中国对外投资的历史情形和现今趋势【外文翻译】.doc

本科毕业论文外文翻译外文题目： Historic and Emergent Trends in Chinese Outward Direct Investment出 处： Management International Review, MIR48(2008)6 作 者： Peter J. Buckley, Adam R, Cross, Hui Xin, HinrichVoss原 文：Historic and Emergent Trends in Chinese Outward Direct InvestmentEntry Mode Literature on the internationalisation of developing country MNEs suggests that minority IJVs are the preferred mode of market entry (Wells 1983, Yeung 1994). One reason is that such rms seldom possess the level of proprietary technology and rm -specic know-how to necessitate internalisation via majority or full ownership (Buckley/Casson 1976, Dunning 1993). This is also evident in the early years of Chinese ODI development: project level SAFE data reveal that, in the early 1990s, around 70 percent of overseas projects of Chinese rms took the IJV form (see Table 5). Zhan (1995) also reports that Chinese rms tended to opt for majority equity shareholdings in overseas projects, typically in the range of 40 to 70 percent equity participation, especially in natural resource-oriented and manufacturing-related projects. A number of explanations can be envisaged. From a governmental perspective, the formal investment approval process generally required Chinese MNEs to adopt the IJV entry mode. The Chinese authorities had become familiar with the economic gains associated with the promotion of inward FDI in the form of IJVs, the promotion of which was a cornerstone of Chinas Open Door policy. The JV form was seen as a vehicle for promoting the inow of foreign-owned technology, management know-how and other skills to China. The authorities were also now adept and comfortable with at administering foreign invested enterprises in China. It is likely that equivalent advantages were sought when Chinese enterprises invested abroad. Familiar cost and risk-minimising features of IJVs will also have been important to the investment approval agencies (Zhan 1995, Taylor 2002, Wang 2002). From an enterprise perspective, inefcient domestic capital markets and budget constraints meant that many Chinese enterprises, including state-owned ones, often found it difcult to obtain sufcient funds to purchase overseas assets outright, compelling them to opt for the IJV alternative. The JV form also allowed Chinese MNEs to exercise a degree of control over local operations whilst avoiding outright ownership and the concomitant exposure to political and commercial risk. Chinese enterprises could tap foreign partner contributions, such as improved access to market intelligence, knowledge of the local operating environment, opportunities for reputation riding and better access to local distribution channels through the IJV (Taylor 2002). When established with other ethnically-Chinese enterprises (in Hong Kong and elsewhere), the JV form also allowed relational assets to be optimised, reducing perceived risks and costs associated with psychic distance, especially for smaller and less experienced Chinese investors (Zhan 1995). Mutual trust would also have been easier to establish. Thus, we see both institutional and rm-specic factors inuencing the choice of IJV by Chinese rms at this time.From the mid-1990s onwards, however, SAFE data at individual project level reveal that wholly-owned FDI projects have increasingly substituted for jointly-owned ones in the international expansion of Chinese enterprise, with 61 percent of overseas afliates in approved projects taking this form in 2001 compared to 30 percent in 1991. We note that this contrasts somewhat with the ndings of Taylor (2002), who reports much greater use of IJVs in the recent internationalisation of Chinese rms, especially in manufacturing related activity. A number of reasons explain the more frequent use of the wholly-owned entry mode in recent years. First, more frequent approval of wholly Chinese-owned projects reects growing condence among the regulating authorities that managers of state owned Chinese MNEs have become sufciently experienced and skilled to take control of, and co-ordinate effectively, the activities of geographically-dispersed afliates. It is also a reection, at least in part, of the strategic importance placed on particular projects by the Chinese authorities. Theory asserts that, by internalising markets, the internationalising rm is able to reduce its dependency on independent intermediaries; militate against the threat of technology and know-how leakage; reduce the risk of opportunistic behaviour by alliance partners and allow for full appropriation of returns on investment (Buckley/Casson 1976). Both the investment approval agencies and enterprises will have found such advantages attractive, despite the costs and risks associated with full ownership. Second, greater use of wholly-owned afliates may reect improved availability of investment funds. Government initiatives under the go global (Zou chuqu) policy have released capital to state-owned rms (often at below market rates) in the form of loans and improved access to hard currencies, to help them nance the outright purchase of foreign assets (Antkiewicz/Whalley 2006). Many Chinese enterprises are also now skilled at raising investment funds on international capital markets, especially in Hong Kong (Buckley et al. 2007, Chan 1995). Thus, many Chinese rms are no longer obligated to reduce investment cost by undertaking an IJV. Third, the growth in international market entry by acquisition will have led Chinese enterprises to establish more wholly-owned subsidiaries in foreign markets rather than jointly-owned projects. The standard theoretical model of “Asian ODI” suggests that China is not unusual among Asian countries in using wholly owned subsidiaries more frequently over time (Pang/Komaran 1985, Euh/Min 1986, Yeung 1994). However, caution should be exercised in assuming that this mirrors improvements in the managerial capacity and competitiveness of Chinese MNEs: greater deployment of majority and wholly-owned foreign operations may also be more a function of the governments desire to retain effective control of state assets abroad and a growing condence in its ability to do so than of purely rm-specic or market-related considerationsMotives for Chinese Outward FDIIn this section, we relate historic and emergent trends in aggregate Chinese ODI data identied above to changes in the motivations driving the internationalisation of Chinese MNEs. Dunning (1993) identies four basic motivations that provide the impetus for foreign-owned production and are discussed below: namely, natural-resource seeking, market-seeking, efciency-seeking and strategic asset-seeking motives.Natural Resource-Seeking FDIBackward integration to acquire or secure the supply of specic location-bound resources and commodities abroad for domestic consumption has been the predominant driver of Chinese outward FDI since the late 1970s (Taylor 2002). More recently, Chinas rapid economic growth over the past decade has fuelled what some say is an almost insatiable demand for raw materials and other inputs in many sectors (Economist 2004).13 The dual objective of further improving the supply of natural resources from abroad while ameliorating (at a national level) exposure to political and commercial risk has seen Chinese enterprises recently investing in natural resources-oriented projects across a broad range of resource-rich countries, especially in Africa and East and Central Asia (see Table 3). Leading recent recipients are Zambia (for copper), Peru (iron ore), and western and central Asian countries like Kazakhstan (oil exploration and extraction). Most investors are state-owned enterprises which enjoy strong support from the Chinese government in the form of direct nancial assistance; the negotiation of bilateral investment treaties and trade agreements with host countries and the close inter-governmental relationships that China is now reviving across certain parts of the developing world. Exemplar companies include China Natural Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), the joint owner of a Sudanese oil production plant (together with Canadian, Malaysian and local interests), Sinopec, Shanghai Baosteel (the owner of six joint ventures in Australia, Brazil and South Africa in iron-ore mining and steel trading), Sinochem and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC). There is some evidence to suggest that ofcial development aid provided by China to developing countries (for example, concerning telecommunications and transportation infrastructure development, project-specic inter-governmental loans, education packages and so forth) is predicated upon market access or exploitation and extraction rights being granted to Chinese MNEs (Pan 2006, Evans/Downs 2006). It has been argued that MNEs from emerging countries are most likely to invest in the industrialised countries when looking to access technology and learning (Monkiewicz 1986, Ye 1992, Deng 2003). However, this may not be the case for China. Whilst knowledge-acquisition has become increasingly important to Chinese MNEs in recent years, much of Chinese ODI by value was invested in the industrialised countries primarily for natural-resource seeking reasons, especially in the early 1990s. Good examples include the investments by CITIC and Huaguang Forest Co. Ltd in timber plantations in New Zealand, CITICs investment in forestry in the USA, CITIC and China National Nonferrous Metal Industrial Corporations 10 percent (US$120mn) investment in Portland Aluminiums smelter operations in Australia. Canada is also now host to a number of timber and sheries related Chinese investments (e.g., CITICs investment in the Celgar pulp mill and sawmill project) (Zhang 2003).Market-Seeking FDI Chinese MNEs now conduct both defensive and offensive market-seeking FDI. It is axiomatic to state that China enjoys a comparative advantage in low-cost labour and labour-intensive production. Given the location-bound nature of labour, the international competitiveness of the majority of (both foreign and locally-owned) rms in China necessitates domestic production and foreign market servicing by exports. Chinese enterprises have long established overseas operations to facilitate trade. Certainly, in the early 1990s, the bulk of Chinese ODI in services was export trade-related. Chinese exporters have commonly confronted a range of tariff and non-tariff trade barriers abroad. Although Chinas WTO accession should see these reduced, the reverse may happen in those countries with which Chinese enjoys a large trade surplus, such as the USA. For example, the imposition of protectionist measures (or its threat) presently underpins a small but signicant proportion of the recent growth in Chinese ODI to the USA, Latin America and, but less so, to Europe (Taylor 2002), for defensive market-seeking reasons. Protectionist pressure also accounts for a signicant share of Chinese ODI in third-party trading countries (Taylor 2002). Increasingly, Chinese enterprises are locating offshore manufacturing plants to those countries with which the industrialised nations set few, if any, export quotas and other anti-dumping measures, or they invest in countries where quota rights can be appropriated readily (Lau 2002, Taylor 2002, UNCTAD 2003). This accounts for much of the recent growth in market-seeking ODI by Chinese rms in a number of countries, including, for example, Cambodia (where Chinese garment manufacturers in particular enjoy fewer quota restrictions in third markets); Mauritius (where export quota restrictions are mostly absent), Jamaica and Fiji (UNCTAD 2003). A further illustration of defensive, market-seeking FDI is provided by the purchase in 2002 of the insolvent German television maker Schneider Electronics AG by TCL, Chinas second largest television and mobile-phone maker. Reportedly, this was motivated, at least in part, by TCLs desire to negate possible accusations of dumping products in Europe (CNN 2003).译 文：中国对外投资的历史情形和现今趋势一、 进入模式关于发展中国家的跨国公司国际化的文献建议少数的国际合资企业是进入市场的首选模式。其中一个原因是这样的公司很少拥有专有技术和知道如何进行多数或全部所有权内部化。在中国对外投资发展早期这也很显然：项目级安全数据显示，在20世纪90年代早期，大概70%中国企业的海外项目采取的是国际合资企业的形式。1995年中国学者也报告说中国企业倾向于选择在海外的项目中持有更多的股份，通常以40%到70%之间参股，特别是天然资源导向型和与生产有关的项目。很多的解释可以被设想。来自一个政府的透视，正式的投资审批过程一般要求中国的跨国公司采用国际合资企业进入模式。对与以国际合资企业形式来促进外来直接投资相关的经济增长，中国当局也很熟悉，这种推广是中国“走出去”政策的基石。这种合资企业的形式被看做是一辆带动国外拥有的技术、管理诀窍和其他技术流入中国的车辆。中国企业投资国外时，等效的优势被追求。国际合资企业熟悉的成本和风险最小化特征对投资审批机构也变得重要起来。从一家企业分析，效率低下的国内资本市场和预算限制意味着许多中国的企业，包括国有企业，经常发现很难获得足够的资金来购买海外资产的买断权，迫使他们选择其他的国际合资企业。该合资企业的形式也让中国的跨国公司对本地业务有一定程度的控制，同时也可以避免买断所有权和随之而来的政治和商业风险。中国企业可以挖掘国外伙伴的贡献，比如完善的市场进入机制、当地经营环境的知识、建立信誉的机会以及通过国际合资企业更好地利用当地的分销渠道。当与其他中国族裔企业（在香港或其他地方），合资的形势也让关系资产趋于优化，降低了知觉风险和心理距离的费用，尤其对于那些规模较小，经验不足的中国投资者。相互的信任也更容易建立。因此，此时我们也看到了影响中国企业选择国际合资企业形式的机构和公司的具体因素。从20世纪90年代中期起，国家外汇管理局关于个别项目的数据显示，全资拥有的外商直接投资项目越来越多地取代合资项目在中国企业的国际扩张中。在2001年61%的海外分支机构在批准的项目中采取独资的形式，然而在1991年只有30%。我们注意到，这点有些与泰勒的发现形成对比，他报告了中国企业在目前的国际化过程中更广泛使用国际合资企业，尤其是制造业。有很多解释了近几年更多使用独资进入模式的原因。首先，越来越频繁的全部中国拥有的项目的审批反映了主管机关日益高涨的信心，中国国有跨国公司的管理者已经变得足够有经验和有技能采取控制和有效协调，活动分散在各地的分支机构。同时也反映了，至少是部分，中国当局把战略的重要性放在具体的项目上。理论主张，通过市场内部化，国际化的公司能够减少对独立中介的依赖。影响反对技术和诀窍泄露的威胁，减少联盟伙伴的投机主义行为的风险，并允许全额拨款的投资回报。不管全部所有权的成本和风险，投资审批机构和企业都将会发现这种优势的吸引力。其次，更好地利用全资的子公司可能反应改善了的投资基金的可用性。在“走出去”政策下，政府的政策倡议向国有企业以贷款的形式发放资金（一般低于市场利率），从而提高企业对硬通货的可获得性，同时也为企业购买外国资产融资。目前中国很多企业在国际资本市场上对于提高投资资金很有经验，尤其在香港。因此，许多中国企业不再对通过开展一家国际合资企业来降低投资成本而负责。第三，通过收购，国际市场的进入不断增加，这将导致中国企业在国外市场上建立更多全资附属公司，而不是合资项目。“亚洲向外直接投资”的标准理论模型表明，中国跟亚洲的其他国家一样在更频繁地使用全资分公司。然而，对于这反映了中国跨国公司管理能力和竞争力的提高的这一假设应谨慎行事。大多数的更大的部署和外商独资经营也可能更多的是政府的愿望，为了保留对国外国有资产有效的控制以及增加这方面的自信，而非单纯地从企业特有的或是市场方面考虑。二、 中国对外直接投资的动机在这一部分，我们从已经确定的总的中国对外投资的数据的历史和现今趋势来分析中国跨国公司国际化动机的动机。邓宁总结出促进外商独资生产的四个基本动机：寻求自然资源、寻求市场、寻求效率以及寻求战略资产。1求自然