应？外文翻译（可编辑） .doc

外商直接投资能否带来溢出效应？外文翻译 外文翻译原文are there positive spillovers from direct foreign investment?material source:journal of development economics 421993 51-74author: mona haddad , ann harrison many developing countries now actively solicit foreign investment, offering income tax holidays,import duty exemptions?and subsidies to foreign firms. one reason for subsidizing these firms is the positive spillover from transferring technology to domestic firms. this paper employs a unique firm-level dataset to test for such spillovers in the moroccan manufacturing sector. we find evidence that the dispersion of productivity is smaller in sectors with more foreign firms. however, we reject the hypothesis that foreign presence accelerated productivity growth in domestic firms during the second half of the 1980s. using detailed information on quotas and tariffs, we also reject the possibility of a downward bias in estimating technology spillovers because foreign investors may be attracted to protected domestic markets 1. introductiou the disappearance of non-equity sources of foreign capital in the 1980s has created a renewed interest in direct foreign investment dfi. despite the controversies surrounding the benefits and costs of dfi, a number of developing country governments have now changed their policies from restricting towards promoting foreign investment. some countries have actually tilted the balance towards foreign firms by offering special incentives: in mexico, the maquiladora firms pay no income taxes; in much of the caribbean, foreign firms receive income tax holidays, import duty exemptions, and subsidies for infrastructure. are these subsidies justified? one benefit often cited in the literature on the gains from dfi, apart from the capital often inflows and additional employment, is the new technology brought in by foreign firms, it could justify some type of subsidy. this may be the rationable for goverment policies in economices as diverse as taiwan and bulgaria, which target special treatment for foreign firms in high technology sectors. technology transfer occurs through many different avenues -new technology is embodied in imported inputs and capital goods, sold directly through licensing agreements, or transmitted to exporters who learn about new techniques from their foreign buyers. in other cases, learning by doing among domestic firms, combined with investments in formal education and on-the-job training, is critical. no individual source of technology is likely to be the best; country experience suggests that the most effective diffusion of new ideas and processes probably involves a combination of all these factors. foreign investment plays an unusual role in several respects, however.first, new technology may not be commercially available and innovating firms may refuse to sell their technology via licensing agreements. mansfield and romeo 1980, for example, found that the technology transferred via multinationals was much newer than the technology sold through licensing agreements. second, foreign investment may provide the competition necessary to stimulate technology diffusion, particularly if local firms are protected from import competition. third, foreign investors may provide a form of worker training which cannot be replicated in domestic firms or purchased from abroad. the theoretical literature on foreign investment suggests that foreign investors possess some sort of intangible asset which cannot easily be sold - such as managerial skills. technology diffusion may occur through labor turnover as domestic employees move from foreign to domestic firms existing case studies of multinational behavior do suggest that foreign investment could be an important source of spillovers. rhee and belot1990 present a number of detailed cases where foreign investors have acted as export catalysts, in some cases fueling domestic export industry where there were no domestic exports at all. mansfield and romeo, however, found that only a small share of the 15 multinationals in their survey believed that foreign investment hastened access to process technology for host country competitors. mansfield and romeo suggested that more important gains from foreign investment were likely to be through cost savings to downstream users of new products or technology transferred to upstream supplier. a number of empirical studies have attempted to directly measure the so-called spillovers from foreign investment. in an early study, cave1974 tested for the impact of foreign presense on value-added per worker in australian domestically-owned manufacturing sectors. caves found that the diparity betweenhigher foreign and domestic value-added disappears as the foreign share of sectoral labor rises, which is consistent with positive spillovers from foreign presence. globerman1979 replicated caves findings1974 using sector-level, cross-section data for canadian manufacturing industries in 1972. globerman, however, was able to control explicity for capital intensity in his estimation of value-added per worker. the results indicate only a weak effect-none of the proxies for foreign presence in the sector are significant at the 5 percent level. most of the empirical work on spillovers from foreign investment in developing countries has focused on mexico, which gathers manufacturing data by ownership type. blomstrom and persson 1983 reproduce globermans study using 1970 census data for 215 mexican manufacturing industries. controlling for capital intensity, scale effects, and worker quality, blomstrom and persson find that labor productivity is significantly higher in sectors where foreign firms employ a higher share of the labor force. blomstrom 1986 and wolff1989 find faster productivity growth and faster convergence of productivity levels in sectors which higher levels of foreign ownership. this paper, which examines the impact of foreign investment on firms in moroccos manufacturing sector from 1985 through 1989, contributes to this existing literature in two respects. this is the first-sepecific attributes such as size. the panel nature of the data which combine cross-section and time series allows us to go beyond cross-section analysis comparing partial productivity measures such as labor productivity across different firms. our results suggest that foreign firms exhibit higher levels of total factor productivity, but their rate of productivity growth is lower than that for domestic firms. at first glance, this would appear to support the catch-up hypothesis ?domestic firms, at lower initial levels of productivity, are able to increase efficiency at a faster rate. however, our tests on the presence of any spillovers from foreign presence show that although domestic firms exhibit higher levels of productivity in sectors with a larger foreign presence, they do not exhibit higer productivity growth in those sectors second, we are able to use detailed information on the level of quota and tariff protection to test whether the lack of any spilbvers stems from a tendency of foreign firms to move towards protected sectors. we do not find evidence of such positive spillovers in either the protected or unprotected sectors section 2 discusses the trade and foreign investment policies in morocco before and during regulatory reform in the 1980s. section 3 examines the relative performance of domestic firms and foreign firms. section 4 measures the spillovers from foreign presence on the level, growth rate, and dispersion of productivity for domestically-owned firms. this section also extends the analysis to examine whether technology spillovers are related to the degree of import protection. section 5 concludes with a discussion of the implications of these findings for policies towards multinationals 2. the regulatory framework: foreign investment and trade policy 2.1. foreign investment polocies the first major action against foreign investment in morocco took place in 1973, when the government passed the moroccanization decree, which restricted foreign ownership of cer6n industrial, commercial, and service activities to no more than 49 perr;nt. the main purpose of this policy was political rather than economic -to reduce the dominant role of french firmsin the moroccan economy. activities falling under the moroccanization law ilycluded textiles, clothing, footwear, leather products, travel goods, toys, fish canriing and preserving, fertilizers, edible oils, vegetable fibers, and processed fruits acd vegetables. the negative impact of this law on foreign investment is evident from the fact that even enterprises not subject to the law voluntarily handed over their capital share to their moroccan partners a major reform uf the investment code was undertaken in 1983. it allowed full foreign ownership of moroccan companies in certain sectors especially manufacturing, eased restrictions on the repatriation of capital and divi-dends, and introduced fiscal and other incentives for direct foreign invest-ment. the code guaranteed i foreign investment against the risks of nationalization and expropriaaion; ii unlimited transfer of dividends and profits to foreign investors; and iii the repatriation of foreign investors capital and related caoital gains. by 1985, the moroccan majority-owners restrion no longer applied to any segment in the industrial sector, which meant that foreign firms could have an equity participation fo more than 49 percent. the investment code was further liberalized in 1988, administrative procedures governing the approval of direct foreign investment were simlifide, and rules similar to those granted to nonresident foreigners were extended to nonredident moroccans.2.2. trade polocies following independence in 1956, moroccos economic development strategy was primarily based on import-substituting industrialization and agricultural self-sufficiency in a ighly protected domestic market. for more than two deeades, trade and in ustrial policies in morocco were based on high tariffs and on quantitative restrictions in imports. furthermore, during the 1970s, the moroccan government expanded growth through high levels of pub!ic spending, financed through foreign borrowing and rising receipts from phosphate exports. this culminated in a major payment crisis in 1983. as a result, the government introduced outward-oriented structural adjust-ment measures designed to eliminate the bias against export activites, liberalized the import regime, and enhanced the allocative role of the financial sector. the trade reform introduced in 1983 called for the eventual elimination of the special import tariff sit, a uniform tariff levied on the c.i.f. value of imports, the lowering of the imum customs duty from 400 percent in 1983 to 60 percent in 1984 and 45 percent in 1985, and a reduction in quantitative restrictions. changes in the industrial code were also undertaken to promote exports. in january 1988, the sit and the customs stamp duty were merged into what was called a fiscal levy on imports, set at 12.5 percent. contrary to the declining imum tariff trend observed since 1983, the fiscal levy actually exceeded the sum of the two abolished taxes. this was intended to generate additionnal fiscal revenue rather than to provide prtection. 译文外商直接投资能否带来溢出效应?资料来源:发展经济学杂志42(1993)51-74作者:莫纳哈达德,安哈里森 许多发展中国家现在正积极争取外国投资,提供假期所得税,进口关税减免,补贴给外国公司。其中一个原因是这些企业补贴,从国内企业转让技术,以积极的外溢。本文采用了独特的企业级数据集,测试在摩洛哥制造业等溢出效应。发现的证据表明,许多外国公司在部门的生产分工会更细。然后,有人产生了这样的假设:1980年后半期,外国公司加速了国内企业生产率的增长。对此,我们是反对的。利用配额和关税上的详细信息,我们不能低估技术溢出效应,因为外国投资者可能倾向于保护国内市场。 1.绪论 在上个世纪八十年代,外资来源的非股权化,重新掀起了外商直接投资的兴趣。尽管对外商直接投资的效益和成本有诸多的争议,但是许多发展中国家政府已经改变限制外商投资的政策。实际上,一些国家已经倾斜于外国公司,提供他们特别的优惠。在墨西哥边境加工企业,不用支付所得税税款;在大部分加勒比地区,外国公司享受免缴所得税节日,进口关税豁免,和基础设施补贴。这些补贴是正确的吗?外商直接投资,除了资本流入和增加就业这些好处外,常常被文献引用的好处,是外国企业可以带来先进的新技术,这可以看作是某种类型的补贴。这可能是政府政策的地区差异,就像台湾和保加利亚,对外国企业的高科技领域的特殊待遇。 技术转让是通过许多不同的途径-新的技术体现在进口和资本货物、直接卖通过技术许可,或通过从国外买家学习新的技术传递给出口商。在其他情况下,在国内企业边做边学并结合正规教育和在职培训,是至关重要的。个人资料来源的技术不可能是最好的, 国家经验表明,