00 硕士研究生《会计专题》授课大纲(正).doc

硕士研究生会计专题授课大纲（专业：2011级学术硕士、MPacc）2011-2012学年第一学期（秋）By：吴昊旻 副教授（PHD.） 研究兴趣及方向：多年来持续关注我国转型经济背景中如下相关问题的研究：（1）产品市场竞争与公司财务相关问题（融资选择、现金持有量、权益资本成本等）；（2）代理冲突及其制度渊源与公司治理（行业竞争环境、成长性影响等）；（3）审计与公司治理（事务所规模与审计质量、政府干预、法律风险、代理成本等）；（4）公司产品市场竞争与其证券市场的效率互动（PMC-SME）研究（特质性风险、回报波动、融资约束）等。 我的联系方式：Whm_1977126.com TEL会计系504教授研究室教学目标及规范 预期效果：通过本专题课程的学习和讨论，希望同学能够掌握相关领域内的经典理论、代表性文献及其应用价值，并能基于我国的制度环境特征（产品/资本市场、政府干预、市场化进程等），就我国当前及今后的会计、审计与公司财务等相关重要问题，掌握进行扎实的理论分析、全面的实证检验和提出有价值研究结论和可操作政策建议的基础研究能力，并在此基础之上能够深入识别和挖掘有关的问题进行较高质量的研究，为将来攻读学位和从事理论及实务工作奠定基础。 课程要求：每次课时为3个小时，每小时师生共同研讨一篇论文。对每一篇要求阅读的文献，要求安排一位同学上台做PPT报告，并有效引导整个课堂进行讨论；其他同学要求事前阅读论文，并做好充分参与讨论的准备。每一个同学都要求做课堂报告PPT。请课代表组织同学分组（按兴趣或拟选题方向组合）并安排报告的顺序。每组2-3名成员，阅读论文时组员要进行充分的讨论，保证上课报告的质量。组内可以进行分工，一位负责报告，一个负责对论文做出点评。讲解及评论的具体要求如下：阅读和讲解文献时，除关注其研究内容之外，请务必从以下5大角度对论文进行思考与评论：（1）作者及其相关研究成果；（2）选题动机/写作目的（idea）；（3）理论基础（理论-文献证据-模型）；（4）作用机理：即文献回顾、研究设计及研究方法的严谨性（理论-实证）；（5）研究启示/研究结论的意义。特别鼓励能在理论基础之上对文章的研究设计和研究方法提出新的想法，或提出对已有研究进行拓展深入的考察角度。 考核评价：原则上不作闭卷考核。课程成绩（平时成绩、作业及最终考核）视同学们报告PPT质量（讲解、评论）打分，课程结束后将其重新整理（包括相关资料附件），然后打印上交任课老师。专题讨论（PPT）n 如何形成好的研究思路：文献述评、专业写作及相关经验例谈附件材料：详见文件夹1、王泛森院士：如果让我重新读次研究生2、田煜（清华）：研究生的成长之路（PPT）3、中美会计学博士学位论文选题的比较研究4、张五常：读书的方法、思考的方法5、陈世敏：Researching and Publishing（PPT）n 中国问题研究：理论基础、制度环境与会计（财务、审计）问题1、张五常：经济发展的真谛再为大哥序（博客）2、经济制度、组织结构与会计信息：一个有关中国会计问题的研究范式（孙铮等）（PPT）3、陈冬华：制度背景与中国研究（PPT）（暨大）4、陈冬华：隐性制度与中国研究（PPT）2011-03-24（暨大）n 美国经济评论_百年经典论文导读1、做PPT？2、美国经济评论_百年经典论文导读，经济学动态2011-5n 公司治理与融资结构附件材料：见MBA文件夹n 外部治理机制与公司治理附件材料：见MBA文件夹n 代理成本与公司融资决策 附件材料：1、连玉君：中国上市公司代理成本的估算，中山大学working paper（暨大）2、成长性、代理冲突与公司财务政策，会计研究2011-83、代理冲突及其制度渊源、事务所规模与审计质量，审计研究2010-5n Property Rights, Organization, and Value：代表文献例讲（Joseph P.H. Fan）1、Politically-connected CEOs, Corporate Governance and Post-IPO Performance of Chinas Partially Privatized Firms, JFE 20072、Organizational Structure as a Decentralization Device: Evidence from Corporate Pyramids, 20073、产权理论与公司财务（Economics of Property Rights）：科斯、德姆塞茨、阿尔钦的四篇经典文献（范PPT）4、交易成本与公司财务（Transaction Costs and the Organization of Economic Activities）：科斯、克莱因、阿尔钦、威廉姆森的四篇经典文献（范PPT）5、文献：管理世界、经济研究、金融研究？n 政府干预或政治关联、公司治理与企业价值：代表文献例讲1、Politically Connected Firms, AER 2006（PPT）2、Politically-connected CEOs, Corporate Governance and Post-IPO Performance of Chinas Partially Privatized Firms, JFE 2007（PPT）3、Public governance and corporate finance_ Evidence from corruption cases, JCE 20084、文献：管理世界、经济研究、金融研究？n The Governance of Entrepreneurial and Family Firms：代表文献例讲（Joseph P.H. Fan）1、Why Do Shareholders Value Marriage? 2009（PPT）2、Succession: The Roles of Specialized Assets and Transfer Costs，2009（PPT）3、案例分析：方太集团传承思考（再跟踪？其他案例？）n 审计与公司治理：代表文献例讲1、Do External Auditors Perform A Corporate Governance Role in Emerging Markets，JAE 2005（PPT）2、State ownership, the institutional environment, and auditor choice: evidence from China, JAE 2008（PPT）3、苏锡嘉：审计专题（PPT）（暨大）4、夏立军：实证审计研究：文献回顾、制度背景及操作举例（PPT）5、文献：管理世界、经济研究、金融研究？n 审计质量影响因素：事务所规模、审计师选择、制度环境等1、事务所规模决定审计质量吗？财贸经济2010-32、代理冲突及其制度渊源、事务所规模与审计质量，审计研究2010-53、事务所规模对审计质量的影响（刘爱松-PPT），暨南大学working paper4、代理成本与审计的自愿需求（Agency cost and the voluntary demand for auditing）（刘爱松-PPT），暨南大学working paper5、中小型会计师事务所内部治理与合并整合2010-10，中山大学working paper（暨大）6、法制对盈利报告质量的影响：理论与来自高层持股的国有IPO的证据（黄志忠-PPT）7、文献：管理世界、经济研究、金融研究？n 内部控制、风险管理与公司治理：趋势、新政与应变1、企业内部控制：序论（PPT）2、内部控制-基本规范及指引讲解（PPT）3、中国企业内部控制与风险管理-思考与实践（PPT）4、内部控制-十大案例对应剖析（PPT）n 后金融危机背景下的若干财务问题探讨1、全球金融危机与中小企成功发展对策（张向前博士）（PPT）2、经济危机下的会计特征问题探讨（李若山博士）（PPT）3、美国金融危机根源研究述评，经济学动态2011-64、美国金融危机研究综述，经济学动态2010-6n 研究方法：实证研究（大样本）、案例研究、实验研究等1、李增泉：会计与财务研究方法论（上财2011-PPT）2、朱红军：如何做案例研究？（PPT）3、实证研究方法（西安交大2011-PPT）n 同学感兴趣的其他专题（结合选题方向）？阅读文献与书目（硕博通用）n 经典文献一、文献综合（未分专题-孙铮）1. Alchian A.A., 1950, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, Journal of Political Economy 58, 211-221.2. Fridman, Milton, 1953, Positive Research Methodology, Published In Chap.1 of “Essays in Positive Economics”, Chicago: The Press of the University of Chicago.3. Coase, R.H., 1960, The Problem of Social Cost, Journal of Law and Economics 3, 1-44.4. Alchian, A., 1965, Some Economics of Property Rights, Originally published in Il Politico 30, 816-829. By the Rand Corporation. Reprinted in Alchian, A., 1977. Economic Forces at Work. Liberty Press, Indianapolis, IN.5. Demsetz, H., 1964, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights, Journal of Law and Economics 3, 11-26.6. Demsetz, H., 1967, Towards a Theory of Property Rights, American Economic Review 57, 347-359.7. Coase, R.H., 1937, The Nature of the Firm, Economica 4, 386-405.8. Alchian, A. and H. Demsetz, 1972, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, American Economic Review 62, 777-795.9. Cheung, S.N.S., 1983, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, Journal of Law and Economics 26, 1-21.10. Klein, B., R.A. Crawford, and A.A. Alchian, 1978, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, Journal of Law and Economics 21, 297-326.11. Williamson, O.E., 1979, Transaction Cost Economies: The Governance of Contractual Relations, Journal of Law and Economics, 22, 233-261.12. Alchian, A. A., 1984, Specificity, Specialization, and Coalitions, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 140, 34-3913. Klein, B., Leffler, K. B., 1981. The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, Journal of Political Economy 89, 615-41.14. Williamson, O.E., 1983, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, The American Economic Review 73, 519-540.15. Grossman, S., Hart, O., 1986, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, Journal of Political Economy 94, 691-719.16. Hayek, F.A. 1945. The Use of Scientific Knowledge in Society. American Economic Review 35: 519-530.17. Stigler, G.J., 1961, The Economics of Information, Journal of Law and Economics 69, 213-225.18. Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling, 1992, Specific and General Knowledge, and Organizational Structure, in Lars Werin and Hans Wijkander, eds., Contract Economics, 251-274. Blackwell, Oxford.19. Alchian, A., 1969, Corporate Management and Property Rights, Originally published in H. Manne, ed, Economic Policy and the Regulation of Corporate Securities, American Enterprise Institute. Reprinted in Alchian, A., 1977. Economic Forces at Work. Liberty Press, Indianapolis, IN.20. Jensen, M.C., and W.H. Meckling, 1976, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360.21. Fama, E.F., Jensen, M.C, 1983a, Separation of Ownership and Control. The Journal of Law and Economics 26, 301-325. 22. Fama, E.F., Jensen, M.C, 1983b, Agency Problems and Residual Claims. The Journal of Law and Economics 26, 327-349.23. Demsetz, H., 1983, The Structure of Ownership and The Theory of The Firm, The Journal of Law and Economics 26, 375-390.24. Stigler, G.J., 1971, The Theory of Economic Regulation, Bell Journal of Economic and Management Science 2, 3-21 25. Cheung, S. N S, 1974, A Theory of Price Control, Journal of Law and Economics 17, 53-71 26. Krueger, A., 1974. The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society. American Economic Review, 64,291303. 27. Shleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny, 1993, Corruption, Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, 599-61728. Jensen, M., 1983, Organization Theory and Methodology, The Accounting Review 58, 319-339 29. Watts, R.L., Zimmerman, J.L., 1990, Positive Accounting Theory: A Ten Year Perspective, The Accounting Review 65,131-156二、公司治理专题文献（分专题-范博宏）链接？（一）COURSE SCHEDULENote: papers with asterisks (*) are to be presented by students.Module 1：OverviewEconomics of Property RightsAlchian, A., (1965), “Some Economics of Property Rights,” Il Politico 30, 816-829. (Originally published in 1961 by the Rand Corporation). Reprinted in Alchian, A., 1977. Economic Forces at Work. Liberty Press, Indianapolis, IN. Coase, R.H. (1960), The Problem of Social Cost, Journal of Law and Economics 3, 1-44.Demsetz, H. (1964), The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights, Journal of Law and Economics, 3, 11-26. Demsetz, Harold (1967), Towards a Theory of Property Rights, American Economic Review Vol. 57, No. 1, Mar., 347-359.Module 2：Transaction Costs and the Organization of Economic ActivitiesCoase, R.H. (1937) “The Nature of the Firm,” Economica 4, 386-405.Klein, Benjamin, Robert A. Crawford, and Armen A. Alchian (1978), Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, Journal of Law and Economics, 21, 297-326. Williamson, Oliver E. (1979), Transaction Cost Economies: The Governance of Contractual Relations, Journal of Law and Economics, 22, 233-261. *Klein, Benjamin, and Keith B. Leffler, “The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance,” Journal of Political Economy 89 (August 1981) 615-641.Fan, Joseph P.H., 2000, Price Uncertainty and Vertical Integration: An Examination of Petrochemical Firms, Journal of Corporate Finance 6, 345-376. Fan, Joseph P.H., Jun Huang, Randall Morck, and Bernard Yeung, 2006, “Institutional Determinants of Vertical Integration in China,” Working Paper. Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shanghai University of Finance & Economics, University of Alberta, and New York University. Joseph P.H. Fan, Jun Huang, Felix Oberholzer-Gee, Mengxin Zhao, “Corporate Diversification in China: Causes and Effects,” Working Paper, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shanghai University of Finance & Economics, Harvard Business School, Bentley College. Module 3：Share Transferability*Furobotyn, E.G., and S. Pejovich (1973), “Property Rights, Economic Decentralization, and the Evolution of the Yugoslav Firm, 1965-1972,” Journal of Law and Economics 16, 275-302. *Karpoff, J.M., and Edward Rice (1989), “Organizational Form, Share Transferability, and Firm Performance,” Journal of Financial Economics 24, 69-105. Decentralization（分权）*Christie, A., M. Joye, and R. Watts (2003), Decentralization of the Firm: Theory and Evidence. Journal of Corporate Finance. *Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling (1992), “Specific and General Knowledge, and Organizational Structure,” In: Lars Werin and Hans Wijkander, eds., Contract Economics, 251-274. Blackwell, Oxford. Fan, J.P.H., T.J., Wong, and T.Y. Zhang, 2007, “Organizational Structure as a Decentralization Device: Evidence from Corporate Pyramids, Working Paper, Chinese University of Hong Kong and City University of Hong Kong. Module 4：Government Ownership*Karpoff, Jonathan (2001), “Public versus Private Initiative in Arctic Exploration: the Effects of Incentives and Organizational Form,” Journal of Political Economy 109, 38-78. Shleifer, Andrei (1998), “State Versus Private Ownership,” Journal of Economic Perspectives Vol. 12, No. 3, Summer, 133-150. Joseph P.H. Fan, T.J. Wong, and Tianyu Zhang, 2007, “Politically Connected CEOs, Corporate Governance and Post-IPO Performance of Chinas Partially Privatized Firms,” Journal of Financial Economics. *La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny (2002), “Government Ownership of Banks,” Journal of Finance 57, 265-301. Module 5：Family OwnershipPramuan Bunkanwanicha, Joseph P.H. Fan, Yupana Wiwattanakantang, “Marriage and Network Formation: A Study of Family Business Groups in An Emerging Market” *Burkart, Mike, Fausto Panunzi, and Andrei Shelifer, “Family Firms,” Journal of Finance 58, 2167-2201. Fan, Joseph P.H., Ming Jian, Yin-Hua Yeh, 2007, “Succession: the Roles of Specialized Assets and Transfer Costs,” Working Paper. Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Joseph P.H. Fan, and Larry Lang, “Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings,” Journal of Finance, 57, December 2002, 2741-2771. Demsetz, H., and K. Lehn (1985), “The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences,” Journal of Political Economy, 93, 1155-1177. Slovin, M. and M. Sushka (1993), Ownership Concentration, Corporate Control Activity, and Firm Value: Evidence from the Death of Inside Blockholders, Journal of Finance 48, 1293-1321. *Bates, T., T. Jandik, and K. Lehn (2000), Promotion Incentives and Executive Compensation in Family Firms, Working Paper, University of Western Ontario, University of Arkansas, and University of Pittsburgh. Module 6：Institutions and Corporate Financing Choices*Meghana Ayyagari, Asli Demigriic Kunt, and Vojislav Maksimovic, “Formal versus Informal Finance: Evidence from China,” Working Paper, George Washington University, World Bank, University of Maryland. Joseph P.H. Fan, Li Jin, and Guojian Zheng, “Internal Capital Market in Emerging Markets: Expropriation and Mitigating Financing Constraints,” Working Paper.Joseph P.H. Fan, Sheridan Titman, and Garry Twite, 2007, “An International Comparison of Capital Structure and Debt Maturity Choices,” Working Paper. Fan, J.P.H., M. Rui, and M. Zhao, forthcoming, “Public and Corporate Finance: Evidence from Corruption Cases,” Journal of Comparative Economics. Volume 36, Issue 3,September 2008, Pages 343-364 *Zhaohui Chen, Jongmoo Jay Choi, Cao Jiang, “Corruption in State Owned Firms: Evidence from Chinas IPOs,” Temple University and Holy Family University. Joseph P.H. Fan, Jun Huang, Ning Zhu, “Distress without Bankruptcy,” Working Paper, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shanghai University of Finance & Economics, and University of California Davis. （三）公司治理专题文献（暨南大学-需跟进更新）专题一：公司治理基础理论（产权、信息经济学与企业理论）1、产权理论Coase (1960), The Problem of Social Cost , Journal of Law and Economics, Volume3,Oct. Coase (1988), Note on the Problem of Social Cost , The Firm, the market and the Law, University of Chicago Press.Demsetz(1964), The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights, Journal of Law and Economics,11-25 Oct.Alchian(1978), Some Economics of Property Rights, Chapter 5 of Economic Forces at Work, Liberty Press.Demsetz(1967), Toward a Theory of Property Rights, American Economic Review, May.Alchian and Demsetz(1973), The Property Rights Paradigm, Journal of Economic History, No.3(Vol.33).盛洪（2003），现代制度经济学（上），北京大学出版社。第一部分产权理论。盛洪（2003），现代制度经济学（下），北京大学出版社。第一部分产权与交易费用。（美）弗鲁博顿 （德）芮切特2000 新制度经济学：一个交易费用分析范式 中译本 2006上海三联书店上海人民出版社。2、信息经济学（经典四篇）Akerlof, G.,1970, “ The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84:488-500. (逆向选择)Holmstrom, B., 1982, “ Moral Hazard in Team ”, Bell Journal of Economics, 13:392-415.(道德风险)Mirrlees, J., 1975, “ The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behavior: Part I ”, Nuffield College, Oxford. (1999, Review of Economic Studies, 66:3-22.) (道德风险)Rothschild, M. and J. Stiglitz, 1976, “Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Market”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90:629-649.(信号传递)Spence, A. M., 1973, “Job Marketing Signaling”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87:355-374.(信息甄别)张维迎（1996），博弈论与信息经济学，上海三联书店上海人民出版社。谢康乌家培（2002），阿克洛夫、斯彭斯和斯蒂格利茨论文精选，商务印书馆。3、企业理论Coase (1937), The Nature of the Firm, Economica, 386-405.Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, American Economic Review, 777-795. Steven N.S. Cheung(1983), The Contractual Nature of the Firm, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol.XXVI, April.Alchian(1978), Corporate Management and Property Rights, Chapter 9 of Economic Forces at Work, Liberty Press.Alchian And Woodward(1988), The Firm is Dead; Long Live the Firm-A Review of Oliver E. Williamsons The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XXVI, Mar.Frank Hyneman Knight(1921), Risk, Uncertainty and Profit.Adolf Agustus Berle and Jr. Gardiner Coit Means(1932), The modern corporation and Private Property, Macmillom, New York.哈特穆尔（1990），产权与企业的性质，中译文，载企业制度与市场组织，上海三联书店上海人民出版社，1996年。哈特（1995），企业、合同与财务结构，中译文，上海三联书店上海人民出版社，1996年。钱德勒（1977），看得见的手美国企业的管理革命，中译本， 重武译，商务印书馆， 1987年。张维迎（1995），企业的企业家契约理论，上海三联书店上海人民出版社。张维迎（1999），企业理论与中国企业改革，北京大学出版社。盛洪（2003），现代制度经济学（上），北京大学出版社。第二部分企业理论。盛洪（2003），现代制度经济学（下），北京大学出版社。第二部分契约与企业。专题二：公司治理框架Oliver E. Williamson(1985), Coporate Governance, Chapter 12 of The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, The Free Press.Jensen and Meckling, 1976, The Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics, 305-362ohnson, Magee, Nagarajan and Newman, 1985, An Analysis of the Stock Price Reaction to Sudden Executive Deaths: Implications for the Management Labor Model, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 151-174Romano, 1995, The Politics of Public Pension Funds, Public Interest, 42-53 Cochran, P. and Wartick, S.(1988), Corporate GovernanceA Review of Literature, 载International Corporate Governance, Prentice Hall,1994,8.Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, A Survey of Corporate Governance, Journal of Finance, 737-83Simon, 1991, Organizations and Markets, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25-44 Jensen, 1993, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems, Journal of Finance, 831-80 Hart, 1995, Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications, Economic Journal, 678-89Jones, 1995, Instrumental Stakeholder Theory: A Synthesis of Ethics and Economics, Academy of Management Review, 404-37 Kay and Silberston, 1995, Corporate Governance, National Institute Economic Review, 84-97Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts, 1992, Economics, Organization, and Management, Englewood Cliffs, NJ:Printice Hall.（中译本：保罗米尔格罗姆、约翰罗伯物，经济学、组织与管理，经济科学出版社，2004年。Robert A.G. Monks and Nell Minow （2004），Corporate Governance. 3rd edition. Blackwell Publishing Ltd.孙永祥（2002），公司治理结构：理论与实证研究，上海三联书店上海人民出版社。张维迎（2004），产权、激励与公司治理，经济科学出版社。专题三：治理、战略与企业Hill and Snell (1988), External Control, Corporate Strategy, and Firm Performance in Research-Intensive Industries, Strateg