【康德】何谓启蒙(中英文版)--何兆武(译)

IMMANUEL KANT AnAnswer to the Question: What is Enlightenment? (1784) Enlightenment is mans emergence from his self-imposed immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use ones understanding without guidance from another.This immaturityisself- imposed when its cause lies not inlack of understanding, but in lack of resolve and courage to use it without guidance from another. Sapere Aude! dare to know Have courage to use your own understanding!-thatisthe motto of enlightenment. Laziness and cowardice are the reasons why so great a proportion of men, long after nature has released them from alien guidance (natura-liter maiorennes), nonetheless gladly remain in lifelong immaturity, and why itisso easy for others to establish themselves as their guardians.Itisso easy to be immature.If Ihave a book to serve as my understanding, a pastor to serve as my conscience, a physician to determine my diet for me, and so on,I need not exert myself at all.Ineed not think,ifonlyIcanpay: others will readily undertake the irksome work for me. The guardians who have so benevolently taken over the supervision of men have carefully seen to it that the far greatest part of them (including the entirefairsex) regard taking the step to maturity as very dangerous, not to mention difficult. Having first made their domestic livestock dumb, and having carefully made sure that these docile creatures will not take a single step without the go-cart to which they are harnessed, these guardiansthen show them the danger that threatens them, should they attempt to walk alone. Now this dangerisnot actually so great, for after falling a few times they would in the end certainly learn to walk; butanexample of this kind makes men timid and usually frightens them out ofallfurther attempts. Thus, itisdifficult for any individual man to work himself out of the immaturity that hasall but become his nature. He has even become fond of this state and for the time beingis actually incapable of using his own understanding, for no one has ever allowed him to attempt it. Rules and formulas, those mechanical aids to the rational use,orrather misuse, of his natural gifts, are the shackles of a permanent immaturity. Whoever threw them off would still make onlyanuncertain leap over the smallest ditch, since heisunaccustomed to this kind of free movement. Consequently, only a few have succeeded, by cultivating their own minds, infreeing themselves from immaturity and pursuing a secure course. But that the public should enlighten itselfismore likely; indeed,ifitisonly allowed freedom, enlightenmentisalmost inevitable.Foreven among the entrenched guardians of the great masses a few will always think for themselves, a few who, after having themselves thrown off the yoke of immaturity, will spread the spirit of a rational appreciation for both their own worth and for each persons calling to think for himself. But it should be particularly noted thatifa public that was first placed in this yoke by the guardiansissuitably arousedby some of those who are altogether incapableof enlightenment, it may force the guardians themselves to remain under the yoke-so perniciousisit to instill prejudices, for they finally take revenge upon theiroriginators,or ontheir descendants. Thus a publiccanonly attain enlightenment slowly. Perhaps a revolutioncanoverthrow autocraticdespotism andprofiteeringorpower-grabbing oppression, but itcannever truly reform a manner of thinking; instead, new prejudices, just like the old ones they replace, will serve as a leash for the great unthinking mass. Nothingisrequired for this enlightenment, however, except freedom; and the freedom in questionisthe least harmful of all, namely, the freedom to use reason publicly inallmatters. Buton allsidesIhear: Do not argue! The officer says, Do not argue, drill! The tax man says, Do not argue, pay! The pastor says, Do not argue, believe! (Only one ruler in the World says, Argue as much as you want and about what you want, but obey!)Inthis we have examples of pervasive restrictionsonfreedom. But which restriction hinders enlightenment and which does not, but instead actually advances it?Ireply: The public use of ones reason must always be free, and it alonecanbring about enlightenment among mankind; the private use of reasonmay, however, often be very narrowly restricted, without otherwise hindering the progress of enlightenment. By the public use of ones own reasonI understand the use that anyone as a scholar makes of reason before the entire literate world. Icall the private use of reason that which a person may make in a civic postoroffice that has beenentrusted to him. Now in manyaffairs conducted in the interests of a community, a certain mechanismisrequired by means of which some of its members mustconduct themselves inanentirely passive manner so that throughanartificial unanimity the government may guide them toward public ends,orat least prevent them from destroying such ends. Here one certainly must not argue, instead one must obey. However, insofar as this part of the machine also regards himself as a member of the community as a whole,or even of the world community, and as a consequence addresses the public in the role of a scholar, in the proper sense of that term, hecanmost certainly argue, without thereby harming the affairs for which as a passive member heispartly responsible. Thus it would be disastrousif anofficeronduty who was given a command by his superior were to question the appropriatenessorutility of the order. He must obey. But as a scholar he cannot be justly constrained from making comments about errors in military service,orfrom placing them before the public for its judgment. The citizen cannot refuse to pay the taxes imposedonhim; indeed, impertinent criticism of such levies, when they should be paid by him,canbe punished as a scandal (since itcanlead to widespread insubordination). But the same persondoes not act contrary to civic duty when, as a scholar, he publicly expresses his thoughts regarding the improprietyoreven injustice of such taxes. Likewise a pastoris bound to instruct his catecumens and congregation in accordance with the symbol of the church he serves, for he was appointedonthat condition. But as a scholar he has complete freedom, indeed even the calling, to impart to the publicallof his carefully considered and well-intentioned thoughts concerning mistaken aspects of that symbol, as well as his suggestions for the better arrangement of religious and church matters. Nothing in thiscan weighonhis conscience. What he teaches in consequence of his office as a servant of the church he sets out as something with regard to which he has no discretion to teach inaccord with his own lights; rather, he offers it under the direction and in the name of another. He willsay,Our church teaches thisorthat and these are the demonstrations it uses. He thereby extracts for his congregationallpractical uses from precepts to which he would not himself subscribe with complete conviction, but whose presentation hecannonetheless undertake, since itisnot entirely impossible that truth lies hidden in them, and, in any case, nothing contrary to the very nature of religionisto be found in them.Ifhe believed he could find anything of the latter sort in them, he could not in good conscience serve in his position; he would have to resign. Thusanappointed teachers use of his reason for the sake of his congregationismerely private, because, however large the congregation is, this useis always only domestic; in this regard, as a priest, heisnot free and cannot be such because heisacting under instructions from someone else. By contrast, the cleric-as a scholar who speaks through his writings to the public as such, i.e., the world-enjoys in this public use of reasonanunrestricted freedom to use his ownrational capacities and to speak his own mind. Forthat the (spiritual) guardians of a people should themselves be immatureisanabsurdity that would insure the perpetuation of absurdities. But would a society of pastors, perhaps a church assemblyorvenerable presbytery (as those among the Dutch call themselves), not be justified in binding itself by oath to a certain unalterable symbol in order to secure a constant guardianship over each ofits members and through them over the people, and this foralltime:Isay that thisiswholly impossible. Such a contract, whose intentionisto preclude foreverallfurther enlightenment of the human race,isabsolutely null and void, evenifit should be ratified by the supreme power, by parliaments, and by the most solemn peace treaties. One age cannot bind itself, and thus conspire, to place a succeeding one in a condition whereby it would be impossible for the later age to expand its knowledge (particularly where itisso very important), to rid itself of errors,and generally to increase its enlightenment. That would be a crime against human nature, whose essential destiny lies precisely in such progress; subsequent generations are thus completely justified in dismissing such agreements as unauthorized and criminal. The criterion of everything thatcanbe agreed upon as a law by a people lies in this question: Can a people impose such a lawonitself? Now it might be possible, in anticipation of a better state of affairs, to introduce a provisional order for a specific, short time,allthe while givingallcitizens, especially clergy, in their role as scholars, the freedom to comment publicly, i.e., in writing,onthe present institutions shortcomings. The provisional order might last until insight into the nature of these matters had become so widespread and obvious that the combined(ifnot unanimous) voices of the populace could propose to the crown that it take under its protection those congregations that, in accord with their newly gained insight, had organized themselves under altered religious institutions, but without interfering with those wishing to allow matters to remainas before. However, itisabsolutely forbidden that they unite into a religious organization that nobody may for the duration of a mans lifetime publicly question, for so do-ing would deny, render fruitless, and make detrimental to succeeding generationsanera in mans progress toward improvement. A man may put off enlightenment with regard to what he ought to know, though only for a short time and for his own person; but to renounce it for himself,or,even more, for subsequent generations,isto violate and trample mans divine rights underfoot. And what a people may not decree for itself may still less be imposedonit by a monarch, for his lawgiving authority restsonhis unification of the peoples collective will in his own. Ifhe only sees toitthatallgenuineorpurported improvementisconsonant withcivilorder, hecanallow his subjects to do what they find necessary to their spiritual well-being, which isnot his affair. However, he must prevent anyone from forcibly interfering with anothers working as best hecanto determine and promote his well-being.Itdetracts from his own majesty when he interferes inthese matters, since the writings in which his subjects attempt to clarify their insights lend value to his conception of governance. This holds whether he acts from his own highest insight-whereby he calls upon himself the reproach, Caesar non eat supra grammaticos.-as well as, indeed even more, when he despoils his highest authority by supporting the spiritual despotism of some tyrants in his state over his other subjects. Ifitisnow asked, Do we presently live inanenlightened age? the answer is, No, but we do live inanage of enlightenment. As matters now stand, a great dealisstill lacking in order for men as a whole to be,oreven to put themselves into a position to be able without external guidance to apply understanding confidently to religious issues. But we do have clear indications that the wayisnow being opened for men to proceed freely in this direction and that the obstacles to general enlightenment-to their release from their self- imposed immaturity-are gradually diminishing.Inthis regard, this ageisthe age of enlightenment, the century of Frederick. A prince who does not find it beneath him to say that he takes it to be his duty to prescribe nothing, but rather to allow men complete freedom in religious matters-who thereby renounces the arrogant title of tolerance-is himself enlightened and deserves to be praised by a grateful present and by posterity as the first, at least where the governmentis concerned, to release the human race from immaturity and to leave everyone free to use his own reason inallmatters of conscience. Under his rule, venerable pastors, in their role as scholars and without prejudice to their official duties, may freely and openly set out for the worlds scrutiny their judgments and views, even where these occasionally differ from the accepted symbol. Still greater freedomisafforded to those who are not restricted byan official post. This spirit of freedomisexpanding even where it must struggle against the externalobstaclesofgovernmentsthatmisunderstandtheir ownfunction.Such governments are illuminated by the example that the existence of freedom need not give cause for the least concern regarding public order and harmony in the commonwealth.If only they refrain from inventing artifices to keep themselves in it, men will gradually raise themselves from barbarism. Ihave focusedonreligious matters in setting out my main point concerning enlightenment, i.e., mans emergence from self-imposed immaturity, first becauseourrulers have no interest inassuming the role of their subjects guardians with respect to the arts and sciences, and secondly because that form of immaturityisboth the most pernicious and disgraceful of all. But the manner of thinking of a head of state who favors religious enlightenment goes even further, for he realizes that thereisno danger to his legislation in allowing his subjects to use reason publicly and to set before the world their thoughts concerning better formulations of his laws, evenifthis involves frank criticism of legislation currently in effect.Wehave before us a shining example, with respect to which no monarch surpasses the one whom we honor. But only a ruler whoishimself enlightened and has no dread of shadows, yet who likewise has a well-disciplined, numerous army to guarantee public peace,cansay what no republic may dare, namely: Argue as much as you want and about what you want, but obey! Here as elsewhere, when things are considered in broad perspective, a strange, unexpected pattern in human affairs reveals itself, one in which almost everythingisparadoxical. A greater degree ofcivilfreedom seems advantageous to a peoples spiritual freedom; yet the former established impassable boundaries for the latter; conversely, a lesser degree ofcivil freedom provides enough room forallfully to expand their abilities. Thus, once nature has removed the hard shell from this kernel for which she has most fondly cared, namely, the inclination to and vocation for free thinking, the kernel gradually reactsona peoples mentality (whereby they become increasingly able to act freely), and it finally even influences the principles of government, which finds that itcanprofit by treating men, who are now more than machines, in accord with their dignity. I. Kant Konigsberg in Prussia, 30 September 1784 康德康德: :何谓启蒙何谓启蒙( (何兆武译何兆武译) ) “在一切事情上都有公开运用自己理性的自由” 启蒙运动就是人类脱离自己所加之于自己的不成熟状态， 不成熟状态就是不经别 人的引导，就对运用自己的理智无能为力。当其原因不在于缺乏理智,而在于不经别 人的引导就缺乏勇气与决心去加以运用时,那么这种不成熟状态就是自己所加之于自 己的了。Sapere aude! 要有勇气运用你自己的理智！这就是启蒙运动的口号。 懒惰和怯懦乃是何以有如此大量的人,当大自然早己把他们从外界的引导之下释 放出来以后(naturaliter maiorennes）时,却仍然愿意终身处于不成熟状态之中,以 及别人何以那么轻而易举地就俨然以他们的保护人自居的原因所在。 处于不成熟状态 是那么安逸。 如果我有一部书能替我有理解,有一位牧师能替我有良心,有一位医生能 替我规定食谱,等等； 那么我自己就用不着操心了。 只要能对我合算,我就无需去思想: 自有别人会替我去做这类伤脑筋的事。 绝大部分的人(其中包括全部的女性)都把步入成熟状态认为除了是非常之艰辛 而外并且还是非常之危险的； 这一点老早就被每一个一片好心在从事监护他们的保护 人关注到了。保护人首先是使他们的牲口愚蠢,并且小心提防着这些温驯的畜牲不要 竟敢冒险从锁着他们的摇车里面迈出一步;然后就向他们指出他们企图单独行走时会 威胁他们的那种危险。可是这种危险实际上并不那么大,因为他们跌过几交之后就终 于能学会走路的；然而只要有过一次这类事例,就会使人心惊胆战并且往往吓得完全 不敢再去尝试了。 任何一个个人要从几乎已经成为自己天性的那种不成熟状态之中奋斗出来,都是 很艰难的。 他甚至于已经爱好它了,并且确实暂时还不能运用他自己的理智,因为人们 从来都不允许他去做这种尝试。条例和公式这类他那天分的合理运用、或者不如说误 用的机械产物,就是对终古长存的不成熟状态的一副脚梏。 谁要是抛开它,也就不过是 在极狭窄的沟渠上做了一次不可靠的跳跃而己,因为他并不习惯于这类自由的运动。 因此就只有很少数的人才能通过自己精神的奋斗而摆脱不成熟的状态,并且从而迈出 切实的步伐来。 然而公众要启蒙自己,却是很可能的;只要允许他们自由,这还确实几乎是无可 避免的。因为哪怕是在为广大人群所设立的保护者们中间,也总会发见一些有独立思 想的人;他们自己在抛却了不成熟状态的羁绊之后,就会传播合理地估计自己的价值 以及每个人的本分就在于思想其自身的那种精神。这里面特别值得注意的是:公众本 来是被他们套上了这种羁绊的,但当他们的保护者(其本身是不可能有任何启蒙的)中 竟有一些人鼓动他们的时候,此后却强迫保护者们自身也处于其中了;种下偏见是那 么有害,因为他们终于报复了本来是他们的教唆者或者是他们教唆者的先行者的那些 人。因而公众只能是很缓慢地获得启蒙。通过一场革命或许很可以实现推翻个人专制 以及贪婪心和权势欲的压迫,但却绝不能实现思想方式的真正改革;而新的偏见也正 如旧的一样,将会成为驾驭缺少思想的广大人群的圈套。 然而,这一启蒙运动除了自由而外并不需要任何别的东西,而且还确乎是一切 可以称之为自由的东西之中最无害的东西,那就是在一切事情上都有公开运用自己理 性的自由。 可是我却听到从四面八方都发出这样的叫喊:不许争辩！ 军官说:不许争辩, 只许操练!税吏说:不许争辩,只许纳税。神甫说:不许争辩,只许信仰。(举世只有一位 君主说:可以争辩,随便争多少,随便争什么,但是要听话！君主指普鲁士腓德烈大王) 到处都有对自由的限制。 然则,哪些限制是有碍启蒙的,哪些不是,反而是足以促进它的呢?我回答说: 必须永远有公开运用自己理性的自由，并且唯有它才能带来人类的启蒙。私下运用自 己的理性往往会被限制得很狭隘,虽则不致因此而特别妨碍启蒙运动的进步。而我所 理解的对自己理性的公开运用， 则是指任何人作为学者在全部听众面前所能做的那种 运用。一个人在其所受任的一定公职岗位或者职务上所能运用的自己的理性,我就称 之为私下的运用。 就涉及共同体利益的许多事物而言,则我们必须有一定的机器,共同体的一些成 员必须靠它来保持纯粹的消极态度,以便他们由于一种人为的一致性而由政府引向公 共的目的,或者至少也是防止破坏这一目的。 在这上面确实是不容许有争辩的;而是人 们必须服从。但是就该机器的这一部分同时也作为整个共同体的，乃至于作为世界公 民社会的成员而论,从而也就是以一个学者的资格通过写作面向严格意义上的公众时, 则他是绝对可以争辩的,而不致因此就有损于他作为一个消极的成员所从事的那种事 业。 因此,一个服役的军官在接受他的上级交下某项命令肘,竟抗声争辩这项命令的合 目的性或者有用性,那就会非常坏事；他必须服从。但是他作为学者而对军事业务上 的错误进行评论并把它提交给公众来作判断时,就不能公开地加以禁止了。公民不能 拒绝缴纳规定于他的税额；对所加给他的这类赋税惹事生非地擅行责难,甚至可以当 作诽谤(这可能引起普遍的反抗）而加以惩处。然而这同一个人作为一个学者公开发 表自己的见解,抗议这种课税的不适宜与不正当不一样,他的行动并没有违背公民的 义务。同样地,一个牧师也有义务按照他所服务的那个教会的教义向他的教义问答班 上的学生们和他的会众们作报告,因为他是根据这一条件才被批准的。但是作为一个 学者,他却有充分自由、 甚至于有责任,把他经过深思熟虑有关那种教义的缺点的全部 善意的意见以及关于更好地组织宗教团体和教会团体的建议传达给公众。 这里面并没 有任何可以给他的良心增添负担的东西。 因为他把作为一个教会工作者由于自己职务 的关系而讲授的东西,当作是某种他自己并没有自由的权力可以按照自己的心意进行 讲授的东西;他是受命根据别人的指示并以别人的名义选行讲述的。 他将要说:我们的 教会教导这些或那些；这里就是他们所引用的论据。于是,他就从他自己不会以完全 的信服而赞同、 虽则他很可以使自己负责进行宣讲的那些条文中因为并非是完全 不可能其中也隐藏着真理,而且无