fdi2中英对照文档.doc

Does ownership structure of emerging-market firms affect their outward FDI? The case of the Indian automotive and pharmaceutical sectors新星市场公司的所有权结构是否会影响其对外直接投资？印度汽车，医药等行业的情况AbstractThis paper examines the impact of ownership structures of emerging-market firms, which are shaped by local institutions, on the decision of these firms to undertake outward FDI. Our results suggest that family firms and firms with concentrated ownerships (both ubiquitous in emerging markets) are less likely to invest overseas, and that strategic equity holding by foreign investors facilitates outward FDI. We conclude that organisational forms such as family firms, which are optimal outcomes of institutions prevailing in emerging markets, may be suboptimal in a changing business environment in which outward FDI is necessary for access to resources and markets.本文探讨的新兴市场公司的所有制结构，这是由当地机构形的影响，对这些企业进行对外直接投资的决定。我们的研究结果表明，家族企业和集中所有制的企业（包括无处不在新兴市场）是不太可能到海外投资，由外国投资者持有，有利于对外直接投资，战略性股权。我们总结的组织形式，如家族企业，这是新兴市场普遍存在的机构的最佳结果，可能是在对外直接投资是为获得必要的资源和市场瞬息万变的商业环境不理想的。Keywords: institutions; ownership/control structures; family firms; foreign investors; outward FDI; emerging-market MNEs关键词：机构;所有权/控制结构;家族企业的外国投资者;对外直接投资;新兴市场的跨国公司INTRODUCTION引言Looking beyond the OLI paradigm, more recent discussions of internationalization acknowledge the role of institutions in determining the extent and nature of internationalisation (Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008). Building on North (2005), Dunning and Lundan (2008) argue that institutional factors influence the behaviour of firms, and we extend this to examining the extent and nature of internationalisation of firms. Peng et al. (2008) suggest that a fundamental issue in IB is how firm characteristics that are shaped by local institutions influence strategic decisions in an ever-changing business environment. However, while the IB literature has examined the impact of local institutions on strategic choices such as entry-mode decisions of MNEs from develop countries (Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009), the impact of local institutions such as business laws and regulations on the decision to internationalise (Yang, Jiang, Kang, & Ke, 2009), and internationalisation strategies of emerging-market firms (Athreye & Kapur, 2009), the impact of institutionally determined firm characteristics on outward FDI from emerging markets remains relatively unexamined (Yamakawa, Peng, & Deeds, 2008).超越优势理论来看，最近的国际化讨论承认机构在确定国际化的程度和性质方面的作用(Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008).。大厦北（2005年），邓宁和Lundan（2008）认为，体制因素的影响，企业的行为，我们扩大这项研究企业国际化的程度和性质。彭等。 （2008年）表明，在国际商务中一个基本的问题就是由当地机构形成的公司特点如何在千变万化的商务环境中影响战略决策的制定。然而，尽管IB文学研究的战略选择，如发展国家跨国公司的入门模式的决定（迈耶，雌激素，Bhaumik，李鹏，2009年），地方机构，如商业法律的影响和地方机构的影响法规上的国际化的决定“（2009年杨，江，康，柯，），以及新兴市场公司的国际化战略（Athreye卡普尔，2009），从制度上确定的公司特征对来自新兴市场的对外直接投资的影响仍然相对未经审查（山川，彭及事迹，2008年）。The firm characteristic in emerging markets that is most significantly affected by local institutions is ownership pattern (Yoshikawa & McGuire, 2008). The institutions that shape ownership patterns include the role of trust and family ties in an environment of weak (legal) enforceability of contracts and social norms concerning altruism and bequest. Our paper represents a significant attempt to explore the relatively unexplored link between ownership patterns and outward FDI of emerging-market firms. As pointed out by Lien, Piesse, Strange, and Filatotchev (2005), neither of the two main strands of the IB literature, namely the internationalisation theory (Buckley & Casson, 1976; Hennart, 1982; Rugman, 1981) and the resource-based theory (Barney, 1986, 1991; Lippman & Rumelt, 1982), discusses this link. While this was perhaps unimportant within traditional IB theory, which has evolved specifically to analyse and explain FDI from the traditional set of source countries in the industrialised world, with the growing visibility of FDI from emerging economies it is becoming imperative to extend the gamut of analysis to the emerging-market MNEs (EMNEs). Yet little is known about the motivation of emerging-market firms to engage in outward FDI, and especially about whether the ownership patterns that are an outcome of institutional contexts facilitate or hinder this avenue of their internationalization process. Therein lies the main contribution of this paper.在新兴市场的坚定本地院校的影响是最显著的特点是所有权的模式（吉川和麦奎尔，2008年）。形状所有制形式的机构包括弱（法律）的合同和有关利他主义和遗赠社会规范的可执行环境的信任和亲情的作用。我们的论文代表了显著的尝试，探索所有制形式和对外直接投资的新兴市场公司之间的相对未开发的链接。正如连战，皮耶斯，奇，和Filatotchev（2005年），既不IB文学，即国际化理论（巴克利和卡森，1976; Hennart，1982;拉格曼，1981年）的两个主要股和资源基础理论（巴尼，1986年，1991年，李普曼和鲁梅尔特，1982年），讨论了此链接。虽然这也许不重要在传统的IB理论，它已经演变具体分析和解释，从源国家在工业化世界的传统的外国直接投资与外国直接投资的增长来自新兴经济体，它是必须的知名度，扩大色域分析新兴市场的跨国公司（EMNEs）。然而，很少有人知道的新兴市场公司从事对外直接投资的动机，尤其是关于所有制形式，体制背景下的产物是否促进或阻碍这种他们的国际化进程的途径。这才是本文的主要贡献。Using Indian firm-level data we examine the impact of two institutionally influenced aspects of firm ownership that are ubiquitous in emerging markets, namely family control (which often coincides with business group affiliation) and concentrated ownership (Khanna & Palepu, 1997), in explaining outward FDI. Our data are drawn from two industrial sectors, pharmaceuticals and automotives. During 20002006 these two sectors accounted for nearly 30% of acquisitions of overseas assets by Indian firms, jointly tying for first place with the much-discussed ICT sector (Nayyar, 2008).使用印度的企业级数据，我们研究两个制度上影响企业所有权方面，在新兴市场中无处不在的影响，即家族控制（通常恰逢业务组联系）和集中的所有权（卡纳Palepu，1997年），在解释对外直接投资。我们的数据来自两个工业部门，药品和汽车。在2000-2006年这两个行业占近30的印度公司收购海外资产，共同搭售了讨论信息和通信技术部门（纳亚尔，2008年）的首位。India accounts for over 20% of the global production of generic products within pharmaceuticals, and many of the firms are cash rich. However, indigenous R&D is low, and acquisition of overseas firms with a pipeline of patents has been an integral part of the growth strategy (Athreye & Godley, 2009). Indian pharmaceutical companies also view overseas acquisitions as the means to establish a market presence in the United States and the European Union (KPMG, 2006). Correspondingly, there has been a sharp increase in the value of such acquisitions. While an average overseas acquisition by an Indian pharmaceutical company stood at US$116 million as late as 2004, by 2006 companies such as Dr. Reddys were involved in acquisitions valued at over US$500 million. The automotive sector, on the other hand, has long been a part of the global supply chain, largely by way of exports of auto components to the United States and Europe. Since 2000, led by companies such as Tata Motors and Ashok Leyland, Indian automotive companies have rapidly expanded their activities overseas (Pradhan & Singh, 2008). During 20002007 these companies were involved in 22 greenfield projects spread across 22 countries, with total investment of about US$750 million. Their overseas acquisitions over roughly the same time period are valued at over US$3700 million.印度帐户内药品的通用产品全球产量的20以上，许多公司的现金丰富。然而，土著研发低，收购海外公司拥有多项专利的管道已经增长的战略（Athreye及戈德利2009年）的组成部分。印度制药公司还认为，海外并购的手段，建立一个在美国和欧盟的市场占有率（毕马威会计师事务所，2006年）。与此相对应，一直存在着这种收购的价值急剧增加。虽然平均为1.16亿美元海外收购印度制药公司在2004年年底，2006家企业，如雷迪博士在价值500万美元以上的收购。另一方面，汽车行业，长期以来被全球供应链的一部分，主要由汽车零部件出口到美国和欧洲的方式。自2000年以来，如塔塔汽车公司和阿肖克利兰公司为首的，印度汽车公司迅速扩大其海外活动（普拉丹辛格，2008年）。在2000年至2007年，分布在22个国家的22新建项目，总投资约7.5亿美元，这些公司都参与了。大致相同的时间内，其海外收购的价值超过3700万美元。In an analysis of Indian multinationals strategies, Ramamurti and Singh (2009) highlight the significant growth in Indian FDI. They point out that while many of the factors that encourage firms to remain family held as they grow are most readily observed in India, India is by no means unique. Ramamurti and Singh (2009) point out that many of the phenomena that they highlight, and which are discussed here, such as the underdevelopment of both hard and soft institutions, are evident in many emerging and developing countries. Therefore, rather than India being a unique case, it offers a particular slant on a much wider phenomenon, that of firms from emerging economies investing in advanced countries.Ramamurti和Singh（2009）在印度跨国公司的战略分析，突出了在印度的外国直接投资的显著增长。他们指出，虽然许多的因素，鼓励公司继续持有成长的家庭是最容易观察到在印度，印度绝不独特。 Ramamurti和辛格（2009）指出，他们突出的现象很多，这点是在这里讨论，如不发达的两个“硬”和“软”的机构，是显而易见的，在许多新兴国家和发展中国家。因此，印度是一个独特的案例，而不是它提供了更广泛的现象，一个特定的倾斜，从新兴经济体投资于先进国家的企业。In the absence of significant literature on the causal link between ownership patterns and outward FDI in the IB literature Doukas and Lang (2003); Gallo and Sveen (1991) and Lien et al. (2005) are important exceptions we draw from relevant literature in related disciplines to develop plausible theories (or hypotheses) about this relationship. In particular, the behaviour of family controlled and group-affiliated firms has been extensively discussed in the management and corporate governance literature. Zahra (2003), for example, concludes that if family members actively participate in the management of companies, they will be cautious about internationalisation even when they attempt to maximise revenue from overseas markets. Zahra (2003) argues that this is in part due to the long gestation periods associated with overseas investment, which may therefore reduce the familys wealth in the short run, and in part because these family members are aware of the fact that managing business ventures overseas may require skills that they do not possess. Similarly, using case studies of (ethnic) Chinese family-owned MNEs from Singapore, Tsang (2001) has highlighted aspects of behaviour of family-owned EMNEs, for example the effort put in by these EMNEs to transplant their family culture in their overseas operations. We discuss these and other related issues in more detail later in the paper.在所有制形式和对外直接投资在IB文学之间的因果关系的情况下显著文学 - Doukas和郎（2003）; Gallo和Sveen（1991）和连战等。 （2005年）是重要的例外 - 我们在相关学科的相关文献，绘制的发展似是而非的理论，对这种关系（或假设）。 familycontrolled和集团下属企业的行为，特别是已在管理和公司治理文献的广泛讨论。扎赫拉（2003年），例如，得出结论，如果家庭成员积极参与公司的管理，他们将谨慎谈国际化，甚至当他们试图最大限度地提高收入来自海外市场。扎赫拉（2003）认为，这部分是由于在长期酝酿与海外投资，这可能会因此减少在短期内家庭的财富关联期间，部分是因为这些家庭成员都知道，管理的商业投资海外可能需要，他们不具备的技能。同样，使用的案例研究（民族）中国家庭拥有来自新加坡的跨国公司，曾（2001）强调家族式EMNEs方面的行为，例如努力把这些EMNEs移植在其海外业务，他们的家庭文化。我们的文件后面详细讨论这些问题及其他相关问题。In addition, we examine the impact of the stake taken by foreign investors in firms on their outward FDI, thereby linking our analysis to two important strands of the IB literature. Since a key contribution of foreign investors is to provide linkages with overseas markets, our analysis has implications for the linkageleveragelearning (LLL) paradigm that has been proposed as an alternative to OLI in explaining outward investment from emerging markets (Mathews, 2006).1 Alternatively, if links with foreign investors generate information about overseas markets that are not publicly available, and if the cost of otherwise producing this information privately is high, then such links or associations can be viewed as resources for EMNEs, thereby linking our analysis to the resource-based view of internationalisation (e.g., Barney,Wright, & Ketchen, 2001) and the investment cycle hypothesis of Dunning (1986). The original investment cycle hypothesis of Dunning (1986) was concerned with explaining FDI flows at a macro level, though this has seldom been tested at the level of the firm. However, as Dunning (1992) shows, the analysis is akin to the subsequent resource-based view of the (multinational) firm, in that some firms attracting foreign investors have a crucial resource to facilitate outward FDI.此外，我们研究在其对外直接投资企业的外国投资者，从而将我们的分析，两股重要的IB文学，采取股份的影响。由于外国投资者的主要贡献是提供与海外市场之间的联系，我们的分析的联动，充分利用学习（LLL）范式在解释新兴市场的对外投资已作为学院的替代建议的影响（2006年，马修斯）0.1另外，如果与外国投资者之间的联系产生海外市场，不公开的信息，否则生产这一私人信息的成本很高，那么这样的链接或协会可以作为EMNEs资源观看，从而将我们分析的资源为基础的国际化的视图（例如，巴尼，赖特，与Ketchen，2001年）和邓宁（1986）投资周期假说。原有投资的催款周期假说（1986年），是有关外国直接投资流入在宏观层面上解释，虽然这很少在企业层面的考验。然而，正如邓宁（1992）显示，分析类似的后续资源为基础的（跨国）公司，在吸引外国投资者，有些公司有一个重要的资源，以促进对外直接投资。OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND OVERSEAS INVESTMENT FROM EMERGING MARKETS来自新兴市场的所有制结构和海外投资The literature on family businesses suggests that, for a variety of reasons, family control might have a positive impact on the competitiveness of firms. To begin with, these firms are more likely to undertake long-term investment, given that the interests of the strategic decision-makers within such a firm are closely aligned with those of the firm itself (Dreux, 1990). Subsequently, that attachment to the family aligns the interests of different generations of managers. Further, while owners of non-family firms have to write and enforce detailed contracts to elicit the appropriate effort from the managers, in family-owned firms conflicts can be managed through informal mechanisms that could be less costly. The absence of the manager-owner agency problem in such firms therefore reduces monitoring costs, and makes the decision-making process flexible (Daily & Dollinger, 1992; Goffee & Scase, 1985; Poza, Alfred, & Maheshwari, 1997). This, in turn, enables these firms to adjust better to changes in business environments, such that they are usually in a better position to withstand economic downturns (Donckels & Frohlich, 1991; Dreux, 1990). A long-established family name might also signal quality and access to corridors of power. In sum, family control is potentially a resource that a firm can leverage to enhance its competitiveness and achieve strategic objectives such as entering new markets.家族企业的文献表明，由于多种原因，家庭控制可能对公司的竞争力产生积极的影响。首先，这些企业更容易进行长期投资，这些公司本身（德勒，1990年），在这样一个公司的战略决策者的利益是紧密对齐。随后，这对家庭的依恋对齐不同世代的经理人的利益。此外，非家族企业的业主，写和执行详细的合同，以引起管理者适当的努力，的家族企业中的冲突，可以管理通过非正式的机制，可以花费较少。因此，在这样的公司经理人代理问题的情况下降低了监督成本，并使得灵活的决策过程“（日报多林格，1992; Goffee Scase，1985年，阿尔弗雷德波萨里卡和Maheshwari，1997年）。这反过来，使这些企业更好地适应商业环境的变化，他们通常能更好地抵御经济衰退（Donckels及FRO hlich，1991;德勒，1990年）。一个历史悠久的家族“名”也可能信号质量和获得权力的走廊。总之，家族控制是一种潜在的资源，企业可以利用，以提高竞争力和实现战略目标，如进入新的市场。Habbershon and Williams (1999) have argued that this generic approach to the strategic advantages of family-controlled firms is misleading. Drawing on the research of Barney (1991) and Grant (1991), among others, they highlight the fact that family control can be a positive resource for a firm in the dynamic sense only if non-family firms find it difficult or costly to devise mechanisms to replicate characteristics such as lower transactions costs and flexible decision-making processes. Moreover, the advantages associated with family control might not be transferable across generations of the controlling family. There is a large literature that suggests that the performance of familycontrolled firms is better than that of their nonfamily counterparts only if the founding family member is in control (Andres, 2008; Villalonga & Amit, 2006).Habbershon和威廉姆斯（1999）认为，这个家族控制的企业的战略优势的通用方法是一种误导。巴尼（1991）和格兰特的研究（1991年）绘制，除其他外，他们强调这一事实，家族控制，可以是一个在动态意义上的坚定积极的资源，只有非家族企业发现很难或昂贵的制定复制的特点，如降低交易成本和灵活的决策过程的机制。此外，家族控制的优势可能不会转让跨越几代人的控股家族。有大量文献表明，familycontrolled公司的表现比他们nonfamily更好，只有创始家族成员控制（安德烈斯，2008;比利亚隆加阿米特，2006年）。Further, in contexts such as internationalization through outward FDI, some characteristics of family-controlled firms might prove to be a hindrance. Gallo and Sveen (1991) argue that family firms might be reluctant to internationalise through overseas FDI, because it is difficult for them to transfer their business models that are rooted in local culture to a new context. Management of overseas operations typically requires skills that may not be available among family members, and hence outward FDI might require families to transfer considerable decision-making power to outside professionals, which families find disagreeable, especially in contexts where property rights are weak and informal contracts are part of the norm (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; Tsang, 2001; Zhang & Ma, 2009). Rejection of meritocracy and dependence on family ties for choice of managers also ensure a state of strategic simplicity in family firms (Zahra, 2003), whereby these firms follow the same set of strategies over and over again, thereby passing up opportunities that are implicit in outward FDI.此外，家族控制的企业的一些特点，如通过对外直接投资的国际化背景下，可能会被证明是一个障碍。 Gallo和Sveen（1991）认为，家族企业可能不愿意通过海外直接投资国际化，因为这是他们难以他们的业务转移，是植根于本土文化的一个新的上下文模型。海外业务的管理，通常需要可能不被家庭成员之间的技能，因此对外直接投资可能需要家庭相当的决策权转移到外的专业人士，发现不愉快的家庭，尤其是在情况下，产权薄弱和非正式的合同规范的一部分（约翰森和Vahlne，1977年，2001年曾张马，2009年）。拒绝任人唯贤和选择管理者的家庭关系的依赖，也确保了“家族企业的战略简单的”（扎赫拉2003年），的状态，使这些企业遵循同一套一遍又一遍的战略，从而传递机会这是隐含在对外直接投资。There is also significant evidence that families that have control over these firms expropriate returns that would otherwise accrue to minority shareholders in a variety of ways (Baek, Kang, & Lee, 2006; Bertrand, Mehta, & Mullainathan, 2002). Such expropriation typically goes unpunished, owing to the dominant family position and the opacity of these firms. Accordingly, family firms tend to be more reluctant to subject themselves to the external scrutiny of regulators, investors, creditors and credit-rating agencies. This aversion to scrutiny may deter them from undertaking outward FDI, a process that would require them to access capital markets and subject themselves to due diligence and regulatory scrutiny. On the other hand, however, outward FDI might actually be preferred, because it can facilitate expropriation through mechanisms such as transfer pricing.2也有显著的证据表明，家庭对这些公司的控制征用在以各种方式（白康，李，2006;贝特朗，梅塔，与Mullainathan，2002年），否则将产生少数股东的回报。这种征用通常逍遥法外，由于占主导地位的家庭中的地位，这些企业的不透明度。因此，家族企业往往更不愿意接受监管机构，投资者，债权人和信贷评级机构的外部监督。厌恶这种审查可能阻止他们开展对外直接投资，将需要一个过程，他们进入资本市场和服从尽职调查和监管审查。然而，另一方面，对外直接投资实际上可能是首选，因为它可以促进征用通过如转让pricing.2机制It is evident from the above discussion that while family control may be a positive resource in many ways, it is by no means obvious that familycontrolled firms would want to internationalise (or necessarily be capable of internationalisation) through outward FDI. Clearly however, family firms are heterogeneous. Hence, even as familycontrolled firms such as LG, Hyundai, Honda and Mitsubishi feature prominently in the global league tables on outward FDI, the above discussion suggests that these