银行监管的经济学分析

Chapter11.EconomicAnalysisofBankRegulation,AsymmetricInformation,Ineconomics,peoplerespondtoincentivesregulationneededtocounteractsometimes,regulationcreatesthewrongincentives,I.AsymmetricInformation,bankssolvesomeasymmetricinfoproblemsbutcreatesothersregulationdealswithasymmetricinfoproblemsbutcreatesothers,A.DepositInsurance,FDICestablished1934preventsdepositorsfrompanickingandwithdrawingfunds“runonthebank”,2typesofaction,payoffmethodFDICclosesdowninsolventbankdepositorspaidupto$100,000FDICsellsoffassetsoftendepositorswithmorethan$100,000oftengivenfullrefund,purchase&assumptionmethodFDICfindsahealthybanktobuyfailingbank-FDICoffersincentivesnodepositorlossesmorecommonmethod,beforeFDICbankpanics1819,1837,1857,1873,1884,1893,1907,1930-33afterFDICnonationalbankpanics,Problemsw/depositinsurance,moralhazardinsurancegiveslessincentivetobecarefuldepositorslesscarefulinselectingbankbankslesscarefulwithdepositormoney,adverseselectionifdepositorsnotpolicingbanks,questionablepeople,knowingthis,attractedtobanking,FDICpoliciesmakeproblemsworse,“toobigtofail”FDICgivespreferentialtreatmenttolargerbankfailures-coveringdeposits$100,000-preventlargelossesmoralhazard/adverseselectionworseforlargerbanks,B.CapitalRequirements,capitalas%assetscounteractmoralhazardproblemscapitalislostiffailurecapitalreducesrisk-takingwell-capitalizedbankslesssupervisionlowerdepositinsurancepremiums,C.BankSupervision,limitingownershipbankexaminationsassetriskbankloanscapitalrequirementmanagingrisk,disclosurefinancialstatementsconsumerprotectiontermsofcreditfeedisclosurediscrimination“redlining”,competitionrestricteduntil1990s-McFaddenAct-GlassSteagallincreaseshealthofbanks-driving“bad”banksout-increasingefficiency,II.BankingCrisisofthe1980s,1934-80lessthan20banksfailureperyear1983-1993200peryearwhathappened?,A.Origins,decliningprofitabilityoftraditionalactivitiesfinancialinnovationsrisingshort-terminterestratesin1970sbanksborrowshort&lendlongespeciallyhardonS&Ls,Deregulation,bankslobbyforchangetoreversedecliningprofits1980DIDMCA1982Garn-St.Germain,repealedRegulationQofferinterest-bearingcheckingS&Lsallowedmoreassetchoiceslending,junkbonds,commonstockincreasedepositinsuranceceilings,result?,bigincreaseinmoralhazardgreatincentive/abilitytotakeriskthriftslackedskillstomanageriskregulatorslackedresourcestopolicethriftsdidnotcorrectproblemwithshort-terminterestrates,economicevents,veryhighshort-terminterestratesin1979-80recession1981-82fallingfarm,energypricesinearly1980shigherloandefaults,by1982,50%ofallS&Lsareinsolvent,B.Failureofregulators,by1982,regulatorsSHOULDHAVEshutdownfailedS&Lsbut,instead,regulatoryforbearanceallowedinsolventS&Lstokeepoperating,why?,FSLIClackedthefundsfordepositorpayoffregulatorstoofriendlyw/industryregulatorswouldbeadmittingtofailure,zombieS&Ls,insolventS&Ls,stilloperatingnothingtoloseofferveryhighdepositratesofferverylowloanratestakingbusinessfromhealthyS&Ls,C.Politicsofthecrisis,economicscausedtheproblemspoliticsmadethecrisisprincipal-agentproblemagentsactonbehalfofprincipalsagentshavedifferentincentivesanddonotactinbestinterestofprincipals,principals:voters/taxpayerselectpoliticiansthatappointregulatorspaycostofbailoutagents:politicians/regulators,principalsbenefitfromdealingw/crisisearlytominimizecostsagentsbenefitfromre-election,careerpoliticiansgothugecampaigncontributionsfromS&Lindustryregulatorspressuredtobackoff,D.Bailout:FIRREA1989,federalbondstofundclosureofS&LschangeinS&LregulationFSLIC,FHLBgoneOTCcreated,FDICforinsuranceRTCtoliquidateassetsdonein1995,re-restrictedS&Lactivitiesraiseddepositinsurancepremiumsmorepowertoregulatorsinclosingbanks,E.Reform:FDICIA1991,dealwithmoralhazardproblemswithdepositinsurancelimited“toobigtofail”risk