天津大学PPT模板.ppt

目录 1 Introduction2 LiteratureReview3 Model3 1RepairProcessandInventoryPolicy3 2CostStructure3 3InformationStructure3 4ContractTypesandPayoffs3 5SignalingGame4 Benchmark First BestUnderCompleteInformation5 SignalingwithVerifiableInventory5 1Resource BasedContract5 2Performance BasedContract6 SignalingwithUnverifiableInventory6 1Resource BasedContract6 2Performance BasedContract7 Extensions EfficiencyEnhancementStrategies7 1EndogenizingInventoryVerifiability7 2PoolingInventoryAcrossMultipleBuyers8 Conclusions 1 Introduction 供货商 买方 产品 PBC RBC 可靠性私有信息 使用 备用库存 维护 背景介绍 文献回顾 2 LiteratureReview PBCforoutsourcedservicesasymmetricinformationinoperationsmanagementtheuseofwarrantiesasasignalingmechanism 建模 3 Model 3 1RepairProcessandInventoryPolicyN identicalcopies B inventorybackorder s inventory TheexpectedbackordersinsteadystateisAvailabilityisequalto 建模 3 2CostStructureEachtimeaproductfailureoccurs thebuyerincursafixedcostr 0 Thebuyer sexpectedcostisequaltoThevendor sexpectedcostisequalto 建模 3 3InformationStructureWeassumethattheproductofferedbythevendorisoneoftwopossibletypes LorH whereLdenoteslowreliabilityandHdenoteshighreliability Hazardrateordering 危险率序 Excesswealthordering 剩余财富序 建模 3 4ContractTypesandPayoffsWecanwritethebuyer sexpectedpayoffasThevendor sexpectedpayoffisgivenbyRBC PBC 建模 3 5SignalingGameWeassumethatthevendor whopossessesprivateinformationaboutthereliabilityofanewlydevelopedproduct choosescontracttermsandproposesthemtothebuyer Thebuyerthenacceptsthecontracttermsifhisexpectedpayoffexceedsanoutsideoptionvaluedat WeseekaperfectBayesianequilibrium PBE thatisalsorenegotiation proof 建模 4 Benchmark First BestUnderCompleteInformation Giventhevendortype thefirst bestoutcomeisobtainedbysolvingtheoptimizationproblem 建模 5 SignalingwithVerifiableInventory Wenowconsiderthesettinginwhichthevendorpossessesprivateinformationaboutproductreliability 5 1Resource BasedContractThevalueof setbythevendorinhercontractmayrelayinformationaboutwhetherornottheproductisreliable 建模 5 1Resource BasedContract Insummary successfulsignalingbythereliablevendorispossibleunderRBCwhenherinventorychoiceisverifiable butitcomesatacostsincethevendorhastoleavepositivesurplustothebuyer 建模 5 2Performance BasedContract Therefore successfulsignalingbythereliablevendorcanbedoneunderbothRBCandPBCwhentheinventoryisverifiable However PBCpresentsanadvantagebecauseitsrisksharingmechanismismoreamenabletosignalingthanthatofRBC 建模 6 SignalingwithUnverifiableInventory 6 1Resource BasedContractWithinventorynolongerverifiable thepayofffunctionsforthevendorandthebuyerunderRBCremainthesameasthoseoftheverifiableinventorycase Anunderinvestmentininventorycauseseconomicinefficiency 建模 6 2Performance BasedContractThereliablevendoroverinvestsininventoryinequilibrium Overall wefindthattheinteractionbetweenthevendor sdiscretionaryinventorychoiceandhersignalingincentivecreatessubtledynamicsthatimpacttherelativeefficiencyofafter salesservicecontractsinnontrivialways 建模 Whichcontracttypewillthereliablevendorprefer Thus thereliablevendorfindsthattheabilitytosignalhertypewithPBCmorethancompensatesforthecostassociatedwithoverinvestmentininventoryandanybenefitpresentedbyRBC whichdoesnotimproveuponapoolingoutcome 扩展 7 Extensions EfficiencyEnhancementStrategies EndogenizingInventoryVerifiabilityPoolingInventoryAcrossMultipleBuyers 结论 8 Conclusions Suggestions Thek