MiG-23MLD_Comparisons_New[1].doc

MiG-23MLD vs Western Fighters the Soviet Air Force ViewAlexander Mladenov looks at the former Soviet Air Force concepts, dating from the mid-1980s, for the MiG-23MLDs employment in the air superiority role pitted against the F-15A, F-16A, F-4E and Kfir C.2 Although this article can be regarded as being of somewhat historical value, in fact it still has a certain practical value for the present day. In Russia, the other CIS republics and Eastern Europe the aging Flogger was retired from service completely between 1997 and 2002, but in the Third World countries, considered hostile to the West, the type is regarded yet as mature and capable enough design, performing useful work in the air-to-air role, with perhaps better mission capable rates than the early-series MiG-29s operated by those nations. As many as 30 fighter Floggers are believed to be maintained in combat-ready state by the Iraqi Air Force; no less than 60 more are in service with the Syrian air arm (including more than 40 highly-modified MiG-23MLDs); the Cuban Air Force has on strength slightly less than three dozens MiG-23MF/MLAs; and more than 40 Flogger-Gs continue to soldier on with the North Korean Air Force. Some of the countries on the rogue list have determined and skilled Flogger pilots and to underestimate them and their mounts would be foolish, and, in case of war, potentially dangerous. The Bekaa Valley Defeat a Stimulus for Further Flogger Upgrades In June 1982, the Soviet-style air superiority/air defence rather orthodox doctrine, training and tactics have proved to be fully inadequate and ineffective when employed against the Israeli Defence Force/Air Force (IDF/AF). Syrian losses fighters, fighter-bombers and helicopters between June 6 and 11 - numbered some 85 (between 82 and 92 according to some sources) while Syrians claimed for some 27 IDF/AF fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft shoot down which is obviously a bogus. It is well known that Israelis deny losing any aircraft in air combats during the 1982 Lebanon war though such statements may also be considered, to some extent, as dubious. According to the authoritative research article Early MiG-23s in Operational Service, written by the 1960s-1980s local conflicts researcher Tom Cooper (published in Air Enthusiast, Vol 100, July-August 2002, p56-67), the Syrian fighter Floggers played only a secondary role in the conflict. Confirmed losses during the clashes over the Bekaa Valley between June 9 and 11 comprised four MiG-23MS and six MiG-23MFs, while their pilots claimed at least five enemy aircraft shoot though most if not all of these kills cannot be confirmed by independent sources and thus could be regarded more as bogus rather than of realistic reports. MiG-23MLDs pros and cons the Soviet view of the 1980sThe most significant post-Bekaa Valley undertaking of the Soviet Air Force was the crash-programme upgrade of the huge VVS-FA MiG-23ML/MLA Flogger-G fleet to the MiG-23MLD Flogger-K standard, also known as Izdelye 23-18 in the internal designation system of the MiG Design Bureau. In the early 1980s, the MiG-23 made up the backbone of the VVS (Voenno-Vazdushni Sili - the Soviet Air Force) Frontal Aviation (FA) air defence/air superiority assets. No less than 1,100 MiG-23M/ML/MLAs were in service with the Soviet front-line combat units by that time and more than 600 of them used to equip at least 15 fighter regiments based in Central Europe that were considered to be the spearhead of the Soviet air superiority assets at the most probable theatre of operations during the Cold War era. The Flogger-Ks upgrade package is known to had been prepared even before the Lebanon war and a total of 560 VVS MiG-23ML/MLAs were upgraded while only 66 improved interceptors (with only new avionics) are reported by Russian sources as being newly-built between mid/late 1982 and December 1984; these are known as the MiG-23MLD(Export) (Izdelie 23-19 or the alternative designation Izdelie 23-22) and were only exported to Syria and Bulgaria 50 and 16 examples respectively. Interestingly, the NATO reporting name Flogger-G was retained, as these aircraft were hardly distinguishable from the basic MiG-23ML/MLA. Unlike its export counterparts, the VVS-FA MiG-23MLDs boasted much-improved maneuvering performance thanks to a host of airframe and flight control system upgrades.It would be interesting for the Western public to examine and analyse in details the content of a Soviet Air Force supplementary air combat manual. This particular 32-page manual titled Aide Memorie for the MiG-23 Pilot on Air Combat vs F-15A, F-16A, F-4E and Kfir C.2 was published not long after the Bekaa Valley clashes. By that time both the Soviet and client states pilots still trained mainly in the orthodox - and often described as inflexible - air intercept tactics, derived from the 1960s and mastered to perfection during the MiG-21 era. Traditionally, in the 1970s and early 1980s, the Soviet and client air arms flew the MiG-23M/ML/MLD like the MiG-21 as a high-speed point interceptor closely guided and supported by the GCI, and it took no less than 12 years to employ the Flogger-G/K as a true air superiority fighter.Aide Memorie for the MiG-23 Pilot on Air Combat vs F-15A, F-16A, F-4E and Kfir C.2 refers to the MiG-23MLD(Export) version, powered by the R35-300 turbojet, rated at 28,700 lbs (127kN or 13,000kg) in full afterburner, without the aerodynamics and flight control system improvements of the VVS-FA MIG-23MLDs. According to the manual, the aircrafts main parameters defining the energy maneuverability performance turn out the fighter slightly better than the McDonnell Douglas F-4E Phantom II and definitely better than the IAI Kfir C.2. However, the MiG-23MLDs air combat performance aspects, as given in the manual, are quoted as definitely inferior to those of the McDonnell Douglas F-15A and General Dynamics F-16A. There are only few areas within the MiG-23MLDs envelope where it could boast equal or slightly better performance aspects when pitted against the third generation US fighters. For example, the manuals authors claim that compared than the F-4E (not specified whether the slated or non-slated sub-version of the Phantom is concerned), the MiG-23MLD has superior sustained turn performance throughout the entire envelope, excluding the range between 377 and 540kts (700 and 1,000km/h) bellow 21,000ft (7,000m) as well as an edge over the Phantom II in the zoom climb performance at all altitudes and speeds, excluding the true airspeed range between 485 and 647kts (900 and 1,200km/h) above 18,000ft (6,000m). Pitted against the F-15A, the MiG-23MLD has the only notable advantage in the zoom climb performance at speeds above 620kts (1,150km/h) while pitted against the F-16A, the manual asserts that the Soviet swing-wing fighter boasts somewhat better sustained turn performance above 15,000ft (5,000m) at speeds close to the maximum as well as better zoom climb performance at true airspeeds exceeding 590kts (1,100km/h). However, as real-world tests have shown in Israel where the defected in November 1989 MiG-23MLD (Export) was flight-tested by the IDF/AF, the swing-wing fighter demonstrated - somewhat surprisingly - better acceleration than the escorting F-16s and this tends to indicate that in real world conditions the MiG-23MLD would have a slight edge over the early F-16s in acceleration and energy maneuverability, at true airspeeds above 485kts (900km/h). The IAI Kfir C.2, as assessed in the manual, is said to be inferior to the MiG-23MLD by sustained turn performance at airspeeds above 540kts (1,000km/h), by zoom climb performance at true airspeeds bellow 540 kts (1,000km/h), while at altitudes bellow 12,000ft (4,0000m) the MiG-23MLD has an edge in energy maneuverability throughout the entire speed range.Sensor and Self-Protection ConsiderationsAccording to the manual, the MiG-23MLDs N008E Sapfir-23MLAE-2 pulse radar has superior performance than the Phantoms APQ-120, approximately equal performance compared to the F-16As AN/APG-66 and definitely inferior performance to the F-15As AN/APG-63. (See Table 2 and Figure 1). The manuals authors claim that airborne radar maximum detection range alone cannot grant any decisive tactical advantage in the non-sterile environment of the real world air combat. It is well known that fighter radar target detection and discrimination performance are, in general terms, somehow limited by the relatively low resolution offered by the radar beam with an average width of between 2.5 and 3.5 degrees in azimuth and elevation. In addition, the generally low reliability of the electronic identification (EID) facilities in the early/mid 1980s is another factor that would prevent the enemy fighters from the full use of their superior Beyond Visual Range (BVR) capability. However, the manual notes that the F-16As and F-15As radars have a plethora of valuable close air combat modes with automatic target acquisition at close ranges (up to 6-10nm 10-18km) with missile seeker heads slaved to the radars line-of-sight for increased accuracy and missile lock-on speed. Both the F-15As and F-16As Pulse-Doppler (PD) radars have well-known problems with their stability of locking-on targets flying bellow them on the beam (side-on, when in snap-down attacks). This particular shortcoming could be used to a good effect by the MiG-23 pilots to escape from attacks and got away as the evasion from the AIM-7F Sparrow SARH missile, launched by the F-15 could be easily achieved by performing a high-g beam maneuvering. As a rule, while operating in look-down/shoot-down mode over mountainous terrain, the early Spafir-23s performance in the look-down/shoot down mode is notably degraded, but the MLDs Sapfir-23MLAE-2 radar has a newly added, highly useful Pulse-Doppler mode (Non-Coherent) with somewhat improved ultra-low level target detection (highly useful for operations over rough terrain) requiring a minimum target altitude of 160ft (50m). Whichever the case, the MiG-23MLDs look-down/shoot down operations require heavily GCI-support, and attacks against fighter-size targets in such conditions are advised to be mounted in tail-on aspect as the radar maximum detection range is advertised to be up to 13nm (25km) and tracking range is up to 9nm (16km). The Spafir-23MLA-2 featuring new look-down, passive jamming countermeasures and close air combat modes demonstrated in real world condition, a moderate reliability performance with Mean Time Between Failures (MBTF) in the order of 60 hours. The MiG-23MLDs sensor suite also incorporates the undernose TP-26-Sh InfraRed Search-and-Track (IRST) sensor, which can be useful for emission-free tail-on intercepts, especially as back-up sensor in situations when the radar is rendered inoperative by heavy jamming or technical failure. The IRST however, has a somewhat limited search performance due to its restricted field of scanning only 60-degree in azimuth and 15-degree in elevation. The average low-level detection range against receding fighter-size targets (in tail-on aspect) with afterburner on is advertised to be over 6nm (11km), at high level detecting range increase up to 13nm (25km). The MiG-23MLD is equipped with the SPO-15LE Beryoza Radar Warning Receiver (RWR). It is an analogous device, developed in the early/mid-1970s, capable of providing a 360-degree coverage in azimuth and 30-degree up and down in elevation, with the capability to issue precise angular warning of emitting targets attacking in the forward quarter though in the rear quarter the accuracy is much lower. The SPO-15LE is advertised as of being sensitive enough to warn on enemys radars and their probable type and mode of operation. On the other hand, the manual states that the RWRs used on the enemy fighters have 360-degree coverage in azimuth and 60-80-degree in elevation; as a rule they are sensitive and smart enough to provide timely warning on the MiG-23MLDs radar emissions as their own detection range is considerably better than the radars own detection range i.e. capable to detect an approaching MiG-23MLD with its radar emitting in search mode at distances over 60nm (110km). Unlike its archrivals, the MiG-23MLD lacks any built-in and pod-mounted ECM systems for self-protection and namely this is considered a huge disadvantage when pitted against the F-15A, F-16A, F-4E and the Kfir C.2 which all boast state-of-the-art ECM gear. The only self-protection gear onboard the MiG-23MLD is the PKiBP-23 (KDS-23M) chaff/flare dispenser comprising two six-round downfiring units built-in the centerline pylon. The VVS-FA Flogger-Ks have their self-protection enhanced by two BVP-50-60 50-round chaff/flare dispensers built in distinctive fences over the centre fuselage. As well, the Syrian MiG-23MLDs, received additional chaff/flare dispensers, (perhaps in the mid/late 1980s) installed in fences onto rear fuselage. One of the MiG-23s major advantages is its compact appearance and relatively small size when fighting vs the F-15A and F-4E; especially with the wings set at 72-degree swept angle; combined with a suitable camouflage this would make low level visual detection and tracking very difficult, particularly from above and in head-on encounters.WeaponsThe manuals authors claim that the MiG-23MLDs R-24R (AA-7 Apex) BVR Semi-Active Radar Homing (SARH) missile has a comparable range performance when pitted against the F-15As AIM-7F Sparrow while the IR-guided R-24T and R-23T are a valuable addition to the Floggers weapons suite. The R-24Ts high altitude maximum range at low level in head-on attack is 7nm (12 km) and the figure increases to 12nm (20km) in tail-on engagements. In the same time, the manual claims that the Foxtrot and Echo-2 Sparrows are known to have inferior ECM resistance compared to the R-24R; there is also conclusion that the US BVR missiles are not considered particularly effective in shoot-down engagements. On the contrary, the MiG-23MLDs R-23R and R-24R missiles boast modern monopulse seekers with a good ECM resistance. In real world air combat, however, it could not be impossible their lock-on to be broken by smart jamming, produced by enemy fighters new generation ECM gear. The ranges of the MiG-23MLDs, F-15As and F-4Es BVR missiles are shown in Table 3 Figure 2. The AIM-9L Sidewinder arming the F-15As and F-16As with all-aspect lock-on capability is considered the best Within Visual Range (WVR) missile as the manual authors note. On the contrary, the MiG-23MLDs R-60 and R-60MK (AA-8 Aphid) purposely-designed dogfight missiles are also being quoted in the manual as somewhat capable of head-on lock-on, but only if the targets afterburner is on. The R-60MK has, in general, the same launch limitations and an equally sensitive cooled seeker head as the AIM-9L, though with much shorter range. The R-60 and R-60MK have decisive edge in the minimum launch range - as little as 750ft (250m) compared to the AIM-9Ls at least 1,500ft (500m). It would be necessary to note that a notable omission of the VVS and/or KGB intelligence authorities was to put in the manual in question any piece of information on the performance and employment details of the Rafael Python 3 all-aspect missile, which was the preferred close air combat weapon of the Israeli F-15As, credited with 35 kills in June 1982. It is of note that the Launch Acceptable Region (LAR) in the horizontal plane of the close air combat missiles as given in the manual (see Figure 3) can be considered valid for a non-maneuvering target only, flying at 16,000ft (5,000m) at military power; both the target and the attacking fighter maintaining at a speed of 485kts (900km/h); if the target is turning then the LAR would shrank considerably.The MiG-23MLDs Sapfir-23MLAE-2 radar has an useful close air combat mode, a noticeable omission on the previous Sapfir-23 variants, with vertical scan in a tall window that is perpendicular to the aircrafts longitudinal axis with a field of 45-degree in elevation and 6-degree in azimuth. In this mode, the radar locks semi-automatically onto the first target to enter the window at distances of between 0.17 and 5nm (0.3 and 9km); this proves very useful during high-g maneuvering situations as th radar sends slaving commands to slave the R-60, R-60MK and R-13M seeker heads toward the acquired target. The manual concludes that the built-in guns of all compared fighters have approximately equal overall efficiency - in terms of useful range and lethality for use against fighter-size targets. As well, the lead-computing optical sights of the MiG-23MLD and its opponents have the approximately the same accuracy in the gun aiming mode.Conclusions and BVR Considerations The manual concludes that the MiG-23MLD(Export) armed with the R-24/R-60MK AAM combination could be considered reasonably capable of holding its own against all types of enemy fighters. However, the edge over the F-15A the most capable archrival - could be gained only through multiple simultaneous slash-and-dash attacks from several directions and from long ranges, mounted in decisive manner; with a high degree of coordination between the groups when the engagement enter into the WVR phase, and with timely exit from combat.Probably the most important rule, contained into the recommendation chapter of the manual dealing with the BVR combat, is that on the importance of the first attack: “In order to achieve surprise in shooting, the MiG-23MLD pilots should spend all of their experience and aggressiveness of into the first attack.” Undoubtedly, this is considered as critical factor since surprise has been proved to be nine-tents of air combat success, both offensive and defensive. The high-speed energy fighters like the MiG-23 have the option of engaging or disen